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ABSTRACT 
 
JOHN HENRY NEWMAN AND GEORGES FLOROVSKY: 
AN ORTHODOX-CATHOLIC DIALOGUE ON  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE 
 
 
By 
Daniel J. Lattier 
December 2012 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Radu Bordeianu 
 This dissertation examines the idea of doctrinal development in the writings of 
John Henry Newman and Georges Florovsky, who are both representative thinkers in 
their respective Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions.  Newman‘s theory of 
doctrinal development proposes that divine revelation has been given once and for all, but 
that the Church is still growing in its understanding of this revelation.  This growth 
sometimes results in new doctrinal definitions, which require confirmation of their truth 
by an infallible authority.  The essence of Newman‘s theory has been received as 
compatible with Roman Catholic theology, and constitutes a hermeneutical lens through 
which Roman Catholics view the categories of revelation, Tradition, and authority.  On 
the contrary, many leading Orthodox theologians of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries have expressed serious reservations about the idea of doctrinal development, 
v 
 
leading one to wonder if there are some unexamined hermeneutical disagreements 
between Roman Catholics and Orthodox on these categories. 
 In order to respond to these Orthodox reservations, I constructed the dissertation 
as a dialogue between Newman and Florovsky on doctrinal development.  More 
specifically, I arranged the dissertation as a dialogue between Newman and Florovsky on 
their understandings of revelation, Tradition, and authority—categories implied in the 
idea of doctrinal development.  The first goal of the dissertation is to show that 
Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development is in fact compatible with Orthodox 
understandings of revelation and Tradition.  The understanding of authority in Newman‘s 
theory does not currently share this compatibility, but dialogue does offer the opportunity 
for mutual enrichment of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s thought on this category.  A second 
goal is to expose Newman‘s theory to Orthodox categories of thought in the hopes of 
further developing Newman‘s theory itself.  One of the principal developments that 
results from this exposure is the clarification that Newman‘s theory is a function of the 
incarnational character of his theology.  Showing that the affirmation of doctrinal 
development follows from an incarnational, or Christocentric, theology represents the 
third and final goal of this dissertation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 In the title of his important 2003 lecture, Orthodox scholar Andrew Louth asks the 
question: ―Is Development of Doctrine a Valid Category for Orthodox Theology?‖  Louth 
particularly singles out John Henry Newman‘s theory of the development of doctrine, 
which posited that the Church grows in its understanding of divine revelation over the 
course of time.  Louth rightly recognizes that there has not been a great deal of explicit 
Orthodox reflection on doctrinal development, and that he is thus ―venturing on to virgin 
territory as an Orthodox theologian choosing to discuss this topic.‖  He eventually 
answers the question posed in his title in the negative, concluding that ―the idea of 
development is not an acceptable category in Orthodox theology.‖1  
 Other modern Orthodox authors have also rejected the idea of doctrinal 
development, leading one to wonder whether there is an Orthodox consensus against this 
category.  In his essay ―Tradition and Traditions,‖ Vladimir Lossky cautions those who 
would ―dare to speak, against all the evidence, of a collective progress in the knowledge 
of the Christian mystery, a progress which would be due to a ‗dogmatic development.‘‖2  
John Behr writes that ―From an Orthodox perspective there is therefore no such thing as 
dogmatic development.‖3  In one of the only Roman Catholic treatments of Orthodoxy 
and doctrinal development, Aidan Nichols writes, ―A majority, it may be, of Orthodox 
writers register serious reservations about what they take to be the Catholic theory of 
                                               
1 Andrew Louth, ―Is Development of Doctrine a Valid Category for Orthodox Theology?‖ in Orthodoxy 
and Western Culture: A Collection of Essays Honoring Jaroslav Pelikan on His Eightieth Birthday, ed. 
Valerie Hotchkiss and Patrick Henry (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 2005), 45-63. 
2 Vladimir Lossky, ―Tradition and Traditions,‖ in In the Image and Likeness of God, ed. John Erickson and 
Thomas Bird (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1974), 162.  
3 John Behr, ―Scripture, the Gospel, and Orthodoxy,‖ St. Vladimir‘s Theological Quarterly 43 (1999): 248. 
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doctrinal development.‖4  These writers typically direct their objections at the 
understanding of revelation and Tradition they believe is implied in the idea of doctrinal 
development.  
 The above-named Orthodox authors who reject doctrinal development either 
belong to, or are the heirs of, what has been dubbed the ―Neo-patristic‖ school of thought.  
This designation originated in Georges Florovsky‘s repeated call for Orthodox theology 
to undertake a ―Neo-patristic synthesis.‖  The precise meaning of this call continues to be 
debated, but it is generally understood as a call for a renewed return to, and appropriation 
of, the Fathers of the Church.  ―Neo-patristic‖ was first applied as a moniker for a 
particular school of Orthodox thought by Alexander Schmemann, who differentiated it 
from the ―Russian‖ school represented by such thinkers as Sergei Bulgakov, Vladimir 
Soloviev, Pavel Florensky, and Nicholas Berdyaev, among others.
5
  It is the Neo-patristic 
school that gained ascendancy in Orthodox thought in the twentieth century, a fact that 
has led many contemporary authors to call for a re-reception of the Russian school.
6
 
 Paul Valliere (who is Episcopalian) is among those voices calling for such a re-
reception.  In Modern Russian Theology—Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox 
Theology in a New Key, Valliere argues that the differing attitudes toward doctrinal 
development constitutes a major distinguishing characteristic of the Neo-patristic and 
Russian schools of thought.  He portrays the Russian school as standing for a creative and 
                                               
4 Aidan Nichols, O.P., From Newman to Congar: The Idea of Doctrinal Development from the Victorians 
to the Second Vatican Council (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 282. 
5 Alexander Schmemann, ―Russian Theology: 1920-1972, An Introductory Survey,‖ St. Vladimir‘s 
Theological Quarterly 16 (1972): 178; ―Role of Honour,‖ SVTQ 2 (1954): 6. 
6 See, for instance, Pantelis Kalaitzidis, ―From the ‗Return to the Fathers‘ to the Need for a Modern 
Orthodox Theology,‖ SVTQ 54:1 (2010): 5-36; Brandon Gallaher, ―‗Waiting for the Barbarians‘: Identity 
and Polemicism in the Neo-Patristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky,‖ Modern Theology 27:4 (October 
2011): 659-691; Aristotle Papanikolaou, ―Orthodoxy, Post-Modernism, and Ecumenism: The Difference 
that Divine-Human Communion Makes,‖ Journal of Ecumenical Studies 42:4 (Fall 2007): 527-46.  
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living understanding of tradition that allows for dogmatic development.  Soloviev‘s essay 
―Dogmaticheskoe razvitie tserkvi v sviazi s voprosom o soedinenii tserkvei‖ (―The 
Development of Dogma in the Church in Connection with the Question of Church 
Union‖) represents the Russian school‘s lengthiest advocacy of the idea of doctrinal 
development.
7
  Bulgakov, in his seminal essay ―Dogmat i dogmatika‖ (―Dogma and 
Dogmatic Theology‖), also supports development as the task of theology.8  Valliere 
accuses the Neo-patristic school of thought, on the other hand, of operating with a 
―hegemonic concept of tradition [that] entails as its corollary the rejection of the 
historical development of dogma except in the formal sense.‖9  
 One of my goals in this dissertation is to argue against the notion that there exists 
a Neo-patristic, or Orthodox, consensus against doctrinal development.  As Louth 
intimated, Orthodox reflection on this issue has been scant, and a more thorough 
engagement with doctrinal development seems a prerequisite of determining whether or 
not there exists an Orthodox consensus for or against development.  Moreover, influential 
Neo-patristic theologians of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have endorsed some 
form of the idea of doctrinal development.  This list includes Dumitru Staniloae, John 
Meyendorff, Thomas Hopko, and none other than the primogenitor of the so-called Neo-
patristic school, Georges Florovsky. 
 More importantly, I believe that the idea of doctrinal development accords with 
the Orthodox understanding of revelation and Tradition.  Without question, the theory of 
                                               
7 In Sobranie sochinenii Vladimira Sergeevicha Solov‘eva, supplementary vol. 2 (Brussels: Izdatel‘stvo 
Zhinzn‘s Bogom, Foyer Oriental Chrétien, 1969), 1-67. 
8 In Zhivoe predanie: pravoslavie v sovremennosti (Paris: YMCA Press, 1937).  Peter Bouteneff has 
translated this essay into English in Tradition Alive: On the Church and the Christian Life in Our Time—
Readings from the Eastern Church, ed. Michael Plekon (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 67–
80.  
9 Paul Valliere, Modern Russian Theology—Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox Theology 
in a New Key (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 373-403.  The quotation is taken from 377.  
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doctrinal development that has had the most influence upon modern thought is that of 
John Henry Newman.  He most famously formulated it in his 1845 Essay on the 
Development of Christian Doctrine—which Yves Congar judged as ―the locus classicus 
for the question [of doctrinal development]‖10—though one can find the principles of this 
theory in his earlier works, and refined in later works.  Since the second half of the 
twentieth-century, Newman‘s theory has become the received understanding of doctrinal 
development in Roman Catholic theology.  Bishop Basil Christopher Butler even made 
the claim that section 8 of Vatican II‘s Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation—Dei 
Verbum—―is practically a précis of Newman‘s theory of the development of doctrine.‖11 
 The starting point of Newman‘s theory is that revelation is similar to other ―ideas‖ 
that develop, or attain greater complexity, in the minds of men and women over the 
course of time.  In his own words,  
 the increase and expansion of the Christian Creed and Ritual, and the variations 
 which have attended the process in the case of individual writers and Churches, 
 are the necessary attendants on any philosophy or polity which takes possession 
 of the intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion; that, from 
 the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and 
 perfection of great ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though 
 communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, could not be 
 comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as being received and transmitted 
 by minds not inspired and through media which were human, have required only 
 the longer time and deeper thought for their full elucidation.
12
  
 
                                               
10 Yves Congar, Tradition and Traditions: An Historical and a Theological Essay, trans. Michael Naseby 
and Thomas Rainborough (London: Burns & Oates, 1966), 211.  Jaroslav Pelikan and Avery Dulles, among 
others, have expressed similar sentiments.  Pelikan judges that ―Newman‘s Essay [is] the almost inevitable 
starting point for an investigation of development of doctrine‖ (Development of Christian Doctrine: Some 
Historical Prolegomena [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press], 1969, 3).  And Avery Dulles writes, 
―Although much has been written on the subject since Newman‘s time, it would be difficult to name any 
rival treatise that measures up to his in depth and thoroughness‖ (John Henry Newman [London: 
Continuum, 2002], 79). 
11 Basil Christopher Butler, The Theology of Vatican II (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967), 40. 
12 Dev., 29-30.   
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Newman‘s description of the theory of development contains the following principles 
pertaining to revelation and Tradition: divine revelation has been given once and for all; 
it has been communicated through human media; the understanding of revelation grows, 
or develops, in human minds as time passes; and this development does not imply a 
substantial addition to revelation itself.  These principles, I contend, constitute the 
essence of Newman‘s theory. 
 In order to both respond to the supposed Orthodox rejection of doctrinal 
development and provide a fuller Orthodox engagement with doctrinal development, I 
have constructed this dissertation as a dialogue between Newman and Florovsky.  
Florovsky is a representative thinker in modern Orthodox thought, especially on the 
subjects of revelation and Tradition that are central to the concept of development.  The 
philosopher Nicholas Lossky deemed Florovsky ―the most Orthodox of modern Russian 
theologians: he is anxious strictly to adhere to the Holy Writ and patristic tradition.‖13  
His son, Vladimir Lossky, similarly regarded Florovsky as ―le plus grand [théologien 
orthodoxe] peut etre de cet époque.‖14  And Rowan Williams has referred to Florovsky as 
―the most lucid and systematic‖ of the Russian émigré theologians.15  I will attempt to 
show numerous points of agreement between Newman and Florovsky on the concept of 
doctrinal development.  Because of their eminent place within their respective 
traditions—Newman in the Roman Catholic tradition, and Florovsky in the Orthodox—a 
                                               
13 Nicholas Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy (New York: International University Press, 1972), 391-
392. 
14 Transcripts of Lectures of Lossky, 13/12/56, p.10; cited in Rowan Williams, The Theology of Vladimir 
Nikolaievich Lossky, D. Phil. Thesis, University Of Oxford, 1975, 281.   
15 Rowan Williams, ―Eastern Orthodox Theology,‖ in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to 
Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2, ed. David F. Ford (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 
166. 
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dialogue between these two thinkers on the subject of doctrinal development has 
ecumenical significance. 
 Not only is Florovsky a representative Orthodox thinker, but his position on 
doctrinal development is also particularly interesting among modern Orthodox authors.  
In many essays, Florovsky registered rejections of development for what he believed it 
implied about revelation and the theology of history.  Yet, in his famous 1937 work Ways 
of Russian Theology, one finds Florovsky defending Soloviev‘s understanding of 
development as ―a method for dogmatic theology,‖ though this sentiment did not negate 
his other reservations.
16
  Moreover, contrary to Lewis Shaw‘s contention that ―Florovsky 
refused to grant Newman‘s idea of the development of doctrine,‖ Florovsky appeared to 
endorse it in print in a German encyclopedia article on ―Tradition‖ in 1960.17  It seems, 
then, that Florovsky himself engaged in an ecumenical dialogue about doctrinal 
development in his writings.  I will explain how Florovsky could both reject and affirm 
the idea of doctrinal development during the course of this dissertation.   
 The fundamental agreement I posit between Newman and Florovsky on doctrinal 
development perhaps stops short on the issue of authority.  In his Essay on Development, 
Newman maintained that ―an infallible developing authority [is] to be expected‖ who 
could distinguish, with certainty, between true developments and false accretions.
18
  
Louth seems to be unique among Orthodox authors in including this aspect of Newman‘s 
theory in his rejection of doctrinal development.
19
  As will become clear, Newman and 
                                               
16 V6, 159.   
17 Florovsky, ―Tradition,‖ in Welkirchenlexicon, ed. F.H. Littell and Hans H. Walz (Stuttgart: Kreuz-
Verlag, 1960), cols. 1469-1475.  I would like to thank Matthew Baker for allowing me to consult his 
English translation of this article. 
18 Dev., 75-92. 
19 Louth, ―Is Development of Doctrine a Valid Category?‖ 51-52. 
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Florovsky do indeed disagree on the particular doctrinal role of authority.  Nevertheless, 
putting Newman and Florovsky in dialogue on the question of authority in relation to 
doctrinal development has the potential to bear ecumenical fruit, for it brings to light 
some aspects of this ―Church-dividing‖ issue of authority that are infrequently discussed.   
 The rejection of doctrinal development by many Orthodox authors provides the 
catalyst for a second goal of this dissertation, namely, the development of Newman‘s 
theory of development.  Newman held that an idea develops through exposure to other 
ideas, which draw out ―the aspects of an idea… [bringing] them into consistency and 
form.‖20  Newman‘s theology was marked by the influence of the Eastern Fathers of the 
Church, and even upon his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church, his theology 
retained many Eastern characteristics throughout his life.  By putting Newman‘s theory 
of development in dialogue with Florovsky and Eastern categories of thought, I hope to 
elucidate its Eastern character.  Furthermore, exposing Newman‘s theory to Eastern 
Orthodox theology will help bring greater clarity to its underlying theological principles, 
will shed light on some of the questions that still surround it, and will provide fodder for 
critiquing some of its lacunae. 
 Many similarities between Newman and Florovsky will emerge as this 
dissertation progresses.  Monsignor Michel D‘Herbigny made the claim in the title of his 
1918 work that Soloviev was ―a Russian Newman.‖21  However, Florovsky is a much 
closer parallel to Newman than Soloviev.  Florovsky, like Newman, was a much more 
ecclesial thinker, and also like Newman, has been received as such by his communion.  
Scripture and the Tradition as primarily communicated through the Fathers of the 
                                               
20 Dev., 38.  
21 Michel D‘Herbigny, Vladimir Soloviev: A Russian Newman, trans. A.M. Buchanan (London: R&T 
Washbourne, 1918). 
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Church—both East and West—were the shared starting points, objects, and bounds of 
their theologies.  And as a Roman Catholic reviewer of Ways of Russian Theology noted, 
there is an obvious analogy between the re-appropriation of the Fathers called for by 
Newman‘s Oxford Movement and Florovsky‘s ―Neo-patristic synthesis.‖22   
 Their common rootedness in the ecumenical patristic witness is undoubtedly the 
principal source of their shared theological emphases.  Newman would not have been 
privy to the Russian theological inheritance, or, the ―ways of Russian theology,‖ that had 
formed the hermeneutic of Florovsky.  He was also not well versed in Orthodox thought 
contemporary to him.  His reflections on the ―Greek Church‖ are confined to his 
introduction to William Palmer‘s Notes of a Visit to the Russian Church and a few 
scattered references throughout his writings and letters and diaries.
23
   
 Florovsky, on the other hand, operated with an almost unparalleled ecumenical 
knowledge base that included familiarity with the writings of Newman.  The exact 
influence of Newman on Florovsky is worthy of further examination than this dissertation 
can undertake.  George Williams has remarked on Florovsky‘s ―appreciation of English 
belles lettres,‖ which included ―a special interest in Walter Scott… certain Victorian 
novelists… [and] the Caroline Divines.‖24  Florovsky appears to also have had an interest 
in Newman, whom James Joyce referred to as the ―greatest‖ prose stylist of the Victorian 
age.  Between 1929 and 1939, Florovsky‘s involvement with the Anglican-Orthodox 
Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius frequently took him to England, where he 
                                               
22 Stanislas Tyszkiewicz, S.J., review of Puti Russkogo Bogosloviia, by Georges Florovsky, Orientalia 
Christiana Periodica 4 (1938): 288-291, at 290-291.  
23 William Palmer, Notes of a Visit to the Russian Church, ed. John Henry Cardinal Newman (London: 
Kegan Paul & Co., 1882), v-xvii.  For Newman‘s references to Eastern Orthodoxy, see Ian Ker, Newman 
and the Fullness of Christianity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 100-102. 
24 George Williams, ―Georges Vasilievich Florovsky: His American Career (1948-1965),‖ Greek Orthodox 
Theological Review 11:1 (Summer 1965): 12.   
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perhaps further cultivated his knowledge of Newman.
25
  I have only found positive 
references to ―the great Newman,‖ as Florovsky calls him, in the latter‘s writings.26 
 The common patristic inheritance marked Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s writings 
with their most significant shared emphasis, namely, the incarnational, or Christocentric, 
character of their theologies.  Recognition of this emphasis leads to the third goal of this 
dissertation: to show that affirmation of the idea of doctrinal development flows from 
such an incarnational theology.  ―The main theme of Patristic theology was always the 
Mystery of Christ‘s Person… this Christological concern permeated the whole 
theological thinking of the Ancient Church,‖ writes Florovsky.27  Certain traits and 
themes emerged from the patristic reflection on Christ as codified in the judgments of the 
first seven ecumenical councils.  These traits and themes were thought to be affirmed by 
the Incarnation, and thus, were thought to belong to the character of Christianity.  They 
included the idea that God‘s assumption of human flesh affirmed both divine and human 
personhood, that freedom and action flow from personhood, that history is the growth of 
the Body of Christ and is thus real and meaningful, and that reason and life contribute to 
this growth.   
 These traits also mark the theologies of Newman and Florovsky, who both affirm 
doctrinal development.  I will attempt to show that the idea of doctrinal development also 
bears these marks of the Incarnation: it affirms that God‘s personal and free revelation of 
Himself calls for the free response of human persons in word and deed; that His 
revelation was a series of historical events in particular times and places, recounted using 
                                               
25 Andrew Blane, ed., Georges Florovsky: Russian Intellectual and Orthodox Churchman (Crestwood, NY: 
SVS Press, 1997), 69. 
26 V13, 157.   
27 V4, 24.   
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particular language and concepts, and that human history constitutes a witness to these 
events using men‘s and women‘s own particularity, historicity, and conceptual 
framework; that God‘s salvific activity was aimed at the progressive deification of men 
and women in the Church; and that reflection on this activity contributes to this 
deification, and is a testament to the growth of the Church.  
 
STATE OF RESEARCH 
 
 This dissertation represents one of the few lengthy works concentrating 
specifically on Newman‘s theory of development in recent years.  Research on Newman 
and his theory of doctrinal development flourished in the period between 1950-1980, 
when Newman began to receive a more favorable reception among Christians, and 
especially among Roman Catholics.  The best systematic treatments of Newman‘s 
understanding of doctrinal development remain Owen Chadwick‘s From Bossuet to 
Newman: The Idea of Doctrinal Development (1957), Jan Walgrave‘s Newman the 
Theologian (1960), and Nicholas Lash‘s Newman on Development: The Search for an 
Explanation in History (1975).  Terrence Merrigan‘s Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The 
Religious and Theological Ideal of John Henry Newman (1992) does not focus 
specifically on Newman‘s theory of development, but is noteworthy as the best 
systematic exposition of Newman‘s thought in the past twenty years.   
 This dissertation also represents the lengthiest correlation of Newman‘s theory of 
doctrinal development with Orthodox categories of thought.  Louth‘s essay directly 
engages aspects of Newman‘s understanding of development, but Louth does not develop 
the Orthodox challenges to Newman at any great length.  Dumitru Staniloae‘s very 
interesting essay published in Sobornost in 1969—―The Orthodox Conception of 
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Tradition and the Development of Doctrine‖—brings to light some distinctive 
contributions Orthodox theology could potentially make to the understanding of doctrinal 
development, but Staniloae does not specifically reference Newman in the essay.  
Jaroslav Pelikan has written of doctrinal development, and even specifically critiqued 
Newman‘s theory in his Development of Christian Doctrine: Some Historical 
Prolegomena.  But Pelikan wrote this work as a Lutheran, and thus, did not make a 
conscious effort to employ Orthodox categories of thought in his critique.   
 In spite of Florovsky‘s influence on Orthodox thought in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, not many direct treatments of his thought exist—a phenomenon 
that is beginning to be rectified.  The best comprehensive works on Florovsky‘s thought 
are Lewis Shaw‘s unpublished dissertation An Introduction to the Study of Georges 
Florovsky, Christoph Künkel‘s Totus Christus: Die Theologie Georges V. Florovskys, 
George Williams‘ lengthy article ―Georges Vasilievich Florovsky: His American Career 
(1948-1965),‖ and Matthew Baker‘s recent Masters‘ thesis, ―Neo-Patristic Synthesis‖: 
An Examination of a Key Hermeneutical Paradigm in the Thought of Georges V. 
Florovsky.  This dissertation represents the first lengthy Roman Catholic treatment of 
Florovsky on the questions of revelation and Tradition that permeated his oeuvre, and the 
only lengthy Roman Catholic treatment of Florovsky in the English language.  The 
lengthiest Catholic works on Florovsky—both on his ecclesiology—are Yves-Noël 
Lelouvier‘s 1968 Perspectives russes sur l'Église. Un theologien contemporain: Georges 
Florovsky, and Miguel de Salis Amaral‘s more recent Dos Visiones Ortodoxas de la 
Iglesia: Bulgakov y Florovsky (2003).  Other recent dissertations on Florovsky include 
Andrew Parlee‘s The Epistemology of George V. Florovsky (2006), which argues from a 
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Calvinist perspective that Florovsky‘s epistemology reduces to fideism, and Sergei 
Nikolaev‘s 2008 Church and Reunion in the Theology of Sergii Bulgakov and Georges 
Florovsky, 1918-1940, which examines Bulgakov‘s and Florovsky‘s divergent views of 
ecumenism from a liberal Protestant perspective. 
      
LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 
 The dialogical nature of this dissertation necessitates the imposition of some 
constraints upon the scope of treatment of each author.  I do not engage in any extensive 
dialogue between each author‘s understanding of development and his respective 
ecclesial tradition.  Thus, I do not devote a great deal of space to comparing and 
contrasting Newman‘s theory of development with theories of development proposed by 
other Catholic and Protestant authors.  I also do not devote a great deal of space to putting 
Florovsky in dialogue with other contemporary Orthodox authors.  Where I do mention 
other Orthodox authors, it is in order to more fully elucidate Florovsky‘s understanding 
of development and his consonance with Newman.  In a future work, I hope to provide a 
general overview of the Orthodox response to doctrinal development in the modern era.   
 In general, my treatment of Newman and Florovsky is more synthetic than 
chronological.  The main concern of my dissertation is to highlight the abiding themes—
or ―first principles,‖ as Newman refers to them—in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s 
understandings of doctrinal development, rather than the changing application of them.  
Nevertheless, when my work of synthesis necessitates it, I will point out shifts that 
occurred in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s positions on revelation, Tradition, or authority.  
Florovsky is a polarizing figure in Orthodox theology today, and I will attempt to nuance 
his thought in order to avoid some of the hasty generalizations about him that are in part 
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the result of bracketing certain statements and isolating them from his entire written 
corpus.  Nevertheless, there is a great need for more detailed chronological work on 
Florovsky than I will be able to undertake here.  
 A more thorough treatment of the development of Florovsky‘s thought would 
consult a broader array of texts than I will here consider.  My dissertation will engage 
writings that are rarely taken into account in evaluations of Florovsky.  Nevertheless, I do 
not have facility with German, and thus, I will not be able to engage with Künkel‘s book.  
Because I do not have facility with Russian, I will not be able to consult some of 
Florovsky‘s essays from his Eurasian period of the 1920s, nor some of the letters that are 
currently being reprinted in Russia.  I will also not be able to plumb the depths of 
Florovsky‘s unpublished papers and correspondence housed at the Princeton Library for 
this dissertation, though I hope to do so for the purposes of future works.   
 My engagement with Florovsky will principally rely on his writings contained in 
the fourteen-volume English Collected Works.  This reliance is somewhat justified given 
the synthetic concerns of my work.  Plus, as Shaw points out, ―after 1935 Florovsky took 
up English as his academic vehicle of expression,‖ and ―wished the translations of his 
works… to supersede the Russian originals.‖28  Nevertheless, there are numerous 
difficulties with the Collected Works that should be kept in mind, including the fact that 
they are organized thematically rather than chronologically.  More troubling is that the 
editor (Richard Haugh) performed surgery on some of Florovsky‘s essays—some were 
re-titled, broken up, and even re-attached to other works.
29
  There is a great need for a 
                                               
28 Lewis Shaw, ―An Introduction to the Study of Georges Florovsky‖ (D.Phil. Thesis, Cambridge, 1992), 8.   
29 Blane recounts that Florovsky began to oppose the misleading changes in the Collected Works by volume 
3, and even hired a lawyer to mediate between him and Nordland Press.  However, Florovsky‘s opposition 
was cut short by his death in 1979 (Blane, 150, 209n28).  Later volumes (beginning with Volume 6) were 
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new edition of Florovsky‘s collected works, or better, a true complete works.  Until that 
time, it is best to refer to Florovsky‘s original, though sometimes less accessible, 
publications. 
 
CHAPTERS 
 
Chapter One: Newman and Florovsky on the Mode and Character of Revelation 
 In Chapter One I expound upon Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understanding of the 
concept of revelation, which is foundational for their understandings of doctrinal 
development.  How doctrine develops, I argue, depends upon the way in which God 
communicates this doctrine, or, revelation.  Newman and Florovsky describe revelation 
using their own idiosyncratic language: Newman has recourse to the British empiricist 
terms of ―idea‖ and ―impression‖; Florovsky refers to revelation as ―event‖ and 
―experience.‖  Nevertheless, both authors‘ understandings of revelation are marked by a 
Christocentric character inasmuch as they portray the Incarnation as the central and 
determining historical event in a series of divine, personal, and free events—aimed at 
men‘s and women‘s deification—in which God calls for an active human reception and 
response in thought and deed.  These characteristics they ascribe to the event of 
revelation will also mark the character of the Church‘s response to this revelation, i.e., the 
Church‘s development of doctrine.  I will also seek to dispel the charge that Newman‘s 
understanding of development promotes the idea of new revelation.  In addition, I will 
discuss the implications of Newman and Florovsky‘s shared contention that the entirety 
of revelation dwells in the ―mind of the Church.‖ 
 
                                                                                                                                            
published by Büchervertriebsanstalt after Nordland went bankrupt.  An intended volume of Florovsky‘s 
sermons and homiletical writings was never published. 
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Chapter Two: Newman and Florovsky on Tradition and Doctrinal Development 
 Chapter Two deals more directly with the idea of doctrinal development, which is 
often considered synonymous with the concept of Tradition.  I will show that Newman 
and Florovsky both view the history of the Church as one of doctrinal development in 
which the members of the Church actively respond to revelation through their reason and 
life.  The Christological character of Tradition is more explicit in Florovsky, who 
portrays the witness of reason and life to revelation (i.e., doctrinal development) as 
contributing to the growth of the Body of Christ in history.  My treatment of Newman 
and Florovsky on Tradition will raise some of the more interesting and debated questions 
surrounding doctrinal development, such as the following: the ability of human language 
to convey the mystery of revelation, the appropriateness of using the organic metaphor to 
describe the life of the Church, and whether or not doctrinal development corresponds to 
the growth of the Church in holiness.  In the Dialogue section of this chapter, I will 
compare and contrast Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s answers to these questions.  In 
addition, I will attempt to reconcile Florovsky‘s apparently contradictory views on 
doctrinal development.  
 
Chapter Three: Newman and Florovsky on Doctrinal Development and Authority 
 In this final chapter, I will explain Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s positions on the 
role of Church authority in the process of doctrinal development.  Newman believed that 
recognition of doctrinal development in the Church‘s history necessitated the recognition 
of an infallible authority who could definitively distinguish true developments from false.  
He maintained that this authority—vested in the Magisterium whose head is the pope, 
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and deriving from the presence and guidance of the Spirit in the Church—served as an 
aid to the certitude of the members of the Church, who are not capable of achieving this 
certitude about the truth of every doctrinal formula on their own.  Newman‘s descriptions 
of authority are permeated by his incarnational emphasis.  Florovsky, on the other hand, 
did not ascribe as clear a role to formal authority in doctrinal development.  He 
acknowledges that the bishops rightfully give voice to the mind of the Church, but he 
does not believe that this act of voicing the Church‘s teaching serves as a formal 
guarantee of its truth.  Yet, Florovsky also frames his understanding of authority within 
his Christological hermeneutic.  In the Dialogue section, I will examine whether or not 
one can judge Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understandings of authority on their 
Christological merits, and will also highlight the interesting ecumenical questions raised 
by a consideration of authority‘s role in doctrinal development.      
 
Conclusion 
 In the Conclusion, I will offer a brief overview of each chapter and describe how 
it contributed to addressing the three goals of this dissertation that I outlined in the 
Introduction.  I will also briefly discuss the potential intra-Orthodox and ecumenical 
implications of my study.     
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CHAPTER ONE: NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON THE  
MODE AND CHARACTER OF REVELATION 
 
The category of divine revelation is fundamental to the concept of the 
development of doctrine.  Other authors have recognized this point.  Henri de Lubac, in 
his groundbreaking 1948 essay ―The Problem of the Development of Dogma,‖ states that 
having an accurate idea of the ―fact of revelation‖ constitutes the ―core of the problem‖ 
of doctrinal development.
30
  Herbert Hammans, in a 1967 essay on doctrinal 
development, similarly writes, ―Any theory about the development of dogma rests 
essentially on the idea of revelation.‖31  It is unsurprising, then, to find that Newman‘s 
theory of doctrinal development follows from particular claims he made about divine 
revelation.  More specifically, I believe that Newman‘s understanding of doctrinal 
development follows from his understanding of the mode in which God reveals Himself, 
and the character of this revelation.   
In this dissertation, I am arguing that Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development 
is congruent with Florovsky‘s theology.  In order to successfully argue this thesis, I need 
to first establish that Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation is congruent with that 
operative in Newman‘s theory of development.  As I will show, both Newman and 
Florovsky portray revelation as consisting of God‘s personal, and thus free, acts in 
history for the purpose of men‘s and women‘s deification.  I will also show that both 
Newman and Florovsky perceive a need for an active human response to divine 
revelation.  What is more, they believe this activity follows from the activity evident in 
                                               
30 Henri de Lubac, ―The Problem of the Development of Dogma,‖ in Theology in History, trans. Anne 
Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 271.  
31 Herbert Hammans, ―Recent Catholic Views on the Development of Dogma,‖ Concilium 1:3 (1967): 54; 
see also Nicholas Lash, Change in Focus: A Study of Doctrinal Change and Continuity (London: Sheed & 
Ward, 1973), 10-18.   
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God‘s revelation of Himself.  They therefore understand this activity to consist of men‘s 
and women‘s free and personal response to revelation in history through their life and 
thought, or, their faith and reason.  As I will show, Newman and Florovsky understand 
this activity to mark even the human person‘s, and the Church‘s, initial reception of 
revelation.  As I will argue in Chapter Two, doctrinal development constitutes the 
continuation of this active response.     
Along with these similarities, certain differences will emerge in Newman‘s and 
Florovsky‘s respective understandings of revelation.  However, I will argue in the 
Dialogue section of Chapter One that none of these differences constitutes a fundamental 
disagreement about the mode and character of revelation, and thus, they do not mitigate 
my attempt to argue for the consonance between Newman‘s theory of doctrinal 
development and Florovsky‘s theology.  Rather, I believe that Florovsky‘s understanding 
of revelation provides opportunities for the development of the understanding of 
revelation operative in Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development.   
 
1.1: NEWMAN ON THE MODE AND CHARACTER OF REVELATION 
By the term ―mode of revelation,‖ I refer to the manner in which God 
communicates Himself to humanity.  In writing of Newman‘s understanding of the mode 
of revelation, I begin with a necessary caveat, namely, that Newman was clear that the 
way in which God communicates Himself to human beings is forever shrouded in 
mystery in this life.  He understood that the language he used to write about the mode of 
revelation was merely analogical.  In the face of a mystery such as God‘s communication 
of himself to human beings, Newman knew that reasonings ultimately fall short: ―not 
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even the Catholic reasonings and conclusions…are worthy of the Divine Verities which 
they represent, but are the truth only in as full a measure as our minds can admit it; the 
truth as far as they go, and under the conditions of thought which human feebleness 
imposes.‖32  Yet reason we must, as Newman recognized, and some of our reasonings are 
nearer approximations to the truth than others.
33
  
As others have noted, Newman‘s understanding of the mode of revelation has its 
roots in the empiricist schema of ―object—impression—idea.‖34  Applied to knowledge 
derived from sense perception in general, this schema means that when the senses 
perceive an object that is external to them, that object makes an impression on them that 
is coterminously the source of ideas, or reflections, on the part of the beholder.  Applied 
to revelation, James Cameron explains the schema of object-impression-idea as follows: 
Revelation, then, is of an object that is given, known in us by an impression which 
 is self-authenticating in the way the impressions of normal sense perception 
 authenticate the reality of the objects to which they correspond.  Such impressions 
 prompt us to analyse and describe their objects, and the validity of such analysis 
 and description rests upon the authenticity of the original perception.
35
   
 
I understand Cameron‘s interpretation of Newman‘s application of the schema to 
revelation as follows: 1) God is the object of revelation; 2) the impression is both the 
action of God in communicating Himself, and the initial reception of that communication 
                                               
32 U.S., 350.  
33 U.S., 340, 350; G.A., 113. 
34 J.M. Cameron, introduction to An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine: The Edition of 1845, 
by John Henry Newman, ed. J.M. Cameron (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1974), 40; quoted in Terrence 
Merrigan, Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The Religious and Theological Ideal of John Henry Newman, 
Louvain Theological & Pastoral Monographs, no. 7 (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1992), 82.  Several scholars 
have attempted to compare Newman‘s empiricist vocabulary with that of Hume and Locke.  While 
Newman was certainly indebted to Hume and Locke, his use of the empiricist vocabulary is also very much 
his own, and thus, these comparisons are not extremely illuminating.    
35 James M. Cameron, ―Newman and the Empiricist Tradition,‖ in The Rediscovery of Newman: An Oxford 
Symposium, ed. J. Coulson and A.M. Allchin (London: Sheed & Ward, 1967), 81-82.   See also J.M. 
Cameron, ―The Night Battle: Newman and Empiricism,‖ Victorian Studies 4:2 (Dec. 1960): 99-117.   
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by human beings; and 3) the idea is the human reflection on the object as mediated by the 
impression.   
In the following paragraphs, I will examine Newman‘s designation of revelation 
as ―object‖ and ―impression‖ in order to elucidate what Newman is trying to 
communicate about the mode and character of revelation.  I will leave the discussion of 
revelation as ―idea‖ to the second chapter.  It has been frequently noted that Newman was 
not stringently consistent with his religious vocabulary.  An example of this 
inconsistency is his sometimes interchangeable use of the terms ―impression‖ and 
―idea.‖36  It is also true that Newman believed the impression made by an object on the 
human mind simultaneously becomes a source of reflection, or, an idea.  However, I will 
argue in Chapter Two that, more often than not, Newman‘s use of the term ―idea‖ seems 
to correspond to the human response to, or reception of, revelation in thought and word.  
In others words, Newman‘s ―idea‖ seems to correspond to the traditioning of revelation, 
or, to doctrinal development.  ―Impression,‖ on the other hand, seems to specially pertain 
to the initial revelatory moment. 
 
 
A. GOD AS THE “OBJECT” OF REVELATION 
 
 I include within Newman‘s understanding of God as ―object‖ three emphases of 
Newman‘s theology of revelation: 1) revelation‘s origin is external to human beings; 2) 
                                               
36 Cf. Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman: The Idea of Doctrinal Development (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1957), 149: ―Newman‘s inconsistent usages of the word idea have caused 
hours of work to his commentators‖; Merrigan, Clear Heads and Holy Hearts, 65.  Avery Dulles attempts 
to describe Newman‘s inconsistent vocabulary in a more positive tone: ―... Newman is using the term ‗idea‘ 
in a rich but fluid sense, somewhat personal to himself‖ (―From Images to Truth: Newman on Revelation 
and Faith,‖ Theological Studies 51 [1990]: 253). 
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the object of revelation is one; and 3) this object is not an abstraction, but a concrete 
person. 
 Newman‘s designation of God as the object of revelation conveys the simple truth 
that revelation is an existential given that originates outside of its (human) recipients.  
―By objective truth,‖ writes Newman, ―is meant the Religious System considered as 
existing in itself, external to this or that particular mind.‖37  Newman considers divine 
revelation in particular to consist in the objective ―manifestation of the Invisible Divine 
Power…‖38  In his first lengthy treatment of doctrinal development—his fifteenth Oxford 
University Sermon entitled ―The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine‖ 
(1843)—Newman maintains that religious objects are analogous to the objects perceived 
by the senses, whose corresponding reflections generated in the human mind ―[force] on 
us a persuasion of their reality from the spontaneous congruity and coincidence of these 
accompaniments, as if they could not be creations of our minds, but were the images of 
external and independent beings.‖39  Newman did not regard God‘s invisibility as a 
detriment to the persuasiveness of His reality, for he always regarded the invisible world 
as more real than the visible world.  Hence his position that ―Almighty God, we know, 
exists more really and absolutely than any of those fellow-men whose existence is 
conveyed to us through the senses…‖40       
Newman‘s focus on the externality of the object of revelation should be 
considered in relation to his historical context.  His life spanned most of the nineteenth 
century—that ―wonderful age‖ in which ―the enlargement of the circle of secular 
                                               
37 Ess., 1: 34.   
38 Dev., 86. 
39 U.S., 331.  By the term ―analogous,‖ Newman does not mean to claim that religious objects are not 
impressed upon human beings by means of the senses, as I will explain below.      
40 P.S., 4: 202. 
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knowledge just now is simply a bewilderment…‖  He believed that the rapid increase of 
secular knowledge, and the ―confident tone of [its] schools,‖ had bred in the Western 
world ―nothing else than [a] deep, plausible skepticism…‖ that engendered an atheistic 
materialism.
41
  He elsewhere includes this skepticism and materialism under the umbrella 
term ―Liberalism.‖  In his ―Biglietto Speech‖ delivered upon receiving the cardinal‘s hat 
in 1879, Newman reflected that, ―For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of 
my powers the spirit of liberalism in religion.‖42  He defined this Liberalism as  
the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good 
as another… It is inconsistent with any recognition of any religion, as true. It 
teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of opinion. Revealed religion 
is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not an objective fact, not miraculous; 
and it is the right of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy.
43
  
 
Perhaps spurred on by the proliferation of Liberalism in religion during his lifetime, 
Newman increased his use of the term ―objective‖ in reference to the human reception of 
revelation from the 1845 to the 1878 edition of the Essay on Development.
44
  His 
apparent concern was to emphasize that Christianity and its ―object‖ was not something 
that originated in the human mind.   
 An instance of the aforementioned inconsistency of Newman‘s religious 
vocabulary arises in the fifteenth Oxford University Sermon in regard to the term 
―object.‖  There Newman vacillates between references to the ―Object of Faith‖ and the 
―Objects of Faith.‖  He deems God the ―great Object of Faith‖ and the separate dogmas 
                                               
41 Apo., 232, 233. 
42 John Henry Newman, Addresses to Cardinal Newman with His Replies, Etc., 1879-81, ed. W.P. Neville 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), 64. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Nicholas Lash, Newman on Development: The Search for an Explanation in History (Shepherdstown, 
WV: Patmos Press, 1975), 47.  One of the most valuable aspects of Lash‘s wonderful work on Newman is 
his careful comparison of the 1878 edition of Newman‘s Essay on Development with the 1845 edition.     
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of Christianity, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, as the ―Objects of Faith.‖45  
Suffice it to say that Newman‘s use of both the singular and plural for the object of 
revelation results in unnecessary confusion.
46
  Within the sermon, however, it is clear that 
Newman understands the dogmas mentioned not as separable objects of revelation 
alongside God, but as propositions formulated as a result of the Church‘s reflection on 
the one object of revelation.   
 Indeed, one of the principal tenets of Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development 
is that the entirety of revelation constitutes a unity or a whole.  As I will discuss below, it 
is Newman‘s position that the mind of the Church can implicitly possess the idea of 
revelation as a whole that allows him to label new doctrines as ―developments‖ rather 
than new revelations.  Newman assigns the characteristic of unity to revelation because of 
its source in the one God: ―Surely, if Almighty God is ever one and the same, and is 
revealed to us as one and the same, the true inward impression of Him, made on the 
recipient of the revelation, must be one and the same…‖47  Newman sees this doctrine of 
God‘s oneness as not only a foundation of the theory of doctrinal development, but ―the 
foundation of all religion‖ as well, as it is a conclusion reachable through human 
reason.
48
  
 Newman appears to arrive at the conclusion that revelation is one because its 
divine source is one through metaphysical reasoning.  Such metaphysical reasoning is 
also behind his Platonic contention that any object is a unity in spite of the variety of the 
aspects through which men and women view it.  After all, men and women cannot reflect 
                                               
45 U.S., 329-337. 
46 See for instance Paul Misner, ―Newman‘s Concept of Revelation and the Development of Doctrine,‖ 
Heythrop Journal 11:1 (1971): 44.   
47 U.S., 328.   
48 G.A., 94.   
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on these aspects all-at-once, and thus, the conclusion that they all belong to the same 
object cannot be arrived at purely through experience; it involves in part a metaphysical 
leap.  Jan Walgrave and Terrence Merrigan are correct in claiming that Newman‘s 
reasoning is principally carried out by what the former refers to as his ―practical 
psychologism,‖ and the latter as his ―philosophical realism.‖49  But, as Walgrave clarifies, 
―every great system of philosophy must have a basis in metaphysics... [and Newman‘s] 
metaphysical intuition, therefore, is the highly conscious background of all his 
intellectual procedures.‖50    
Newman emphasized that this unity that is the object of the Christian‘s faith is no 
mere monad, or abstraction, but a concrete person.  In fact, he held that one purpose of 
divine revelation was to give knowledge of God‘s person: ―how great an addition of 
fulness and exactness is made to our mental image of the Divine Personality and 
Attributes, by the light of Christianity.  And, indeed, to give us a clear and sufficient 
object for our faith, is one main purpose of the supernatural Dispensations of Religion.‖51  
Divine revelation provides ―an addition of fulness and exactness‖ to what Newman refers 
to as ―natural revelation.‖  Here a brief explanation of Newman‘s estimation of natural 
revelation is necessary in order to more fully understand the role he ascribes to divine 
revelation.     
                                               
49 See Appendix C (―Newman‘s Practical Psychologism‖) in Jan Walgrave, Newman the Theologian: The 
Nature of Belief and Doctrine as Exemplified in His Life and Works, trans. A.V. Littledale (New York: 
Sheed & Ward, 1960), 334-341; Merrigan, Clear Heads and Holy Hearts, 29-36.  Both Walgrave and 
Merrigan use these designations to refer to Newman‘s practice of reasoning based on actual human 
experience, rather than on preconceived principles that dictate our experience.  On the place of metaphysics 
in Newman‘s thought, see also Maurice Nédoncelle, La philosophie religieuse de J.H. Newman 
(Strasbourg: Sostralib, 1946).    
50 Walgrave, Newman the Theologian, 340.   
51 G.A., 107.   
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 According to Newman, natural revelation and the forms of religion derived from 
it ―mean the knowledge of God, of His Will, and of our duties towards Him…‖52  The 
primary and most authoritative source of this natural knowledge that pertains to God is 
conscience.  Newman operates with the Thomistic definition of conscience as ―the 
practical judgment or dictate of reason, by which we judge what hic et nunc is to be done 
as being good, or to be avoided as evil.‖53  He also describes conscience as the human 
apprehension of the natural law, which reflects the divine law.
54
  However, Newman also 
assigns a revelatory function to conscience.  When a human person does right or wrong, 
and feels a consequent sense of either ―approbation‖ or ―blame,‖ Newman holds that 
conscience ―impress[es] the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a 
Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive.‖55  Because conscience so clearly 
impresses these characteristics of God on men and women, Newman famously referred to 
it as the ―aboriginal Vicar of Christ.‖56   
Other sources of natural knowledge about God include ―the voice of mankind‖ 
and ―the course of the world,‖ by which Newman means, respectively, what the 
commonalities of human religion and human experience reveal about the character of 
God and our relation to Him.
57
  Thus, for instance, all major world religions contain some 
form of a doctrine of sin, mutatis mutandis, and rituals of atonement, which, according to 
Newman, implies that there is someone whose mercy or forgiveness we need to seek.  
Newman also holds that a reasoned reflection on human experience can yield such truths 
                                               
52 G.A., 303.  
53 Summa Theologiae I, q.79, a.13; quoted in Diff., 2: 256.   
54 Diff., 2: 247.   
55 G.A., 100, 101. 
56 Diff., 2: 248.       
57 G.A., 389. 
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as human beings‘ inability to autonomously better themselves, or the natural desire for 
religion and eternal life—truths that can further lead one to surmise the existence of a 
good God.
58
  In postulating that human knowledge and experience can both tell us of the 
existence of God and also yield truths about God, Newman exhibits a very generous 
attitude toward natural revelation.   
Newman divides natural revelation into two categories: ―natural religion‖ and 
what he refers to variously as the ―religion of the philosophers,‖ the ―Religion of 
Reason,‖ or the ―Religion of Civilization.‖   By ―natural religion,‖ Newman means the 
pagan religions prevalent in the time before Christ that were typically polytheistic and 
employed a number of rituals and customs in rendering worship to the gods.  By ―the 
religion of the philosophers,‖ Newman means the reasoned reflection on the world and 
human nature that yields truths about God and humankind, but is not explicitly connected 
with a traditional religious structure consisting of creed and worship.
59
    
Part of Newman‘s apologetic for the development of Christian doctrine is the 
argument that development is a principle of life and history.  As such, Newman perceived 
a process of development in natural revelation that served a preparatory role for divine 
revelation.  This process of development involved men‘s and women‘s growth in both the 
understanding and living out of those truths about God that they could glean through their 
reflection on the world.
60
  Francis McGrath argues that Newman‘s view of development 
                                               
58 G.A., 303-317.  
59 Newman elaborates on the nature of ―the religion of the philosophers‖ in his sixth Oxford University 
Sermon, ―On Justice, as a Principle of Divine Governance‖ (U.S., 99-119), and Idea, 136-161.   
60 The implications of Newman‘s view of natural revelation and the capability of development in religions 
outside of Christianity are relevant to interreligious dialogue today.  For instance, the Roman Catholic 
Church‘s position that it possesses ―the fullness of truth‖ has led some Catholics to question whether 
interreligious dialogue is really a dialogue at all.  That is, does the Roman Catholic Church really need to 
dialogue with the religious other in order to arrive at a greater grasp of a truth it already possesses in its 
fullness?  If, however, as Newman maintains, other religious traditions visibly manifest certain truths about 
11 
 
in natural religion was in part attributable to his appropriation of Justin Martyr‘s doctrine 
of the Logos spermatikos and Clement of Alexandria‘s view of Greek philosophy as a 
preparation for Christianity.
61
  McGrath‘s argument is plausible, though only indirectly 
supported in Newman‘s works.62  A more certain influence was Newman‘s doctrine of 
Divine Providence, which held that both natural and divine revelation were 
―appointments of one and the same being, working at sundry times and in diverse 
manners, but on consistent principles.‖63        
In spite of his optimistic view of natural revelation as manifested in both natural 
and philosophical religion, Newman is clear that it remains incomplete and thus 
inadequate without divine revelation.  He believes that natural revelation testifies to its 
own inadequacy inasmuch as the desire for, and expectation of, a divine revelation is ―an 
integral part‖ of it.64  In describing why natural revelation is inadequate, Newman 
employs epistemological distinctions between the ―concrete‖ versus the ―abstract,‖ and 
relatedly, the ―real‖ versus the ―notional.‖  These distinctions, as elaborated in the 
                                                                                                                                            
God—truths capable of undergoing development—there would seem to be some ground for dialogue.  
Other religions can be capable of manifesting certain aspects of God and the human response to Him, 
which they have spent centuries in developing, that the Catholic Church has not adequately plumbed from 
the depths of its fullness; and the Catholic Church, on its part, can attempt to persuade other religions that it 
represents the completion of those truths that the latter already recognize.  Hans Urs von Balthasar, too, 
recognizes the connection between Newman‘s understanding of doctrinal development and support for 
ecumenical and interreligious dialogue: ―According to a well-known position of Newman, the Catholic 
Church can see herself as the embodiment of wholeness and totality only when she has done all in her 
power actively to incorporate the riches of all partial points of view‖ (The Theology of Karl Barth: 
Exposition and Interpretation, trans. Edward T. Oakes, S.J. [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992], 12.)  
Von Balthasar does not reference the particular text of Newman that he has in mind. 
61 Francis McGrath, John Henry Newman: Universal Revelation (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
1997), 45-50; Justin Martyr, First Apology; Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis.     
62 Such apparent statements with affinities to Justin Martyr include the following: ―… the Almighty 
scattered through the world, before His Son came, vestiges and gleams of His true Religion, and collected 
all the separated rays together, when He set Him on His holy hill to rule the day, and the Church, as the 
moon, to govern the night‖ (D.A., 210-211); and  ―from the beginning the Moral Governor of the world has 
scattered the seeds of truth far and wide over its extent; that these have variously taken root, and grown up 
as in the wilderness, wild plants indeed but living‖ (Ess. 1: 231); quoted in McGrath, 75, 79.     
63 A.S., 1: 214; quoted in McGrath, 42.  
64 G.A., 315.   
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Grammar of Assent, act as the lens through which Newman views not only natural 
revelation, but divine revelation, as well.  They thus require explanation.    
The ―concrete‖ refers to those things or objects of which men and women have an 
experience, either sensual, intellectual, or both.  It refers to individuals or particular 
instances of things, versus universals or general instances of things.  Newman calls our 
knowledge of the concrete ―real,‖ because it is a knowledge whose reference points are 
res (―things‖ or ―objects‖).  Thus, one can be said to have real knowledge of objects such 
as a flower, or the sun, or one‘s mother, through having actually experienced these 
realities with one‘s senses.  But, according to Newman, one‘s real knowledge is not 
confined to those phenomena with which one has sensual familiarity.  For instance, even 
though a man has never fought in a war, he can be said to have a real knowledge of it 
through the descriptions he has read of the Jewish War by Josephus, or the Napoleonic 
wars in Tolstoy‘s War and Peace.  These, too, constitute experiences inasmuch as men 
and women are actively engaged in interpreting the experience of the authors.
65
 
                                               
65 Newman elaborates on how we can have real knowledge of things without having sensually experienced 
them as follows: ―Further, we are able by an inventive faculty, or, as I may call it, the faculty of 
composition, to follow the descriptions of things which have never come before us, and to form, out of such 
passive impressions as experience has heretofore left on our minds, new images, which, though mental 
creations, are in no sense abstractions, and though ideal, are not notional.  They are concrete units in the 
minds both of the party describing and the party informed of them.  Thus I may never have seen a palm or a 
banana, but I have conversed with those who have, or I have read graphic accounts of it, and, from my own 
previous knowledge of other trees, have been able with so ready an intelligence to interpret their language, 
and to light up such an image of it in my thoughts, that, were it not that I never was in the countries where 
the tree is found, I should fancy that I had actually seen it. Hence again it is the very praise we give to the 
characters of some great poet or historian that he is so individual.  I am able as it were to gaze on Tiberius, 
as Tacitus draws him, and to figure to myself our James the First, as he is painted in Scott's Romance.  The 
assassination of Caesar, his ‗Et tu, Brute?‘ his collecting his robes about him, and his fall under Pompey's 
statue, all this becomes a fact to me and an object of real apprehension.  Thus it is that we live in the past 
and in the distant; by means of our capacity of interpreting the statements of others about former ages or 
foreign climes by the lights of our own experience.  The picture, which historians are able to bring before 
us, of Caesar's death, derives its vividness and effect from its virtual appeal to the various images of our 
memory‖ (G.A., 42). 
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The ―abstract,‖ on the other hand, refers to the realm of the universal and the 
general.  Whereas the concrete is represented by propositions whose terms are singular 
(―Philip was the father of Alexander,‖ ―the earth goes round the sun‖), the abstract is 
represented by propositions whose terms are general.  Newman provides the following 
examples of abstract propositions: ―Man is an animal, some men are learned, an Apostle 
is a creation of Christianity.‖66  The abstract is the product of the human mind, which can 
only grow in knowledge through situating objects in relation to other objects.  Since the 
abstract refers to ideas or notions originating in the human mind, Newman calls our 
knowledge of the abstract ―notional.‖  Notional knowledge is thus the work of ―regarding 
things…as they stand in relation to each other,‖ of comparing and contrasting, of 
defining, that is natural to human beings.
67
  In other words, it is the product of human 
reason.   
According to Newman, the concrete and the abstract, the real and the notional, are 
complementary to one another.  He held that ―life is for action,‖ and the concrete and the 
real is that which stirs our emotions and impels us to action.
68
  ―It is in human nature,‖ 
writes Newman, ―to be more affected by the concrete than by the abstract.‖69  Newman 
did not believe that human beings are moved to action by that of which they only have an 
abstract or notional knowledge.  Someone may have learned and understood the maxim 
dulce et decorum est pro patria mori (―It is sweet and good to die for one‘s country‖), but 
unless one is able to apply this maxim to particular experiences, one will not desire to 
sacrifice himself or herself on the battlefield.   
                                               
66 G.A., 29. 
67 G.A., 44, 45.  
68 D.A., 295.  
69 G.A., 50.   
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However, Newman assigns the notional a significant role in human knowledge.  
Whereas men and women anchor themselves in knowledge of an object through real 
knowledge, they grow in knowledge of that object through notional knowledge: 
Each use of propositions has its own excellence and serviceableness, and each has 
its own imperfection.  To apprehend notionally is to have breadth of mind, but to 
be shallow; to apprehend really is to be deep, but to be narrow-minded.  The latter 
is the conservative principle of knowledge, and the former the principle of its 
advancement.  Without the apprehension of notions, we should for ever pace 
round one small circle of knowledge; without a firm hold upon things, we shall 
waste ourselves in vague speculations.
70
  
 
Applying this distinction to religious epistemology, (which is Newman‘s ultimate 
concern in the Grammar of Assent,) faith corresponds to real knowledge, whereas 
theology corresponds to notional knowledge.  Faith is rooted in one‘s experience of God; 
it is a belief in, or assent to, the God whom one knows as an individual, as a person.  
Theology, on the other hand, is fides quaerens intellectum; it is the development of one‘s 
knowledge of that God in whom he or she has faith.  As I will discuss further in Chapter 
Two, Newman understands doctrinal development to primarily refer to the development 
of the Church‘s notional knowledge of God and His revelation, though this notional 
knowledge must remain rooted in the real knowledge of God.  
According to Newman, the role of divine revelation is to perfect both the abstract 
and concrete elements of natural revelation.  Natural religion‘s particular strength, 
Newman holds, was its exhibition of the concrete and real through personal conceptions 
of gods who were worshipped in ritual actions.  ―But it failed,‖ assesses Newman, ―as 
degrading His invisible majesty by unworthy, multiplied and inconsistent images, and as 
shattering the moral scheme of the world into partial and discordant systems.‖71  
                                               
70 G.A., 47.  
71 U.S., 24.   
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Philosophical religion testified more to the abstract and the notional element through the 
development of its reasonings on God and human nature.  But because these reasonings 
were rooted neither in faith in a concrete and personal deity, nor in a sense of sin and 
corporeality, they did not inspire action.  Newman thus concludes, ―The God of 
philosophy was infinitely great, but an abstraction; the God of paganism was intelligible, 
but degraded by human conception… it was left for an express Revelation to propose the 
Object in which they should both be reconciled…‖72  Divine revelation thus performs the 
dual function of uniting and completing the concrete and abstract, the real and the 
notional, as they exist in natural and philosophical religion. 
 Newman especially highlights divine revelation‘s function of communicating the 
personal character of the one object of faith.  He allows that men and women can arrive at 
the truth that God is a person through natural revelation.  In fact, he maintains, ―No one is 
to be called a Theist, who does not believe in a Personal God, whatever difficulty there 
may be in defining the word ‗Personal.‘‖73  Newman believes that the personhood of God 
is especially communicated in natural revelation via conscience.
74
  But he regards the 
picture of the divine person that emerges from natural revelation as so limited and vague 
that it cannot sustain the religious longings of men and women: ―Natural Religion 
teaches, it is true, the infinite power and majesty, the wisdom and goodness, the presence, 
the moral governance, and, in one sense, the unity of the Deity; but it gives little or no 
                                               
72 U.S., 24.  See also Mix., 295: ―and the great consolatory disclosures of Him, which Nature begins, 
Revelation brings to perfection‖; and G.A., 375: ―Revelation begins where Natural Religion fails.  The 
Religion of Nature is a mere inchoation, and needs a complement,—it can have but one complement, and 
that very complement is Christianity.‖ 
73 G.A., 111. 
74 G.A., 98-107.  
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information respecting what may be called His Personality.‖75  ―The philosopher,‖ writes 
Newman, ―aspires towards a divine principle; the Christian, towards a Divine Agent.‖76  
 Newman holds that divine revelation primarily fills this lack in natural revelation 
by impressing upon human beings the personal character of God.  This is the theme of his 
1830 Oxford University Sermon entitled ―The Influence of Natural and Revealed 
Religion Respectively,‖ wherein one finds many crucial elements of Newman‘s theology 
of revelation.
77
   Divine revelation, according to Newman, is ―especially calculated… to 
impress upon our minds the personal character of the Object of our worship.‖78  
Underlying this point is Newman‘s principle that human beings are moved to action (the 
purpose of life) more by the concrete than the abstract, and that the personal constitutes 
the concretissimum.  The personal, he maintains, is ―that most efficient incentive to all 
action, a starting or rallying point,—an object on which the affections could be placed, 
and the energies concentrated.‖79  Walgrave points out that Newman does not anywhere 
provide an analysis of why it is that men and women are more affected by personal rather 
than impersonal objects.  But nevertheless, writes Walgrave, ―[Newman] felt it strongly 
and refers to it frequently.‖80 
                                               
75 U.S., 22.  Newman qualifies in a note that he believes this statement ―seems to me too strongly said‖ 
(36), but his qualification only serves to temper his estimate of how much of the divine personality is 
knowable through natural revelation.  It does not negate his position that divine revelation further reveals 
the personality of God.  This passage also demonstrates that Newman did not consistently maintain his 
distinction between ―natural religion‖ and ―philosophical religion,‖ since the latter here appears to be 
denoted by the former. 
76 U.S., 28.   
77 The entire sermon is found in U.S., 16-36. 
78 U.S., 26.   
79 U.S., 23.  See also Newman‘s fifth Oxford University Sermon, ―Personal Influence, the Means of 
Propagating the Truth‖ (U.S., 75-98), in addition to G.A., 101: ―Inanimate things cannot stir our affections; 
these are correlative with persons.‖ 
80 Walgrave, Newman the Theologian, 112.  The full passage is as follows: ―Nowhere, for example, did 
[Newman] give a phenomenological description of the great difference between real apprehension of a 
‗thing‘ or an ‗object,‘ and that of a ‗person‘ or ‗subject.‘  These are two irreducible kinds of experience; the 
one, of a world which is at my disposal, like an extension of my body; the other, of a presence standing 
17 
 
 Thus, in divine revelation one sees carried out what Newman refers to as the 
―method of personation.‖  By ―method of personation,‖ Newman means that God, 
evidently concerned with impelling men and women to action, frequently reveals truths 
through persons.  Newman elaborates on the ―method of personation‖ as evidenced in 
Scripture: 
The doctrine of original sin is centred in the person of Adam, and in this way is 
made impressive and intelligible to the mass of mankind.  The Evil Principle is 
revealed to us in the person of its author, Satan.  Nay, not only thus, in the case of 
really existing beings, as the first man and the Evil Spirit, but even when a figure 
must be used, is the same system continued.  The body of faithful men, or Church, 
considered as the dwelling-place of the One Holy Spirit, is invested with a 
metaphorical personality, and is bound to act as one, in order to those practical 
ends of influencing and directing human conduct in which the entire system may 
be considered as originating.
81
  
 
Newman assumed this method of personation in his Anglican sermons.  To his listeners 
at St. Mary‘s of Oxford and the chapel at Littlemore, he portrayed Abraham an example 
of faith and self-denial, and Lot as a contrast to these virtues.
82
  He regarded Balaam as 
an instance of ―obedience without love,‖ Josiah as ―a pattern for the ignorant,‖ and 
Jeremiah as ―a lesson for the disappointed.‖83  And in his famous sermon, ―The Parting of 
Friends‖ (1843), he invoked Jacob, Naomi, and David as examples of those who have 
endured the painful necessity of leaving behind of loved ones in order to do God‘s will.84     
 Newman regards the ―method of personation‖ of the revealed system as reaching 
its culmination in the Incarnation.  It is only in a ―real and manifested incarnation of the 
Deity,‖ writes Newman, that the ―desires‖ of both natural and philosophical religion are 
                                                                                                                                            
over against me.  All the same, he was fully aware of the difference; in fact, he felt it strongly and refers to 
it frequently, but I know of no description of it in his writings.‖ 
81 U.S., 29-30.   
82 P.S., 3: 1-15 (―Abraham and Lot‖). 
83 P.S., 4: 18-36; 8: 91-109, 124-140.  
84 S.D., 395-409.  Newman delivered this sermon on September 25, 1843, in the church at Littlemore.  It 
was the last sermon he preached as an Anglican.     
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―satisfied.‖85  To the person of Christ are attributed ―all those abstract titles of moral 
excellence bestowed upon Him which philosophers have invented.  He is the Word, the 
Light, the Life, the Truth, Wisdom, the Divine Glory.‖86  As the ultimate concretization 
of the abstract, and the enhypostatization of all notional truths, the Incarnation represents 
for Newman the pinnacle of divine revelation, and the ―central aspect of Christianity.‖87   
In presenting Newman‘s contention that the Incarnation is the ultimate revelation 
of the concrete person of God, I introduce what Merrigan has referred to as the ―radically 
incarnational‖ character of Newman‘s theology.88  Newman considered the Incarnation of 
the Second Person of the Trinity to be the central identifying mark of Christianity, and 
the lens through which the Church judges all other aspects of Christianity: ―It is the 
Incarnation of the Son of God rather than any doctrine drawn from a partial view of 
Scripture (however true and momentous it may be) which is the article of a standing or a 
falling Church.‖89  As Ian Ker points out, Newman‘s incarnational theology could also be 
termed ―radical‖ if contrasted with the (at the time) contemporary Protestant and Catholic 
focus on, respectively, the doctrines of the atonement and the crucifixion.  Ker attributes 
Newman‘s focus on the Incarnation to his reading of the Greek Fathers of the Church, 
whose writings are permeated with the idea that the Incarnation is the axis of the whole of 
salvation history, and the gateway to the knowledge of, and participation in, God.
90
    
                                               
85 U.S., 24.   
86 U.S., 28.   
87 Dev., 36.   
88 Merrigan, ―Revelation,‖ in The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman, ed. Ian Ker and 
Terrence Merrigan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 56.   
89 U.S., 35.   
90 Ker, introduction to Selected Sermons, by John Henry Newman, Classics of Western Spirituality (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1993), 29.  For Newman‘s critique of the subordination of the doctrine of the 
Incarnation to that of the Atonement, see Ess. 1: 47-8.  See also McGrath, 60-63.    
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Nicholas Lash, like Merrigan, also sees the Incarnation functioning as a 
hermeneutical principle in Newman‘s works ―throughout the greater part of his life.‖91  
Lash claims that the Incarnation was the ultimate realization of the sacramental principle 
that was first inculcated in Newman by Bishop Joseph Butler‘s Analogy of Religion and 
John Keble‘s Christian Year.92  He quotes Newman, who writes that ―The doctrine of the 
Incarnation… establishes in the very idea of Christianity the sacramental principle as its 
characteristic.‖93  It is, writes Newman, ―the central truth of the gospel, and the source 
whence we are to draw out its principles.‖94  As such, I argue throughout this dissertation 
that the Incarnation is a crucial hermeneutical key for understanding Newman‘s theory of 
doctrinal development.        
 The above aspects I have included under Newman‘s label of God as the ―object‖ 
of revelation have implications for his theory of doctrinal development.  In referring to 
God as the object of revelation, Newman implies that revelation is an existential given 
whose origin is external to human beings.  Accordingly, the development of doctrine 
involves a development in the Church‘s understanding of this existential given.  The 
Church‘s development in its understanding of the object of revelation is conditioned by 
the character of this object.  Newman emphasizes that the object of revelation, God, is 
one, concrete, and personal.  Accordingly, as I will demonstrate below, these 
characteristics of oneness, concreteness, and personhood, are at the heart of Newman‘s 
                                               
91 Lash, Newman on Development, 140. 
92 ―… the two main intellectual truths which [the Christian Year] brought home to me, were the same two, 
which I had learned from Butler, though recast in the creative mind of my new master.  The first of these 
was what may be called, in a large sense of the word, the Sacramental system; that is, the doctrine that 
material phenomena are both the types and the instruments of real things unseen,—a doctrine, which 
embraces in its fulness, not only what Anglicans, as well as Catholics, believe about Sacraments properly 
so called; but also the article of ‗the Communion of Saints;‘ and likewise the Mysteries of the faith‖ (Apo., 
37).   
93 Lash, Newman on Development, 140-141; Dev., 325.   
94 Dev., 324. 
20 
 
understanding of revelation and doctrinal development.  Finally, in this section I have 
introduced Newman‘s distinctions between the concrete and the abstract, and the real and 
the notional.  These distinctions are operative in his theology of revelation, as he 
expresses one purpose of divine revelation as the completion of the concretizations and 
abstractions, the real and the notional knowledge, of natural revelation through God‘s 
self-manifestation.  In Chapter Two I will show how these distinctions are also operative 
in Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development, where such development is understood as 
a development in the notional knowledge of the ―real‖ object of revelation.      
 
B. REVELATION AS “IMPRESSION”: GOD’S IMPRESSION OF HIMSELF 
 In Newman‘s application of the empiricist schema of object-impression-idea to 
revelation, I interpret his use of the term ―impression‖ as referring to both God‘s 
communication of Himself and the initial human reception of this communication.  In 
implying both divine and human action, the term ―impression‖ thus embodies what I see 
as the relational character of Newman‘s theology of revelation.  My focus on the 
theological implications of the term ―impression‖ here involves taking a divergent path 
from much of Newman scholarship—which tends to briefly define the term ―impression‖ 
in order to devote the majority of the attention to the term ―idea‖—and also involves a 
development of Newman‘s own thought.    
I maintain that a number of important themes in Newman‘s theology of revelation 
emerge from a stricter interpretation of the term ―impression‖ within the empiricist 
schema.  The impression is the initial relational moment when God reveals Himself 
through impressing an image of Himself upon the human person.  God‘s otherness 
21 
 
necessitates the use of economic media for impressing His revelation on men and women.  
Among these economic media, Newman particularly emphasizes that God at first 
impressed Himself on men and women through historical facts and actions, and has done 
so since the apostolic age through the instrumentality of the Church.  Though the media 
of God‘s impression are various, Newman holds that this impression is essentially one.  
According to Newman, this impression is made upon both individual members of the 
Church and what he refers to as ―the mind of the Church.‖  As was the case with the 
above section on revelation as ―object,‖ the principles established in this section have 
important implications for Newman‘s understanding of doctrinal development. 
 The relational character of Newman‘s theology of revelation is implied in the 
purpose he ascribes to divine revelation.  Newman described the revelation of God‘s 
personality as one of the purposes of divine revelation.  But he understood this purpose as 
subservient to the ultimate purpose of human beings‘ deification, or, their ―partaking of 
the divine nature‖ (2 Pt 1:4).95  As C. Stephen Dessain has shown, deification was a 
persistent theme of Newman‘s writings.96  It permeates Newman‘s Parochial and Plain 
Sermons.
97
  Andrew Louth, himself a Newman scholar, has remarked that one can also 
consider the doctrine of deification to be the ―central theme‖ of Newman‘s Lectures on 
Justification and the ―central conviction of the Oxford Movement.‖98   
                                               
95 Newman rarely used the term ―deification,‖ speaking instead of the ―indwelling of the Holy Spirit.‖  
When he did use it, he qualified that it was his translation of Athanasius‘ term ―theopoiesis‖ (L.D., 22: 160-
161; L.D., 28: 197).  In the latter reference Newman writes, ―St Athanasius dwells much on the deification 
of man.‖   
96 C. Stephen Dessain, ―Cardinal Newman and the Doctrine of Uncreated Grace,‖ The Clergy Review 47 
(1962): 207-225, 269-288.  See also Dessain, ―Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition,‖ Downside 
Review 94 (1976): 95-96. 
97 John Connolly, ―Newman‘s Notion of the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Parochial and Plain 
Sermons,‖ Newman Studies Journal 5:1 (Spring 2008): 5-18.   
98 Andrew Louth, ―Manhood into God: The Oxford Movement, the Fathers and the Deification of Man,‖ in 
Essays Catholic and Radical, ed. Kenneth Leech and Rowan D. Williams (London: Bowerdean Press, 
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Ker attributes Newman‘s use of the soteriological model of deification to the 
influence of the Eastern Church Fathers and the incarnational character of their theology.  
Indeed, Newman used the oft-referenced Athanasian (and Irenaean) formula to 
characterize the purpose of the Incarnation: ―by God's becoming man, men, through 
brotherhood with Him, might in the end become as gods.‖99  Ker also points out that 
Newman endorsed the predominantly Eastern view that the Incarnation would have taken 
place in spite of the original sin of Adam and Eve: ―In his Catholic sermons Newman 
does not hesitate to ally himself with the view of Duns Scotus (as against St. Thomas 
Aquinas) that even had mankind never sinned, the Son of God would still have ‗had it in 
mind to come on earth among innocent creatures…to fill them with grace, to receive their 
worship, to enjoy their company, and to prepare them for…heaven.‘‖100  John Connolly 
makes the important observation that Newman ―present[s] an outline of salvation history 
from the perspective of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit‖ in his Anglican sermon ―The 
Law of the Spirit.‖101  In this sermon, Newman describes the righteousness that Adam 
possessed due to the indwelling of the Spirit, his loss of this indwelling after original sin, 
and the regaining of the indwelling after the redemption brought about by Christ.  Thus, 
                                                                                                                                            
1983), 74-5.  Ian Ker has gone one step further in claiming, ―In Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification 
Newman solves the problem of justification, which of course was at the heart of the Reformation, by 
invoking the great scriptural and patristic doctrine of the divine indwelling, so long forgotten and neglected 
in the West by both Protestants and Roman Catholics‖ (The Fullness of Christianity [Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1993], 95).  Allusions to the doctrine of deification are less frequent in Newman‘s Catholic writings 
because, as Dessain writes, ―the atmosphere was not propitious, and as a convert he did not wish to set up 
as a dogmatic and mystical teacher‖ (―Cardinal Newman and the Doctrine of Uncreated Grace,‖ 285).  
Dessain neglects to mention that Newman‘s adoption of the Catholic practice of delivering sermons from 
memory or brief notes, rather than a written text, probably also contributed to the paucity of Newman‘s 
mentions of deification as a Catholic. 
99 P.S., 5: 118.  For Newman‘s understanding of the doctrine of deification as found in the Fathers, see his 
articles in Ath., 2 on ―Deification‖ (88-90), ―The Divine In-Dwelling‖ (193-195), and ―Metousia‖ (424-
425).    
100 Ker, introduction to Selected Sermons, 29; Mix., 321-322.  
101 Connolly, 8; P.S., 5: 143-163, at 148. 
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the Incarnation and deification are interconnected lenses through which Newman views 
Christianity.
102
 
Newman understands deification to be the dwelling of God‘s very self in the 
Christian.  I have thus far been describing Newman‘s understanding of revelation as 
God‘s impression of Himself on the Christian.  Indeed, Newman at times seems to 
attribute a divinizing character to the impression, such as when he describes Christians 
―(as if) inhabited by that sacred impression…which acts as a regulating principle, ever 
present, upon the reasoning…‖103  However, Paul Misner has expressed dissatisfaction 
with qualifications like ―as if,‖ and has criticized Newman for having an inadequate 
notion of revelation inasmuch as ―he nevertheless never expressed this insight required 
by his theory of development, namely that God‘s revealing Word confers not merely an 
idea of himself, nor a vision of himself, but his very Self.‖104  Lash and Merrigan have 
both cryptically remarked that Misner‘s preferred concept of revelation as God‘s 
communication of His self ―is not without its difficulties.‖105  I wish to flesh out Lash‘s 
and Merrigan‘s brief remarks by pointing out what I believe to be the major difficulty of 
Misner‘s desired understanding of revelation as he expresses it, namely, that it fails to 
account for Newman‘s principle of mediation, which in turn is so significant for 
Newman‘s understanding of doctrinal development.     
                                               
102 Dessain perceptively remarks, ―One of the reasons why the Greek Fathers of the fourth century 
defended so firmly the divinity of Christ and the divinity of the Holy Spirit, was the connection of these 
truths with the divinization, the deification of the Christian‖ (―Cardinal Newman and the Eastern 
Tradition,‖ 95).  This insight is also at the heart of Norman Russell‘s The Doctrine of Deification in the 
Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
103 U.S., 336.   
104 Misner, ―Newman‘s Concept of Revelation,‖ 44, 45. 
105 Lash, Newman on Development, 186-187n25; Merrigan, Clear Heads and Holy Hearts, 92.  Merrigan 
also charges Misner with being anachronistic in criticizing Newman for not employing this more modern 
understanding of revelation in his paper on doctrinal development submitted to Fr. Giovanni Perrone in 
1847.  In this letter, Newman wished to defend his theory of doctrinal development to Perrone, professor of 
dogmatic theology at the Roman College, within the categories used by Roman Catholic theology of that 
time.  See T. Lynch, ―The Newman-Perrone Paper on Development,‖ Gregorianum 16 (1935): 402-447. 
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 In order to accomplish the deification of men and women, God revealed Himself 
to them through what Newman refers to as a ―system of continual mediation.‖106  
Newman understands that the need for mediation arises from ―the great revealed principle 
[of] the incommunicable character and individuality of the Divine Essence,‖107 combined 
with the finite, limited nature of human understanding.  He uses the Alexandrian term of 
―Economy‖ to refer to God‘s mediating, revelatory actions.   
Newman‘s most thorough description of ―Economy‖ occurs in Arians of the 
Fourth Century.  Like the Alexandrian Church Fathers, Newman understands ―Economy‖ 
in a broad sense to mean ―any Divine procedure, greater or less, which consists of means 
and an end‖—the end being the deification of men and women.108  Thus, Newman 
explains that ―Economy‖ refers to ―the work of creation itself, as opposed to the absolute 
perfection of the Eternal God, that internal concentration of His Attributes in self-
contemplation…‖  ―Again,‖ he writes, ―it might with equal fitness be used for the general 
system of providence by which the world‘s course is carried on.‖  It also refers to the 
truths communicated through natural revelation and the sacramental character of the 
world.  And, it of course refers to divine revelation as present within ―the Jewish and 
patriarchal dispensations,‖ and the life of Christ, ―as exhibited in the doctrines of His 
incarnation, ministry, atonement, exaltation, and mediatorial sovereignty.‖109  Newman 
considers all such examples of God‘s Economy, ―which display His character in actions, 
[as] but condescensions to the infirmity and peculiarity of our minds, shadowy 
representations of realities which are incomprehensible to creatures such as ourselves, 
                                               
106 A.S., 1: 213; quoted in McGrath, 41.   
107 Ari., 189.   
108 Ari., 74.   
109 Ari., 74, 75.   
25 
 
who estimate everything by the rule of association and arrangement, by the notion of a 
purpose and plan, object and means, parts and whole.‖110 
If Newman failed to so bluntly describe revelation as God‘s communication of 
His very self, it was because he recognized the need to respect the principle of Economy 
in one‘s theological reasonings.  Misner‘s attribution of his ―more comprehensive 
present-day concept of revelation‖ to Karl Rahner is perhaps predictable, since Rahner 
has been famously criticized for blurring the distinction between God‘s immanence and 
economy.
111
  Misner also fails to proffer a distinction between God‘s communication of 
Himself in revelation and God‘s communication of Himself through the Sacraments.  It is 
through the latter, not the former, Newman maintains, that God comes to ―inhabit us 
personally.‖112  Nevertheless, Newman repeatedly affirms that there is no division in 
God, and that the impression God makes on human recipients is also without division in 
spite of the various means by which it is communicated.  If one holds these affirmations 
in tension with the principle of mediation, it follows that one could claim Newman 
regarded the communication of divine truths as God‘s communication of Himself.       
A difference in the way God impresses Himself in natural and divine revelation 
emerges from Newman‘s understanding of Economy.  In natural revelation, men and 
women discern, through the use of reason, principles or ―scattered fragments‖ of truth in 
                                               
110 Ari., 75.  Newman expounds upon another understanding of Economy in Arians (70-74) and the Preface 
to the Third Edition of the Via Media (lvii-lxix).  He defines it as the method by which one holds back upon 
disclosing certain truths to a person or group due to their inability to rightly comprehend them, or allows 
for certain excesses in practice lest putting them down cause unnecessary scandal.  Thus, in the ―Preface‖ 
he gives the examples of God‘s allowance for divorce in Mosaic Law, or Jesus‘ failure to rebuke the 
hemorrhaging woman who touched his cloak for superstition.  Newman also refers to this particular 
understanding of Economy as the principle of ―Accommodation.‖  
111 Misner, ―Newman‘s Concept of Revelation,‖ 47; Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel 
(London: Continuum, 2001).   
112 Ath., 2: 193.   
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―the phenomena of the external world‖ and human behavior and conscience.113  One 
might say, then, Newman understands natural revelation as God impressing His truth on 
men and women by means of His creation.   
Newman understands divine revelation, however, as God impressing Himself 
through His actions in history.  He determines, ―Such, then, is the Revealed system 
compared with the Natural—teaching religious truths historically, not by investigation; 
revealing the Divine Nature, not in works, but in action; not in His moral laws, but in His 
spoken commands…‖114  The historical character Newman ascribes to divine revelation, 
Merrigan explains, also fulfills the underlying desire of men and women that what they 
know in abstract principles be manifested in the concrete: ―It is, above all, the radically 
‗historical‘ character of Christian teaching, its rootedness in concrete facts and historical 
events which, according to Newman, accounts for its appeal to the beleaguered 
practitioner of natural religion.‖115  Out of the desire that men and women may come to 
know and participate in Him, God enters into human history through economic means.  
As such, the historical character of divine revelation further testifies to its relational 
character.  ―Its home,‖ writes Newman, ―is in the world,‖116 as its purpose is the salvation 
of those who dwell in the world.   
 Newman understands divine revelation to encompass the historical actions and 
events of both the Jewish and the Christian ―dispensations.‖  Newman refers to Judaism 
in the Grammar as ―this grand drama, so impressed with the characters of supernatural 
agency…[with] all those tokens of the Divine Presence, which distinguish [its] 
                                               
113 Ari., 75, 86. 
114 U.S., 30.   
115 Merrigan, ―Revelation,‖ 56.   
116 Dev., 4.   
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history…‖117  At the same time, Newman‘s writings scarcely make mention of the 
particular actions and events that make up the Jewish history, which constitutes a 
weakness of his account of divine revelation.
118
  His tendency is to focus on the 
preparatory role of Judaism, illustrated by his frequent association of Judaism with 
prophecy and typology.
119
  The effect of this tendency is the subsuming of the distinctive 
historical and revelatory character of the acts and events of the Old Covenant; they 
become subservient to the perceivably greater principles of development and fulfillment.  
While not denying the preparatory role of Judaism, a more complete Christian theology 
of revelation would give due attention to the concrete acts of God‘s communication of 
Himself during the time of the Jewish covenants, rather than remain at the level of 
abstract generalizations of the history of this communication.
120
  Nevertheless, one could 
claim that Newman affirms the action and event character of Jewish revelation in 
differentiating it and Christianity from natural revelation.  He also affirms this character 
by his inclusion of Judaism within Christianity, the latter of which, Newman claims, is 
―Judaism itself, developed and transformed.‖121   
When describing the Christian dispensation, Newman more clearly characterizes 
it as comprised of concrete actions and events.  ―Christianity,‖ writes Newman, ―is a 
history supernatural, and almost scenic: it tells us what its Author is, by telling us what 
                                               
117 G.A., 339.   
118 Dev., 68-71 constitutes one exception to this tendency in Newman. 
119 G.A., 342, 345.  
120 For a rather unfavorable portrayal of Newman‘s views on Judaism, see Virginia Burrus, ―Hailing 
Zenobia: Anti-Judaism, Trinitarianism, and John Henry Newman,‖ Culture and Religion 3 (2002) 163-77.  
Steve Aguzzi responds to Burrus by highlighting the apologetic purposes behind Newman‘s sometimes 
negative characterizations of Judaism in ―John Henry Newman‘s Anglican Views on Judaism,‖ Newman 
Studies Journal 7:1 (Spring 2010): 56-72.  
121 G.A., 339.   
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He has done…‖122  With the Incarnation ―revelation meets us with simple and distinct 
facts and actions, not with painful inductions from existing phenomena, not with 
generalized laws or metaphysical conjectures, but with Jesus and the Resurrection…‖123  
Indeed, Newman holds that it is not only the principal actions of Christ that are 
revelatory, but ―the [entire] life of Christ [that] brings together and concentrates truths 
concerning the chief good and the laws of our being, which wander idle and forlorn over 
the surface of the moral world, and often appear to diverge from each other.‖124 
Newman regards the Incarnation, understood as the entire life of Christ, as the 
ultimate historical fact and action of God.  I have already mentioned Merrigan‘s 
characterizations of Newman‘s theology as ―radically incarnational‖ and ―radically 
historical.‖125  I would perhaps take Merrigan‘s characterizations one step further and 
claim that it is because Newman‘s theology is radically incarnational that it is also 
radically historical.  In the Incarnation, God most fully enters into history, where He 
―pitches His tent‖ among men and women in order that they may come to know, love, 
and participate in Him.  The Incarnation, as what revelation was leading up to, becomes 
in Newman‘s mind the standard by which all previous modes of historical revelation are 
judged; it is ―the principle of a new life.‖126  Thus, Newman holds that God incarnates 
Himself in an analogous way during the Jewish dispensation, when God dwelt in His 
                                               
122 G.A., 92.  
123 U.S., 27.   
124 U.S., 27.  Newman‘s emphasis on revelation as action and event is in part attributable to his opposition 
to the dogmatic liberalism manifested in Oxford Noetics such as Renn Dickson Hampden (1793-1868) and 
Richard Whately (1787-1863), and Evangelicals such as Thomas Erskine (1788-1870) and Jacob Abbott 
(1803-1879).  According to Newman, the chief characteristic of their liberalism was that they judged 
Christianity by the yardstick of their principles (such as the belief  that religion is primarily ordered toward 
morality) rather than vice versa.  See especially Newman‘s Tract 73—―On the Introduction of Rationalistic 
Principles into Revealed Religion‖—in Ess., 1: 30-101.    
125 Merrigan, ―Revelation,‖ 56.   
126 Ess., 1: 248.   
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prophets, and continues to dwell in their utterances; when He filled the Temple with His 
presence; and when He appeared to men in those visions known as theophanies.  
However, these historical manifestations are contrasted to ―that infinitely higher and 
mysterious union which is called the Incarnation…‖127  In the Incarnation, Newman 
claims, ―All is superseded by Him, and transmuted into Him.‖128   
 Newman‘s characterization of revelation as action and event seems contrary to 
the propositional understanding of revelation that had dominated post-Tridentine Roman 
Catholic theology.
129
  However, Newman‘s descriptions of revelation were not entirely 
consistent, and scholars have argued that at times he appeared to fall back into a 
predominantly propositional understanding of revelation.  Misner implies this 
inconsistency in his characterization of Newman‘s view of revelation as 
―intellectualist.‖130  Lash sees it evidenced by Newman‘s resort to the formula—made de 
fide in 1907 by Pope Pius X‘s Lamentabili Sane—that divine revelation ended with the 
death of the last Apostle.
131
  Writes Lash, 
Unfortunately, this claim, thus formulated, seems to imply that revelation consists 
in the divine provision of items of information.  Certainly Newman‘s treatment of 
revelation in the Essay would have gained in coherence if he had more clearly 
perceived that the categories within which the christian claim to the finality of the 
Christ-event was, at the time, expressed, were inadequate to their intention.
132
   
 
                                               
127 P.S., 2: 33-36. 
128 Jfc., 196.   
129 Indeed, one might accuse Newman of denying that revelation is conveyed through propositions.  A note 
in the margins of Newman‘s 1877 edits of his Essay on Development reads, ―Revelation is not of words—
from the derivation of the term it is addressed to the sight‖ (Chadwick, 246).  Chadwick also remarks, 
―Though sometimes, in his careless or luxuriant use of analogies, he sounded as though he thought that all 
was wordless, that religion was (ultimately) feeling or religious or moral experience, that revelation 
contained no propositions,‖ but then concludes, ―he neither believed nor intended to teach that‖ (153).   
130 Misner, ―Newman‘s Concept of Revelation,‖ 44.  
131 Denzinger 2021; H.S., 3: 164; Idea, 223-4, 255-6, 440-1; S.N., 317-18; T.T., 333.  
132 Lash, Newman on Development, 100.   
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Lash‘s lament derives from his assumption that the ―death of the last Apostle‖ formula 
implies that since the salvific actions and events of revelation had been completed with 
the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, the interim between Pentecost and this death 
was solely filled with the further conveyance or transmission of divine truths.   
 At first glance, Newman‘s dynamic emphasis on revelation as action and event 
certainly appears to conflict with his repeated invocation of the formula that revelation 
closed with the death of the last Apostle.  Many today consider this formula to be an 
expression of the more static, propositional understanding of revelation that Newman and 
post-Neoscholastic Roman Catholic theology have opposed.  Perhaps Newman‘s resort to 
the formula is in part attributable to the unresolved tensions that persisted, after his 
conversion to Roman Catholicism, between his Anglican and patristically-influenced 
theology and the predominant Roman Catholic theology of the time.  Thus, Lash would 
be right in pointing out that Newman‘s affirmation of the formula was not entirely 
consistent with his religious epistemology.   
However, it must be born in mind that Newman‘s main concern in invoking the 
―death of the last Apostle‖ formula was likely to affirm that developments of doctrine do 
not constitute new revelations, but instead represent a growth in the Church‘s 
understanding of that divine revelation definitively given to it in the time of the Apostles.  
His invocation of the formula thus establishes his orthodoxy on the closure of divine 
revelation.  It is difficult to judge the strength of Newman‘s assent to all that the formula 
may imply about the mode of revelation.  But given the suspicious attitude that his Essay 
on Development engendered among many within the Roman Catholic Church of the time, 
his affirmation of the formula would have been a relatively small concession. 
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 Had Newman reflected on this question further, however, it is certain that he 
would not have brushed aside the formula as ―inadequate‖ to his theory of revelation and 
development.  The formula was not made de fide until after Newman‘s lifetime, and thus, 
he technically could have regarded it as a theological opinion and proffered another way 
of expressing the truth that divine revelation is in some sense ―closed.‖  But Newman was 
no doctrinal minimalist, and he believed that a Catholic‘s duty was to ―accept what is 
taught him with what is called the pietas fidei…‖133  His instinct would have been to 
accept the formula and seek to bring his theory of development and its attendant 
understanding of revelation into harmony with it.  I will attempt to do just that in the 
Dialogue portion of this chapter.   
 Newman more fully includes the verbal mode of God‘s impression of Himself 
when he writes of the conveyance of revelation in the post-Apostolic Church.  In the time 
of the Old Testament and the Apostolic Church, Newman‘s emphasis is primarily on God 
impressing Himself on men and women through the media of actions and events.  In post-
Apostolic times this impression is made ―through the instrumentality of His Church.‖134  
Newman allows that this impression may be made through extraordinary means, such as 
―inspiration‖ or ―the illuminating grace of Baptism.‖  However, he lists the ordinary 
means by which Christians receive the impression as ―the habitual and devout perusal of 
Scripture… the gradual influence of intercourse with those who are in themselves in 
possession of the sacred ideas… the study of Dogmatic Theology… [or] a continual 
                                               
133 Diff., 2: 339.   
134 G.A., 115.   
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round of devotion…‖135  Of these means, Newman is clear that Scripture enjoys pride of 
place.
136
 
 Newman holds that God‘s impression of Himself through the instrumentality of 
the Church is still very much a historical impression through acts and events.  In 
accordance with His Providence, God still ―is acting through, with, and beneath those 
physical, social, and moral laws, of which our experience informs us,‖ and ―is secretly 
concurring and co-operating with that system which meets the eye, and which is 
commonly recognized among men as existing,‖ maintains Newman.137  Newman 
especially affirms that God continues to act in history through the Church.  ―The long 
history of the Church,‖ writes Newman, demonstrates ―fresh exhibitions of Divine 
Agency….‖138  His affirmation is rooted in his consistent ecclesiological emphasis on the 
Church as the Body of Christ: ―what His material Body was when He was visible on 
earth, such is the Church now.  It is the instrument of His Divine Power…‖139  Newman 
clarifies that Christ now acts in his Church through the Holy Spirit: ―[the Church‘s] 
outward rites and forms are nourished and animated by the living power which dwells 
within it.‖140  In the next section I will explain Newman‘s position that God‘s continuing 
                                               
135 U.S., 333.  
136 Newman interpreted the Church Fathers as giving a priority to Scripture above all other sources of faith.  
In an 1835 letter to Hurrell Froude he wrote, ―The more I read of Athanasius, Theodoret etc, the more I see 
that the ancients did make Scripture the basis of their belief… [the Creed] is the authentic record & 
document of this faith… for the Holy Catholic Church etc [[in it]] is but the medium through which God 
comes to us.  Now the θεολογια, I say, the Fathers do certainly rest upon Scripture, as upon two tables of 
stone‖ (L.D., 5: 126).       
137 Ess., 2: 192; Merrigan, Clear Heads and Holy Hearts, 83. 
138 G.A., 107.  
139 P.S., 4: 250.  Ker maintains ―that Newman both as an Anglican and a Roman Catholic had the same 
sacramental conception of the Church as the Body of Christ, the temple of the Holy Spirit, or the 
communion of the baptized‖ (―The Church as Communion,‖ in Cambridge Companion to Newman, 139).     
140 P.S., 5: 41.  Another instance of the patristic character of Newman‘s thought is his insistence that the 
work of Christ and the Holy Spirit not be separated, going so far as to write, ―This indeed is a mystery, how 
God the Son and God the Holy Ghost, two Persons, can be one, how He can be in the Spirit and the Spirit 
in Him; but so it is‖ (P.S., 4: 249).   
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actions in history through the Church are received by corresponding actions on the part of 
men and women.  
 
C. REVELATION AS “IMPRESSION”: THE RECEIVED IMPRESSION OF REVELATION 
 I wrote above that Newman‘s concept of the impression implies the relational 
character of his theology of revelation.  According to Newman, God not only impresses 
Himself on men and women through historical actions and events, but men and women 
personally receive this impression in their ―imaginations,‖ and immediately seek to 
rationally understand and conceptualize this impression.  Their reception of God‘s 
impression of Himself thus implies an active role on their part in the very process of 
revelation, which has important implications for Newman‘s theory of doctrinal 
development.  Moreover, I will also discuss the active role of the entire Church in 
receiving this impression, which, Newman claims, God also makes on the ―mind of the 
Church.‖  
 Newman holds that human beings exhibit both passivity and activity in their 
reception of God‘s impression of Himself through historical actions and events.  Indeed, 
in the human reception of an object, there is the initial moment of passivity when the 
object imprints itself on both the physical and mental senses.  However, the human mind 
immediately begins an active categorization of this impression according to physical 
traits such as color, shape, and size, and moral traits such as beauty, goodness, and truth, 
so that one might claim that the passive impression of an object is inseparable from the 
active apprehension of it.  Newman deems the ―imagination‖ as the special sphere of this 
activity.  The imagination, writes Walgrave, is ―our entire faculty of knowing the 
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concrete,‖ and involves ―an act of synthesis, namely, the active apprehension, through the 
impressions received, of existing reality.‖141  
Newman thus emphasizes that human beings play an active role in the process of 
receiving revelation.  God impresses Himself on men and women, and they receive this 
impression through apprehending it with the aid of the imagination.  Their active 
reception of revelation derives from their status as persons.  Newman understands 
revelation to consist of the establishment of a relation between God and an individual 
person through God‘s impression of Himself and the person‘s reception of that 
impression.  God ―is found through His preachers [here understood as all those 
―secondary means‖ of communicating revelation in the post-Apostolic age], to have 
imprinted the Image or idea of Himself in the minds of His subjects individually…‖142  
Facilitating the human reception of this impression is God‘s grace, which accounts for the 
difference Newman sees as existing between the impressions of material objects and 
religious objects.  ―… [N]o such faculties have been given us, as far as we know, for 
realizing the Objects of Faith,‖ writes Newman.  Between all those historical actions and 
events that are the media of God‘s impression of Himself, ―man sees no necessary 
bond.‖143  Thus, Newman maintains that men and women need grace in order to attribute 
the impression of these actions and events to God.  This is the grace of faith, ―for faith 
                                               
141 Walgrave, Newman the Theologian, 108.  Walgrave also points out that Newman described this same 
faculty of knowing the concrete as ―instinct,‖ ―intuition,‖ ―perception,‖ and ―real apprehension.‖   
142 G.A., 359.  When he was made a cardinal, Newman chose for his motto the phrase ―cor ad cor loquitur‖ 
(―heart speaks to heart‖).142  One may fairly substitute ―persona‖ for ―cor‖ in order to produce a fitting 
summary of Newman‘s theology of revelation: ―Persona ad personam loquitur‖—―Person speaks to 
person.‖        
143 P.S., 2: 213.   
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impresses the mind with supernatural truths, as if it were sight, and the faith of this man, 
and the faith of that, is one and the same, and creates one and the same impression.‖144 
The individual person then receives this graced impression according to his or her 
particularity.  Newman claims that the human reception of the impression is in part 
conditioned by what he refers to as ―first principles.‖  By ―first principles,‖ Newman 
means both the conscious and unconscious starting points of our knowledge; those truths 
we have accepted as ―givens‖ and through which we view the world and judge our 
encounters with it.  They are  
the recondite sources of all knowledge, as to which logic provides no common 
measure of minds—which are accepted by some, rejected by others,—in which, 
and not in the syllogistic exhibitions, lies the whole problem of attaining to 
truth,—and which are called self-evident by their respective advocates because 
they are evident in no other way.
145
   
 
These principles are formed in part by our shared human nature, and in part by our 
individual traits and context.  As Merrigan explains, 
The former flow spontaneously from certain experiences which belong to us by 
 nature.  Those experiences can never be completely absent.  The latter are the 
 direct issue of decidedly individual doings and undergoings, and involve a 
 graduated scale of personal responsibility.
146
 
 
Thus, men‘s and women‘s first principles are of a personal nature not only 
because they are based upon their particular experiences, but also because they are in part 
products of their free will.
147
  Though men and women are for the most part unconscious 
                                               
144 Diff., 289.   
145 G.A., 216. 
146 Merrigan, Clear Heads and Holy Hearts, 214.  In making this point, Merrigan references the article of 
his mentor, Jan Walgrave, ―Newman‘s beschrijiving en verantwoording van het werkelijk denken,‖ 
Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 1 (1939), 544-545, and J.H. Walgrave, J.H. Newman: His Personality, His 
Principles, His Fundamental Doctrines: Course Delivered by Professor J.H. Walgrave, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven 1975-1976-1977 (Leuven, Belgium: By the Author, K.U.L., 1981), 48-49.   
147 On the personal character of first principles, see also Walgrave, Newman the Theologian, 122: ―All 
together, [first principles] are the expression of our personality.  Our common nature, social position, 
individual gifts, personal acquirements, these are what our mind expresses in the form of first principles.  
36 
 
of these principles and their operation in their assents, Newman holds that they are 
responsible for some of them: ―Certainly [first principles] are not necessarily true; and, 
again, certainly there are ways of unlearning them when they are false: moreover, as 
regards moral and religious First Principles which are false, of course a Catholic 
considers that no one holds them except by his own fault…‖148  Because men and women 
arrive form these first principles through their free response to experience, they factor 
into the active role exercised by human persons in their response to revelation.    
 According to Newman, the impression of revelation exists not only in the minds 
of individual Christians, but also in what he refers to as the ―mind of the Church.‖  As an 
Anglican, Newman alluded to revelation existing in the ―bosom of the Church itself.‖149  
Beginning with the fifteenth Oxford University Sermon, Newman gives a more 
epistemological tone to his metaphor by deeming revelation to exist within the ―mind of 
the Church.‖  He discovered, however, that Roman Catholic theology of the time was 
uncomfortable with the idea of a common mind that was shared by all the faithful.  He 
had referred to the ―Catholic mind‖ in his 1847 ―Newman-Perrone Paper on 
Development,‖ but had written in a parenthetical note to W.G. Ward a couple of years 
later that ―Perrone does not seem to allow me to speak of the consciousness or intellect of 
the Church.‖150  Newman‘s silence on the ―mind of the Church‖ in ―On Consulting the 
Faithful in Matters of Doctrine‖ (1859)—where the phrase would have been particularly 
                                                                                                                                            
Character, temperament, personal cast of mind, practical attitudes, the level of culture, the history of the 
individual, his moral condition, all these factors, and other too, combine in the setting up of our first 
principles.  Now, if these are personal, so it thought as a whole.‖  See also Prepos., 260-261; G.A., 216-
217, 222, 284-285, 287-288, 321.  
148 Prepos., 279.   
149 V.M., 1: 250.   
150 ―Newman-Perrone Paper on Development,‖ 413-414; L.D., 13: 82.  See also Samuel D. Femiano, 
Infallibility of the Laity: The Legacy of Newman (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), and Allen Brent, 
―Newman and Perrone: Unreconcilable Theses on Development,‖ Downside Review 102 (1984): 276-289.    
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suitable to the subject—further illustrates his desire to avoid any unnecessary controversy 
with Rome.  As a result of the boundaries of his milieu, Newman‘s concept of the ―mind 
of the Church‖ remained undeveloped during his lifetime.   
 Toward the end of the 1868 ―Letter to Flanagan,‖ which contains Newman‘s most 
direct treatment of the concept, Newman poses the question: ―What is meant by the mind 
of the Church?‖  Newman attempts an answer to his question, but his answer is 
circumscribed by the parameters of the discussion that prompted the letter, namely, the 
question of the infallibility of the Church.
151
  The letter ultimately accounts for only one 
aspect of the mind of the Church, namely, its ability to pronounce on matters of faith 
when called upon to do so.  Newman‘s question therefore deserves a better answer than 
he was able to give at the time.   
Assuredly, Newman sees the mind of the Church as a function of the corporate 
identity of the Church as the Body of Christ.  Yet, he also recognizes that a mind or 
intellect belongs properly to a person, and that the Church is not a person.
152
  He writes in 
the Grammar about ―that Image, apprehended and worshipped in individual minds, [that] 
becomes a principle of association, and a real bond of those subjects one with another, 
who are thus united to the body by being united to that Image…‖153  In part, then, he 
understands the mind of the Church to consist of that collective apprehension of God‘s 
impression of Himself as it exists in the minds of individual members, or persons, of the 
Church.  This aspect of the mind of the Church corresponds to the consensus fidelium, 
                                               
151 Newman, ―Letter to Flanagan,‖ in The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Biblical 
Inspiration and on Infallibility, ed. J. Derek Holmes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 159-160.  Newman 
addressed the letter to Fr. John Stanislas Flanagan, a parish priest in Ireland, who wished Newman to 
clarify his position on the Apostles‘ knowledge of the deposit of faith.  
152 Newman, ―Flanagan,‖ 159: ―… for the Church is not a person, as an Apostle is, but is merely made up 
of Fathers & theologians, and how can they altogether have one mind, which is not the mind of each?‖  
153 G.A., 359.   
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which Newman defines as ―a sort of instinct, or phronema, deep in the bosom of the 
mystical body of Christ.‖154  But, in ―Flanagan,‖ he also claims this mind existed in its 
fullness in the Apostles, and then was handed on in its fullness to the Church, but does 
not now exist ―habitually‖ in its fullness in any of its members, even the pope.  Thus, 
Newman describes the mind of the Church as at the same time internal and external to its 
members. 
There is a need to posit the existence of a mediating principle in order to explain 
Newman‘s contention that the mind of the Church is both internal and external to its 
members.  Newman appears to claim that the Holy Spirit serves as this mediating 
principle.  In the Via Media he attributes a Pauline origin to this link between the mind of 
the Church and the Spirit when he describes the Church‘s understanding of revelation 
(Tradition) as ―what St. Paul calls ‗the mind of the Spirit,‘ the thought and principle 
which breathed in the Church, her accustomed and unconscious mode of viewing things, 
and the body of her received notions, than any definite and systematic collection of 
dogmas elaborated by the intellect.‖155  In ―Flanagan‖ Newman wonderfully links 
Christology and Pneumatology in describing the Church‘s possession of revelation in its 
fullness as ―a living, present treasury of the Mind of the Spirit of Christ.‖156   
 The close link Newman posits between the mind of the Church and the mind of 
the Spirit helps explain some of the characteristics of the former alluded to above.  
Newman maintains that the mind of the Church existed in its fullness in the Apostles 
precisely because they were inspired, that is, precisely because the Holy Spirit was 
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specially working through the Apostles during their lives.
157
  The Apostles communicated 
this ―mind‖ to the Church through Scripture, the Creed, and other manifestations of the 
Christian idea, but also through the sacraments.  The Church understood as comprised of 
its members does indeed have a collective consciousness inasmuch as the members share 
a common bond of God‘s impression of Himself.  But, according to Newman, this 
consciousness alone does not amount to the fullness of revelation.  This fullness only 
exists in the mind of the Spirit, without whom ―no one can say, ‗Jesus is Lord‘‖ (1 Cor 
12:3).  It is the Spirit who acts as the ―common bond‖ of the members of the Church, and 
who is the ―person‖ in which the mind of the Church can truly be said to dwell.  Thus, I 
hold that the mind of the Church is a participatory concept for Newman: it is a 
participation of the minds of the Church‘s members in the mind of the Spirit who dwells 
within them individually and the Church collectively.  
 Newman‘s references to the ―mind of the Church‖ were ultimately directed 
toward explaining his theory of doctrinal development, which has recourse to an analogy 
between the individual and the corporate manner of apprehension.  According to 
Newman, when an individual receives an impression of an object on his or her mind, he 
or she can be said to have an implicit knowledge of that object as a whole, as a unity.  
The reasoning process is the making explicit of this implicit knowledge of an object; it is 
the ―tracing out of our ideas and impressions,‖158 the latter of which come to us with an 
initial vagueness.  Newman maintains that just as an individual Christian mind possesses 
an implicit knowledge of revelation as a whole, so too does the mind of the Church, and 
―the absence, or partial absence, or incompleteness of dogmatic statements is no proof of 
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the absence of impressions or implicit judgments, in the mind of the Church.‖159  
Doctrinal development, for Newman, is the process whereby the mind of the Church 
makes explicit what it knows implicitly through the impression God has made of Himself 
on it.  It is the reflection by various minds who ―analyze, verify, methodize, and exhibit‖ 
what is essentially contained in the impression that has been communicated to the Church 
per modum unius.
160
   
 Newman emphasizes in his fifteenth Oxford University Sermon the ―reality and 
permanence of inward [or implicit] knowledge, as distinct from explicit confession.‖161  
This emphasis is important given the nature of Owen Chadwick‘s suggestion that 
Newman‘s particular theory of development implies that new doctrinal definitions are 
new revelations.  Chadwick writes,  
…we are in difficulties about the language in which these ―new‖ doctrines are 
expressed.  This language is new language.  As language it is not part of the 
original revelation.  Nor is it a restatement of part of the revelation already 
expressed in propositions.  Nor is it logically deducible from the original 
revelation, since you cannot ―infer‖ propositions from a wordless experience or 
feeling or (in Newman‘s sense) ―idea‖… Newman‘s theory, like that of Suarez, is 
dependent upon the contention that definition by the Church is ―equivalent‖ to 
revelation.  If it were established (for example) in Catholic theology that 
―revelation ended at the death of the last apostle,‖ Newman‘s theory could hardly 
survive without a restatement so drastic as to leave it almost unrecognizable.
162
  
 
As Ker rightly points out, Chadwick‘s suggestion is based on the erroneous conclusion 
―that what is ‗wordless‘ must therefore be ‗feeling.‘‖163  Ker thus repeats Newman‘s 
assertion that the implicit knowledge contained within the human reception of God‘s 
impression of Himself is, in fact, a true knowledge.  Chadwick had acknowledged that 
                                               
159 U.S., 323.   
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161 U.S., 323.   
162 Chadwick, 160.   
163 Ker, ―Newman‘s theory—Development or continuing Revelation?‖ in Newman and Gladstone 
Centennial Essay, ed. James D. Bastable (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1978), 148.  
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this impression was ―in part a proposition-bearing impression.‖164  Ker counters, ―But 
Newman‘s point is that original ideas are essentially simple intuitions, all of which are 
ultimately and in theory susceptible to comprehension in propositional form… they 
cannot be divided up into propositional and feeling or experiential parts.‖165  In other 
words, Ker opposes Chadwick by claiming that Newman considered experience to be a 
form of knowledge.  
 The pneumatological character of Newman‘s understanding of the ―mind of the 
Church‖ also further illustrates the relational, or dialogical, character of doctrinal 
development.  In the Essay on Development, Newman conceives development as a 
dialogue where men and women grow in their understanding of the Christian idea 
through interacting with other minds and ideas: ―it is carried on through and by means of 
communities of men… and it employs their minds as its instruments… it developes by 
establishing relations between itself and them…‖166  I have argued that Newman‘s 
concept of the ―mind of the Church‖ includes not only the collective instinct of the 
individual members, but also the ―mind of the Spirit,‖ in which Christians participate.  
The fullness of understanding exists only in the Spirit, and the development of doctrine is 
thus a process where the mind of the Church grows in its understanding of revelation in 
dialogue with the mind of the Spirit. 
 The Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation is the fulfillment of a call 
contained within its initial reception of revelation.  As Newman shows, the persons who 
constitute the Church begin a free and active process of reception the moment God 
impresses Himself on them.  Doctrinal development is but the Church‘s continuation of 
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this active process of reception.  It is the history of the Church‘s active reception of what 
God has impressed on them in and through history.   
 
1.2: FLOROVSKY ON THE MODE AND CHARACTER OF REVELATION 
In his patrologies Florovsky begins his analysis of the work of St. Maximus the 
Confessor by claiming that his ―whole system can be understood most easily from the 
idea of Revelation."
167
  Florovsky could have appropriately applied this statement to 
himself, for much of his writings are either directly or indirectly concerned with 
elaborating and defending an orthodox, Christian understanding of revelation.
168
  His 
theology of revelation serves as an introduction to the emphases that permeate his 
understanding of the entire Christian theological system; it ―is that proto-fact to which 
any theological reflection goes back.‖169  After presenting these emphases of Florovsky‘s 
theology of revelation, I will show how they are further illustrated in his opposition to the 
forms of de-Christianized Hellenism he perceived in both the patristic age and his own 
era.  Furthermore, I will show in Chapters Two and Three, respectively, that they 
undergird his understandings of Tradition and ecclesiastical authority. 
 
A. REVELATION AS DIVINE “EVENT” 
Consistent with the radically Christocentric tenor of Florovsky‘s theology, his 
theology of revelation begins with the Incarnation.  ―Christ,‖ writes Florovsky, ―is both 
the alpha and omega, the ‗first‘ and ‗last,‘ as well as the center.  In another sense, Christ 
                                               
167 V9, 215. 
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Totus Christus: Die Theologie Georges V. Florovskys (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991).   
169 V9, 215.     
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is precisely Beginning.‖170  Florovsky holds that the Incarnation serves as both the axis of 
history and the hermeneutical key for interpreting what the Bible demonstrates is ―a 
comprehensive vision of history, a perspective of an unfolding time, running from a 
‗beginning‘ to an ‗end,‘ and guided by the sovereign will of God toward the 
accomplishment of His ultimate purpose.‖171 
Florovsky‘s emphasis on the Incarnation includes the corresponding emphasis 
that the entire meaning of history is centered upon a person, namely, the person of Christ.  
He attributes this Christocentric personalism to the Church Fathers: ―The main theme of 
Patristic theology was always the Mystery of Christ‘s Person.‖  In particular, Florovsky 
regards the Christological dogma formulated at Chalcedon as itself a midpoint and 
hermeneutical key for Christian theology.  He maintains that ―one can evolve the whole 
body of Orthodox belief out of the Dogma of Chalcedon.‖172  Florovsky sees Chalcedon 
as the starting point of the Church‘s attempt to achieve a Christological synthesis when it 
dogmatically defined the enhypostasized divine and human natures of Christ.
173
  As I will 
show, Florovsky wonderfully illustrates the centrality of Chalcedon in his own theology 
of revelation by portraying revelation as a synergy of divine and human actions.
174
 
Florovsky‘s synthetic view of history from the perspective of the Incarnation 
illustrates balance by not diminishing the significance of history either preceding or 
following the Incarnation.  He recognizes that the Christian views history as a whole 
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―definitely linear from the beginning to the end‖ in which the parts plays a role in 
bringing about that end.
175
  Though Florovsky acknowledged that ―no more than a 
‗hypothetical‘ (or ‗convenient‘) answer can be given‖ to the Anselmian question of Cur 
Deus Homo?, his preference was to assume with Maximus the Confessor that it was 
inscribed in the very ―logos and skopos‖ of creation.176  Behind this preference, as 
Jaroslav Pelikan has perceptively noted, is Florovsky‘s concern with proposing ―a 
doctrine of the Incarnation that does not negate, but in fact requires, ‗the context of the 
general doctrine of Creation.‘‖177  As such, Florovsky‘s Christocentrism can also claim 
that ―the very fact of Creation constitutes the basic paradox of the Christian faith, to 
which all other mysteries of God can be traced back, or rather in which they are 
implied.‖178  Indeed, as I will now illustrate, one discovers the principal truths of 
Florovsky‘s theology of revelation within his elaboration of the Christian understanding 
of creation. 
In common with the patristic tradition as represented by Maximus, Florovsky 
identifies the ―logos and skopos‖ of creation as the deification, or theosis, of men and 
women.  In ―Creation and Creaturehood‖ (1928) he writes, ―The limit and goal of 
creaturely striving and becoming is divinization [θἐωσις] or deification [θεοποίησις].‖179  
―[This] telos,‖ he writes, ―is implied in the very design of Creation.‖180  With Maximus, 
Florovsky acknowledges that this telos of theosis could not be accomplished without the 
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Incarnation.  ―For St. Maximus,‖ writes Florovsky, ―the Incarnation is the focus of the 
world‘s existence—and not only in the plan of redemption but also in the primordial plan 
for the creation of the world… Man is created so that God may become man and through 
the Incarnation man is deified.‖181 
  In some essays Florovsky exhibits a certain reticence regarding the term theosis.  
It is, he writes, a ―daring word‖ that is ―rather offensive for the modern ear‖ and ―quite 
embarrassing, if we would think in ‗ontological categories.‘‖182  Yet, Florovsky at the 
same time recognizes that the doctrine of theosis ―was the common conviction of the 
Greek Fathers,‖183 and he affirms the implications of the term throughout his oeuvre.  
Florovsky understands the essence of theosis to be ―a personal encounter.  It is that 
intimate intercourse of man with God, in which the whole of human existence is, as it 
were, permeated by the Divine Presence.‖184  Florovsky also emphasizes that the telos of 
creation includes the transformation of all creation: ―the ‗whole creation‘ was expected to 
share or to participate in that ultimate ‗re-novation,‘…‖185  But he makes clear that this 
aspect of the telos is subordinated to, and contingent upon, the deification of men and 
women, the ―microcosmoi,‖ and their personal relationship with God.186             
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a sort of ‗microcosm,‘ every kind of life is combined in him, and in him only the whole world comes into 
contact with God‖ (V3, 106).  Florovsky‘s recourse to the microcosm concept is also another instance of 
the tremendous influence of Maximus on his theology, for, he writes, ―The idea of the central position of 
man in the cosmos is strongly emphasized in the theological system of St. Maximus the Confessor‖ (V3, 
283n19).     
46 
 
Florovsky interprets the term ―creation‖ as synonymous with the distinctive 
Judeo-Christian concept of creatio ex nihilo.
187
  ―The world is created,‖ he writes.  ―That 
means: the world came out of nothing.‖188  Florovsky understood the Christian doctrine 
of creation to be the fruit of the early Christological controversies, especially the Arian 
crisis: ―The Fathers of the fourth century, in their struggle against Arian heresy, were 
specially concerned with a clear definition of Creation.‖189  For Athanasius, writes 
Florovsky, the doctrine of creation ―was intimately related to the crucial message of the 
Christian faith: the redemptive Incarnation of the Divine Word.‖190  Florovsky 
particularly emphasizes two interrelated truths that emerged from the patristic reflection 
on creation, namely, freedom and personhood.  These truths are crucial elements of his 
theology of revelation. 
Florovsky‘s theology of revelation is punctuated by his raising of a number of 
antinomies that the Christian must hold in tension.  Accordingly, he describes the idea of 
creation as ―basically antinomical,‖ and its attendant concept of freedom as ―always 
essentially antinomical,‖ too.191  God is a necessary, immutable being who has always 
existed.  In creating something out of nothing, however, God acts in bringing into being a 
contingent reality, that is, something that did not have to exist.  Writes Florovsky, ―To 
say: the world is created is, first of all, to emphasize its radical continengcy… a created 
                                               
187 On the uniqueness of Christian idea of creation, see V3, 51; V4, 39-40; ―Idea of Creation,‖ 53-54.  I 
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world is a world which might not have existed at all.‖192  Thus, the idea of creation 
discloses the antinomy of a necessary, immutable being who acts by creating something 
essentially non-necessary.  The Fathers wished to respect this antinomy while at the same 
time affirming the divinity of the Son and Spirit.  In order to do so, they differentiated 
between the creation of the world and the respective generation and procession of the Son 
and the Spirit from the Father.  With Athanasius, Florovsky maintains that ―creating is an 
act of will [ἐκ βοσλήματος], and therefore is sharply distinguished from the Divine 
generation, which is an act of nature [γεννᾶ κατὰ υύσιν].‖193   
Inasmuch as creation is an act of the divine will, it testifies to God‘s freedom—a 
point that Florovsky considered well expressed by the ―Subtle Doctor‖ Duns Scotus: 
―The creation of things is executed by God not out of any necessity, whether of essence 
or of knowledge or of will, but out of a sheer freedom which is not moved—much less 
constrained—by anything external that it should have to be a cause.‖194  Once it has been 
established that creation is a free act of God‘s will, Florovsky recognizes that one must 
admit a distinction in God that the Eastern tradition has formulated as the distinction 
between God‘s ―essence and His energies.‖  If creation was an act of God‘s essence or 
nature, it would mean that creation was always in existence, and indeed, is God.  
Furthermore, it would not be a free act, since willing involves giving existence to that 
                                               
192 Ibid., 54; V3, 51.  
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which previously did not exist.  Therefore, Florovsky describes creation as an act of 
God‘s energies—―the powers and operations of God‖ that proceed from His will.195 
In the Florovskian schema, God‘s free will, as illustrated in His creation of the 
world, is a function of His personhood.  More accurately, it is a function of the 
Trinitarian personhood: ―Creation is a deed of the Divine will, and this will is common to 
and identical in all Three Persons of the One God.‖196  According to Florovsky, ―The idea 
of personality itself was probably the greatest Christian contribution to philosophy.‖197  
This statement has been born out in the work of Florovsky‘s student, John Zizioulas, who 
has developed an ontology of personhood based upon what he views as the patristic 
understanding of the person as fundamentally one who is in relation.
198
  Unlike Zizioulas, 
however, Florovsky does not attempt to locate specific texts that testify to the Fathers‘ 
personalism.  Rather, he sees it implied in their theology of creation and their personalist 
Christocentrism.  One should also note that Florovsky‘s personalism owes a debt not only 
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the Church (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1985) and Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in 
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to the Fathers, but also to the work of the modern French philosopher Charles Renouvier 
(1815-1903).
199
   
 As a free act of the Trinitarian Persons, Florovsky assigns to creation a term that 
is all-important in his theology of revelation, namely, ―event.‖  In ―The Predicament of 
the Christian Historian‖ (1959)—which Rowan Williams has called ―a philosophically 
systematic defense‖ of Florovsky‘s Neo-patristic program—Florovsky quotes the English 
historian Robin Collinwood (1889-1943) who defines ―event‖ at the same time he 
critiques the term: ―What is miscalled an ‗event‘ is really an action, and expresses some 
thought (intention, purpose) of its agent…‖200  Collingwood‘s definition of event as an 
action, a free action, serves in its simplicity as a fitting summary of Florovsky‘s 
understanding of the term.  In his writings Florovsky repeatedly uses the terms ―facts,‖ 
―deeds,‖ and ―actions‖ interchangeably with the term ―events.‖   
Unfortunately, the simplicity of Florovsky‘s few descriptions of the term ―event‖ 
reveals a lack of philosophical analysis of the concept in his writings.  He is so emphatic 
about the free and personal character of events that he borders on the tautological when 
he attempts analysis.  For example, in ―In the World of Quests and Wanderings‖ (1923), 
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Florovsky seemingly introduces a significant addition to the definition of ―event‖ by 
writing that it ―turns out to be a ‗meaning‘ and a ‗value,‘ a manifestation of ‗other 
worlds.‘‖  However, in the very next paragraph he makes a statement that simply equates 
the new term ―value‖ with ―event‖: ―The birth of any value is free; it is accomplished 
through the creative deed of the personality.‖201  
 As an aside, I wish to also note that Florovsky‘s understanding of ―event‖ reveals 
a certain allergy to form.  This allergy is in part attributable to his desire to stress the 
uniqueness and contingency of the event.  Also, as I will explain below, Florovsky 
considered experience and interpretation to be constitutive of the event, and to represent 
the ―‗formedness‘ that is of true value.‖202  Furthermore, Florovsky opposed his 
understanding of history as events to the Idealist view of history, where ―the notion of 
form remains here always the final and highest value.‖203  It is important to remember 
this allergy to form evident in Florovsky‘s understanding of event, for it plays a negative 
role in other aspects of his theology—most significantly, his theology of ecclesiastical 
authority.    
 Creation‘s character as an event serves for Florovsky as a pattern for the rest of 
history.  ―History,‖ he writes, ―is a field of action‖; it is comprised primarily of ―actions, 
or complexes of actions,‖ both divine and human.204  Thus, Florovsky primarily describes 
divine revelation as ―the system of divine deeds; one might say, revelation was the path 
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Russia, 1890-1918, ed. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak and Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (Newtonville, MA: 
Oriental Research Partners, 1982), 238, 239. 
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of God in history.‖205  ―The revelation of God,‖ he writes, ―consists of a series of events 
rather than a chain of symbols.‖206  The Scriptures recount the history of these divine 
deeds: ―They tell us still the story of salvation, Magnalia Dei.‖207  Christianity, which 
Florovsky consistently deems the fulfillment of the Old Testament and Israel, ―consists of 
nothing but events.‖208  According to Florovsky, Christianity is history.209  He writes, ―It 
comprises the whole of existence in a single historical scheme as one ‗History of 
Salvation,‘ from Creation to Consummation, to the Last Judgment and the End of history.  
Emphasis is put on the ultimate cruciality of certain historic events, namely, of the 
Incarnation, of the Coming of the Messiah, and of his Cross and Resurrection.‖210  
Florovsky holds that the event-character of Christianity was especially affirmed by the 
Fathers, whose theology he refers to as a ―theology of facts,‖ and he claims that such a 
theology is ―the only sound Orthodox theology.‖211   
Florovsky thus expresses the category of ―event‖ as the thread linking all of 
salvation history, punctuated by the beginning event of creation, the middle event of the 
Incarnation, and the final event of the parousia.  Using the patristic vocabulary, he 
designates all divinely-enacted events as part of God‘s οἰκονομία, as distinct from the 
inner-Trinitarian θεολογία.212  To use Florovsky‘s term, the ―cruciality‖ of these events 
for him consists not only in their revelatory character—that they reveal truths about God 
to men and women—but in the fact that they actually accomplish something.  As 
                                               
205 V1, 21; V3, 23; Florovsky, ―The Work of the Holy Spirit in Revelation,‖ Journal of the Fellowship of 
St. Alban and St. Sergius 17 (September 1932): 8.   
206 V12, 35.   
207 V1, 23.   
208 V12, 35.   
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210 V2, 31-32.   
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Florovsky maintains, the Scripture narrative ―is more than merely a narrative; it relates 
not only something that took place, but something that was realized and completed.‖213 
In his writings on revelation, Florovsky tends to make an unfortunate distinction 
between divine ―events‖ and divine ―words.‖  Thus, in ―Revelation, Philosophy and 
Theology‖ he writes that ―Revelation is not only a system of divine words but also a 
system of divine acts…‖214  A similar qualification appears in ―The Work of the Holy 
Spirit in Revelation,‖ the only difference being that Florovsky substitutes the word 
―works‖ for ―acts.‖215  Lest one think this distinction is only a mark of his essays on 
revelation from the 1930s, Florovsky writes in a later essay, ―Revelation and 
Interpretation‖ (1951), that ―Historic events are the source and the basis of all Christian 
faith and hope. The basis of the New Testament is facts, events, deeds—not only 
teaching, commandments or words.‖216  His repeated qualification that revelation consists 
of events, and not only words, is undoubtedly directed toward a Protestant identification 
of revelation with the Scriptural text.  However, Florovsky should have clarified that 
divine words are also divine events inasmuch as they are the product of God‘s free 
activity.   
Consistent with his Christocentrism, Florovsky regards the Incarnation as ―the 
event of all events.‖217  ―This point is the center of history, of the ‗history of salvation,‘ 
die Heilgeschichte,‖ he writes.218  The event of the Incarnation refers back to the original 
event of creation inasmuch as it is both the fulfillment of creation and the beginning of 
                                               
213 Florovsky, ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 10; V12, 78.   
214 V3, 24.  
215 Florovsky, ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 8.   
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the new creation.  In defending the newness of the Incarnation, Florovsky lauds the words 
of Kierkegaard: ―God enters the world… Something new happens.  This new reality is 
the beginning of eternity!‖219  With the Incarnation Christianity has an ―‗experience of 
novelty,‘ a ‗Neuheitserlebnis‘‖ that provided ―the solution of an existential predicament 
in which mankind was hopelessly imprisoned.‖220  In ―Predicament,‖ Florovsky wrote 
that one could conceive of an event as either an action or ―complexes of action.‖221  He 
clearly intends the latter when referring to the Incarnation, which term he uses to 
designate ―the Incarnate life of the Son, ‗with all that for our sakes was brought to pass, 
the Cross and tomb, the Resurrection the third day, the Ascension into Heaven, the sitting 
on the right hand‘ (Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, Prayer of Consecration).‖222 
What is more, Florovsky considers that the actions and events inaugurated by the 
Incarnation are continued in and through the Church.  Florovsky‘s ecclesiology is above 
all marked by his conception of the Church as the Body of Christ—that Pauline image 
whose renewed emphasis in contemporary theology he considered essential to his 
program of Neo-patristic synthesis.
223
  In his frequently repeated homage to St. 
Augustine, Florovsky refers to the Church as ―the Whole Christ – totus Christus, caput et 
corpus.‖224  Through the Church, which is the ―continuation and the fulfillment of the 
theanthropic union,‖ ―God‘s Revelation continues coming down to us.‖225  Writes 
Florovsky, ―Christ appeared and still appears before us not only in the Scriptures; He 
                                               
219 V12, 37.  On the Incarnation as the new creation, see also V2, 59; V3, 23.    
220 V4, 65.  Florovsky here probably takes the description of Christianity as ―Neuheitserlebnis‖ from Karl 
Prümm‘s Christentum als Neuheitserlebnis (Freiburg: Herder, 1939).      
221 V2, 48.   
222 V1, 64.  
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unchangeably and unceasingly reveals Himself in the Church, in His own Body.‖226  In 
the Church, ―the Heilsgeschichte is effectively continued‖ through the Liturgy, the 
sacraments, dogma—indeed, the entire matrix of the Church‘s life.227  Thus, Florovsky 
affirms that Christ continues to act in history through His Church, ―knit together‖ by the 
Holy Spirit.  Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that the Church ―is a part of revelation—
the story of the Holy Ghost.‖228   
Florovsky also refers to the events surrounding Christ‘s Incarnation—―[his] 
coming into the world, his Incarnation, his Cross and Resurrection, and the Descent of 
the Holy Spirit‖—as ―eschatological events.‖229  In part Florovsky deems these events 
eschatological because they accomplished the redemption of the world, which is the sine 
qua non of the eschaton.  It is also ―because [these events] are situated in a sequence of 
the antecedent events, and thereby validate retrospectively the whole series.‖230  
However, there is a third reason why Florovsky designates these events as eschatological.  
Through Christ‘s coming, Florovsky maintains that ―time was validated… It was 
‗consecrated‘ and given meaning, the new meaning.  In the light of Christ‘s coming 
history now appears as a ‗pro-gress,‘ inwardly ordered toward ‗the end,‘ to which it 
unfailingly precipitates.‖231  The ―meaning‖ of the time since Christ‘s coming consists of 
the fact that the historical actions and events preceding the eschaton are in actuality 
constitutive of it.  These include both the actions of Christ through his Body, the Church, 
and the actions of men and women who contribute to the building up of this Body.  
                                               
226 V1, 48.   
227 V2, 62.   
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Florovsky refers to these actions as ―prophetic‖ and ―sacramental,‖ and thus, 
revelatory.
232
    
The understanding of revelation as event described above leads Florovsky to 
reject the formula that revelation ended with the death of the last Apostle.  In a lesser 
known publication of 1968, ―The Patterns of Historical Interpretation,‖ Florovsky 
laments, 
And unfortunately even first-class historians are sometimes using these strange 
phrases: ―with the death of the last apostle.‖  It is an absolutely impossible 
historical date—because nobody can verify it—and it is unclear which Apostles 
were meant, the twelve or some wider group.  What is the use of this phrase when 
it is said that ―the normative period continues till the death of the last apostle,‖ 
when nobody knows when it was… Actually, it is just a romance of fiction.233 
 
In this passage, Florovsky ostensibly rejects the formula as an arbitrary historical 
construction that is impossible to verify.  However, other texts reveal that Florovsky‘s 
rejection is not solely based on historiographical considerations.  Elsewhere, Florovsky 
designates the event of Pentecost as the end of divine revelation: ―On the day of 
Pentecost Revelation was completed, and will admit of no further completion till the Day 
of Judgment and its last fulfillment.‖234  The only possible reason for this designation is 
that Florovsky understood the ―end‖ of revelation to mean that there will be no new 
revelatory events that accomplish or bring about our redemption.  According to 
Florovsky, Pentecost represents the last redemptive event until the Last Judgment:  ―The 
descent of the Spirit was a supreme revelation.  Once and for ever, in the ‗dreadful and 
inscrutable mystery‘ of Pentecost, the Spirit-Comforter enters the world in which He was 
                                               
232 V1, 68.  
233 Florovsky, ―The Patterns of Historical Interpretation,‖ Anglican Theological Review 50:2 (1968): 150.  
This essay is a transcription of a tape recording of an address Florovsky gave in Dallas, TX.  It is 
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not yet present in such manner as now He begins to dwell and to abide.‖235  However, 
one must hold in tension Florovsky‘s belief that revelation ended with Pentecost with his 
affirmation that this event continues in the Church through the abiding of the Holy Spirit 
and the sacramental life of the Church.
236
  To use the antinomical language to which 
Florovsky frequently had recourse, he believed that revelation is at the same time 
completed and continuing.    
 Florovsky‘s understanding of both creation and revelation as ―events‖ begs the 
question about his understanding of the difference between natural and divine revelation.  
In spite of Rowan Williams‘ description of Florovsky‘s essays on revelation from the 
1930s as ―strongly Barthian in tone,‖ they appear to demonstrate a fairly traditional 
understanding of natural revelation.
237
  For instance, Florovsky writes that ―in a certain 
sense the whole world is the Revelation of God.  The creation of the world is a 
revelation… The whole world testifies of God, of His Wisdom, Mercy and Love.  This is 
generally named: ‗Revelation through Nature.‘‖  Indeed, the Maximian influence on 
Florovsky would seem to demand an acknowledgement of the sacramental character of 
the world, though his opposition to German Idealism probably prevented him from 
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emphasizing it.  Florovsky also allows that God is somehow manifested within the human 
person himself or herself, created as he or she is in the image of God.
238
   
 However, Florovsky is ultimately concerned with stressing the difference and 
otherness of divine revelation.  ―So-called ‗natural theology,‘‖ he writes, ―is no theology 
in the true sense of the word.  It is rather a philosophy, a word about the ‗Unknown God,‘ 
towards whom the restless human soul reaches out but has not yet found…‖239  He 
characterizes the difference between natural and divine revelation as the difference 
between ―manifestation‖ and ―Revelation,‖ where only the latter represents ―a direct 
vision of God granted to man…the path of God towards man…the Voice of God 
speaking to man.‖240  Somewhat more helpful is his description of the difference as 
between ―a realm of rupture and interruptions‖ and ―the continuous stream of the world‘s 
natural order.‖241   
These distinctions are not wholly illuminating, and perhaps serve as a reminder 
that Florovsky was primarily a theologian and not an apologist.  They also serve to 
illustrate a point that Florovsky knew well, namely, that an apt phenomenological 
description of the difference between natural revelation and divine revelation is 
impossible.  Nevertheless, and most importantly, Florovsky‘s distinctions between 
natural revelation and divine revelation serve to uphold God‘s freedom, for they entail 
that God can act in different ways and at different times in history.  This affirmation 
seems to be a particular difficulty for those who conflate natural revelation and divine 
revelation.  However, because Florovsky posits a distinction between God‘s essence and 
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energies, he is not forced to conclude that creation and revelation proceed according to a 
common mode, and originate in a singular act. 
As I have demonstrated, Florovsky understood the Christian doctrine of creation 
to exhibit many of the same truths present in other Christian doctrines, including the 
Christian doctrine of revelation.  He portrays both creation and revelation as enacted 
events of the free and personal God for the purpose of the deification of humanity.  Some 
of these same truths are also evident in Florovsky‘s portrayal of the reception of 
revelation by men and women, who are in the image of God.  As I will show in the next 
section, Florovsky stresses that the human reception of revelation is a personal, and thus 
free and active, process in which they strive toward theosis through their knowledge and 
living out of revelation.  I will for the most part limit myself to describing Florovsky‘s 
understanding of the initial human reception of revelation, which acts as a model for the 
Church‘s continued reception of revelation in history.     
 
B. REVELATION AS HUMAN “EXPERIENCE” 
 In order to counter a modern, predominantly Western tendency toward 
Nestorianism, Florovsky proposed what he called an ―asymmetric Christology‖ that 
prioritized the divine nature and person over the human in Christ.
242
  Applied to his 
theology of revelation, Florovsky‘s ―asymmetric Christology‖ manifests itself in his 
emphasis upon the contingent nature of God‘s revelation of Himself.  In other words, 
Florovsky recognizes the initial priority of the divine over the human inasmuch as God 
must first reveal Himself to men and women before they can respond to Him.  However, 
this asymmetry in Florovsky‘s theology of revelation hardly extends beyond this initial 
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priority, as he portrays revelation as a wonderful synergy of both divine and human 
activity.  Indeed, as I will show, Florovsky considers the human response to revelation as 
integral to the substance of divine revelation.  According to Florovsky, this human 
response is personal, free, active, and thus, creative, and characterizes not only men‘s and 
women‘s initial response to revelation, but the continuing response of the Church in 
history. 
 In this section, I will outline the main features of the anthropological character 
that Florovsky assigns to revelation.  He regards revelation as comprised of not only 
divinely-initiated events, but the active human reception of these events.  Revelation, for 
Florovsky, is thus a relational phenomenon where the personal God communicates with 
human persons in order that they may participate in His divine life.  Florovsky expresses 
the initial human reception of revelation as an ―experience‖ to which the Christian person 
attempts to be a witness through his or her askesis in life and thought.  The Christian 
experiences revelation in and through the Church, and strives to express this experience 
in its fullness according to the ―mind of the Church.‖   
 Florovsky illustrates the relational character of revelation by maintaining that it is 
not only a revelation about God, but also a revelation about humankind.  He writes, 
―Revelation is the Word of God and the Word about God.  But, at the same time, in 
addition to this, Revelation is always a Word addressed to man, a summons and an appeal 
to man.  And in Revelation the destiny of man is also revealed.‖243  As already 
established, Florovsky understands this ―destiny‖ as theosis, which means that men‘s and 
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women‘s very destiny is to be in relation with God.  Again, for Florovsky, theosis 
primarily means ―a personal encounter,‖ and is the fulfillment of the true relation that is 
only possible between persons.
244
  In revelation, he writes, ―‗the God of the living‘… 
speaks to living persons‖ and establishes a personal relationship with them that reaches 
its culmination in their participation in His nature.
245
  Florovsky‘s relational 
understanding of revelation extends so far as to claim that ―without man Revelation 
would be impossible—because no one would be there to hear and God would not 
speak.‖246  Thus, both divine and human persons play a role in revelation. 
 In spite of his emphasis on personhood, Florovsky does not provide a 
consideration of its etiology in human beings.  It is fair to assume, however, that 
Florovsky located human beings‘ personhood in their creation in the imago Dei—an 
attribution that Florovsky‘s student Zizioulas has developed.  Like Irenaeus, Florovsky 
maintains that ―the ‗image‘ is in the total structure of man,‖ which includes men‘s and 
women‘s personalities.247  Also like Irenaeus, Florovsky‘s understanding of the imago 
Dei is Christocentric, for ―the ‗image‘ is the Son of God, in whose image man was 
made.‖248   And in line with the Alexandrian Fathers of the Church, he associates the 
―image‖ with rationality and freedom, which are qualities possessed in a supreme manner 
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by the persons of the Trinity.
249
  Florovsky also insists that men‘s and women‘s creation 
in the image of God makes them ―capable of perceiving God, of receiving God‘s Word 
and of preserving it.‖250  As I will explain in Chapter Two, Florovsky understands this 
capability to mean that men and women are able to ―adequately express‖ revelation in 
dogmatic formulations. 
 As I showed in the previous section, one of the principal traits Florovsky assigned 
to personhood was free and creative activity.  In Florovsky‘s theology of revelation, the 
most important consequence of men‘s and women‘s personhood is that it entails an active 
reception of revelation.  Precisely because they are persons, Florovsky believed that men 
and women ―are called to be more than just spectators, but actors in this drama of 
salvation.  For Christians history is not just a stage on which a symbolical play is 
performed and certain eternal values are exhibited.‖251  As Florovsky was wont to 
emphasize, men and women are called not only to listen to God‘s speech, but to answer, 
as well.  Indeed, Florovsky points out that men‘s and women‘s answer itself forms part of 
the content of revelation!  ―In Scripture,‖ he writes, ―we not only hear the Voice of God, 
but also the voice of man answering Him…‖252  It is an obvious, yet often overlooked 
point in presentations of the Christian understanding of revelation. 
 Florovsky frequently used the Russian word podvig and the Greek word askesis to 
express the activity to which human persons are called.  Western Christianity has 
                                               
249 V4, 125.  This passage is taken from Florovsky‘s essay ―Theophilus of Alexandria and Apa Aphou of 
Pemdje,‖ in which he discusses the ―unresolved ambiguity concerning the image of God‖ among the 
Alexandrian Fathers of the fourth century (V4, 123).  Florovsky finds fault with the Fathers for their stress 
on the deformation (or loss) of the image due to sin, in addition to their tendency to restrict the image of 
God to the ―interior man.‖  He believes this latter tendency was ―undoubtedly, an inheritance from Origen‖ 
(V4, 125).   
250 V3, 22.   
251 V13, 182.   
252 Florovsky, ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 7; V1, 21.   
62 
 
typically understood ―askesis‖ to refer to acts of self-denial, whereas Eastern Christianity 
has understood it in a wider sense to refer to any spiritual practice that promotes one‘s 
communion with God.  Florovsky used the term in an even wider sense to refer to any 
free and creative response to revelation by human beings.
253
  One could thus rightly 
characterize Florovsky as having an ―ascetical theology of revelation.‖  Men‘s and 
women‘s active response to revelation—their ―ascetic achievement,‖ as George Williams 
translates ―podvig‖—constitutes the substance of their life in the time before the 
eschaton.
254
  Writes Florovsky, ―The meaning of history consists in this—that the 
freedom of creation should respond by accepting the pre-temporal counsel of God, that it 
should respond both in word and in deed.‖255  Florovsky identifies this response with the 
Christian‘s participation in the life of the Church, or, Tradition.  It is concretely 
manifested in Scripture, the Liturgy, the sacraments, and the dogmas formulated 
throughout the history of the Church.   
 Florovsky portrays this active reception of revelation, this askesis, as manifest 
even in the initial revelatory moment.  His preferred term for this moment is ―experience‖ 
which, with revelation as ―event,‖ represents one of the ―two aspects of religious 
knowledge‖ for Florovsky.256  He defines experience in general as ―encompass[ing] 
                                               
253 See also Baker‘s comment, drawn in part from Rowan Williams‘ observation, that ―both Bulgakov and 
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everything that is simply and directly ‗given‘ to us.‖257  In regard to revelation, which is 
the concern of this chapter, Florovsky understands experience to consist of the initial 
human appropriation of the divinely-enacted events of salvation history.  To describe the 
initial human reception of these given events, Florovsky also frequently has recourse to 
the term ―vision.‖  Thus, he describes revelation as ―theophany,‖ and writes that 
―Revelation discloses itself and is received in the silence of faith, in silent vision—this is 
the first and apophatic step of the knowledge of God.‖258      
 However, one must be careful not to take Florovsky‘s description of the 
―apophatic‖ character of experience to mean that it is devoid of concepts.  Such is 
Brandon Gallaher‘s mistake in his recent article—―‗Waiting for the Barbarians‘: Identity 
and Polemicism in the Neo-Patristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky‖—where he 
attempts to link Florovsky‘s concept of experience or vision with what the Romantics 
described as an ―intellectual intuition‖ or ―feeling.‖259  Contrary to the Romantic, pre-
conceptual understanding of experience or vision, Florovsky writes that ―Experience is 
given not in an atomically chaotic state of perceptionlessness but as ‗regulated variety‘: 
relations are initially given.‖  It is regulated by those relations that the human mind seems 
to immediately apply to an object that it encounters, ―singling it out from among a group 
of other objects, generally not only not being aware of our grounds for doing so but also 
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not being in a position to be aware of them.‖  Florovsky holds that this ―‗direct‘ 
‗intuitive‘ stability‖ provided by the mind is ―a primary fact,‖ and testifies that no object 
is received by the human person ―entirely without form.‖260       
 But Florovsky holds that ―Givens necessitate interpretation,‖ and thus, experience 
must move quickly beyond this ―direct intuitive stability‖ to become cognition.261  
Experience is not primarily a passive reality in Florovsky‘s writings.  In fact, one could 
very well critique Florovsky‘s religious epistemology for not sufficiently accounting for 
the concept of passivity in his understanding of reception, interpretation, and 
relationship.
262
  He consistently portrays the interpretation of experience, i.e., cognition, 
as an active endeavor on the part of men and women: ―Cognition, as a historical 
phenomenon created by the systematic and interrelated efforts of successive generations, 
is a heroic act.‖263  He maintains that a concept (which is the product of cognition) ―lives 
in judgments,‖ namely, the active reasonings of the human mind.  He thus echoes 
Friedrich Trendelenburg‘s statement that ―Understanding is Interpretation,‖ as he 
believes that experience demands an active response from human rationality.
264
   
Florovsky presciently recognized that hermeneutics conditions any individual‘s 
attempt to understand experience, but also emphasized that ―in this willful initial choice 
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portrayal of cognition as a purely active phenomenon.  Interestingly, Florovsky endorses Viktor 
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we are not inescapably restricted by either innate character, inherited predispositions or 
everyday circumstances.‖265  He thus portrays the thought process as free in its activity, 
for ―man remains a free agent even in bonds.‖266  Through the active interpretation of 
experience, Florovsky claims that men and women give ―existence,‖ ―meaning,‖ and 
―form‖ to events.267  Through cognition, or rational thought, men and women become 
―witnesses‖ to events, which the Russian historian Vassily Bolotov characterized as the 
goal of history.
268
 
 Florovsky defines faith as this active witness to the events of revelation.  He 
writes, ―… [F]aith is vision and perception.  God appears to man and man beholds God.  
The truths of faith are truths of experience, truths of a fact… Faith is a descriptive 
confirmation of certain facts… faith is the evidence of experience.‖269  According to 
Florovsky, it is faith that acknowledges divine events ―as truly eventful,‖ meaning that 
they were willed by God for the salvation of men and women.
270
  As Matthew Baker has 
so well emphasized, Florovsky did not perceive a sharp dichotomy between the 
experience of faith and reason.
271
  Indeed, Florovsky viewed faith‘s acknowledgement of 
divine events as itself a rational undertaking, for it is ―only in the process of cognition‖ 
that ―‗things‘ become ‗sources,‘‖ or, that divine events are ―recognized as utterly 
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momentous.‖272  Furthermore, he viewed the life of faith as a crucial element of 
rationality, as ―revelation becomes clearly heard by us in all its fullness only in spiritual 
experience.‖273  He thus portrayed rational reflection as constitutive of the very 
experience of the events of revelation.  Faith—understood as the active interpretation of 
revelation in both thought and life—is formative of the Christian‘s experience, which is 
why Florovsky frequently conjoined the two realities in the phrase ―experience of faith.‖  
According to Florovsky, then, experience is itself a synergy between divine and human 
action, between divinely-willed events and the human reception of them in thought.  
After the moment of faith, this active Christian reflection on experience continues and 
forms part of the Tradition of the Church.   
Florovsky characterizes the witness of faith as a personal act on the part of each 
Christian individual.
274
  But he understands that the experience that comprises faith is not 
available to Christians today in the form that it was available to its first witnesses.  
Revelation now ―is given, and is accessible, only in the Church; that is, only through life 
in the Church, through a living and actual belonging to the mystical organism of the Body 
of Christ.‖275  Thus, one‘s experience of revelation is inevitably an ecclesial experience.  
As Florovsky points out, ―‗the past‘ as such cannot be ‗observed‘ directly.  It has actually 
passed away and therefore is never given directly in any ‗possible experience‘… The 
knowledge of the past is necessarily indirect and inferential.‖276  The Christian‘s 
experience of faith is thus mediated by the Church‘s reflection on revelation as 
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manifested in Scripture, dogma, and Liturgy—its entire life—a fact that also serves to 
demonstrate that Christian experience is intimately tied to thought.
277
 
Furthermore, the Christian‘s experience of faith is colored by his or her 
commitment ―to a particular interpretation of certain events of history, and also to a 
definite interpretation of the historic process itself, taken as a whole.  In this sense, 
[Christians] are inevitably prejudiced.‖278  On this point Florovsky quotes the Russian 
historian B.M. Melioransky, who described the Church‘s particular interpretation of 
history as a ―key‖ by which Christians may enter God‘s City and enjoy the experience of 
faith.
279
  Without this key, the events of salvation history remain ―unclear, unconvincing‖ 
to men and women.
280
   
However, it is not only a hermeneutics of history, but grace that the Church gives 
to the Christian person who participates in its life.  Florovsky recognizes that men and 
women ―need a special method of seeing to be able to recognize [revelation]… reason 
itself must be transfigured, and this transfiguration of our consciousness can be 
accomplished only in the Church, in its spiritual charismatic completeness.‖281  One 
could call this ―special method‖ divine grace, as I have, but one should also note that 
Florovsky identifies grace with ―a personal communion with the personal God.‖282 
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But human thought cannot exhaust all of the aspects of the experience of faith, 
which, according to Florovsky, contains the whole of divine revelation.  Rational thought 
gives this experience form from the beginning, but the experience will always be ―more 
comprehensive and fuller‖ than this form.283  Florovsky locates the ―fullness‖ of the 
experience of revelation in the Church; indeed, he describes it as ―living‖ in the 
Church.
284
  What is the character of this fullness of the experience of revelation?  
Florovsky undoubtedly regards it as a fullness of the knowledge of God, or, a ―noetic 
vision,‖ that constitutes ―a system of religious philosophy.‖285  This fullness of the 
knowledge of God was made possible by Christ, who ―made religious knowledge 
possible for the first time‖ through his redemption.286  
But one must remember that, for Florovsky, this fullness of knowledge is 
inseparable from the fullness of union that comes through Christ‘s redemptive work, and 
is a condition of this union.
287
  He emphasizes that ―the Truth is not an idea, but a person, 
even the Incarnate Lord.‖288  The theanthropic union that Christ effected is continued in 
the Church understood as the Body of Christ in which the Spirit abides.  Christ and the 
Spirit are the ―fullness,‖ and it is their continued presence in the Church that enables 
Florovsky to claim that ―the Church is fulness, τό πλήρωμα that is, fulfilment, 
completion.‖289  Fullness, for Florovsky, is the equivalent of ―catholicity,‖ and is thus a 
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284 V1, 47.  
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mark of the Church.
290
  The (true) knowledge of God is only possible in the Church 
because it is within the Church that the Christian person can participate in Christ‘s life 
through incorporation into his body.  In sum, Florovsky regards ―fullness‖ as a 
gnoseological concept because it is tied to theosis.     
Florovsky recognizes an antinomy in regard to the notion of the fullness of 
revelation: the Church possesses the fullness, but at the same time, this fullness is not yet 
complete because the Body of Christ is not yet complete.  On this point, Florovsky quotes 
St. John Chrysostom, who writes, ―[Christ] Himself is complete and all-perfect, but not 
yet has He drawn mankind to Himself in final completeness.  It is only gradually that 
mankind enters into Communion with Him and so gives a new fulness to His work, 
which thereby attains its full accomplishment.‖291  Florovsky also portrays the individual 
member of the Church as participating in the fullness of revelation in an ―already, but not 
yet‖ manner.  The Christian person is united to Christ through the Spirit, but does not yet 
enjoy the fullness of this union.  Thus, Florovsky writes, ―I maintain that each person can 
realize the catholic standard in himself.  I do not say that each person does realize it.  
That depends upon the measure of one‘s spiritual maturity.‖292   
Florovsky sometimes describes the particular ecclesial location of the fullness of 
the experience of revelation as the ―mind of the Church.‖  What Florovsky writes of the 
concept of the Church also applies to his concept of the ―mind of the Church,‖ namely, 
                                                                                                                                            
Florovsky witnesses to between ―body‖ and ―fullness‖ leads him to describe the Eucharist as ―the primary 
witness to the mystery of Redemption, in all its fulness‖ (V1, 85).  See also ―The Eucharist and 
Catholicity‖ (V13, 46-57).       
290 V1, 41.   
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292 V3, 40.   
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that it ―can be rather depicted and described than properly defined.‖293  As with the idea 
of fullness, there is an epistemological component to Florovsky‘s understanding of the 
mind of the Church.  This is evidenced not only by his references to it as ―mind,‖ but also 
as the ―sensus catholicus‖ and the ―υρόνημα ἐκκλησιαστικόν.‖294  He attributes a 
patristic provenance to this concept of the ―mind of the Church,‖ and regards it as 
encompassed by neither Scripture nor dogma; rather, it was, ―in the Early Church, first of 
all, an hermeneutical principle and method‖ that allowed the Church‘s members to both 
understand and protect divine revelation.
295
  It ―is a concrete oneness in thought and 
feeling,‖ writes Florovsky, that is shared by the members of the Church.296  Ultimately, 
Florovsky identifies the ―mind of the Church‖ as none other than Tradition.  
But Florovsky does not regard this ―mind‖ as some esoteric, impersonal reality 
that acts as the storehouse for all divinely-revealed truths.  On the contrary, he maintains 
that this mind ―is not a common consciousness, neither is it the joint consciousness of the 
many or the Bewusstsein ueberhaupt of German philosophers.  Catholicity is achieved 
not by eliminating the living personality, nor by passing over into the plane of an abstract 
Logos.‖297  Again, he emphasizes that ―it is not to a ‗transcendental subject,‘ not to any 
‗consciousness-in-general‘ that God speaks.  The ‗God of the Living,‘ the God of 
Revelation speaks to living persons, to empirical subjects.‖298  As the Church to whom 
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God reveals Himself is comprised of ―a symphony of personalities,‖299 so also is the 
mind of the Church. 
As a personal reality, Florovsky primarily characterizes the mind of the Church as 
both an enacted and relational reality.  It is less something possessed in a mystical fashion 
by the members of the Church than it is something to be realized by them through the 
―transfiguration‖ of their personality: ―It is the ‗telos‘ of personal consciousness, which is 
realized in creative development, not in the annihilation of personality.‖300  To repeat, 
Florovsky held that the fullness of the experience of faith exists only in the Church 
inasmuch as it is the Body of Christ indwelt by the Spirit.  Thus, the Christian person 
comes to realize this fullness, or, the mind of the Church, only through his or her 
participation in Christ, who is the ―personal centre‖ of the Church to which Christians are 
united.
301
  One‘s participation in Christ comes through incorporation into his Body, the 
Church, through Baptism, Chrismation, and the Eucharist.  This participation increases 
through one‘s continued askesis manifested in one‘s life in the Church and growth in the 
knowledge of God; in other words, through the life of faith and reason.  Because 
Florovsky regards the mind of the Church as something realized by the Christian person 
through his or her union with Christ through his body, he claims that ―the Christian mind 
is through and through a corporate mind.‖302  Another way of putting it is that the mind of 
the Church is a relational reality.  
According to Florovsky, the Church deems those persons who have realized this 
fullness ―Fathers and Teachers of the Church.‖  Their realization of this fullness in their 
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knowledge and life does not mean for Florovsky that they reached the limit of this 
fullness, but that they are able to witness this fullness to the other members of the 
Church, to speak from the mind of the Church.
303
  In deference to this patristic witness, 
Florovsky advocated that Christian theology today seek to recover the ―mind of the 
Fathers.‖304  This call for the recovery of the patristic mind represents the essence of 
Florovsky‘s call for a Neo-patristic synthesis.  However, the ―mind of the Fathers,‖ as 
Florovsky understands it, does not refer primarily to the content of patristic theology 
(though it is not separable from it), but a way of life in the Church.  This way involves 
the ―existential theology‖ that Florovsky saw exemplified in the Fathers of the Church.  
An ―existential theology‖ is one that seeks after the fullness of Christian experience by 
actively unfolding this experience through rational thought and one‘s participation in the 
life of the Church.
305
  Florovsky characterizes this active unfolding of Christian 
experience as the vocation of each member of the Church.  It is the condition of both the 
individual Christian‘s theosis and the completion of the Body of Christ.  And 
furthermore, as I will argue in Chapter Two, it constitutes the essence of what Florovsky 
understands as Tradition and doctrinal development.  
 
C. THE ERRORS OF HELLENISM 
 Most of Florovsky‘s writings resulted from a perceived need to respond to 
challenges to the Christian faith.  For the sake of clarity, I have above laid out the main 
tenets of Florovsky‘s theology of revelation in a positive fashion.  In his writings, 
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however, his theology of revelation was forged through a defense of Christian orthodoxy 
against certain modern intellectual trends, particularly German Idealism and 
Romanticism—which he considered the offspring of the Protestant Reformation—in 
addition to Russian Sophiology.  Florovsky was consciously aware that his theology 
through polemic represented another affinity between him and the Fathers of the Church, 
whom he said ―most often theologized for the refutation of heretics.‖306  In order to 
further elaborate Florovsky‘s theology of revelation, I will briefly summarize what he 
opposed in these trends. 
 Florovsky‘s defense of the Christian understanding of revelation, and relatedly, 
creation, was influenced by his theology or philosophy of history, which he construes as a 
dialectic between Christianity and Hellenism.  With Justin Martyr and Clement of 
Alexandria, Florovsky was willing to regard Hellenism as a kind of preparatio 
Evangelii.
307
  Indeed, Christianity came to be in a Hellenistic milieu, and thus, the 
Hellenistic idiom is formative of the Christian experience that is manifested in Scripture 
and dogma.  But the Incarnation and Redemption also signaled the need for Hellenism to 
be purified and transfigured with the rest of creation, a task that the Church Fathers set 
about to accomplish through their writings.  The efforts of the Fathers produced what 
Florovsky terms ―Christian Hellenism,‖ or, a ―‗Churchification‘ [‗Verkirchlichung‘] of 
Hellenism.‖308  However, some Christians in the early Church desired to figuratively 
―return to Egypt‖ by judging Christianity by the logic of Hellenism, rather than judging 
Hellenism according to the ―mind of the Church.‖  For Florovsky, this return to a pre-
                                               
306 John Meyendorff, ―Predislovie,‖ in Puti Russkogo Bogosloviia, 2nd ed. (Paris: YMCA Press, 1981), vi; 
translated in Gallaher, 661.  See also Blane, 171: ―This interest in ‗problems‘ was the starting point for all 
Father Georges‘ intellectual pursuits.‖   
307 Florovsky, ―The Christian Hellenism,‖ The Orthodox Observer 442 (1957): 9.   
308 V3, 32.   
74 
 
Christian Hellenism in thought constitutes the nature of Christian heresy not only in the 
early Church, but in all ages of the Church. 
 Florovsky sees the problems of Hellenism as rooted in a deficient understanding 
of creation, the concept of which he held ―was alien and even unintelligible to the Greek 
mind…‖309  Whereas Christianity understands God to be other than the world and 
creation to be ex nihilo, Hellenism was pantheistic and thus regarded ―the Cosmos... as an 
‗eternal‘ and ‗immortal‘… being.‖310  The pantheism of Hellenism entailed an impersonal 
God—―a common failure of Greek philosophy‖311—which meant that the world‘s 
existence was not the result of God‘s free act, and thus, was necessary.  The necessity of 
the cosmos colored human existence with a certain necessity.  Men and women could 
bring about no change in the world‘s process through their free actions; instead, their 
purpose was merely to discern the eternal patterns present within the structure of the 
world and either resign themselves to their fate, or try to escape the cyclical process of 
the world through a fuga mundi.
312
  
 Florovsky discerns some of these same problems in forms of ―de-Christianized 
Hellenism‖ that have arisen in Christian history.  He sees the dangers of Origenism—
Florovsky‘s type of an erroneous Christian appropriation of Hellenism—as rooted in 
Hellenistic ―metaphysical presuppositions‖ that exalt spiritual and immutable reality at 
the expense of the bodily and historical.  Origen could not reconcile the antinomy of 
God‘s immutability and creation‘s newness resulting from God‘s free action, and opted to 
preserve the former at the expense of the latter.  As a result, Origen postulated the pre-
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existence of souls, and portrayed history and its events as an ephemeral realm needing to 
be surpassed and transcended.
313
  
 Protestantism represented an attempt to remove what it perceived as Christianity‘s 
Hellenistic accretions.  Ironically, however, Florovsky believed that anti-Hellenistic 
Protestantism created the space necessary for modern forms of de-Christianized 
Hellenism to flourish by eliminating religion as an object for the creativity of Christian 
thought.  German Idealism arose in the wake of Protestantism, and Florovsky paints it as 
almost a whole scale, though indirect, ressourcement of the deficient Hellenistic views of 
creation.  According to Florovsky, Idealism perceived the world as ―an eternal self-
revelation of God, an eternal changing existence of divine life,‖ and was therefore 
pantheistic inasmuch as it postulated an ―absolute, insoluble connection of God with the 
world, the idea of mutual closest connection.‖314  Like Hellenism, Florovsky saw 
Idealism as confining men‘s and women‘s activity to morphological thought and ―the 
search for the unchangeable foundations of the world, at the revelation of its eternally 
ideal outline or the scheme which holds it together.‖315   
 Florovsky considers a properly orthodox understanding of creation (and 
revelation) as a corollary of a properly orthodox Christology.  As such, he perceived a 
deficient Christology in these forms of de-Christianized Hellenism.  He refers to the 
Christology of Origen as ―utterly inadequate and ambiguous,‖ for Origen portrayed the 
Incarnation as but ―a moment in the continuous story of permanent Theophany of the 
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Divine Logos—a central moment, in a sense, but still no more than a central symbol.‖316  
Idealism does not understand the Incarnation as a central moment in history, but ―only a 
section of the entire theogonic process‖ of God‘s continuously evolving self-revelation.  
It stresses God‘s link with the world and humankind, and postulates their ultimate unity, 
but this unity is not to be brought about by concrete, historical events such as the 
Incarnation.  Florovsky thus resolves that ―One could say that German Idealism is a 
theory of God-humanity without the God-man.  That is its fatal error.‖317   
 The manifestations of de-Christianized Hellenism that Florovsky perceived in 
modern Russian theological thought seemed to come to a head during his lifetime in 
Sophiology.  Florovsky‘s student John Meyendorff has gone so far as to claim that the 
―psychological impulse which inspired Florovsky during the writing of his books was the 
refutation of the so-called ‗sophiology‘ in all its forms.‖318  Sophiology refers to the 
theory variously elaborated by Soloviev, Florensky, and Bulgakov, among others, which 
postulates the existence of creation in the Godhead almost to the point of conceiving it as 
a separate hypostasis called ―Wisdom,‖ or, ―Sophia,‖ symbolized in history in the person 
of the Virgin Mary.
319
  Florovsky characterizes Sophiology as ―pan-logistic‖ because it 
fails to make a distinction between ―the truth of a thing‖ (the thought of the world in 
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God‘s essence) and the ―substance of a thing‖ (the act of creating the world).320  
According to Florovsky‘s reasoning, if creation and humanity were somehow part of the 
Godhead, as Sophiology holds, then they would necessarily exist, and creation would not 
be the result of God‘s free will.   
 He also saw Sophiology as insufficiently accounting for free, human activity.  His 
critiques about Sophiology‘s views of human activity and history were mainly directed at 
the young Soloviev.
321
  According to Florovsky, Soloviev understood the world as ―an 
ideally constructed mechanism,‖ and history as ―a gradual process of Godmanhood, the 
profound and free unity of the Divine and the human‖ that would culminate in a ―world 
synthesis‖ and the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth.322  Florovsky sees a 
deficient Christology lurking behind Soloviev‘s problematic conception of history.  He 
could not help but note the irony that ―Solov‘ev spoke much more about God-manhood 
than about the God-man.‖323  ―Yet, even in his Lectures Concerning Godmanhood,‖ 
Florovsky writes, ―the Historic Christ was more a manifestation of a general idea than a 
true Person.‖324  Thus, in Soloviev‘s utopian vision, even the person of Christ fades into 
the shadows of the continuous flow of the historical process.  As a result, Florovsky 
concludes that Soloviev ―did not go beyond Origen‖ and his Logos-theology.325  He 
levels this same criticism at Florensky in his scathing review of the latter‘s The Pillar and 
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Foundation of Truth: ―In Florensky the fate of Origen repeats itself: for both, Christianity 
is the religion of the Logos and not that of Christ… The image of the God-man has still 
not been revealed to him.‖326   
 Florovsky‘s calls for a Neo-patristic synthesis and a return to a proper Christian 
Hellenism have too hastily been characterized by contemporary Orthodox thinkers as 
anti-Western, isolationist, and an example of ―cultural chauvinism.‖327  On the contrary, 
as Matthew Baker has persuasively argued, Florovsky explicitly repudiated such a 
simplistic understanding of his prescription for the renewal of Orthodox theology.  Like 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Florovsky recognized that German Idealism was now part of the 
Western world‘s hermeneutic, and a programmatic effort of Orthodox to forget it would 
itself be a-historical: ―For renouncing Idealism means renouncing the past, means a 
cultural and historical break.‖328  Plus, though Florovsky warns about certain excesses of 
modern Russian theological thought, he clarifies that the path of thinkers such as 
Soloviev and Florensky ―is mainly correct,‖ and commends them for their bringing an 
examination of the relationship between faith and reason to the forefront of Orthodox 
thought.
329
       
 Indeed, Florovsky‘s call for a Neo-patristic synthesis was primarily a call for the 
reunification of faith and reason in Christian life.  ―Solov‘ev‘s basic and fatal 
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History of Church and Theology,‖ The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 42:3-4 [1997]: 321-342); F.J. 
Thompson, (―Peter Mogila's Ecclesiastical Reforms and the Ukrainian Contribution to Russian Culture. A 
Critique of George Florovsky's Theory of the Pseudomorphosis of Orthodoxy,‖ in Belgian Contributions to 
the 11th International Congress of Slavists, Bratislava, 30 Aug.-8 Sept. 1993 [no publication date], 67-119); 
and Kalaitzidis, ―From the ‗Return to the Fathers‘ to the Need for a Modern Orthodox Theology.‖   
328 V12, 24.   
329 V12, 114, 120. 
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contradiction‖ does not lie in his dialogue with the Idealist tradition, but rather, ―lies in 
the fact that he attempted to construct an ecclesiastical synthesis from non-ecclesiastical 
experience.‖330  Christian Hellenism was born when the Church Fathers undertook a 
rational engagement with Hellenistic philosophy by passing it through the sieve of the 
Christian experience of faith.  Florovsky advocates the recovery of this patristic schema: 
―the task of theology lies… not in controlling dogma by means of contemporary 
philosophy but rather in re-shaping philosophy on experience of faith itself so that the 
experience of faith would become the source and measure of philosophical views.‖331  
Such a theology involves the Church‘s authentic engagement with ideas, rather than a 
slavish imitation of them.  The Neo-patristic synthesis is therefore a call for Christians to 
exercise the freedom that belongs to them as persons.      
 According to Florovsky, an authentic Christian Hellenism is one that recognizes 
its Greek patrimony without being subjected to its logic.  It is one that preserves a 
uniquely Christian conception of God as necessary, eternal, and immutable, yet also 
personal, free, and active.  It is one that views both creation and revelation as divine 
events, culminating in the Incarnation, and affirms that these events were not merely the 
appearance of pre-existent elements, but brought something new into existence and 
transformed the world.  And it is one that understands history as the forum for both 
divine and human events, which both contribute to the completion of the Body of Christ 
and the inauguration of the eschaton.  In Chapter Two, I will argue that this emphasis on 
human events and creative activity leads Florovsky to endorse the idea of doctrinal 
development. 
                                               
330 V6, 85.  See also V4, 177.     
331 V4, 177.   
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1.3: DIALOGUE 
 In Chapter One I have focused on summarizing how Newman and Florovsky 
understand the mode and character of divine revelation.  As I stated at the beginning of 
this chapter, I believe Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development follows from his 
particular understanding of revelation.  In the Dialogue section of this chapter I will 
attempt to show that Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation is fundamentally congruent 
with Newman‘s, thus laying the groundwork for Chapter Two in which I argue that 
Florovsky accepts the idea of doctrinal development.   
Newman and Florovsky demonstrate a similar understanding of revelation in large 
part because of their common foundation in the theology of the Eastern Church Fathers.  
However, a comparison of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understandings of revelation also 
reveals some interesting differences attributable to their different ecclesial traditions, 
influences, and opponents.  These differences do not constitute obstacles to my argument 
that Florovsky accepts the idea of doctrinal development.  Instead, they represent 
opportunities for the mutual development of each author‘s position, and potentially point 
the way toward the future development of the understanding of revelation in each 
author‘s religious tradition. 
 
A. NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON GOD’S REVEALING ACTIVITY 
Certain common emphases in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s theologies of revelation 
have emerged in this chapter.  They converge in emphasizing that God reveals Himself as 
person to men and women through His free actions in history.  They both attach a 
relational purpose to God‘s revealing activity, which aims at union between God and 
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human persons.  In addition, both Newman and Florovsky imply that the way in which 
God reveals Himself to men and women serves as a model or pattern of the human 
reception of revelation.  As persons, men and women are called upon to freely receive 
revelation through their own creative activity in history, which manifests itself in thought, 
word, and deed.  These delineations of ―thought, word, and deed‖ are but Newman‘s and 
Florovsky‘s categorized way of saying that the Christian‘s entire life constitutes his or 
her active reception of revelation.  As I will make clear in Chapter Two, this creative 
reception of revelation by human persons is nothing other than what Newman refers to as 
doctrinal development.   
 Dictating and coloring these common emphases is perhaps the most important 
similarity between Newman and Florovsky: their use of Incarnation as a lens for their 
understandings of revelation, and furthermore, for their theologies as a whole.  Florovsky 
further specifies his Incarnational and Christological hermeneutic as consciously 
Chalcedonic, centered on the person of Jesus Christ possessed of both a divine and 
human nature.  Florovsky interprets Chalcedon as implicitly mandating that any Christian 
expression of faith or practice affirm the person and his or her ability to freely act.  In 
addition, he sees the coinherence of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ 
as demanding that Christian theology affirm the place of both θεολογία and οἰκονομία, 
the dignity of both body and spirit, the importance of both dogma and life, and the 
significance of both history and eschatology.   
Newman does not invoke Chalcedon per se, but a Chalcedonic perspective similar 
to Florovsky is unmistakably present in his insistence that divine revelation has both 
concrete and abstract aspects.  Newman holds that truth is most fully concrete when it is 
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enhypostasized, and sees Christian revelation as concrete insofar as it consists of the 
Person of God revealing Himself to human persons for the sake of their deification.  He 
also sees the concrete nature of revelation manifested in its historical character, for he 
writes that God primarily reveals Himself through distinct ―facts and actions‖ (see note 
123) of which the Incarnation represents the fulfillment and the standard.  Yet, Newman 
also affirmed the abstract character of revelation.  According to Newman, Christian 
revelation is abstract insofar as men and women conceptually express it in order to 
understand it, while knowing that they can never fully do so because of the otherness of 
revelation‘s object.    
Interestingly, one also finds language of the concrete versus the abstract recurring 
throughout Florovsky‘s writings in a manner harmonious with the Chalcedonic character 
of his theology of revelation.  Perhaps the presence of this scheme of the concrete and 
abstract in both Newman and Florovsky is not so surprising, given Hans Urs von 
Balthasar‘s contention that ―this scheme of thought is at the basis of Western philosophy 
and can be followed down throughout its history.‖332  In his writings, Florovsky 
associates the ―concrete‖ with the personal, the free, the historic, the visible, and the 
active.
333
  Accordingly, Florovsky regards revelation as concrete because God is a person 
who freely acts in revealing Himself to persons through visible, historic events.  One can 
translate his critiques of many alternative theological and philosophical systems as his 
                                               
332 Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theology of History (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 9. 
333 For Florovsky‘s associations of the historical with the concrete, see V1, 89; V11, 15; V13, 30, 60.  He 
associates the personal with the concrete in V1, 41 and V12, 63.  For associations between the visible and 
the concrete, see V2, 201 and V13, 66, 140, 189.  For associations between activity and the concrete, see 
V3, 258 and V5, 4. 
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perception that abstract principles in these systems overshadowed and determined 
concrete realities.
334
   
At the same time, Florovsky clearly recognized the importance of the abstract 
element in revelation, which he located in human reason‘s call to unfold the concrete 
experience of faith through theology.
335
  Parallel to the human and divine natures of 
Christ, Florovsky held that ―both are to be kept side by side: a somewhat abstract or 
generalized presentation of the main message in a creed or in a system, and all particular 
documents referring to the concrete instances of revelation.  One might say a system and 
the history itself.‖336  One could fairly claim that Florovsky believes the ―scheme‖ of the 
concrete and the abstract find their definitive reconciliation in the person of Jesus Christ.         
 The concept of personhood is an emphasis in both Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s 
understandings of revelation, but there are some noteworthy differences.  Florovsky 
exhibits a concept of personhood more fully rooted in theology and metaphysics than 
Newman‘s.  He principally portrays the person as the nexus of free and creative activity.  
In regard to God, this portrayal is a fruit of the Christological controversies of the early 
Church, during which the Fathers perceived the need to more clearly distinguish between 
God‘s person and nature in order to defend the divinity of the Son (and the Holy Spirit).  
Florovsky roots men‘s and women‘s free activity in their personhood belonging to them 
by virtue of their creation in the imago Dei.  He also implies that personhood is the nexus 
of relationality, and that men‘s and women‘s status as persons makes possible their 
relation with the person of God in theosis. 
                                               
334 V12, 13; V6, 271. 
335 V13, 168.   
336 V1, 28.   
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 As I pointed out above, Newman also linked personhood with freedom and 
activity in his brief, direct foray into metaphysics.  One of his recurrent emphases, too, 
was that ―life is for action,‖ and that the quality of one‘s reception of divine revelation 
was measurable by how much it manifested itself in action.  However, when he referred 
to the concepts of personhood and revelation together, Newman tended to focus more on 
the revelatory effectiveness of personal manifestation, which he considers ―that most 
efficient incentive to all action,‖ than on attributing God‘s revealing activity, and the 
human being‘s active reception of revelation, to their status as persons.  As Walgrave has 
pointed out, Newman did not clarify why he regarded the personal as such an effective 
impetus to action (see notes 49 and 50).  In addition, John Crosby‘s chapter on 
Newman‘s ―personalism‖ unintentionally shows how little sustained theological and 
philosophical attention Newman gave to the concept of the person in spite of his frequent 
invocation of it.
337
  Here Florovsky‘s link between personhood and the image of God 
may be helpful, for it provides theological support for Newman‘s emphasis on the person.  
Newman does not devote much reflection to the concept of the image of God, even in his 
Lectures on Justification.  However, it further bolsters his contention that human beings 
are fundamentally acting persons who image God‘s own personal activity.   
One of the principles of Newman‘s theory of development is that developments of 
ideas are often catalyzed by the circumstances of one‘s context.  Newman‘s theology of 
revelation exhibits many hallmarks of Eastern Orthodoxy due to his reading of the 
Eastern Church Fathers.  Indeed, the patristic emphasis of many twentieth and twenty-
first century Orthodox theologians such as Florovsky is in some ways indebted to 
                                               
337 John F. Crosby, ―John Henry Newman on Personal Influence,‖ in Personalist Papers (Washington, 
D.C.: CUA Press, 2004), 221-242.    
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Newman‘s return ad fontes in the nineteenth century.338  However, Newman‘s theology 
of revelation was also circumscribed by his Anglican and Roman Catholic contexts, 
which included a particular theological vocabulary and the pressing issues of the day.  
Some of Florovsky‘s catalysts were not his own.  One must remember that while 
Florovsky claims patristic provenance for his understanding of personhood, he is also 
indebted to modern scholarship such as the philosophy of personhood in Charles 
Renouvier.  Both Florovsky‘s and Renouvier‘s links between personhood, freedom, and 
activity were spurred on by the determinism they perceived in German Idealism and its 
theological and philosophical offspring.  Newman, on the other hand, was by and large 
ignorant of German Idealism save for his brief exposure to it via a secondary source.
339
  
Largely contributing to his ignorance of Idealism was his ignorance of the German 
language. 
The patristic influence on Florovsky‘s particular understanding of personhood is 
evident in his Christocentrism and his paralleling of creation and revelation.  The 
Christocentric character of personhood is obviously evident in Chalcedon‘s dogma of the 
hypostatic union.  However, it is also discernible in the earlier Christological 
controversies in which the Fathers defended the divinity of Christ by distinguishing 
between God‘s θεολογία and οἰκονομία, or, His essence and energies.  The Fathers‘ 
defense was an attempt to successfully navigate the heresies of Arianism and 
Sabellianism, and consisted in them clarifying that the begetting of the Son was an act of 
                                               
338 See, for instance, Lawrence Cunningham‘s introduction to John Henry Newman, Heart Speaks to Heart: 
Selected Spiritual Writings (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2004), 24: ―Newman, in a certain sense, 
predated the cry for going back to the sources (ressourcement) which was so much part of the Catholic 
revival of the twentieth century.‖  See also Andrew Louth, ―The Oxford Movement, the Fathers and the 
Bible,‖ Sobornost 6 (1984): 30-45.   
339 P.N., 1: 227-234.  The secondary source was Dr. H.M. Chalybäus‘s Historical Development of 
Speculative Philosophy from Kant to Hegel, trans. Rev. Alfred Edersheim (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1854). 
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God‘s essence, whereas historic events such as creation and revelation were the result of 
God‘s personal, and thus free and creative, activity.  Florovsky can thus claim that all the 
truths of creation are contained within the Church‘s understanding of revelation, and vice 
versa, because both creation and revelation testify to a personal God who freely acts in 
history.   
At the heart of the early Christological controversies was also the question of 
men‘s and women‘s eschatological destiny.  The Chalcedonic defense of Christ‘s divinity 
and humanity was also a defense of the possibility of theosis, for if God did not truly 
become human, men and women could not truly participate in God.  The distinction 
between God‘s essence and energies was also a defense of the character of theosis itself, 
for in distinguishing between acts of God‘s essence and acts of God‘s person, the Fathers 
assured that men‘s and women‘s deification was conceived as a union of persons without 
confusion.   
Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation is both synthetic and cosmic, connecting 
the concepts of divine personhood and freedom with the historic events of creation, the 
Incarnation, and the eschaton.  The clear link between the Incarnation, creation, and 
eschatology in Florovsky‘s theology of revelation is in part attributable to the influence 
of Maximus the Confessor on his thought.  As I pointed out above, Florovsky classified 
the theology of Maximus as a ―theology of revelation‖ that similarly regarded the 
Incarnation as the thread that held together the fabric of the created world.  He elsewhere 
described Maximus as providing a ―magnificent theological synthesis‖ of Byzantine 
thought up to that point in history.
340
  Maximus‘ synthesis included a developed 
                                               
340 V2, 127.   
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understanding of revelation that drew upon the Church‘s understanding of creation 
formulated in the Christological controversies of the previous centuries. 
  Florovsky‘s link between revelation and creation was also catalyzed by his 
perception that a challenge to the orthodox doctrine of creation was at the heart of 
modern forms of de-Hellenized Christianity such as German Idealism and Romanticism, 
and their manifestation in Russian Sophiology.  Florovsky believed the challenges faced 
by the Fathers were similar to those we face today, and saw his role as not that different 
from Athanasius who was forced to defend the doctrine of creation against the 
―Hellenisms‖ manifest in Origenism and Arianism.  As a result of this conscious link, 
Florovsky‘s theology of revelation clearly bears those fruits won when orthodoxy 
emerged at the councils.   
 Newman does not similarly link revelation with creation in his writings.  But this 
lack is not due to a failure to perceive the nuances, or antinomies, of the Christian 
doctrine of creation, as witnessed to by Arians, Volume Two of his Select Treatises of St. 
Athanasius, and his lengthy essay ―Causes of the Rise and Successes of Arianism.‖341  
Newman, like Florovsky, also recognized that the divine act of creation was a paradigm 
for the rest of God‘s actions in history: ―For that first act of creation could not stand 
alone; other acts necessarily followed. Creation and conservation must go together.‖342  
And, as I pointed out, Newman had recourse to the eschatological model of deification, 
                                               
341 Newman wrote ―Causes of the Rise and Successes of Arianism‖ (T.T., 137-330) as a Catholic in 1872.  
In this essay, Ker notes that Newman refers to the Eastern Church Fathers in order to explain the dogma of 
the Trinity.  Newman confided to William Bright that, because of the Eastern flavor of the essay, ―I fear it 
will not altogether please, I won‘t say Anglican Divines, but even my own people‖ (L.D. XXVI, 276; Ker, 
Newman and the Fullness of Christianity, 85).     
342 T.T., 201-202.   
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which was unusual in his context.  However, he does not establish the link between 
creation, revelation, and men‘s and women‘s deification as clearly as Florovsky.  
 It is fair to say, then, that Newman lacks Florovsky‘s explicitly formulated 
synthetic and cosmic understanding of revelation.  I wrote above that Florovsky was 
primarily a theologian and not an apologist.  Newman, on the other hand, was primarily 
an apologist and not a theologian in the sense he understood the term.  Like Florovsky, 
Newman wished to defend Christian orthodoxy against modern threats.  But the battle 
Newman waged was primarily on the ground of first principles, where he sought to bring 
to light the erroneous premises of his opponents.  Unlike Florovsky, Newman‘s 
opposition did not usually involve the reassertion and reinterpretation of the Church‘s 
dogmatic tradition.  Newman engaged in a historical retrieval of the Fathers, and, as 
Brian Daley writes, ―felt a deep religious kinship‖ with them, but their influence on his 
understanding of revelation was seemingly indirect.
343
  It is perhaps also noteworthy that 
Newman was not well versed in the works of Maximus the Confessor, who exercised 
such a great influence on Florovsky‘s view of revelation.   
In spite of being less developed, Newman‘s understanding of revelation exhibits 
some of the same emphases as Florovsky‘s.  The similar emphases are a testament to 
Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s common foundation in the patristic ethos, which is marked 
by a thoroughly incarnational character.  Florovsky‘s theology of revelation offers the 
opportunity for the development of the understanding of revelation that acts as the 
foundation for Newman‘s idea of doctrinal development.  It does so by representing a 
fuller expression of the patristic theology that is at the heart of Newman‘s understanding 
of revelation.        
                                               
343 Brian E. Daley, ―The Church Fathers,‖ in The Cambridge Companion to John Henry Newman, 43. 
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As I showed in the first two sections of Chapter One, Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s 
shared focus on the centrality of the Incarnation is connected with their shared focus on 
the historical character of revelation.  Newman described God as revealing Himself 
through concrete ―facts and actions.‖  Florovsky was even more concerned with asserting 
the historical character of revelation.  He also used the terms ―facts‖ and ―actions‖ to 
classify God‘s entrances into history, but above all he described them as ―events.‖  Both 
Newman and Florovsky also stressed that God continues to act in history through His 
Church, the Body of Christ, through its actions of Liturgy, the sacraments, prayer, and 
theology.  Indeed, the ―Body of Christ‖ is a dominant motif of both Newman‘s and 
Florovsky‘s ecclesiologies, a fact that leads one to surmise an intimate connection 
between a corporate ecclesiology and a strong emphasis on God‘s continued activity in 
ecclesiastical history.   
 Both Newman and Florovsky also perceived threats to the historical integrity of 
Christian revelation in their times that they attributed to Protestantism and its effects.  
Newman‘s lifelong battle against ―the spirit of liberalism in religion‖ included a defense 
of Christian revelation against those who reduced divine revelation to its moral 
implications, or, like William Paley, reduced it to numerous ―evidences‖ whose 
miraculous nature pointed toward the existence of God.
344
  What was ignored by those 
Newman opposed, and what he saw as a component of a historical revelation, is the fact 
                                               
344 William Paley (1743-1805) was a British philosopher known for arguing for God‘s existence based on 
the design evident in the universe.  Newman did not disagree with the general thrust of Paley‘s arguments, 
but maintained that men and women are not primarily moved to faith in God through logic: ―I say plainly I 
do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism…‖ (G.A., 330).  Newman was also uncomfortable with 
Paley‘s position, laid out in his A View of the Evidences of Christianity (1794), that divine revelations must 
be attended with credentials that ―are necessarily in their nature miraculous.‖  Newman, on the other hand, 
held that the assent of faith on the part of the human person is what recognizes the divine agency behind 
revelations: ―I think, then, that the circumstances under which a professed revelation comes to us, may be 
such as to impress both our reason and our imagination with a sense of its truth, even though no appeal be 
made to strictly miraculous intervention…‖ (G.A., 331, 333)  
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that God‘s actions were revelatory precisely because they accomplished something in 
history.  Florovsky saw a denial of revelation as ―event‖ in the pantheism of Idealism and 
Romanticism, which conceived of history as the gradual unveiling and realization of an 
ideal according to a pre-formed structure.  To the Idealist and the Romantic, events were 
not dramatic irruptions of time in which God acted in history and effected change in that 
history, but instead, were the periodic, symbolic manifestations of the ―Absolute 
Reality.‖  Newman famously wrote in the Essay on Development that ―To be deep in 
history is to cease to be a Protestant.‖  In the text, he directed this statement toward the 
Protestant ―neglect of ecclesiastical history.‖345  However, it also serves as a fitting 
summary of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s shared emphasis upon revelation as consisting of 
historical actions. 
 But a de-emphasis upon revelation as event is not solely a Protestant 
phenomenon.  It marked the post-Tridentine Roman Catholic characterization of 
revelation as a number of propositions about God.  It is also evident in the works of 
Vladimir Lossky, whose neo-Palamite, apophatically-focused presentation of the 
Orthodox faith has been so influential in modern Orthodox theology.  When Lossky treats 
of revelation, it is mainly revelation in the abstract.  He refers in various places to the 
―facts‖ and ―data‖ of revelation, but notably absent from these references is any extended 
description of the content of these facts and data.  The particular datum of revelation that 
receives Lossky‘s recurring attention is that of the Holy Trinity, the dogma that he terms 
―the highest point of revelation.‖346  Yet, Lossky does not devote attention to the 
historical means, or mode, by which this dogma was revealed.  In contrast to Florovsky‘s 
                                               
345 Dev., 7, 8. 
346 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1976), 43.   
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theology of revelation that begins with events, Lossky begins with the believer‘s 
experience, which is the starting point for the believer‘s ascent toward the ―divine 
darkness‖ of union with God.   
I have showed that the historical character both Newman and Florovsky ascribe to 
revelation follows from the central place of the Incarnation in their respective theologies.  
It is therefore telling that Florovsky criticizes Lossky‘s Mystical Theology of the Eastern 
Church for its lack of a Christological approach to theology.  In his review of Lossky‘s 
Mystical Theology, Florovsky praises it as an ―excellent‖ book that ―is an essay in what 
can be described as a ‗neo-patristic synthesis.‘‖  However, he describes its most 
―substantial weakness‖ as ―its basic structure,‖ which follows ―a rather ‗philosophical‘ 
order of thought: God, creation, Created Being, and Imago Dei, etc., so as to arrive at 
Christology only in the middle of the road.‖  He furthermore writes that ―the 
christological chapter of Lossky‘s book (chap. vii, ‗The Economy of the Son‘) is the most 
controversial…‖347  Florovsky seems to implicitly apply to Lossky a criticism of 
Soloviev he originally made to Bulgakov, namely, ―[T]he road to discovering [the main 
thing] lies through Christology, not through Trinitology, since only with Jesus Christ did 
the worship of the Trinity become reality.‖348 
I have furthermore argued that a theology marked by a strongly incarnational and 
historical focus is amenable to the idea of doctrinal development.  It is thus noteworthy 
that the lack of an incarnational and historical focus in Lossky‘s theology is accompanied 
by a rejection of doctrinal development.  Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s portrayal of 
revelation as consisting of God‘s actions and events in history leads them to emphasize 
                                               
347 Florovsky, review of The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 207, 208.  
348 A.M. Pentkovskii, ―Pis‘ma G. Florovskogo S. Bulgakovu i S. Tyshkevichu,‖ Simvol (Paris) 29 (1993): 
206-207; quoted in Klimoff, 75, and referenced in Baker, ―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 186.   
92 
 
the active human reception of revelation in thought, which I have deemed the essence of 
doctrinal development.  Conversely, as I will show in Chapter Two, Lossky‘s lack of 
emphasis upon revelation as event results in his lack of emphasis upon the active role 
played by human thought in receiving revelation.  Aidan Nichols has noted that Lossky‘s 
focus on the mystical at the expense of the historical has had a negative impact upon 
modern Orthodox theology: ―Lossky‘s dictum that all theology must be mystical 
theology has given a certain anti-historical bent to contemporary Orthodox writing…‖349  
One wonders if the Orthodox rejection of doctrinal development is a casualty of this 
―anti-historical bent.‖ 
 Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s respective answers to the question of when divine 
revelation ended seemingly signal a divergence in the historical character of their 
theologies of revelation.  Newman appears to retreat to a more static understanding of 
revelation by invoking the formula that revelation ended with the death of the last 
Apostle.  This formula was a fixture of the Roman Catholic theology of Newman‘s time, 
and is today typically associated with theories that primarily regard revelation as the 
communication of divine truths, rather than a series of divine acts.  Florovsky appears 
more faithful to an event-based understanding of revelation in claiming that Pentecost 
represents the last revelatory event until Christ‘s Second Coming.  However, a closer 
examination reveals that Newman‘s invocation of this formula is entirely consistent with 
an understanding of revelation as event.     
 Newman believed revelation ended with the death of the last Apostle not simply 
out of deference to Roman Catholic school theology, but because it conformed to his 
doctrine of inspiration.  He understood the Apostles to be inspired in the sense that they 
                                               
349 Nichols, Light from the East, 32. 
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had a special grace, a special presence of the Holy Spirit, by which they possessed ―the 
fullness of revealed knowledge.‖350  In his sermon ―The Indwelling Spirit,‖ Newman 
describes the interpretation of ―the birth, the life, the death and resurrection of Christ‖ as 
a collaboration of divine and human activity whose actors are the Holy Spirit and the 
Apostles.  Then, in a remarkable phrase, he writes that the Holy Spirit ―has made history 
to be doctrine‖ through inspiring the Apostles in their interpretive work.351  Newman here 
maintains that the Apostles‘ interpretation of the divine actions in history is also part of 
revelation, and thus implies that these acts of interpretation also constitute revelatory 
events. 
 Unlike Newman, Florovsky has no extensive treatment of the doctrine of 
inspiration, and mentions it only sparingly in his writings.  He writes in ―Revelation and 
Interpretation‖ that he considered it theologically appropriate to remain apophatic about 
the nature of inspiration, since ―what is the inspiration can never be properly defined—
there is a mystery therein.‖352  It is therefore understandable that he would dismiss the 
death of the last Apostle formula as an arbitrary construction.  In addition, Florovsky 
does not appear to believe that the Apostles possessed a special grace of interpretation, 
though he regarded them as privileged witnesses of the Christian faith.  He would 
certainly not claim, as Newman does, that the Apostles were inspired in a way that the 
Fathers were not.
353
  However, what Newman otherwise implicitly affirms in the 
formula—that human actions and events are integral to divine revelation—absolutely 
                                               
350 Newman, ―Flanagan,‖ 158.   
351 P.S., 2: 227.  Many commentators on Newman have been intrigued by this quotation, and with good 
reason: it could well act as a summary statement of Newman‘s understanding of divine revelation.     
352 V1, 27.   
353 Newman, ―Flanagan,‖ 156.  As a retort to Newman‘s position, see Florovsky in V1, 101: ―Apostles and 
Fathers—these two terms were generally and commonly coupled together in the argument from Tradition, 
as it was used in the Third and Fourth centuries. It was this double reference, both to the origin and to the 
unfailing and continuous preservation, that warranted the authenticity of belief.‖ 
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conforms to the historical tenor of Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation.  Indeed, 
within the context of his mention of biblical inspiration in ―Revelation and Interpretation‖ 
Florovsky writes, ―God spoke to man indeed, but there was man to attend and to 
perceive.  ‗Anthropomorphism‘ is thus inherent in the very fact.‖354  Thus, both Newman 
and Florovsky affirm that human actions are constitutive of divine revelation.   
 
B. NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON HUMAN PERSONS’ RECEIVING ACTIVITY 
In both Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation, the way in which 
God reveals Himself to men and women serves as a model or pattern of the human 
reception of revelation.  They portray revelation as God‘s personal and free entrance into 
history through actions and events in order to redeem men and women so that they may 
participate in His divine life.  Accordingly, men and women are called to receive God‘s 
revelation through their own creative activity.  Newman and Florovsky usually delineate 
this active reception in categories such as thought, word, and deed, though really they 
regard the entire Christian life as a reception of God‘s revelation.   
 Using the vocabularies particular to their backgrounds, both Newman and 
Florovsky portray the human reception of revelation as active from the beginning.  
Newman primarily uses the empiricist term ―impression‖ to describe the initial human 
reception of revelation, while Florovsky primarily describes it as an ―experience.‖  These 
different terms refer to what appears to be a similar reality in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s 
thought.  Both Newman and Florovsky understand this ―impression‖ or ―experience‖ to 
originate in a human person‘s contact with an external reality.  In fact, Newman writes 
that the impression of God through revelation is ―an experience of something in the 
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concrete.‖355  Similarly, both Newman and Florovsky emphasize that the human person‘s 
impression or experience of revelation derives from the concrete events, facts, and 
actions of God in history, which are now communicated through the life of the Church.  
In addition, both Newman and Florovsky affirm that the whole of revelation is 
contained within the human person‘s impression or experience of it.  ―[I]ts truths were 
given once for all at the first,‖ writes Newman.356  Newman provides a metaphysical 
basis for this wholeness, or unity, of the impression in writing that ―surely, if Almighty 
God is ever one and the same, and is revealed to us as one and the same, the true inward 
impression of Him, made on the recipient of the revelation, must be one and the same…‖ 
(see note 47).  Florovsky, on the other hand, tended to characterize revelation as a 
historical unity, rather than a metaphysical (or, ontological) unity.  That is, Florovsky 
regarded revelation as a unity primarily because all revelation concerns the divine 
purpose—the deification of men and women—that began at creation and will be 
consummated at the end of time. Thus, one could say that Florovsky regards revelation as 
not only a historical, but an eschatological unity. 
Interestingly, both Newman and Florovsky seemed reticent to identify revelation, 
or its impression or experience dwelling within the human person, as God.  According to 
Paul Misner, such an identification would have provided Newman with a more 
―adequate‖ and ―comprehensive present-day concept of revelation.‖357  Such an 
identification on the part of Florovsky would also link him with many neo-Palamite 
Orthodox theologians of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, who emphasized that 
revelation was a form of God‘s energies, which are truly God.  However, Newman‘s firm 
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insistence on the principle of mediation led him to avoid identifying revelation and its 
impression with God.  Florovsky, on the other hand, opposed any interpretation of 
revelation that smacked of pantheism or seemingly limited God‘s freedom.  Neo-
Palamism and its excessive focus on the essence-energies distinction seems susceptible to 
this charge of pantheism, as it sometimes fails to differentiate between God‘s actions and 
His modes of presence in the world.
358
  This susceptibility is ironic, to say the least, since 
neo-Palamites perceive this distinction as necessary to avoiding such a lapse into 
pantheism.   
  Both Newman and Florovsky recognize that, as God is inexhaustible, so also is 
His revelation as known by the believer through his or her impression or experience.  
Though it exists as a whole in the human person, it can never be wholly known by that 
person.  Newman holds that ―mystery is the necessary note of divine revelation,‖ and 
describes the ―original impression‖ as existing within us in ―dimness and confusion.‖359  
Florovsky describes how the experience of revelation ―is received in the silence of faith, 
in silent vision—this is the first and apophatic step of the knowledge of God‖ (see note 
258). 
But neither Newman nor Florovsky holds that the apophatic character of the 
impression or experience means that its communication to, or existence in, the human 
person is non-cognitive.  The impression or experience is received via historical actions 
                                               
358 Matthew Baker also hints at this danger inherent in neo-Palamism in, ―The Eternal ‗Spirit of the Son‘: 
Barth, Florovsky and Torrance on the Filioque,‖ International Journal of Systematic Theology 12:4 (2010): 
402: ―A ‗vulgarised Losskianism‘, marked by fixation with the energies paradigm and an exaggerated 
apophaticism which easily transforms itself into its opposite, threatens to displace the centrality of 
Christology.‖  Baker takes the phrase ―vulgarised Losskianism‖ from Aidan Nichols‘ chapter on ―Vladimir 
Lossky and Apophatic Theology,‖ in Light from the East, 21-40, at 32.  On neo-Palamism see also Jeffrey 
D. Finch, ―Neo-Palamism, Divinizing Grace, and the Breach between East and West,‖ in Partakers of the 
Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, ed. Michael 
Christensen and Jeffrey Wittung, 233-249 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007). 
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and events that are cognitively processed by the human mind, ―spontaneously, or even 
necessarily, becom[ing] the subject of reflection on the part of the mind itself.‖360  In 
spite of his misreadings of Newman‘s religious epistemology, Owen Chadwick has 
astutely observed that Newman believed ―the ‗sacred impression‘ which can be described 
as prior to propositions is in part a proposition-bearing impression‖ (see note 164).  The 
same could be said of Florovsky, whose philosophical essays show that he understands 
the believer‘s experience to be immediately regulated by numerous mental relations, and 
is followed by further cognitive examinations that attempt to draw out the contents of the 
experience.  Newman and Florovsky thus both exhibit a religious epistemology nuanced 
enough to know that because the impression or experience is beyond reason, it does not 
mean it is non-rational.  
Importantly, both Newman and Florovsky believe the impression or experience 
that represents the whole of revelation must be expressed.  This need for men and women 
to give expression to the impression or experience constitutes the impetus and 
justification of doctrinal development.  For Newman and Florovsky, the active cognition 
that marks the person‘s initial reception of revelation is a harbinger of the process that is 
to mark his or her life in the Church.  Writes Newman, ―[T]he increase and expansion of 
the Christian Creed and Ritual… are the necessary attendants on any philosophy or polity 
which takes possession of the intellect and heart…‖361  Florovsky regards the act of 
giving expression to the experience of faith as the fulfillment of men‘s and women‘s 
personhood and their vocation to askesis. ―But Truth must still be expressed and 
pronounced,‖ he writes.  ―Because man is called not only to receive Truth attentively, but 
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also to witness of it.  Silencium mysticum does not exhaust the complete calling of man.  
He is called to creative activity…‖362    
Newman and Florovsky both consider the active cognition of the impression or 
experience as involving men‘s and women‘s rationality, or, their abstract thought.  As 
Florovsky puts it, the members of the Church are called to contribute to the growth of 
―Christian philosophy.‖  However, Newman and Florovsky also claim that the impression 
or experience is something that is lived, and that the individual Christian‘s entire life 
contributes to his or her cognition.  I have hinted at something in Chapter One that will 
become clearer in Chapter Two, namely, the inadequacy of the distinction between life 
and thought, or faith and reason, when characterizing the thought of Newman and 
Florovsky.  Assuredly, both of these authors employed these categories in their writings.  
But at the same time, these categories also obscure the mutual coinherence between life 
and thought affirmed by Newman and Florovsky.  They both imply that rationality is an 
integral part of one‘s life in Christ, and that one‘s life in Christ conditions one‘s 
rationality.       
Also pertinent to the subject of doctrinal development is Newman‘s and 
Florovsky‘s claim that the impression or experience of faith is not only a reality at the 
individual level, but at the level of the entire Church, as well.  They both describe this 
communally held knowledge of revelation as existing in the ―mind of the Church.‖  There 
are a few issues in regard to Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s respective understandings of the 
mind of the Church that pertain to doctrinal development.  Both Newman and Florovsky 
agree in affirming that the impression or experience of revelation is committed to the 
―mind of the Church‖ in its fullness.  The term ―deposit‖ is equivalent to this impression 
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or experience in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s writings.  Significantly, neither Newman nor 
Florovsky regard the deposit committed to the mind of the Church to be reducible to 
propositions.  It is, as Newman writes, ―a Divine philosophy… not a number of formulas 
such as a modern pedantic theologian may make theology to consist in, but a system of 
thought…‖363  Florovsky describes the deposit as ―an existential attitude, as a spiritual 
orientation.‖364  According to both Newman and Florovsky, the task of the members of 
the Church is to give expression to the deposit committed to it through ―word and deed.‖  
In this sense, they regard the deposit as a living thing, or, according to the phrase of 
Irenaeus that Florovsky frequently referenced, a depositum juvenescens.
365
  Newman and 
Florovsky, as I will argue in Chapter Two, see the idea of doctrinal development as 
testifying to the living character of the deposit as held within the mind of Church. 
On first examination, it appears that Newman and Florovsky part ways on the 
question of where the mind of the Church resides.  Newman speaks of the members of 
the Church having a common consciousness and phronema, but then declares that the 
mind of the Church does not habitually reside in any of its members, and refers to the 
mind of the Church as the ―mind of the Spirit.‖  Florovsky, on the other hand, insists that 
the Church—the Body of Christ—is most fundamentally a ―symphony of personalities,‖ 
and would not countenance the idea that the Church‘s mind at any time exists outside of 
its members.  For him, that would be the equivalent of saying that the mind of the Church 
existed outside of the Church. 
However, further examination reveals that this seeming difference in Newman 
and Florovsky is reconciled by the connection they both make between the mind of the 
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Church and theosis.  Above, I attempted to show that Newman‘s dual understanding of 
the mind of the Church seems to imply that it involves a dialogue between the individual 
members of the Church and the Spirit who dwells within the Church.  Florovsky 
emphasizes that the Church is a ―symphony of personalities,‖ but in no way would he 
claim that the mind of the Church exists in these personalities irrespective of their union 
with Christ.  They participate in the mind of the Church inasmuch as they are ―in direct 
and immediate union with Christ and His Father,‖ or, one might say, inasmuch as they 
are in union with the mind of Christ.
366
  Furthermore, Newman and Florovsky converge 
in holding that the activity of the Church‘s members contributes to the explication of the 
deposit committed to the mind of the Church, but that this process of activity cannot be 
separated from their union with Christ.   
The real parting of ways between Newman and Florovsky comes on the issue of 
who can legitimately speak from the fullness of the mind of the Church.  According to 
Newman, it is the pope when he pronounces either ex cathedra or in the context of a 
council when he is surrounded by his bishops.  At that time, Newman maintains, the mind 
of the Church ―is capable of being presented to their mind with that fullness and 
exactness, under the operation of supernatural grace… with which it habitually, not 
occasionally, resided in the minds of the Apostles…‖367  Thus, Newman holds that the 
fullness of the mind of the Church is a ―temporary illumination of Divine Grace‖ brought 
out only at those times it is required.
368
   
Florovsky, on the other hand, portrays the mind of the Church as something that 
can be achieved in its fullness only through askesis.  Accordingly, those most qualified to 
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speak from the mind of the Church in any given age are its saints, those who have 
existentially appropriated the experience of faith.  This is not to say that Florovsky 
attributes no role to Church authority.  Rather, his emphasis on the enacted character of 
the mind of the Church leads him to claim that Church authorities are competent to speak 
from this mind only insofar as they remain united with Christ.  I will return to this issue 
in Chapter Three when I deal with the relation between doctrinal development and 
authority.   
My goal in Chapter One has been to show that Newman and Florovsky believe 
this active reception of revelation mirrors the active character of God‘s revelation to men 
and women.  In other words, I have attempted to establish that the concept of doctrinal 
development follows from a particular concept of revelation that views revelation as 
comprised of the personal, free, and historical actions of both God and men and women.  
Such a concept of revelation is concomitant with a view of the history of the Church as 
comprised of men‘s and women‘s free and active reception of this revelation in their life 
and thought.  
The character Newman and Florovsky ascribe to the active reception of the 
impression or experience of faith will be the focus of the next chapter on Tradition.  
There I clarify that ―doctrinal development‖ is nothing other than Newman‘s 
nomenclature for this process of active reception, and that the idea of ―doctrinal 
development‖ is therefore consonant with Florovsky‘s theology.  To use Florovskian 
language, doctrinal development is the process in which thought witnesses to the 
experience of faith.  
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CHAPTER TWO: NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON  
TRADITION AND DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 In Chapter Two I will examine selected aspects of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s 
understandings of Tradition as they relate to the idea of doctrinal development.  If 
Chapter One on revelation was a more indirect, though highly pertinent, consideration of 
doctrinal development, Chapter Two will involve a more direct consideration of it.  The 
concept of Tradition typically refers to the Church‘s preservation and handing on of 
revelation through, among other things, its theology, which manifests itself in, among 
other things, the definition of doctrines.  The Church‘s Tradition thus constitutes the 
special realm of doctrinal development, which is why many authors treat the latter as a 
function of the former.
369
 
 The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a general overview of Newman‘s and 
Florovsky‘s respective understandings of Tradition.370  Instead, I will focus on each 
author‘s understanding of Tradition as it relates to doctrinal development.  In particular, I 
will concentrate my discussion on the following aspects: the place and role of Scripture 
and dogma in Tradition, the nature of theology, and the fittingness of the organic 
metaphor as a descriptor of the process of Tradition.  I have also chosen to focus on these 
aspects because, as will become apparent, most of the Orthodox objections to doctrinal 
development touch on them in some way.   
                                               
369 Among those who treat doctrinal development as a function of Tradition, see Yves Congar, La Foi et la 
théologie (Tournai, Belgium: Desclée, 1962); Nicholas Lash, Change in Focus, 35-45; Pierre Gauthier, 
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Stern, Bible et Tradition chez Newman: Aux Origines De La Théorie Du Développement (Paris: Aubier, 
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 Throughout the section summarizing his understanding of Tradition, one will note 
the fact that Florovsky both affirms and rejects the idea of doctrinal development, the 
rejections outweighing the affirmations.  The rejections are located in essays from both 
Florovsky‘s earlier and later career, while a clear, direct affirmation of doctrinal 
development is contained in only one published work of Florovsky‘s, namely, Ways of 
Russian Theology.  I will seek to address this seeming contradiction in the dialogue 
portion of this chapter.  There I will contextualize Florovsky‘s rejections of doctrinal 
development, showing that his objections to it do not conflict with the principles of 
Newman‘s theory.  More importantly, I will argue that Florovsky‘s theology of Tradition 
is in agreement with these principles, so much so that his calls for a Neo-patristic 
synthesis seemingly imply a call for authentic doctrinal development of the Orthodox 
Tradition.  A consequence of this agreement is that Florovsky‘s theology of Tradition 
diverges in significant ways, both implicitly and explicitly, from those contemporary 
Orthodox theologians who reject doctrinal development.  At the same time, however, I 
will point out the ways in which Florovsky‘s theology of Tradition offers important 
correctives and supplements to Newman‘s theory of development, and thus, contributes 
to the development of the theory itself.  
 
2.1: NEWMAN ON TRADITION 
 
A. THE PRINCIPLES OF NEWMAN’S UNDERSTANDING OF TRADITION 
 
 Newman described the development of an idea as the ―process… by which the 
aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form.‖371  This process requires time 
and the idea‘s exposure to different contexts, which draw out its various aspects.  
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Newman‘s concept of Tradition itself was an idea that underwent development.  During 
his Anglican years he uncovered various aspects of the idea of Tradition, and thus 
deepened his understanding of it, with the aid of numerous influences and historical 
circumstances.  It is therefore fitting that I accompany a description of Newman‘s 
doctrine of Tradition with an account of the persons and events that catalyzed its 
development.  This development resulted not only in his theory of doctrinal development, 
but also in his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church.  
 In the Apologia, Newman attributes an 1818 sermon by Edward Hawkins as 
among the earliest influences on his doctrine of Tradition.
372
  In particular, Newman 
recounts that he gleaned from Hawkins‘ sermon the principle ―that [Scripture] was never 
intended to teach doctrine, but only to prove it, and that, if we would learn doctrine, we 
must have recourse to the formularies of the Church; for instance, to the Catechism, and 
to the Creeds.‖373  Hawkins‘ sermon thus cemented for Newman an understanding of 
Tradition in opposition to the Protestant doctrine of sola Scriptura.  Newman further 
developed his opposition to sola Scriptura through his participation in the Oxford 
Movement.     
Aiding Newman in this development were the Church Fathers, whose 
understanding of Tradition further convinced him in the ―safe truth‖ that ―the Christianity 
of history is not Protestantism.‖374  In the second volume of his Treatises of St. 
Athanasius, Newman describes Athanasius‘ view of Tradition as encompassing Scripture 
                                               
372 Edward Hawkins (1789-1882) was a fellow of Oriel College at Oxford and vicar of the university 
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373 Apo., 29-30.   
374 Dev., 7.   
105 
 
and having the authority to interpret it: ―The fundamental idea with which [Athanasius] 
starts in the [Arian] controversy is a deep sense of the authority of Tradition, which he 
considers to have a definitive jurisdiction even in the interpretation of Scripture.‖375  
Indeed, Newman notes that Athanasius viewed the recourse to Scripture alone as a 
characteristic of the Arians.   
Newman also employed the patristic term regula fidei (―rule of faith‖) to describe 
this interpretive function of Tradition.  The Via Media (1837) represents Newman‘s 
attempt to provide a positive elaboration of the teachings of the Anglican Church, which 
necessarily included its teaching on Tradition.  He defines the regula fidei as ―the Bible 
and Catholic Tradition taken together.  These two together make up a joint rule; Scripture 
is interpreted by Tradition, Tradition is verified by Scripture; Tradition gives form to the 
doctrine, Scripture gives life; Tradition teaches, Scripture proves.‖376  In this work of his 
Anglican years, Newman then subdivides Tradition into two categories: Episcopal 
Tradition and Prophetical Tradition.  Benjamin King refers to this division as Newman‘s 
―twofold system of doctrine.‖  For Newman, Episcopal Tradition corresponds to the 
Creeds, which he describes as ―a collection of definite articles set apart from the first, 
passing from hand to hand… forced upon the attention of each Christian, and thus 
demanding and securing due explanation of its meaning.‖377  It includes those teachings 
that conform to the criteria of the Vincentian Canon, and thus, have been held semper, 
ubique, et ab omnibus (―always, everywhere, and by all‖) since the Church‘s inception.378  
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378 Vincent of Lérins, Commonitorium 2.3. References to the Commonitorium refer to the text in Corpus 
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Newman regarded the dogmas of Episcopal Tradition as necessary to the individual 
Christian‘s faith. 
 Prophetical Tradition includes those other teachings that are part of the Church‘s 
patrimony, but not strictly necessary for belief.  Newman describes the contents of 
Prophetical Tradition as ―partly written, partly unwritten, partly the interpretation, partly 
the supplement of Scripture, partly preserved in intellectual expressions, partly latent in 
the spirit and temper of Christians; poured to and fro in closets and upon the housetops, 
in liturgies, in controversial works, in obscure fragments, in sermons, in popular 
prejudices, in local customs.‖379  Prophetical Tradition is for Newman the equivalent of 
theology.  It represents all those elements that are the product of the Church‘s reflection 
on revelation such as defined, non-creedal doctrines, theological and devotional works, 
liturgy, art, and various other practices.   
Newman‘s description of Prophetical Tradition in the Via Media contains the 
seeds of his later and fuller understanding of Tradition.  Though Newman principally 
describes Tradition as content, he also describes it as a lens through which the Church 
views revelation, as ―consisting of a certain body of Truth, pervading the Church like an 
atmosphere.‖380  He writes that this Tradition ―exist[s] primarily in the bosom of the 
Church itself‖381—a passage that illustrates his view of Tradition as an ecclesial reality.  
What is more, he quotes Irenaeus in support of this view of Tradition.  Irenaeus had 
spoken of the ―barbarous nations‖ who were able to believe in Christ without having the 
privilege of written Scriptures, instead ―having salvation impressed through the Spirit on 
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their hearts.‖382  Newman here claims that Christians have the power to discern the truth 
through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.  This power is the basis for the position 
Newman later enunciates as a Catholic in his Rambler article ―On Consulting the Faithful 
in Matters of Doctrine,‖ namely, that the faithful act as a witness of Tradition.383  
The further development of Newman‘s understanding of Tradition resulted in the 
collapse of his twofold system of doctrine.  To repeat, Newman held that the teachings 
comprising Episcopal Tradition—those considered necessary to the individual believer‘s 
faith—were all traceable to Apostolic times.  However, through his continued reading of 
the Fathers, Newman came to recognize that some of these teachings could not claim 
even a minimal consensus in the early Church, and thus, could not claim to pass the test 
of the Vincentian Canon.
384
  Such, for instance, was the case with the dogma of the 
Trinity, which one cannot locate in the pre-Nicene Church without a creative 
interpretation of history.   
Newman did not consider the falling back upon the Disciplina Arcani (―discipline 
of the secret‖) as a solution to this problem, either.  The Disciplina Arcani refers to the 
early Church‘s occasional practice of keeping certain Church teachings secret from 
pagans lest the latter profane them, and has been used by some to explain the paucity of 
textual evidence for certain dogmas.
385
  Newman therefore postulated the theory of the 
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development of doctrine, which was ―an hypothesis to account for a difficulty.‖  386  
According to this hypothesis, even some of the fundamental dogmas of the Church were 
the result of human thought reflecting on God‘s revelation and unfolding its contents over 
time.  The distinction between what Newman had termed ―Episcopal Tradition‖ and 
―Prophetical Tradition‖ having become blurred, the idea of doctrinal development took 
on a normative role in his understanding of Tradition.     
   
 
B. TRADITION AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
Newman‘s broadening of the notion of Tradition with the concept of the 
development of doctrine resulted in his use of a broader vocabulary for Tradition.  In his 
fifteenth Oxford University Sermon (1843) Newman began referring to the ―idea‖ of 
Christianity.  He continued to use this terminology throughout his Catholic years.  I 
previously outlined in Chapter One the empiricist schema of revelation operative in 
Newman‘s writings, namely, object-impression-idea.  I have already expounded upon the 
first two portions of this schema, which, briefly, refer to God as the object of revelation, 
and the impression as both God‘s activity of revealing Himself and the initial, active 
human reception of this revelation.  Here I turn to the meaning of ―idea‖ in the schema.   
The difficulties of determining what exactly Newman meant by referring to 
Christianity as an ―idea‖ are the same as those previously encountered when treating 
Newman‘s use of the term ―impression.‖  Newman did not write theology in a systematic 
fashion, and thus, he did not always use the term in a consistent manner.
387
  At times, 
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Newman described revelation itself as the ―initial and essential idea of Christianity.‖388  
Nicholas Lash thus interprets Newman‘s ―idea‖ as ―God‘s saving revelation, His self-
disclosure in history, which is the ‗vital principle‘ of that Church which is its visible 
expression.‖389   
Upon examination of Newman‘s entire corpus, however, one cannot so simply 
identify the ―idea‖ of Christianity with revelation.  By applying the term ―idea‖ to 
Christianity, Newman conveys the essential unity of revelation, a unity derivative of the 
oneness of God and the oneness of the impression He makes on those who receive His 
revelation.  Thus, according to Newman, the idea of Christianity, like other ideas, ―is 
commensurate with the sum total of [the object‘s] possible aspects, however they may 
vary in the separate consciousness of individuals.‖390   
Perhaps because of the link between the oneness of the ―idea‖ of Christianity and 
the oneness of God and His revelation, it is tempting to identify this idea with Christ 
himself, who is the fullness of revelation.  Lash sees this implication in Newman whom, 
he writes, has a tendency ―to express the transcendence of the ‗idea‘ by hypostasizing, or 
personalizing it.‖391  Merrigan does not directly challenge Lash‘s position, though what it 
implies is not that different from Paul Misner‘s desire that Newman would have treated 
God‘s revelation as communicating ―His very Self.‖392  What both Lash and Misner fail 
to acknowledge is that Newman did not consider the ―idea‖ to be revelation itself, but 
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revelation-as-received.  As Merrigan writes, ―The idea is not, properly speaking the 
object of faith.  It is however, by means of it that the object of faith is apprehended.‖393 
To repeat the quotation in the paragraph above, Newman held that the ―idea‖ of 
Christianity is ―commensurate‖ with God‘s revelation.  But the qualification 
―commensurate‖ implies that it is not God Himself.  Nor is it God‘s revelation itself, 
which refers to the divine communicating activity.  The idea of Christianity is the human 
reflection upon God, upon revelation, as present within the impression made by God‘s 
revealing activity—an impression that ―spontaneously, or even necessarily, becomes the 
subject of reflection on the part of the mind itself.‖394  Newman furthermore held that the 
individual Christian gains access to the idea through the existence of the Church, which 
possesses the idea in its ―mind.‖  It is ―preserved, by the operation of the Holy Spirit, in 
the living tradition of the Church.‖395  Given, then, that Newman most consistently 
characterizes the idea not as revelation itself, but as revelation possessed and preserved 
by the Church, it seems more accurate to identify it with what Roman Catholic theology 
classifies as ―Tradition.‖  Tradition, thus understood, is not revelation per se, but 
revelation as received by the Church.  
 According to Newman, the Church‘s reception of revelation consists of not only 
reflection and preservation, but also development.  Indeed, Newman uses the term ―idea‖ 
to describe Christian Tradition precisely because it allows him to posit the theory of 
doctrinal development.  In chapter one of the Essay on Development, Newman sets up an 
analogy between the Christian ―idea‖ and other human ideas by describing the latter‘s 
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process of formation.  Over the course of time, an idea that takes hold of the minds and 
hearts of men and women is variously contemplated, interpreted, and applied.  The ideas 
Newman has in mind are complex, such as ―the doctrine of the divine right of kings, or of 
the rights of man, or of the anti-social bearings of a priesthood, or utilitarianism, or free 
trade…‖396  At first, holds Newman, the idea will be understood only vaguely.  However, 
with the passage of time, the reflection of numerous minds, and the manifestation of the 
idea in various forms, the complexity and richness of the idea will take greater shape.  
―This process,‖ writes Newman, ―whether it be longer or shorter in point of time, by 
which the aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form, I call its 
development, being the germination and maturation of some truth or apparent truth on a 
large mental field.‖397   
Newman considers Christianity to have undergone such a process.  He writes, ―If 
Christianity is a fact, and impresses an idea of itself on our minds and is a subject-matter 
of exercises of the reason, that idea will in course of time expand into a multitude of 
ideas, and aspects of ideas, connected and harmonious with one another, and in 
themselves determinate and immutable, as is the objective fact itself which is thus 
represented.‖398  Such has been the history of Christianity.  It began as an impression 
upon the Apostles and those in the milieu in which Jesus‘ ministry took place.  There was 
from the beginning much question about the identity of Jesus and the nature of his 
mission.  Gradually, over the course of Jesus‘ ministry, people began to ascribe various 
titles to him, and the nature of the kingdom that Jesus preached became more fully 
revealed.  In the years following the Christ-event this reflection on the person of Jesus 
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and his mission continued, and resulted in the clarification of certain aspects of what 
came to be known as Christianity, but also the raising of further questions to which men 
and women sought answers.  This process was aided by the presence of the Holy Spirit in 
the Church and its members.   
The Christian idea also came to manifest itself in Scriptures, liturgy, devotional 
practices, art, and an ethical system.  The aspects associated with Christianity were also 
applied to other ideas: particular philosophies, governments, moralities.  This 
engagement, or application, resulted in the further plumbing of the aspects of the 
Christian idea.  This process I have described is essentially what Newman understands to 
be the development of the Christian idea, i.e., the development of Christian doctrine.  It is 
a process that continues to occur, and will occur until the eschaton.  In the section that 
follows, I will consider what Newman regards as the two principal manifestations of the 
Christian idea: Scripture and Dogma.         
 
C. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN IDEA 
 
I. SCRIPTURE 
 
 Scripture represents one of the manifestations of the Christian idea.  Because it is 
inspired, Newman regards it as the privileged manifestation of the Christian idea.  Above, 
I explained that Newman interprets the history of the Christian idea as one of doctrinal 
development.  But, in his Essay on Development, Newman not only wishes to argue that 
Christianity has experienced doctrinal development, but also that there is a need for 
doctrinal development.  In particular, and against the Protestant doctrine of sola 
scriptura, he argues that the need for doctrinal development follows from the nature of 
Scripture.   
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More specifically, Newman sees the need for doctrinal development following 
from the character of Scripture as mystery.  According to Newman, as I previously 
quoted in Chapter One, ―mystery is the necessary note of divine revelation, that is, 
mystery subjectively to the human mind.‖399  Newman predicates the term ―mystery‖ of 
divine revelation in order to recognize that it is comprehensible, but not fully so; that it is 
conveyed in ways that have meaning to men and women, but that it has meanings that 
will never be uncovered due to its infinite nature.  Inasmuch as it is comprehensible, 
Scripture represents a portion of the divine economy; inasmuch as it remains 
incomprehensible, Scripture represents a mystery.  In a famous passage Newman writes 
of Scripture that ―it cannot, as it were, be mapped, or its contents catalogued; but after all 
our diligence, to the end of our lives and to the end of the Church, it must be an 
unexplored and unsubdued land, with heights and valleys, forests and streams, on the 
right and left of our path and close about us, full of concealed wonders and choice 
treasures.‖400  The exploration of Scripture is left to the work of doctrinal development, 
where men and women seek to grow in their understanding of the mystery while at the 
same time acknowledging that they can never fully grasp the mystery.     
 Secondly, Newman believes Scripture entails the need for doctrinal development 
because it does not exhibit self-sufficiency.  Scripture does not provide direct answers to 
questions that are crucial to the identity, explanation, and living out of the Christian faith: 
―great questions exist in the subject-matter of which Scripture treats, which Scripture 
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does not solve.‖401  Among such questions Newman includes the question of the Canon 
of Scripture, of the nature of its inspiration, whether or not infant baptism is permissible, 
and purgatory.  Moreover, there are a number of other issues of great pertinence to the 
faith that arise with the passage of time, the change of context, and the complexity of 
human life.  These issues require answers that Scripture does not immediately provide.   
Newman also points out that Scripture is not self-interpretive, which further 
demonstrates its lack of self-sufficiency.  He uses as an example Jn 1:14: ―The Word 
became flesh.‖  Newman poses three questions that inevitably arise if someone tries to 
discern the meaning of this passage: ―What is meant by ‗the Word,‘ what by ‗flesh,‘ what 
by ‗became.‘‖  While the answers to these questions require engagement with the biblical 
text itself, one also must have recourse to concepts and uses of these terms that have been 
learned elsewhere.  For instance, in order to answer the first question (―What is meant by 
‗the Word‘‖), one might look to Prov 8:22-31, which describes the ―first-born‖ of the 
Lord who was with Him at creation.  But such a connection is not immediately justified, 
and even if it was, a fuller understanding of the term ―Word‖ (Logos) would require a 
study of its origins in Greek philosophy.  As Newman rightly concludes, ―The answers to 
these involve a process of investigation, and are developments.‖402  
Newman considers development a principle intrinsic to the biblical narrative.  
―The whole Bible,‖ he writes, ―not its prophetical portions only, is written on the 
principle of development.‖403  Newman holds that prophecy in the Old Testament 
wonderfully illustrates development, since what is initially a mysterious, obscure text, has 
light progressively shone on it with the passage of time, even after its historical 
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fulfillment.  Such is most famously the case with the messianic prophecies.  But Newman 
sees this development in numerous other instances in Scripture.  Thus, he regards the 
entire history of Israel as ―the growth of an idea‖ in which God gradually revealed 
Himself to the chosen people, continually perfecting their understanding of Him that they 
were to exhibit in their words and deeds.
404
  In the New Testament, too, Newman points 
out that the sayings of Christ are ―characterized by mingled simplicity and mystery,‖ and 
thus, seemingly require development in order that their meaning be understood and 
thereby lived.
405
  
  
II. DOCTRINE 
 
 Newman held that doctrinal definitions constitute another manifestation of the 
Christian idea.  He primarily attributed the development of these definitions to the work 
of theology.
 406
  Therefore, it is unsurprising that Newman describes theology and 
doctrinal development in a similar fashion.  In the Idea of a University Newman defines 
theology as ―one idea unfolded in its just proportions… the evolution, not of half-a-dozen 
ideas, but of one.‖ 407  It is also significant that Newman identifies theology with the 
prophetical office of the Church, as opposed to its priestly and kingly offices.
408
  As 
shown above, Newman regarded the gradual realization of prophecies as one of the 
clearest examples of doctrinal development.  The example of the prophet, according to 
Newman, best embodies the vocation of the theologian, for ―Apostles rules and preach, 
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Prophets expound.  Prophets… are the interpreters of the revelation; they unfold and 
define its mysteries, they illuminate its documents, they harmonize its contents, they 
apply its promises.‖409  Finally, Newman refers to theology and its developments as 
―commensurate with Revelation,‖410 and thus, as authentic manifestations of the Christian 
idea, i.e., Tradition. 
 Newman understood theology in the traditional Catholic sense as the application 
of human reason to revelation.  It seeks to know the contents of revelation through 
abstractions, generalizations, and categorizations.  It therefore belongs to the realm of 
notional apprehension and knowledge.  Faith, on the other hand, belongs to the realm of 
real apprehension and knowledge, as it involves giving assent to God—a concrete, 
particular person who contains all the aspects sought by notional knowledge.
411
    
 Newman unabashedly affirms the important role played in religion by the notional 
work of theology.  One could argue that much of his life‘s work was devoted to giving an 
apologia pro theologia.  Since the Reformation many have presupposed (or constructed) 
a dichotomy between the real and the notional, faith and reason, spirituality and theology.  
This dichotomy has been particularly unfavorable to theology, which is often 
characterized as cold, sterile, and peripheral to one‘s growth in faith.  But, as Newman 
explains, theology is necessary to the flourishing of faith for a number of reasons.  For 
one, the notional is the means by which men and women grow in the knowledge of their 
faith: ―To apprehend notionally is to have breadth of mind, but to be shallow; to 
apprehend really is to be deep, but to be narrow-minded.  The latter is the conservative 
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principle of knowledge, and the former the principle of its advancement.‖412  This 
quotation contains a crucial insight.  As ―the principle of [knowledge‘s] advancement,‖ 
the notional realm of knowledge is the realm of doctrinal development.  Put another way, 
Newman regards the development of doctrine as a development of the Church‘s notional 
understanding of revelation.  This growth in the Church‘s understanding of the Christian 
idea is brought about through the activity of human reason.
413
     
What is more, Newman held that this notional development in the knowledge of 
revelation is the rule not only for the Church as a whole, but for each individual 
Christian.  ―Every religious man is to a certain extent a theologian,‖414 writes Newman, 
because all possess a reasoning intellect, and thus, come to understand revelation through 
abstractions.  According to Newman, it is the duty of all Christians to ponder on the 
mysteries of faith, and to grow in their understanding of them.  He sees Mary as the 
preeminent witness to this duty, for she ―kept all these things, reflecting on them in her 
heart‖ (Lk 2:19), thus demonstrating that ―she does not think it enough to accept [Divine 
Truth], she dwells upon it; not enough to possess, she uses it; not enough to assent, she 
developes [sic] it; not enough to submit the Reason, she reasons upon it.‖415 
 The above quotation also shows that Newman viewed the real and the notional, 
faith and theology, as intimately connected with one another.  Indeed, Newman viewed 
faith as an act of reason, and reason as needing to make faith-like ventures and 
                                               
412 G.A., 47.  See also U.S., 207: ―[Reason‘s] act is usually considered a process, which, of course, a 
progress of thought from one idea to the other must be…‖ 
413 It is noteworthy that Newman includes the principle of development in his description of human reason: 
―All men reason, for to reason is nothing more than to gain truth from former truth…‖ (U.S., 258)   
414 G.A., 93 
415 U.S., 313.   
118 
 
assumptions in its pursuit of knowledge.
416
  Beyond their intermingled nature, faith and 
theology perform important functions for each other.  ―Reason (or theology),‖ writes 
Newman, ―has not only submitted, it has ministered to Faith; it has illustrated its 
documents; it has raised illiterate peasants into philosophers and divines; it has elicited a 
meaning from their words which their immediate hearers little suspected.‖417   
Theology‘s ministry to faith thus primarily consists in helping the Church to grow 
in its knowledge of God.  As Newman points out, such knowledge is inseparable from the 
love of God: ―We love our parents, as our parents, when we know them to be our parents; 
we must know concerning God, before we can feel love, fear, hope, or trust towards 
Him.‖418  Theology also ministers to faith by serving as ―the fundamental and regulating 
principle of the whole Church system.‖419  Theology ―regulat[es]… the whole Church 
system‖ by not only ordering and developing the truths of revelation, but also by 
providing a check on both the excesses of the intellect that manifest themselves in heresy, 
and the excesses of devotion that manifest themselves in superstition and sentimentality.  
Newman thus implies that a religion that does not notionally develop jeopardizes its 
grasp upon the real.  
In their mutually interpenetrative relationship, the real also ministers to the 
notional: faith minsters to theology.  Admittedly, Newman did not see an exact parity 
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between the real and the notional.  He held that ―Theology may stand as a substantive 
science, though it be without the life of religion; but religion cannot maintain its ground 
at all without theology.‖420  Nevertheless, a notional knowledge that does not remain 
rooted in the real is also subject to its own errors.  For example, a business professor who 
has a solely notional knowledge might be able to discourse about the principles of his or 
her discipline as contained in a textbook.  However, he or she cannot apply these 
principles to particular examples of success and failure in contemporary business models.  
The principles will survive, but their existence will be shadowy, losing their force and 
vigor as a result of their failure to be enacted.  In theology, one sees this phenomenon 
occur with the professor who teaches the truths of the faith, but has lost his or her faith.  
When theology becomes increasingly disconnected from the realities that are the basis of 
its notions, its abstractions become less relevant to the concerns of the Church and its 
faithful, and it devolves into a science pursued for its own end.  What is more, it ceases to 
be a living theology, since the real, for Newman, is the principle of action.
421
 
 The notional work of theology manifests itself, among other things, in the 
formulation of dogmas.  Newman defines a dogma as ―a proposition [that] stands for a 
notion or for a thing; and to believe it is to give the assent of the mind to it, as it stands 
for the one or for the other.‖422  Since the time of the Reformation, the expression of 
revelation in propositional form has come to be associated with a static understanding of 
religion.  Newman was aware of this association, referring to the existence of ―people… 
[who] object that such propositions are but a formal and human medium destroying all 
true reception of the Gospel, and making religion a matter of words or of logic, instead of 
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having its seat in the heart.‖423  But to Newman, doctrinal propositions were simply 
necessary to the continuance and growth of a human religion: ―If there is a Revelation, 
there must be a doctrine; both our reason and our hearts tell us so.‖424  Men and women, 
due to their own finitude, cannot reflect upon the whole of a reality such as the Christian 
idea without breaking it into its separate aspects or notions.
425
  Dogmas, in spite of the 
new wording they may sometimes utilize, are not new revelations, but are aspects or 
notions of the original idea of Christianity.  They are those aspects that the Church has 
previously held implicitly within its ―mind,‖ but is now able to hold explicitly through 
their having been clothed with human expression.  Dogmas are none other than 
incarnations of the Christian idea.   
Newman held that defined dogmas help the Church better communicate the 
Christian idea to the faithful.  Writes Newman, ―…they are necessary to the mind in the 
same way that language is ever necessary for denoting facts, both for ourselves as 
individuals, and for our intercourse with others.  Again, they are useful in their dogmatic 
aspect as ascertaining and making clear for us the truths on which the religious 
imagination has to rest.‖426  As Walgrave points out, it is only the realm of the notional 
that is communicable.  The real is the level of the personal, based in one‘s individual 
experience, and therefore cannot be imparted to another.  Walgrave‘s contrast between 
the real and the notional is perhaps too stark, as the Holy Spirit, who dwells within each 
member of the Church, is perhaps able to effect a shared experience among them.  
However, he is right in maintaining that dogmas specially function to give expression to 
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this experience, and enable the Church to both preserve and transmit this experience to 
others.
427
    
 Newman‘s position that dogmatic definitions concretize aspects of Christian 
revelation is balanced by an apophatic attitude toward them.  In Western expressions of 
Christianity, the term ―apophaticism‖ is usually synonymous with what is known as 
―negative theology.‖  Negative theology holds that finite, human statements can never 
quite adequately express truths about the infinite God, and indeed, are more unlike than 
like Him.  Modern Orthodox authors, however, have contended that the Eastern tradition 
of Christianity has a fuller and richer understanding of apophaticism that goes beyond 
mere negative theology.  Vladimir Lossky sums up the Orthodox position well when he 
writes that apophaticism ―is not simply a question of a process of dialectic but of 
something else: a purification, a κάθαρσις... It is an existential attitude which involves the 
whole man.‖428 
It is therefore significant that C. Stephen Dessain holds that Newman‘s writings 
illustrate an apophaticism characteristic of the Eastern Tradition.  Dessain writes that the 
―sense of reverence, of God‘s transcendence and of the mystery in Christianity is 
characteristic of all Newman‘s religious writings.‖429  The mystery that Newman 
predicated of Scripture he also predicated of dogma, inasmuch as the latter is also 
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commensurate with revelation.
430
  Dogmatic propositions seek to approach a truth of 
divine revelation, but they never quite encompass that truth.  Once they are formulated, 
there is a feeling that they correspond to the intended truth in some way, but there is 
coterminously a ―difficulty of recognizing them… as the true representation of our 
meaning.‖431  They are, writes Newman, ―approximation[s] to the truth,… 
expedient[s],… the truth as far as they go.‖432  Newman elsewhere terms them ―symbols 
of a Divine fact which cannot be compassed by them,‖ and which serve to represent our 
assent to the reality behind them.
433
 
 Yet, for all his emphasis on mystery, Newman was sanguine about how much 
recourse theology should have to the idea of it.  To repeat, Newman held that the task of 
theology is to abstract from the concrete realities of revelation, breaking them into 
separate notions so that we may grow in our understanding of these realities.  He 
maintained that the term ―mystery‖ is also a notion, as it is ―not part of the Divine 
Verity… but in relation to creatures and to the human intellect.‖434  In this passage from 
the Grammar, Newman is responding to those who have disdain for the endless number 
of propositions that human beings attach to God; in other words, to those who have 
disdain for theology.  The error Newman perceives in those who frequently invoke the 
term ―mystery‖ for God is that they believe it somehow enables them to behold God as a 
whole, per modum unius.  Newman believes we can experience God as one through our 
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personal relationship with Him; in other words, through real knowledge.  He also 
believes that the faculty of the imagination enables the intellect to associate a number of 
separate propositions with a single object, such as God.
435
  But he does not believe we 
can understand God as one through the invocation of the term ―mystery,‖ which he 
simply considers to be a substitution of one notion at the expense of innumerable 
others.
436
   
Rather than being a theological safeguard of the ineffability of the one God, 
Newman sees mystery more as an existential attitude: an experience of the infinite God 
who remains far beyond the grasp of any human words and concepts.
437
  In this way 
Newman exhibits that deeper understanding of apophaticism that lies beyond mere 
negative theology, and regards such an apophatic attitude as crucial to faith.  However, it 
is important to note that Newman did not think this attitude a substitute for theology, nor 
did he think it identifiable with theology.  As I will discuss in the Dialogue section of this 
chapter, this substitution or identification of apophaticism and theology factors into some 
Orthodox authors‘ rejection of doctrinal development.        
Newman recognized that human words will always fall short of the divine reality, 
but he at the same time recognized that we must nevertheless use these words: ―We are 
aware, while we do so, that they are inadequate, but we have the alternative of doing so, 
or doing nothing at all.‖438  The idea of economy is a two-sided coin: on one side, it 
deems human formulations of divine truth as inadequate, and God‘s deigning to be 
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expressed by the human as a form of kenosis.  But on the other side it affirms that these 
formulations do indeed convey divine truth.  Therefore, concludes Newman, theology 
proceeds ―by saying and unsaying, to a positive result.‖439  In sum, we have here 
Newman‘s acknowledgement of the need for both cataphatic and apophatic theology. 
  In his attitude toward doctrinal definition, Newman attempted to maintain a 
tension between the cataphatic and apophatic throughout his life.  Perhaps his attempt is 
consistent with the tension inherent in the categories themselves.  While Newman was an 
Anglican, Rowan Williams argues, he predominantly viewed definitions in a negative 
light.  Williams interprets Newman as implying in Arians that it would be preferable for 
the Church to not have recourse to the technical language of definition, instead being able 
to behold God using the simple words and images of revelation in its infancy.  However, 
heresies forced the Church‘s hand, compelling it to define doctrines when it would have 
rather remained reticent.  Williams characterizes Newman as regarding these definitions 
as ―necessary evils,‖ and writes, ―Newman comes close to a Verfallstheorie of dogmatic 
language, the notion of formulation itself being a kind of betrayal of some richer truth; 
but it is a necessary fall, a felix culpa, given that the Church lives in a history of change, 
contingency, and human sinfulness, and that the gospel must be preached in a variety of 
contexts.‖440  Thus, from the ―necessary evil‖ of definition arise consequent goods. 
 Newman‘s seemingly negative view of definition is not, however, limited to 
Arians.  In the Essay on Development, Newman defends the lack of officially defined 
teachings on the papacy in the early Church with the statement: ―No doctrine is defined 
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till it is violated.‖441  Newman appears here to once again express the belief that doctrinal 
definition only follows close upon the heels of heresy.  He later expressed this same 
sentiment as a Catholic when the First Vatican Council was threatening to define papal 
infallibility as a dogma.  Writing in confidentiality to Bishop Ullathorne, Newman asks, 
―When has definition of doctrine de fide been a luxury of devotion, and not a stern 
painful necessity?‖442 
This negative view of doctrinal definition, however, appears inconsistent with 
Newman‘s view that definition is a natural result of the application of human reason to 
revelation.  It also seems inconsistent with Newman‘s belief that definitions represented a 
term in the process of development; in other words, that they are the fulfillment of 
doctrinal development.
443
  One must also take into account Newman‘s consistently 
positive attitude toward the dogmatic proclamation of the Immaculate Conception (1854), 
which was not a response to a particular heresy.  In 1849 he described Pius IX‘s 
encyclical foreboding it as ―very joyful news‖ and ―a wonderful time,‖444 and his 
subsequent writings testify that he did not waver in this initial sentiment throughout his 
life.  Newman also recognized that the definition on the Immaculate Conception would 
potentially represent a confirmation of his theory of doctrinal development, and even 
contrasted it with previous definitions that had arisen because of heresy:   
The Bull Unigenitus has generally been appealed to on the question of the Pope‘s 
 Infallibility—but there what was doctrinal was indirect, viz. from the necessity 
 of putting down a heresy which had risen; but now the Pope comes forward 
 proprio motu, directly to decree a point of faith, which is demanded by the growth 
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 of opinion.  Its bearing upon the doctrine of development is equally  
 striking…‖445    
 
In this letter, Newman expresses the remarkability of a pope defining a dogma as a result 
of devotion rather than heresy, but he does not express a theological objection to it. 
 A second look at those places where Newman appears to espouse a negative view 
of doctrinal definition reveals the need for qualification.  I grant Williams that the 
Newman of Arians seems to have some nostalgia about the pre-Nicene Church, and 
views heresy as the principal historical impetus for doctrinal definition.  However, 
Williams ignores Newman‘s more balanced attitude toward definition in this work.  
Indeed, one finds this balance exhibited amidst those statements that Williams terms 
Newman‘s near ―Verfallstheorie of dogmatic language.‖  Newman writes,  
 As the mind is cultivated and expanded, it cannot refrain from the attempt to 
 analyze the vision which influences the heart, and the Object in which that vision 
 centres; nor does it stop till it has, in some sort, succeeded in expressing in words, 
 what has all along been a principle both of its affections and of its obedience… 
 Much as we may wish it, we cannot restrain the rovings of the intellect, or silence 
 its clamorous demand for a formal statement concerning the Object of our 
 worship.  If, for instance, Scripture bids us adore God, and adore His Son, our 
 reason at once asks, whether it does not follow that there are two Gods; and a 
 system of doctrine becomes unavoidable; being framed, let it be observed, not 
 with a view of explaining, but of arranging the inspired notices concerning the 
 Supreme Being, of providing, not a consistent, but a connected statement.  There 
 the inquisitiveness of a pious mind rests, viz., when it has pursued the subject into 
 the mystery which is its limit.  But this is not all.  The intellectual expression of 
 theological truth not only excludes heresy, but directly assists the acts of religious 
 worship and obedience; fixing and stimulating the Christian spirit in the same way 
 as the knowledge of the One God relieves and illuminates the perplexed 
 conscience of the religious heathen.—And thus much on the importance of Creeds 
 to tranquilize the mind; the text of Scripture being addressed principally to the 
 affections, and of a religious, not a philosophical character.
446
 
 
In this passage are the seeds of Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development.  Though 
definition most often comes about as a result of heresy, Newman also admits that it 
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serves a demand of reason for ―formal statements,‖ and thus satisfies the constitution of 
the human intellect.  It is not the definition that is the felix culpa, but the heresy.   
 In addition, one must further contextualize Newman‘s statement about de fide 
definitions being ―a stern painful necessity.‖  It is well documented that Newman was 
concerned not about the orthodoxy of papal infallibility per se—whose impending 
definition precipitated Newman‘s statement—but about the opportuneness of its 
dogmatic definition.
447
  More specifically, he was concerned that the ultramontanes—
who seemingly desired that definitions become ―as plenty as blackberries‖448—were 
pushing the definition through without due regard for a proper period of reception.  He 
contrasted the definition of papal infallibility with the definition of the Immaculate 
Conception, which had been preceded by ―many steps… [and] many centuries… before 
the dogma was ripe.‖449  He thought, in other words, that the coming-to-be of the 
definition of the Immaculate Conception illustrated the process of doctrinal development, 
whereas the definition of papal infallibility did not.  If he had indeed thought that dogmas 
could be legitimately proclaimed only as a result of heresy, his unabashed approval of the 
proclamation of the Immaculate Conception would be unintelligible, since there was no 
immediate heresy against which it was directed.        
                                               
447 For studies of Newman‘s response to the dogmatic proclamation of papal infallibility, see John R. Page, 
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449 L.D., 25: 93. 
128 
 
Newman‘s concern that the definition of papal infallibility did not have a heretical 
impetus also appears to be related to his understanding of the function of ecumenical 
councils.  In the same letter in which he claims that dogmas should only arise as a result 
of ―a stern painful necessity,‖ he writes that ―a Council‘s proper office is, when some 
great heresy or other evil impends, to inspire the faithful with hope and confidence.‖450  
Two months earlier, in a letter to Mrs. William Froude, Newman had further elaborated 
his position with historical examples: ―In the early times the Nicene Council gave rise to 
dissensions and to confusions which lasted near a century.  The Council of Ephesus 
opened a question which it took three centuries to settle.  Well, these Councils were 
NECESSARY—they were called to resist and to defend opposition to our Lord‘s 
divinity—heresies—They could not be helped.‖451  Thus, Newman regards an ecumenical 
council as a moment of crisis, called to respond to teachings that pose an imminent threat 
to the faith.  This response occasionally comes in the form of dogmatic definitions.  Such 
definitions are somewhat lamentable not because they define what should remain 
undefined, but because they define what has not necessarily undergone a due course of 
development in the mind of the Church.  They hastily require the assent of the faithful to 
an aspect of the Christian idea that has not yet matured in their understanding.                   
Having established Newman‘s positive view of doctrine, and qualified his 
reservations about it, I turn now to another aspect of Newman‘s understanding of 
theology, namely, its systematic thrust.  He regards theology as systematic by nature: ―the 
Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into system.‖452  This systematic 
character belongs to theology inasmuch as it is a science whose instrument is human 
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reasoning, which seeks to order the various notions and aspects of ideas into a unity that 
is an image of what it cannot comprehend as a whole.  The goal of all sciences is to 
―raise… a conceptual construct which is able to house the whole world of human 
experience,‖ i.e., a system.453  Theology is no different, for it is a conceptual, notional 
construct of the Church‘s experience of revelation, ―and the notional is the general and 
systematic.‖454   
Newman viewed a theological system as a fruit of the development of doctrine.  
His very summary of the idea of doctrinal development in the Essay on Development 
serves as a summary of his understanding of a system: ―This process, whether it be longer 
or shorter in point of time, by which the aspects of an idea are brought into consistency 
and form, I call its development, being the germination and maturation of some truth or 
apparent truth of a large mental field.‖ 455  Just as there is an inevitability to the 
development of the Christian idea due to the nature of human reason, so there is an 
inevitability that human reason will order this development into a system.  
Benjamin King points out that Newman considered what he called the ―Catholic 
system‖ to exist in the Apostles, and to have been transmitted to their disciples.  While 
granting the occasional nature of the Fathers‘ writings, Newman maintains, ―It is hardly 
too much to say that almost the whole system of Catholic doctrine may be discovered, at 
least in outline, not to say in parts filled up, in the course of [the Fathers].‖456  As an 
Anglican, Newman considered the Roman Catholic Church to have a definite system, 
though he rejected its identity with the system of the Fathers.  He at the same time 
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acknowledged that the Anglican Church was missing a positive system.  Its identity, he 
perceived, was principally constructed from the negative: anti-Protestantism and anti-
Romanism.  He set out in the Via Media to construct a positive system to supply a need 
for the lack of one in the Anglican Church.
457
  Eventually, Newman came to see that the 
Anglican system he had constructed (which, he admitted, existed only on paper) was in 
fact not in conformity with the theological system present in the Fathers.
458
  Instead, he 
came to see the Roman Catholic Church as the nearest approximation to the Church of 
the Fathers.  Newman‘s conversion to Roman Catholicism thus consisted of an assent to 
one theological system (the Roman) over another (the Anglican).    
Lash describes a two-stage process to the process of the development of the 
Christian idea: ―The first stage is the development from implicit awareness to explicit 
articulation in a body of doctrine.  The second stage is the further elaboration and 
expansion of that body of doctrine.‖459  Dogmas are thus both the fruits and vehicles of 
doctrinal development.  However, Newman understood that the mode and manifestation 
of development was not limited to dogmatic definitions.  Lash puts it well when he 
remarks, ―One of the more striking feature of the Essay, in contrast to most catholic 
studies of doctrinal development, consists in the fact that the range of data to which, in 
principle, Newman appeals, includes all aspects of the church‘s life, thought, structure 
and experience.‖460  Of the aspects of the Church‘s life that play a role in the 
development of doctrine, Newman accords a special place to worship.  Thus, Newman 
considers that the dogmatic statements on the Trinity developed in large part due to the 
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worship the early Church directed toward the Son and the Spirit.  This development, 
writes Newman, ―fulfill[ed] the maxim, ‗Lex orandi, lex credendi.‘‖461  Newman also 
implied that developments of doctrine can result from praxis.  Such is the case, for 
instance, with the Church‘s allowance for infant baptism, which ―would be the practical 
development of [a father‘s] faith in Christ and love for his offspring.‖462  
To summarize, Newman holds that the notional is the principle of development, 
and helps us to grow in our knowledge of what we know really through our experience.  
The examples above, however, testify that Newman also believed that the real should be 
a cause of notional development: that experience and concrete actions should lead men 
and women to reflect more deeply on ideas.  It remains to be seen whether or not 
Newman believed that notional development can cause real development: whether the 
development of doctrine results in the development of faith, or whether growth in 
theological understanding can cause growth in holiness, both in the individual Christian 
and the corporate Church.  I will examine this question further in the next section.    
 
D. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ORGANIC METAPHOR 
 
 One of the most consistently invoked reasons for rejecting Newman‘s 
understanding of doctrinal development is its seeming dependence on the organic 
metaphor.  Newman claimed that the manner in which the Christian understanding of 
revelation developed was analogous to the way in which biological phenomena 
developed, beginning as a seed or embryo and progressively growing to full maturity.  
The rejection of doctrinal development for its organic reading of Church history and 
doctrine is a point of convergence between Orthodox and Protestants.  The Orthodox 
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theologian Andrew Louth rightfully acknowledges a place for organic metaphors applied 
to ecclesiology, but balks at applying the metaphor to doctrinal history, and criticizes 
Newman‘s theory for its parallels with Darwin‘s theory of evolution.463  Lossky rejects an 
organic conception of dogmatic history because he believes it would imply ―an inner 
necessity, which would effect a progressive increase in the Church of the knowledge of 
revealed Truth.‖464  George Lindbeck claims to represent the Protestant consensus when 
he writes that ―organismic analogies [of Christian history] are sharply rejected.‖465  In the 
Dialogue portion of this chapter, I will respond in greater detail to the principles 
operative in these allergies to the organic metaphor.  In this section, I will limit myself to 
summarizing what Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor implies about his 
understanding of doctrinal development.   
 Newman identifies the chief contemporary influence behind his application of the 
organic metaphor to doctrinal development: Joseph Butler‘s Analogy.  The hypothesis 
operative in Butler‘s Analogy is that the Christian religion acts in a manner analogous to 
―the whole natural world.‖  This world, according to Butler, is a ―progressive…system,‖ 
as exhibited by ―the change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the earth, the very 
history of a flower...and…human life.‖466   
While Newman was influenced by Butler‘s Analogy, there are some differences in 
his application of the organic metaphor to his theory of doctrinal development.  Owen 
Chadwick has examined some of these differences.  Among the differences Chadwick 
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perceives is that Butler did not allow that the progress exhibited in nature could be used 
as an a priori argument for a similar progress in our understanding of God‘s revelation, 
whereas Newman did.
467
  But Chadwick misrepresents Newman by exaggerating the 
importance of a priori reasoning to his theory of doctrinal development.  A posteriori 
reasoning is much more crucial to Newman‘s theory: most of his Essay on Development 
is devoted to arguing that the pattern of doctrine in the Christian Tradition has indeed 
shown development much like the development we witness in the realm of nature.  
Chadwick also ignores the Scriptural warrant for Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor, 
a warrant that Newman himself refers to in the Essay on Development when he recalls the 
parables of Jesus that anticipate the growth of the Kingdom of God.  Newman sees the 
development of doctrine as intrinsic to the growth of this Kingdom.
468
  
 Chadwick ultimately rejects the supposition that there were other direct modern 
influences behind Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor.  It is perhaps tempting to 
suppose a connection between Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development and Darwin‘s 
theory of evolution, which both came out of nineteenth-century England.  Or, if one were 
to look for a more theological influence on Newman‘s theory, Möhler‘s Die Einheit in 
Der Kirche (1825) would be the most likely candidate.  Yet, though Newman knew of 
Möhler, there is no evidence that he ever read him.  Chadwick concludes that, though the 
idea of development ―was in the atmosphere which surrounded Newman at Littlemore,‖ 
―the line of thought, the expression of ideas, the use of analogies, the form and argument 
were Newman‘s, original to him, individual, stamped with the impress of that unusual 
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cast of mind.‖469  But Henry Tristram overstates when he writes that ―We can affirm 
without hesitation that Newman derived the idea of development from no other source 
than his own mind.‖470  As Chadwick points out after an examination of the notebooks 
and drafts Newman used to write the Essay on Development, ―There are his authorities 
and the ideas which they suggested to him—and… they are patristic authorities.  He was 
not reading Möhler, nor Wiseman, nor Perrone, nor even Petau.  He was reading Justin 
Martyr, Athanasius, Tertullian, Ambrose, Lactantius, Cyril.‖471  Thus, Newman‘s use of 
the organic metaphor was primarily theological, derived from Scripture and Tradition as 
expressed in the works of the Fathers.   
 Before I describe Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor for the development of 
doctrine, a clarification is necessary.  Newman viewed the organic metaphor as just that: 
a metaphor.  Like all metaphors and analogies it is limited, and does not fully conform to 
the reality to which it is applied.  That said, one needs ask: in what manner did Newman 
believe the idea of Christianity to be like an organism?  For one, Newman describes an 
idea as ―living.‖  Indeed, Newman claims in a letter of 1846 that he was ―the first writer 
to make life the mark of a true church.‖472  In a passage that reinforces the metaphorical 
character of his use of organic terminology, Newman explains what he means by a living 
idea: ―When an idea, whether real or not, is of a nature to arrest and possess the mind, it 
may be said to have life, that is, to live in the mind which is its recipient.‖473  The history 
of the Christian idea—its beginnings in the time of Christ, its persistence through times 
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of persecution and heresy, its triumphs in spite of tribulations, and its continuing ability 
to dwell in the minds and hearts of men and women—bears witness to its living 
character.   
According to Newman, the Christian idea is also living precisely because it has 
undergone change.  In a famous statement that has more theology in it than most initially 
suspect, Newman writes, ―In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to 
change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.‖474  Behind this passage is one of the 
fundamental principles of Alexandrian and Cappadocian patristic theology, namely, that 
the mark of the uncreated is immutability, while the mark of the created (what Newman 
means by ―living‖ in the context of this quote) is change.  This distinction was one of the 
hinges on which turned the Christological dogmas produced by the patristic age.  The 
change Newman predicates of the Christian idea once again illustrates the received nature 
of revelation: its origin is in the unchanging God, but it is received by changing creatures, 
and as such, its reception is subject to change. 
 Newman predicates not only life and change of organic realities, but progress and 
development.  He holds that the sign of a truly living reality is that it exhibits progress.  
Thomas Scott‘s aphorism ―Growth the only evidence of life‖ acted as a first principle for 
Newman.
475
  This principle also serves to demonstrate the patristic character of 
Newman‘s theology.  Newman‘s identification of progress as a sign of life is consonant 
with the ascetical character of patristic theology.  The Church Fathers deemed persistence 
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in a life of askesis to be the mark of a true Christian.  Though most often associated with 
acts of renunciation and self-discipline, the word askesis refers to any Christian practice 
directed toward increasing one‘s participation in God.    Like the Church Fathers, 
Newman also held that ―[man] is a being of progress with relation to his perfection and 
characteristic good.‖476  His Parochial and Plain Sermons are perhaps the best 
illustrations of the ascetical character of his theology.  He claimed that he attempted in 
these sermons to ―lead his hearers to the Patristic Church‖477 by encouraging the practices 
of prayer, fasting, and watchfulness.   
Likewise, Newman deems the Christian idea to be living (organic) precisely 
because the Church has exhibited progress in its understanding of it.  Once again, the 
progress he predicates of the Church is a notional progress in its understanding of 
revelation.  He claims that such notional progress naturally occurs over time with any 
idea that captures the attention of men and women.  This process can be described as 
organic inasmuch as it is a function of the nature of the human mind: ―the increase and 
expansion of the Christian Creed and Ritual… are the necessary attendants of any 
philosophy or polity which takes possession of the intellect and heart… that from the 
nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of 
great ideas…‖478  Because human beings are rational animals who require time in order 
to understand, and because time has indeed passed since the Christian idea took hold of 
the Church‘s mind, Newman holds that the progress of the Christian idea has necessarily 
taken place in the Church.  
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 Interestingly, Newman does not ascribe the same necessity to notional progress on 
the individual level as he does to notional progress on the collective level of the Church.  
Of individual progress he writes, ―Nor is this progress mechanical, nor is it of necessity; 
it is committed to the personal efforts of each individual of the species…‖479  Newman is 
not referring here in the Grammar toward a more holistic form of progress of the 
individual; he is indeed referring to the ―law of progress…carried out by means of the 
acquisition of knowledge.‖480  Whereas he claims that the individual‘s progress in 
knowledge is contingent on his actions, he claims that the Church‘s progress in the 
understanding of the Christian idea, like other ideas, necessarily happens with time.  
Newman here fails to simultaneously hold in tension the Church‘s unity and diversity: 
that the Church is one, but that its oneness is comprised of a number of individuals.   
 Newman‘s doctrine of Providence is perhaps behind the necessity he predicates of 
the Church‘s progress in its understanding of the Christian idea.  As the title of 
Merrigan‘s essay on this subject points out, Newman considered Providence to be that 
―momentous doctrine or principle which enters into my own reasoning‖ that served a 
―unitive function‖ in his theology.481  In the Essay on Development, Newman assigns a 
special role to Providence in watching over and directing the development of doctrine.  
He holds that God, in His providential design, has left ―gaps… in the structure of the 
original creed of the Church‖ that He intended to be filled up through the application of 
human reason.  ―Thus,‖ writes Newman, ―developments of Christianity are proved to 
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have been in the contemplation of its Divine Author.‖482   The providential guidance of 
the development of doctrine is consonant with God‘s providential guidance as illustrated 
in Scripture: He does not reveal Himself all at once, but ―works out gradually what He 
has determined absolutely…‖483  As in the Bible, so in the Church: God leads human 
beings step-by-step toward a fuller understanding of Him, allowing room for the 
operation of their own free will and reason.   
Newman‘s understanding of Providence, applied to doctrinal development, rightly 
maintains a tension between necessity and freedom.  God guides His Church toward a 
fuller understanding of revelation, but incorporates the activity of human reason into His 
guidance.  Such a tension between necessity and freedom is arguably the litmus test for a 
truly Christian use of organic metaphors.  Unfortunately, Newman does not seem to 
maintain this tension within human reason itself.  His consistent tendency is to emphasize 
that developments are the results of human nature, rather than human will.    
 Newman‘s position that the Church‘s progress in its understanding of revelation is 
not altogether smooth does not necessarily mitigate this tendency.  In the ―Letter to 
Flanagan,‖ Newman describes the episodic character of doctrinal development in the 
Church, which answers questions that arise ―intermittently, in times & seasons, often 
delaying and postponing, according as she is guided by her Divine Instructor.‖484  Even 
before he formally posited his theory of doctrinal development, he had come to 
understand such development as occurring in ―fits and starts.‖485  Because doctrinal 
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development happens intermittently, Newman holds that the most one can predict is that 
it will occur, but not when or how it will occur: ―we will triumph in the leave given us to 
go forward, ‗not knowing whither we go‘…‖486  At first glance, this position seems to 
argue against a purely organic development that happens naturally and continuously: it 
seems to accord a place for contingent, unpredictable, and free human actions.  But 
Newman is here only referring to the type of development that is catalyzed by historically 
contingent heresies and results in doctrinal definitions.  He is not referring to that more 
general type of development of the Christian idea, that inevitable development for which 
he does not adequately incorporate human freedom.  Thus, positing an episodic character 
to doctrinal development does not necessarily represent a qualification of the organic 
metaphor.  
 The allowance for occasional regressions in the Church‘s understanding of 
revelation would seemingly have more promise as a qualification of the organic 
metaphor.  In other words, one could hold that the Church has experienced not only 
periods of doctrinal development, but also periods of doctrinal regression, when the 
Christian idea grew dim in the minds of men and women.  That there have been 
occasional regressions seems justified by history.  Lash echoes the thoughts of many 
others when he asks, ―Is a ‗linear‘, ‗cumulative‘, ‗progressive‘ view of doctrinal history 
demanded by the claims of christian belief, and justified by history?‖487  There is no way 
to definitively determine which periods might constitute regressions in the Church‘s 
understanding of revelation, though there seems to be a consensus of scorn for certain 
periods.  Just as it is popular to regard the patristic age as one noteworthy for its 
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development of the Christian idea, so it is also popular today to regard the ages of late 
scholasticism and manual theology for their desiccation of the Christian idea.  
Newman, however, does not admit of such regressions in his theory of doctrinal 
development.  His immediate reason for not doing so is theological rather than biological: 
it is rooted in the providential relationship between God and His people as revealed in 
Scripture.  According to Newman, the entire Bible illustrates the principle of 
development, as God gradually leads His creatures to a fuller understanding of Him.  In 
this relationship, writes Newman, ―[God] does not reverse, but perfect, what has gone 
before.‖488  Because of his doctrine of Providence, and his understanding of the limits of 
historical retrospection, Newman would have been untroubled by the seeming difficulty 
of affirming doctrinal progress throughout all eras of the Church‘s history.  While 
allowing for trials and tribulations in the Church‘s doctrinal history, Newman would still 
claim that the overall movement of this history was one of progress.  Indeed, as I have 
shown, Newman believed these apparent regressions were but temporary, as they soon 
themselves became the means for doctrinal progress. 
Most importantly, though, the way in which Newman understands doctrinal 
development means that he does not need to entertain the hypothesis of regressions.  For 
Newman, doctrinal development means notional development.  It means the process of 
men and women uncovering various aspects of the Christian idea.  It occurs merely as a 
result of mental engagement over the course of time and place.  Given this understanding 
of doctrinal development, a regression could in theory only occur with the complete and 
utter abandonment of an idea, or the cessation of time.   
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The notional character Newman attributes to doctrinal development also serves as 
a response to those who claim that the theory implies the superiority of the present-day 
Church to the Church of the past.  Newman indeed affirms a superiority, but he clarifies 
that it is a ―particular superiority,‖489 namely, a notional superiority.  That is, the Church 
of today is superior only inasmuch as it has the benefit of two-thousand years of 
reflection on the Christian idea from which it may draw in trying to deepen its own 
understanding of the idea.  It is able to benefit from the questions, challenges, and 
controversies to which the Church has responded with new terminology, new ideas, and 
new comparisons, all of which have served to ―throw the [Christian] idea into fresh 
forms‖ and thus reveal its previously undiscovered aspects.490  This ―particular 
superiority‖ needs further qualification.  It does not refer to the quality of mind or 
understanding.  Thus, it does not necessarily follow that there are members of the Church 
today superior to Augustine or Aquinas in their comprehensive vision of revelation.
491
  
Nor does it follow that the Church today necessarily unites all of the uncovered aspects of 
the Christian idea into a better synthesis than the Church of, say, the patristic age. 
Nor does Newman intend to claim that doctrinal development means the Church 
today is necessarily holier than the early Church.  However, there is some question about 
whether Newman‘s theory in principle implies that the Church‘s doctrinal development is 
attended by a concomitant development in holiness.  Previous Newman scholars have 
discussed this implication only briefly, and often hesitatingly, lest they take a position 
                                               
489 Newman, ―Flanagan,‖ 159.   
490 U.S., 317. 
491 In ―Flanagan,‖ Newman explains the difference between Aristotle and an Aristotelian.  The latter has an 
―advantage‖ over Aristotle inasmuch as he/she is able to apply Aristotelian principles to questions and 
problems that ―Aristotle would have answered, but for the want of the opportunity did not.‖  However, 
Newman holds that this advantage does not mean that the Aristotelian‘s grasp of philosophy is ―more 
vigorous than Aristotle‘s grasp, because of the superiority of Aristotle‘s vigorous creative intellect‖ (157).   
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that places them outside the bounds of Christian orthodoxy.  Lash has seen this 
implication in Newman, though he agrees that Newman himself did not countenance it.  
Lash bases his position on the supposition that ―Throughout his life, Newman insisted 
that growth in holiness is a necessary condition of growth in the knowledge of God.‖  
Unfortunately, Lash does not support this supposition with examples from Newman‘s 
works.  Nevertheless, he goes on to write, ―In view of this, it would seem possible to 
claim that the contemporary church had a deeper grasp of God‘s revelation than had the 
primitive church only if, at the same time, it could be claimed that the church had grown 
in holiness.‖492  Ian Ker opposes Lash‘s position in an essay entitled ―Newman‘s 
theory—Development or continuing Revelation?‖  Ker, like Lash, points out that, 
according to Newman, ―the development of ideas whether in the individual‘s intellect or 
in the mind of the Church has no necessary connection with virtue or holiness.‖493  
However, Ker fails to ask whether or not Newman‘s writings might themselves imply this 
connection.    
Like Lash and Ker, I also cannot find evidence that Newman explicitly 
maintained that the development of doctrine corresponded to a development in holiness.  
From his explicit statements, the most one can maintain is that he acknowledged the 
mutual interpenetration of the real and the notional, of faith and theology.  Though 
Newman assigned a crucial place to theology in the practice of religion, his emphasis 
remained on the negative function of theology as a protective against heresy and spiritual 
excess.  He did not draw out the implications of the positive role theology played in 
religion, and the possibility of theology‘s intimate connection with the individual‘s, and 
                                               
492 Lash, Change in Focus, 93-94. 
493 Ker, ―Newman‘s Theory—Development or Continuing Revelation?‖ 158.   
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the Church‘s, progress in holiness.  Newman did not have his thought on development 
catalyzed by this question, a question Newman thought was necessary to the drawing out 
of the implications of an idea.  In the Dialogue section of this chapter, I will examine 
whether Newman‘s theology contains the principles that enable one to make the leap of 
claiming a necessary connection between doctrinal development and development in 
holiness.  In other words, I will examine whether this aspect of Newman‘s theory of 
doctrinal development is itself capable of development.   
In this section, I have shown how Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development was 
much more than ―an hypothesis to account for a difficulty‖ (namely, the difficulty of 
defending the orthodoxy of doctrines not ostensibly taught in either Scripture or the early 
Church).
494
  Rather, it was a description of the process by which the Church actively 
receives the revelation God has impressed upon it.  This process is otherwise known as 
Tradition, and represents the reasoned reflection of the Church on the Christian ―idea,‖ 
informed by faith, and concretely incarnated in Scripture and Dogma.  Newman 
understands theology to be this dual work of reason and faith, notional and real 
knowledge.  It is the means by which the Church grows in its knowledge of God, and it is 
how the Church manifests its living, organic identity as the Body of Christ.  While 
dogmatic definition undoubtedly performs both a preservative and a protective function, 
it also serves to give concrete shape to the notional reflection of the Church, which is 
ordered toward systematization.  Definitions and systems represent the fruits of this 
reflection, and thus, the fruits of doctrinal development.    
 
                                               
494 Dev., 30. 
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2.2: FLOROVSKY ON TRADITION 
A. THE CONTOURS OF FLOROVSKY’S UNDERSTANDING OF TRADITION 
 
 The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed an enrichment of the concept of 
Tradition by both Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox.  The Council of Trent (1545-
1563) responded to the Protestant reliance on Scripture alone with a two-source theory of 
revelation comprised of Scripture and Tradition.  Tradition was understood to represent 
those teachings Christ communicated to the Apostles that were not recorded in Scripture, 
but were just as binding as Scripture on the Church.
495
  However, such an understanding 
of Tradition, while useful as an initial rejoinder to sola scriptura, itself has limitations.  
Without further supplementation, it seems to imply a solely propositional model of 
revelation, and does not convey a fuller, theological understanding of the concept.  
Florovsky was among the Orthodox theologians who contributed to a developed 
understanding of the concept of Tradition, one that he considered more consonant with 
the patristic ethos.  Perhaps because of its supposed patristic character, many 
contemporary Orthodox have received Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition as 
representative.
496
  
 Part of the richness of Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition derives from its 
integration with other areas of theology.  Aidan Nichols points out that Florovsky 
considers Tradition to be a ―dimension of ecclesiology.‖497  In the first chapter, I 
                                               
495 Council of Trent, Session IV; referenced in Dei Verbum 7-10.   
496 Lossky‘s essays on Tradition—―Tradition and Traditions‖ and ―Concerning the Third Mark of the 
Church: Catholicity‖ (In the Image and Likeness of God, 169-182)—bear many similarities to Florovsky‘s 
―Sobornost: The Catholicity of the Church‖ (in The Church of God: An Anglo-Russian Symposium, ed. E.L. 
Mascall [London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1934], 53-74), and ―Le Corps du Christ 
vivant.‖  Above all, the widespread acceptance of Florovsky‘s ―Neo-Patristic synthesis‖ hermeneutic 
testifies to the positive reception of his understanding of Tradition among Orthodox theologians.      
497 Nichols, Light from the East, 137.   
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elaborated on Florovsky‘s understanding of revelation as events that are appropriated by 
human experience.  Since Pentecost, this experience of God‘s revelation in all its fullness 
now lives in the Church.  Indeed, if one is to reduce Florovsky‘s understanding of 
Tradition to one idea, it is that Tradition is fundamentally ―the life of the Church‖498—it 
is revelation and the human response to revelation ―ever re-enacted‖ in the numerous 
modes of the Church‘s existence.499  Through membership in the Church, the Christian 
has access to the experience of revelation in all its fullness: ―Revelation has been granted 
to the Church not to individuals.‖500  It is primarily this experience—this faith—that is 
tradunt, or ―handed on,‖ to subsequent generations in the Church.  
According to Florovsky, Christians‘ ecclesial experience of revelation is the basis 
of the regula fidei (―rule of faith‖) by which they judge the orthodoxy of interpretations 
of revelation, or, ―the true meaning of Scripture.‖501  For him, the regula fidei is the 
equivalent of the ―mind of the Church‖—the concept I elaborated on in Chapter One.  
Drawing from numerous Fathers, Florovsky regards the patristic understanding of the 
regula fidei as ―first of all, a hermeneutical principle and method,‖ by which Christians 
interpret revelation according to the ―common mind of the Church,‖ or, the υρόνημα 
ἐκκλησιαστικόν.502  They are ―initiated… by their baptismal profession‖ into the rule, 
which consists of ―the witness and preaching of the Apostles, their κήρσγμα and 
                                               
498 V6, 296.  See also V1, 80.     
499 V1, 26.  
500 Florovsky, ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 9.  
501 V1, 74-75.  Hence Florovsky‘s oft-referenced maxim that Tradition is ―Scripture rightly understood‖ 
(V1, 75).  This definition of Tradition, however, does not conflict with his other definition that Tradition is 
―the life of the Church,‖ for Florovsky understands the right interpretation of Scripture to involve a 
―continuous life in the truth‖ that is ―reflected in [the Church‘s] life and structure‖ (V1, 80, 84).  In other 
words, Florovsky does not regard the right understanding of Scripture as ―just a transmission of inherited 
doctrines‖ (V1, 80).     
502 V1, 74, 89.  It is interesting to note that Florovsky quotes Newman in support of his explanation of the 
regula fidei: ―As Cardinal Newman has rightly observed, St. Athanasius regarded the ‗rule of faith‘ as an 
ultimate ‗principle of interpretation,‘ opposing the ‗ecclesiastical sense‘… to ‗private opinions‘ of the 
heretics‖ (Ath., 2: 250-252; quoted in V1, 82). 
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praedicatio‖—in other words, the teaching of the Apostles based upon their experience 
of revelation.
503
  Florovsky even refers to ―faithfulness to Tradition‖ as ―a participation in 
Pentecost,‖ and Tradition itself as ―a fulfillment of Pentecost.‖504  Through the regula 
fidei, the members of the Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, preserve and transmit the 
faith.  Though all the members have a share in this process of the preservation and 
transmission of the faith, it is especially entrusted to those who have been given the 
authority to teach through their succession from the Apostles.
505
 
As an ecclesiological phenomenon, Tradition for Florovsky is also a 
Christological phenomenon, for ―ecclesiology, in the Orthodox view is an integral part of 
Christology.‖506   Florovsky believed that the ―Body of Christ‖ is the preeminent image 
for the Church, but he effectively accounted for the Spirit‘s role in the Body in his 
descriptions of Tradition.
507
  Thus, he defines Tradition as ―the witness of the Spirit‖ and 
―the constant abiding of the Spirit‖ who ―lives and abides ceaselessly in the Church.‖508  
But in what he considered a faithful witness to the theology of the Fathers, and in 
reaction to Joachimite tendencies manifest in an overemphasis on the pneumatological 
character of the Church, Florovsky never separated the work of the Holy Spirit from that 
of the Son; in other words, he never separated the Spirit from the Body.  He affirmed that 
the Church is where the Spirit dwells, but that one must always keep in mind that the 
                                               
503 V1, 78.  See also Florovsky, ―Scripture and Tradition: An Orthodox Point of View,‖ Dialog 2:4 (Fall 
1963): 291: ―The apostolic tradition, as it was maintained and understood in the early church, was not a 
fixed core or complex of binding propositions, but rather an insight into the meaning and power of the 
revelatory events, of the revelation of the ‗God who acts‘ and has acted.‖  
504 V3, 194.   
505 V1, 78-79.   
506 V4, 25.  See also Florovsky, ―Le Corps du Christ vivant,‖ 12: ―The theology of the Church is not only a 
chapter, but is a major chapter, of Christology.‖  
507 V6, 195; V1, 67.     
508 Florovsky, ―Sobornost,‖ 64, 65; V1, 37.     
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dwelling place is the Body of Christ.
509
  Consequently, Florovsky maintains that the 
Tradition of the Church is a pneumatological reality only inasmuch as it is a 
Christological reality.  
Finally, inasmuch as Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is ecclesiological 
and Christological, it is also eschatological.  ―Eschatology,‖ writes Florovsky, is not just 
one particular section of the Christian theological system, but rather its basis and 
foundation, its guiding and inspiring principle, or, as it were, the climate of the whole of 
Christian thinking.‖510  Florovsky regarded the telos of the Church, the Body of Christ, as 
its progressive deification, which will be completed at the end of time.  In a statement 
that perhaps best summarizes his theology of history Florovsky writes, ―History goes on 
because the Body has not yet been completed.‖511  He also emphasized that the 
deification of the Church is contingent upon the freely-willed response of men and 
women.  The Spirit‘s mission is to guide the Church toward its deification through His 
presence in the Church, His constant revelation of Christ to men and women, and His 
preservation of this revelation and the Church‘s access to the sanctified means by which 
                                               
509 The work of Zizioulas, Florovsky‘s student, represents one of the better-known modern Orthodox 
attempts to hold the Christological and pneumatological character of the Church in tension.  Zizioulas 
defends Florovsky against interpretations of his ecclesiology as too Christologically-focused when he 
writes, ―Christology as the starting point in ecclesiology in general has been stressed by G. Florovsky… 
and should not be understood as a negation of the pneumatological or the triadological aspect of the 
Church‖ (Being as Communion, 158n67).  See also Yves-Noel Lelouvier, Perspectives russes sur l‘Eglise: 
Un théologien contemporain, Georges Florovsky (Paris: Éditions du Centurion, 1968).  For an 
interpretation of Florovsky‘s ecclesiology as lacking a proper pneumatological focus, see Lucian Turcescu, 
―Eucharistic Ecclesiology or Open Sobornicity?‖ in Dumitru Stăniloae: Tradition and Modernity in 
Theology, ed. Turcescu (Iaşi, Romania: The Center for Romanian Studies, 2002), 91-92.     
510 V4, 63.   
511 V4, 66.  Florovsky draws upon John Chrysostom‘s interpretation of Ephesians for his view of history as 
the completion of the Body of Christ: ―In this manner St. John Chrysostom explains the words of the 
Apostle: ‗The Church is the fulfillment of Christ in the same manner as the head completes the body and 
the body is completed by the head.  Thus we understand why the Apostle sees that Christ, as the Head, 
needs all His members.  Because if many of us were not, one the hand, one the foot, one yet another 
member, His body would not be complete.  Thus His body is formed of all the members.  This means, that 
the head will be complete, only when the body is perfect; when we all are most firmly united and 
strengthened‖ (John Chrysostom, In Ephes. Hom. 3,2, Migne, P.G. lxi., c.26; quoted in Florovsky, 
―Sobornost,‖ 54).  
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men and women may participate in the divine life.  Tradition is then both this guiding 
action of the Spirit directed toward deification, in addition to the human response to 
Christ‘s revealing and sanctifying acts.  Tradition, for Florovsky, is thus a synergetic 
reality.
512
       
If doctrinal development does indeed have a place in Florovsky‘s theology of 
Tradition, it, too, must exhibit the characteristics described above.  That is, it must be 
ecclesiological, Christological, and eschatological.  It must be intimately connected with 
the life of the Church, it must have an incarnational character, and it must be directed 
toward, and contribute to, the completion of the Body of Christ.   
 
B. TRADITION AS THEOLOGY 
 
That Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition has been favorably received by other 
contemporary Orthodox theologians is in part due to the quality of its exposition and its 
consonance with the patristic mind.  It is also perhaps due to its partial dependence on 
Slavophilism—the Russian intellectual movement of the early nineteenth-century, led by 
thinkers such as Alexei Khomiakov (1804-1860), Ivan Kireevsky (1806-1856), and Yuri 
Samarin (1819-1876), which sought to combat Russia‘s imposed Westernization through 
a return to its original national and ecclesiastical consciousness.  Lewis Shaw has rightly 
dubbed Slavophilism the ―common ancestor‖ of modern Russian ecclesiological 
thought.
513
  As Rowan Williams notes, ―Florovsky, as much as Lossky, cannot but read 
the Fathers through spectacles faintly tinged with Slavophil interests.‖514  The Slavophile 
                                               
512 V6, 158.   
513 Shaw, ―Introduction,‖ 175-176.   
514 Rowan Williams, ―Eastern Orthodox Theology,‖ in The Modern Theologians, 166. 
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doctrine most evident in Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is that of sobornost, a 
Slavic term that Florovsky typically translates as ―catholicity.‖   
As is frequently pointed out, the term sobornost does not have an English parallel 
that can convey the richness of the Slavic term.  For Florovsky, the term refers to the 
fullness of the life of the Church: all that constitutes the unity and identity of the Church, 
in all ages, and contributes toward the fulfillment of its mission. Florovsky basically 
considers sobornost, then, as the equivalent of Tradition.  Such an equivocation is evident 
in the following definition of Tradition: ―It is the unity of the Holy Spirit, the communion 
of the sacraments… [O]nly in the Church is authentic tradition possible.  Only in the 
Church does the Grace of the Holy Spirit pour forth revealed truth in an unbroken stream 
and admonish with it.‖515  
Yet, the Slavophile term sobornost is also the axis on which Florovsky‘s critique 
of Slavophilism turns.  As much as Florovsky was indebted to Slavophilism, the beau 
idéal for his understanding of Tradition was Philaret (Drozdov), the Metropolitan of 
Moscow (1782-1867) whom Shaw dubs Florovsky‘s ―nineteenth-century hero.‖516  ―With 
Philaret,‖ Florovsky claims, ―begins the real liberation of Russian theology not only from 
Western influences but from Westernization in general… by a creative return to Patristic 
foundations and sources…‖517  Florovsky criticizes the Slavophile understanding of 
Tradition for its primarily passive character—a criticism latent in his contention that 
                                               
515 V5, 214.  In addition to being a very holistic description of Tradition, this passage partially acts as a foil 
to Lewis Shaw‘s contention that Florovsky‘s writings lack a sufficient treatment of grace (―Introduction,‖ 
189-190).  As George Williams rightly points out, it is an assumption in Florovsky that the Church is the 
realm of grace (―Georges Vasilievich Florovsky,‖ 60).  The entire life of the Church, its life in Christ, in the 
Holy Spirit, is ―an unbroken stream‖ of grace.  Thus, the concept of grace underlies all of Florovsky‘s 
discussions of the Church.  Nevertheless, Shaw‘s contention does have some merit inasmuch as it alerts one 
to the fact that Florovsky‘s theological vocabulary was inconsistent.  He did not frequently have recourse to 
terms such as ―grace,‖ ―nature,‖ ―synergy,‖ or ―energies,‖ even though these ideas permeated his theology.  
516 Shaw, ―Introduction,‖ 53. 
517 V4, 173.   
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―[Slavophilism‘s] entire pathos lies precisely in its escape or even retreat from 
history.‖518  Khomiakov and others rightly described Tradition as a fullness and a unity 
rooted in the presence of the Spirit in the Church.  But at the same time they failed to 
adequately describe the human role in Tradition, holding that it was ―generally not a 
human, but a divine characteristic of the Church.‖519  One of the main tenets of 
Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is that it is not only constitutive, but creative, as 
well: ―Tradition is not only a protective, conservative principle; it is, primarily, the 
principle of growth and regeneration.‖520  Florovsky considered Philaret as better 
accounting for the active, creative role of men and women in Tradition, perhaps most 
uniquely in the dignity that he accorded to the work of theology.  According to 
Florovsky, ―Filaret always emphasized the necessity to engage in theology as the single 
and immutable foundation for a complete religious life.‖521 
 As I pointed out above, Florovsky believed the entirety of God‘s revelation is 
contained in what he terms the ―experience‖ of that revelation.  The Christian has access 
to this experience through membership in the Church, whose Tradition preserves and 
communicates this experience in its fullness.  Yet, according to Florovsky, this 
experience requires men and women to bear witness to it, to freely respond to it through 
word and deed.  Theology—the reflection on divine revelation through the use of human 
reason—constitutes the human response to God in word: ―It is the human response to 
                                               
518 V6, 19.   
519 V6, 45.  Florovsky here quotes Khomiakov as saying, ―It is not the person or the multitude of persons, 
but the Spirit of God living in the totality of the Church who preserves and writes tradition in the Church.‖ 
520 V1, 47.   
521 V5, 208.   
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God, who has spoken first.  It is man‘s witness to God who has spoken to him, whose 
word he has heard, whose words he has kept and is now recording and repeating.‖522   
Florovsky perceived both a positive and a negative need for this response.  The 
positive need for it follows from his theology of personhood, which places importance on 
the free and creative response of human beings to revelation.  The importance Florovsky 
attached to this response is evident in his emphasis on podvig, or, askesis.  In accord with 
what he described as the ―existential character‖ of patristic theology, Florovsky regarded 
theology as an ascetical endeavor.  He looked especially to the example of Maximus the 
Confessor, in whose system he saw ―dogmatics and ascetics… organically and 
inseparably brought together.‖523   As I pointed out above, Florovsky used the term 
asceticism in its commonly understood sense to refer to the activities of prayer and self-
denial.  These activities, according to Florovsky, are inseparable from the work of 
theology: ―The theologian must learn to discover himself continually within the Church 
through ascetic trial and self-discipline.‖524  Yet he also used the term in a wider sense to 
refer to any free and creative response to revelation that is proper to human beings as 
persons.  His understanding of theology is a marriage of these two senses of asceticism: it 
is a freely-willed activity, on the part of men and women, purified by their prayer and 
self-denial. 
The ―negative‖ need for theology follows from the limitations of human 
epistemology.  Florovsky holds that the ―fullness of knowledge and understanding is 
given, but this fullness is only gradually and partially disclosed and professed…‖ due to 
                                               
522 V1, 28.   
523 V10, 136.   
524 V6, 295.   
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the fact that ―knowledge in this world is always only a ‗partial‘ knowledge.‖525  He thus 
holds that the finite nature of the human intellect requires the rational elaboration of 
revelation by men and women in the Church.  
 Matthew Baker believes that Florovsky is particularly to be lauded among 
Orthodox for the positive role he assigns to reason in theology.  He holds that 
―Florovsky‘s positive account of the place of rationality in theological enterprise remains 
relatively unique amongst modern Orthodox theologians; the only major figure whose 
thought bears comparison on this question is Dumitru Staniloae.‖526  Baker argues that 
there has been a prevalent tendency in modern Orthodox theology (though by no means is 
it limited to Orthodox theology) to regard experience, or faith, as opposed to reason.  
Indeed, Florovsky himself exhibited signs of this tendency early in his publishing career 
when reacting against Neo-Kantian rationalism.
527
  This tendency manifests itself in some 
modern Orthodox theologians‘ predilection for apophatic theology and their 
characterization of it as a path of theandric ascent that seeks to move beyond discursive 
thought.  I will elaborate further on the nature this Orthodox predilection for 
apophaticism, and its consequences for theology, later in this chapter.   
 Though Florovsky‘s earlier writings may at times privilege experience at the 
expense of reason, his later writings clearly accord a positive role to reason in making 
experience intelligible.  Florovsky, like Philaret, viewed the vocation of all Christians as 
                                               
525 V3, 35.   
526 Baker, ―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 199.  Among the Staniloae references Baker cites are: Orthodox 
Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, The Experience of God: Revelation and Knowledge of the Triune God, trans. 
Ioan Ionita and Robert Barringer (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1994), 95-122, and 
Orthodox Spirituality: A Practical Guide for the Faithful and a Definitive Manual for the Scholar (South 
Canaan, PA: St. Tikhon‘s Seminary Press, 2002), 202-223. 
527 Baker, ―‗Theology Reasons.‘‖  Baker‘s article is particularly valuable because he cites a number of 
untranslated Florovsky texts, in addition to material contained in the Princeton library‘s archives of 
Florovsky‘s papers. 
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a theological one.  According to Florovsky, ―Filaret of Moscow was the first person in 
the history of modern Russian theology for whom theology once more became the aim of 
life, the essential step toward spiritual progress and construction.‖528  Florovsky was even 
wont to quote the Anselmian definition for theology in referring to the Christian vocation 
as ―fides quaerens intellectum.‖529  Unabashedly supporting the place of reason in the 
religious realm, Florovsky refers to theology as ―a kind of Christian philosophy.‖530  Of 
course, he qualifies in a number of places that the use of reason in theology must always 
remain rooted in the living experience of the Church.  He writes that one who theologizes 
without faith ―risks remaining outside and not really finding anything.‖531  Yet, he also 
does not reduce theology to the experience that belongs to the Christian by faith.  Instead, 
as Baker emphasizes, Philaret‘s aphorism that ―theology reasons‖ encapsulated for 
Florovsky the proper relationship between reason and experience.
532
  
The positive role Florovsky accords to reason and theology is a function of his 
positive view of history, and men‘s and women‘s roles in history.  Through their 
reasoning, men and women perform an important and necessary task in making concrete 
the various aspects of revelation contained within Christian experience.  This application 
of human reason to divine revelation in order to progressively unfold its contents 
constitutes the heart of Florovsky‘s understanding of theology.  And theology, in turn, 
                                               
528 V5, 212.   
529 V3, 31; V5, 208; Florovsky, ―Le Corps du Christ Vivant,‖ 47.  See Baker, ―‗Theology Reasons,‘‖ n140, 
for a discussion of the potential Barthian influence behind Florovsky‘s use of the Anselmian formula, in 
addition to the differences between Barth‘s and Florovsky‘s understanding of the formula. 
530 V7, xiv. 
531 Florovsky, ―Sobornost,‖ 69. 
532 V6, 208.  Baker regards this aphorism as emblematic of Florovsky‘s call for a Neopatristic synthesis, 
which Florovsky understood to involve a creative application of reason to the truths of Christian 
experience.  The goal of this rational enterprise is the eventual formation of a new theological system, or, as 
Baker puts it, ―Florovsky's call for a Neo-Patristic synthesis is in essence a summons to a newly articulated 
Christian philosophy‖ (―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 107).   
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constitutes the meaning of history as it fulfills the vocation of men and women to respond 
to God‘s revelation through creative activity.   
Given the connection Florovsky posits between theology and history, it is no 
surprise that he also saw an intimate connection between theology and culture.  Florovsky 
understood culture as the entire matrix of ―aims… concerns… habits… and values‖ that 
constitute the identity of a civilized group of human beings.  It is ―produced and 
accumulated in the creative process of history, and tend[s] to obtain a semi-independent 
existence, i.e., independent of that creative endeavor which originated or discovered these 
‗values.‘‖533  Both theology and culture thus testify to the ―creative vocation of man‖: 
―that Man was created by God for a creative purpose and was to act in the world as its 
king, priest, and prophet.‖  The redemption accomplished by Christ has allowed man ―to 
resume his [original] role and function in the Creation.‖  Christian men and women are 
thus called not only to ―display obedience, but also… to accomplish the task which was 
appointed by God in his creative design precisely as the task of man.‖  They accomplish 
this task through their creative activity, which includes, among other things, their 
application of reason to revelation and their Christianization of the world.  These tasks of 
theology and the building up of culture fulfill the vocation of Christian men and women 
only if they are eschatological—only if they are ordered toward deification and the 
completion of the Body of Christ.  Thus, Florovsky writes that ―the cultural process in 
history is related to the ultimate consummation, if in a manner and in a sense which we 
cannot adequately decipher now.‖534    
                                               
533 V2, 11.  
534 V2, 21.  
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To those who do not attach such a positive role to theology, one has to pose the 
same question Florovsky posed in ―The Predicament of the Christian Historian‖: ―Has 
history any constructive value, now after Christ? or any ‗meaning‘ at all?‖535  Is it, asks 
Florovsky, merely ―an enigmatic interim between the Mighty Deeds of God, for which it 
[is] difficult to assign any proper substance,‖536 or is it the forum for human creativity?  
Are men and women to respond to revelation by turning inward, by resting in the 
experience of faith?  Or, are they to apply the reason that is proper to their natures to 
more fully elaborate this revelation?  Is theology only preservative and elaborative, or is 
it also creative and transformative?  According to Florovsky, the answers to these 
questions have implications not only for theology, but also for history and eschatology.     
 
C. THE “RESPONSES” TO CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE—SCRIPTURE AND DOGMA 
 
 Florovsky holds that Sacred Scripture represents men‘s and women‘s ―primary 
response‖ to revelation.  Its status as the ―primary response‖ follows from the fact that it 
is also inspired: it is ―at once both the Word of God and the human response—the Word 
of God mediated through the faithful response of man.‖537  Because Florovsky regards 
theology as the human response to God, and because Scripture constitutes such a 
response, one could claim that he regards Scripture as a work of theology.  Like many of 
the Church Fathers, whom Florovsky considered to be exemplar theologians, the contents 
of Scripture permeate his writings rather than being the subject of direct commentary.  
When he directly treats of Scripture as a whole, he repeatedly qualifies its place within 
the Church‘s Tradition.  It appears that his qualifications are in large part a reaction to the 
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536 V2, 20. 
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Protestant identification of the Word of God with Scripture, and perhaps also the past 
Roman Catholic tendency to separate Scripture from Tradition.  Thus, he clarifies in a 
number of places that experience is temporally and hierarchically prior to Scripture; that 
while the Bible flows from the Christian experience of revelation, it does not exhaust 
it;
538
 and that the Church, as the bearer of experience, ―stands mystically first and is fuller 
than Scripture.‖539  Unfortunately, Florovsky does not devote enough attention to giving a 
positive account of Scripture.  In addition, he does not provide a sufficient account of the 
doctrine of biblical inspiration, and thus, it is unclear what he views as the qualitative 
difference between Scripture and other theological responses.   
 Dogma constitutes another theological response to God‘s revelation.  Like 
Scripture, it proceeds from the experience of the Church while not exhausting that 
experience.  Though Florovsky refers to Scripture as ―the primary response‖ to 
revelation, dogma is the response that receives the primary focus in his oeuvre.  Indeed, 
in Florovsky‘s writings one finds a particularly remarkable theology of dogma that 
includes many insights apropos to contemporary theological discussions.   
   Florovsky uses a variety of terms and images to describe the nature and function 
of a dogma.  Chief among these terms is that dogma is ―a witness of experience.‖540  This 
witness, which takes the form of ―definitions and conceptions,‖541 is a function of the 
active response to revelation that God requires of men and women qua persons; it is the 
result of men‘s and women‘s creative activity through thought as applied to Christian 
experience.  Florovsky also sees this witness in ―definitions and conceptions‖ as a 
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function of human epistemology, of men‘s and women‘s need for abstraction in order to 
understand:   
Revelation is received in the silence of faith, the silence of contemplation—such 
 is the first silently receptive moment of theology.  And in this receptive silence of 
 contemplation the whole fullness of Truth is contained and given.  But Truth must 
 still be expressed and pronounced.  Because man is called not only to receive 
 Truth attentively, but also to witness to it… He is called to creative activity, above 
 all, to the building up of his own self.
542
       
 
In deeming revelation as first ―received in the silence of faith,‖ Florovsky here perhaps 
unnecessarily assumes a schema of temporal succession where experience precedes 
expression, as if expression was not concomitant with the experience, or the cause of the 
experience.  However, his truth consists in affirming the positive character of the abstract 
language of doctrinal definitions.  Against all such Harnackian characterizations of 
dogmas as representative of a compromise of Christianity‘s original simplicity, Florovsky 
claims that dogmas represent precisely Christianity‘s fulfillment.  
Using the language particular to the Orthodox tradition, Florovsky also refers to 
dogma as an ―ikon‖ of Christian experience.543  In Orthodox theology, the icon is a visual 
sacrament through which one may enter more deeply into the divine reality.  By referring 
to dogma as an icon, Florovsky implies that it is a verbal sacrament through which one 
may enter more deeply into the divine reality.  He allows the possibility that one may 
come to a fuller participation in God—the reality within Christian experience—the more 
he or she grows in his or her understanding of a dogma.
544
   
                                               
542 Ibid.  
543 Paul Evdokimov also describes dogma as a ―verbal icon of truth.‖  See Evdokimov, L‘Orthodoxie; 
quoted in Nichols, From Newman to Congar, 279. 
544 Coincidentally, Walgrave also characterizes Möhler as recognizing this connection between dogma and 
experience: ―That which is believed and afterward analyzed by reflection must become a part of the 
Christian‘s being.  It is not enough that it should be present to the mind in the way of objective information.  
The message has to be converted into existential truth…‖ (Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation, 288).  
Walgrave is here interpreting Möhler‘s view of dogma in Die Einheit der Kirche.   
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Florovsky‘s use of ―ikonic‖ language for dogma also implies the Christological 
sanction of dogma.  Through the Incarnation, Christ became the ultimate icon of God, 
and the human became the means by which one could depict and come to know God.
545
  
This sanction applies not only to the writing of icons, but also to the formulation of 
dogma.  ―Knowledge of God,‖ writes Florovsky, ―has become possible through that 
renewal of nature which Christ accomplished in his death and resurrection.‖546  With 
Christ‘s redemptive renewal of nature and transformation of the world, dogma can now 
serve as ―a ‗logical icon‘ of divine reality‖547 that adequately expresses this reality.548  
What is more, Florovsky holds that men and women participate in Christ‘s redemptive 
activity through their formulation of revelation into dogma: ―When divine truth is 
expressed in human language, the words themselves are transformed.‖549  Theological 
activity itself then becomes transformative for the human participants, as ―the very realm 
of thought becomes transfigured, sanctified, and renewed.‖550    
Florovsky‘s application of the term ―icon‖ to dogma also implies the limitedness 
of dogma.  An icon is an image of a reality, and therefore does not capture the fullness of 
the reality it portrays.  Similarly, a dogma is an image, or witness, of a truth of revelation, 
and thus, it does not capture the fullness of that truth.  In Western theology it has become 
popular to use the ―substance-expression‖ distinction to convey the economic character 
of dogmatic language.  This distinction implies that the humanly-formulated expression 
                                               
545 V3, 210. 
546 V3, 28.   
547 V3, 29; ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 13.   
548 V3, 22; ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 12. 
549 V3, 33.   
550 Florovsky, ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 13.  Florovsky‘s belief that Christ‘s redemption effected the 
renewal of human language and knowledge is behind his contention that ―knowledge of God has [now] 
become possible‖ (V3, 28).  While this contention bespeaks an important truth, there is an admittedly 
Barthian tone to it inasmuch as Florovsky here fails to sufficiently clarify the nature of men‘s and women‘s 
knowledge of God prior to Christ‘s redemption. 
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of a dogma can never adequately, or accurately, describe a dogma‘s divinely-revealed 
substance.  Among the supposed advantages of this distinction is that it allows for some 
wiggle-room in the reception of a dogma.  Thus, for instance, in his well-known work on 
the subject, Francis Sullivan argues that Lateran IV‘s formulation (expression) of extra 
ecclesiam nulla salus (―there is no salvation outside of the Church‖) still remains valid, 
even if the Church‘s present interpretation of it is vastly different than in 1215.  The 
expression, explains Sullivan, inadequately conveyed the substance of the teaching that 
has been held by the Church from the beginning.
551
   
My raising of the substance-expression distinction perhaps pre-emptively takes 
this chapter into the dialogical realm.  I nevertheless raise it because it helps illuminate 
Florovsky‘s own understanding of dogma.  Though Florovsky does not address this 
distinction in his writings, he most assuredly would have been uncomfortable with it for a 
number of reasons.  For one, Florovsky shirked the use of ―essentialist‖ language for any 
human, created realities.  As already discussed, he was at pains to curb the Idealistic 
influences that had crept into Christianity, which included a pantheism that blurred the 
distinction between God and His creation.  Against this pantheism, Florovsky reaffirmed 
the patristic (and biblical) distinction between created and uncreated realities.   
The expression of revelation in dogma, while certainly speaking truly of God, is 
nevertheless a created, economic reality: it is ―the Word of God that has been heard by 
us.‖552  Only through affirming this does Florovsky believe that one can avoid a kind of 
pantheism—a ―pan-logism‖—that identifies ―the thought of a thing and the Divine 
                                               
551 See Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., Salvation Outside the Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic 
Response (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002). 
552 Florovsky, ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 6.  
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thought-design concerning a thing.‖553  Just as a pantheistic Idealism reduces the 
importance of free and creative human actions (as discussed in Chapter One), so also a 
dogmatic pan-logism that highlights the ―essences‖ of dogmas relativizes their wording, 
and in principle constitutes the death of theology.  Thus, Florovsky preferred to speak of 
the ―truth‖ of a dogma rather than its ―essence‖ or ―substance.‖554  
Secondly, the implication behind the substance-expression distinction seems to be 
that the substance, or essence, of a doctrine is separable from the human terms in which it 
has been expressed.  Florovsky repeatedly fought against this assumption as manifested 
in those who, like Harnack, called for the de-Hellenization of Christianity and its 
dogmatic language in an attempt to once again return Christianity to its original purity.  
For Florovsky, Christian revelation is inseparable from the milieu in which it emerged in 
history, and this milieu was Hellenism.  In solidarity with others who have made a similar 
point, Florovsky reminds us that the New Testament was originally written in Greek, and 
is thus eternally tied to the conceptual framework of the Greek language.  According to 
Florovsky, the formulation of Christian dogmas in the language of Hellenistic philosophy 
did not place limitations on Christianity, but instead, enabled it to increase its influence.  
In fact, Florovsky believed that the attempt to abstract truth from its historical framework 
results not in the ability to behold truth in a more unadulterated state, but in the abolition 
of the truth.
555
  His belief that we must take the original context of Christian dogmatic 
                                               
553 V3, 62.   
554 V3, 30, 62.  Florovsky‘s emphasis on the ―truth‖ of a dogma is also connected with his attempt to 
maintain the relational character of revelation: ―For the Truth is not an idea, but a person, even the 
Incarnate Lord‖ (V1, 20).     
555 V1, 20. Baker, ―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 58. 
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formulation seriously is what prompts his bold (and often misunderstood) comment that 
we must ―become more Greek in order that we may be more Catholic.‖556         
Third, Florovsky believed the Church‘s dogmatic language adequately conveyed 
the truth of Christian experience.  Partly in reaction to the perceived, negative influence 
of Western Neo-Scholasticism on Eastern Orthodox theology, partly due to their 
particular recovery of Pseudo-Dionysius, many Orthodox theologians in the twentieth 
century exalted apophatic theology as the preeminent means of Christian spiritual 
ascent.
557
  The most influential promoter of apophaticism among these Orthodox 
theologians was Vladimir Lossky.  According to Lossky, apophaticism does not simply 
refer to the intellectual exercise known in the West as negative theology, but is ―an 
existential attitude which involves the whole man.‖558  This existential attitude requires 
one to acknowledge the impossibility of knowing God in His essence, and to eventually 
abandon human concepts of God in order to grow in divine participation through prayer 
and askesis.  Taking Gregory of Nyssa‘s Life of Moses as illustrative of the apophatic 
way, Lossky emphasizes that the ―light‖ that shone forth from the burning bush (Ex 3) 
was not as great a theophany as the ―divine darkness‖ that later enveloped Moses on Mt. 
Sinai (Ex 24).  He interprets the former theophany as signaling that cataphatic, rational 
thought was still predominant in Moses, while the latter theophany illustrates God 
showing Moses that the apophatic way is greater.  
                                               
556 Florovsky, ―The Christian Hellenism,‖ 10.  The most well-known of recent defenses of the Hellenistic 
categories present in Scripture and the Church‘s dogmas is Pope Benedict XVI‘s ―Regensburg Address.‖  
Shaw is perhaps right, however, that Florovsky did not adequately deal with how the Church should 
accommodate non-Greek expressions of Christianity (―Introduction,‖ 223).   
557 See Paul Gavrilyuk, ―The Reception of Dionysius in Twentieth-Century Eastern Orthodoxy,‖ Modern 
Theology 24:4 (October 2008): 707-723. 
558 Lossky, Mystical Theology, 39.   
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A consequence of the modern Orthodox emphasis on apophaticism has been a 
marked de-emphasis on the ability of doctrinal statements to convey truths of religious 
experience.  This de-emphasis in two particular Orthodox authors—Lossky and Andrew 
Louth—is related to their rejection of doctrinal development.  By no means do Lossky 
and Louth go so far as to deny the relation between doctrinal definitions and experience.  
Lossky recognizes that, as a function of the fullness of faith he or she possesses, ―the 
Christian knows all, but theology is necessary to actuate this knowledge.‖559  And Louth 
describes theology as ―a search for truth, because we are seeking to find ways of 
expressing that truth, using the historically conditioned categories available to us.‖560  
What they deny, however, is the ability of theology (understood as the application of 
reason to revelation) to continually contribute to an ever-deeper knowledge of 
experience.  In other words, they deny that theology is a handmaiden in our ascent toward 
God.    
Illustrative of their denial is their position that new doctrinal language does not 
contribute to a greater understanding of revelation either for the individual Christian or 
the entire Church.  Lossky acknowledges that the Church must preserve its dogmatic 
tradition by occasionally renewing the language in which it communicates this tradition, 
but that ―‗to renew‘ does not mean to replace ancient expressions of the Truth by new 
ones, more explicit and theologically better elaborated.‖561  A doctrine, according to 
Lossky, only ―each time opens anew an access towards the fulness outside of which the 
                                               
559 Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction, trans. Ian and Ihita Kesarcodi-Watson (Crestwood, NY: 
SVS Press, 1978), 17.  
560 Louth, ―Is Doctrinal Development a Valid Category?‖ 59.   
561 Lossky, ―Tradition and Traditions,‖ 160.  
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revealed Truth can be neither known nor confessed.‖562  Louth echoes Lossky through the 
words of his former student, Mihail Neamţu: 
The profound dogmatic elaborations of the fourth century, on the side of the 
 orthodox theologians, did not bring the apostolic faith somewhere further, on to a 
 deeper level of understanding.  Given their relative flexibility regarding the 
 language, the champions of orthodoxy in the fourth century only provided new 
 means of conceptualization of what is essentially encapsulated in the 
 proclamation of Christ‘s lordship and divinity…563 
 
For Lossky and Louth, then, theology makes explicit certain aspects of the implicitly-held 
mystery of revelation without ever penetrating that mystery.  Doctrines ―open an access‖ 
toward understanding revelation, but do not reveal a path toward further understanding 
after the initial access.  They are merely points along the circumference of the mystery of 
revelation which do not afford one the ability to progress toward the center.  According to 
them, the formulation of doctrine does not lead to any sort of development.
564
 
 For Lossky and Louth, doctrinal definition mainly performs a negative function.  
Such a view of doctrine is operative in their belief that doctrine‘s main purpose is to serve 
as a protective measure against heresies.  According to Louth, ―The main concern of 
theology is not so much to elucidate anything, as to prevent us, the Church, from 
dissolving the mystery that lies at the heart of the faith.‖565  In Lossky‘s words, doctrines 
therefore function as ―boundaries,‖ as Tradition‘s ―external limit,‖ outside of which lie 
false interpretations of revelation.
566
  The implication in this view is that doctrine 
primarily serves as a bulwark against heresies; that it is merely a necessity imposed upon 
                                               
562 Ibid., 162. 
563 Mihail Neamţu, ―The Unfolding of Truth: Eunomius of Cyzicus and Gregory of Nyssa in debate over 
Orthodoxy (360-381),‖ Archaeus VI (2002), fasc. 1-2:113; quoted in Louth, ―Is Doctrinal Development a 
Valid Category?‖ 60.  The emphasis in the quotation is mine.   
564 For a fuller discussion of this issue, see my article ―The Orthodox Rejection of Doctrinal Development,‖ 
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the Church, at certain times in its history, when faith has dwindled, and the experience of 
faith is not enough to sustain the faithful. 
 Florovsky differs sharply from his fellow Orthodox theologians in his positive 
attitude toward doctrinal definition.
567
  As I pointed out above, Florovsky affirms that 
―the Word of God may be adequately and rightly expressed in human words‖ as a result 
of men‘s and women‘s possession of the imago Dei and Christ‘s redemption of human 
nature, which included the redemption of human knowledge.
568
  This affirmation serves 
to counter an overemphasis on apophatic theology and the inability of human words to 
convey divine truth.  Florovsky‘s positive attitude toward doctrinal definition implies that 
an overemphasis upon apophaticism fails on two accounts: one, it fails to respect the 
dignity of human knowledge in spite of the fall.  Or, perhaps more accurately, it fails to 
adequately incorporate rationality into the understanding of the imago Dei which, writes 
Florovsky, ―is in the whole man… and not just one part of man.‖569  Two, an 
overemphasis upon apophaticism fails to account for the redeemed, and thus transformed, 
character of human knowledge following Christ‘s salvific acts.  As Florovsky writes, 
―The resurrection is the true renewal, the transfiguration, the reformation of the whole 
creation.  Not just a return of what has passed away, but a heightening, a fulfillment of 
something better and more perfect.‖570  Florovsky‘s positive view of doctrine is thus 
connected with his conviction of the reality of Redemption. 
                                               
567 Louth hints that he is aware of this difference: ―Lossky‘s understanding of the Neo-Patristic synthesis 
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568 V1, 27.  
569 V4, 120.   
570 V3, 120.   
165 
 
Moreover, Florovsky believes that doctrines, once defined, have a perennial and 
eternal character.  ―The words of dogmatic definitions,‖ he writes, ―are not ‗simple 
words,‘ they are not ‗accidental‘ words which one can replace by other words.  They are 
eternal words, incapable of being replaced.  This means that certain words—certain 
concepts—are eternalized by the very fact that they express divine truth.‖571  They 
represent, as it were, the termini of certain truths of Christian experience that will not be 
superseded by improved expressions for the same truths.  Unfortunately, Florovsky did 
not devote extensive attention to this point, but it is a point that could provide balance to 
the modern theology‘s tendency to over-hermeneuticize doctrinal definitions.  
It is interesting to note that Florovsky himself perceived the exaggerated 
apophaticism evident in Lossky and Louth operative in those Russian theologians who 
objected to doctrinal development in the nineteenth-century.  Responding to P.I. 
Leporskii‘s position against development on the ground that ―a deeper apprehension of 
the mystery [doctrines] contain was [im]possible,‖ Florovsky writes, ―He exaggerated the 
incomprehensibility of revelation, leaving an aftertaste of an unexpected agnosticism.‖572  
What is more, Florovksy sees in this form of apophaticism the seeds of relativism and the 
reduction of religion to morality—dangers perennially present in the a-dogmatism of 
Protestant theology.
573
  Thus Baker‘s perceptive comment that an Orthodox 
overemphasis on apophaticism, and their supposition of a dichotomy between experience 
and reason, ―threatens a retreat of Orthodox thought and culture into a form of masked 
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fideism having more in common with the spirit of Luther than that of the Greek 
Fathers.‖574   
 Florovsky‘s optimistic estimate of human reason is manifest in his belief that the 
formulation of new doctrines—usually done at ecumenical councils—does indeed result 
in new understanding.  He saw this principle affirmed by Vladimir Soloviev‘s 
understanding of dogmatic development.  Such support for Soloviev on this point of 
dogmatic development is surprising given that Florovsky opposes much within 
Soloviev‘s system, including the understanding of history present within that system.575  
Florovsky interprets Soloviev‘s endorsement of dogmatic development as an affirmation 
that ―the ecumenical councils defined and described with new precision and binding 
authority that Christian truth which had existed from the beginning, and their importance 
and novelty lies in this precision and authoritativeness—this new degree or stage of 
exactness.‖576  Florovsky characterized those who assigned only a preservative and 
protective, rather than a constructive and illuminative, role to doctrinal definitions as 
having a negative view of history.  The opponents of Soloviev‘s idea of doctrinal 
development, according to Florovsky, held that ―the councils only protected tradition and 
clarified it relative to the ‗passing needs of the Church at that moment,‘‖ and that 
                                               
574 Baker, ―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 200.  
575 Baker notes how remarkable Florovsky‘s support for Soloviev‘s understanding of dogmatic 
development is in ―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 84-88. 
576 V6, 158.  Soloviev‘s understanding of doctrinal development is located in his lengthy essay, 
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development‖ (Tillard, ―Dogmatic Development and Koinonia,‖ in New Perspectives on Historical 
Theology: Essays in Memory of John Meyendorff, ed. Bradley Nassif [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996], 
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doctrinal language brings about new understanding: ―It is not only a question of an exterior renewal, or of 
an ‗aggiornamento‘ of language.  It is impossible to separate language and content so clearly as that‖ (―The 
Orthodox Conception of Tradition and the Development of Doctrine,‖ 660).    
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―ecumenical testimony has largely a negative significance: the condemnation and 
exclusion of definite heresies or errors.‖577  Florovsky perceived in such a view of 
doctrine a rather pessimistic view of Church history that considers doctrines as evidence 
of particular lapses in Christian faith.  ―The entire discussion,‖ writes Florovsky, ―is a 
variation on the typical theme of Protestant historiography: church history as decay.‖578  I 
will further examine Florovsky‘s endorsement of Solovev‘s understanding of dogmatic 
development in the Dialogue section of this chapter. 
 Florovsky also differs from Lossky and Louth inasmuch as he views the role of 
human reason in theology as inseparable from the ascent to God.  Once again, in holding 
this position he mirrors Philaret, who ―was the first person in the history of modern 
Russian theology for whom theology once more became the aim of life, the essential step 
toward spiritual progress and construction.‖579  He also sees himself as following the 
example of the Church Fathers, whose theology was of an ―existential‖ character that 
informed the character of Christian life.
580
  Just as Florovsky‘s ecclesiology is rooted in 
the totus Christus, one might say his anthropology is rooted in the totus homo.  
According to Florovsky, the entire man—including his thought—becomes progressively 
united with Christ in the process of the human person‘s deification.  He sees theology, 
too, as part of the theanthropic process that culminates in men‘s and women‘s 
deification. 
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 Ironically, Florovsky congratulated Lossky above all else for ―his insistence that 
doctrine and spirituality were intimately correlated.‖581  Yet, Lossky‘s strength is also the 
source of his weakness, for in affirming the inseparability of theology and spirituality he 
at the same time conflates them by not according an adequate role to knowledge in 
deification.  Florovsky, too, notes this weakness in his review of Lossky‘s Mystical 
Theology.  He concedes to Lossky that ―the ultimate knowledge of God is available ‗by 
faith‘ only, in an ‗experience‘ which transcends ‗logical reason.‘‖ ―But,‖ he qualifies, 
―‗knowledge‘ is still an integral part of this beatific ‗life‘‖—an insight he ascribes to the 
Cappadocian Fathers.
582
 
 On a final note, I wish to point out that Florovsky‘s positive evaluation of 
doctrine and theology is balanced by his own recognition of the apophatic character of 
theology.  Louth is right in noting that Florovsky ―makes little of the language of 
apophaticism.‖583  George Williams also notes this lacuna, but points out that 
Florovsky‘s oeuvre is permeated by a ―profoundly apophatic‖ character.584  The 
apophatic character of Florovsky‘s theology is sufficiently evident in his position that 
experience contains a fullness that can never be exhausted by Scripture and dogma.
585
  
He also employed the traditional distinction between theology and economy in order to 
distinguish between knowledge of God‘s essence (which is impossible) and that known 
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through God‘s revelation through His energies.586  Indeed, Florovsky admitted that 
―theology itself is bound to be ultimately rather an ‗apophatic theology,‘ just a symbol of 
the unfathomable mystery of God…‖587  Furthermore, Florovsky repeatedly 
acknowledged that there are times when theology reaches its limit, and where silence 
must take over in the face of mystery.
588
  
 But Florovsky was also cautious about the emphasis one should give apophatic 
theology.  ―I am for apophatic theology,‖ writes Florovsky, ―but its use must be regulated 
very carefully…‖589  As Florovsky saw it, the consequence of a one-sidedly apophatic 
theology was the eventual devaluation of the dogmatic element in theology, ―to a renewal 
of the heresy of the ‗antisophoi,‘ ‗gnosimachoi.‘‖590  Moreover, Florovsky would have 
seen it as devaluing the anthropological character of revelation.  As I have pointed out 
above, Florovsky believed that divine truth could be adequately communicated in human 
language because men and women have been created in the image of God.  He also 
believed that Christians had a vocation to use their gift of reason to unfold and clarify the 
experience of revelation in the course of human history.  Florovsky understood theology 
to constitute this rational unfolding and clarifying of revelation.  He thus regarded an 
exaggerated apophaticism as devaluing the rational element within human beings, and as 
fatal to theology.  He regarded an exaggerated apophatic theology as really no theology at 
all.   
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D. THEOLOGY AND THE ORGANIC METAPHOR 
 
 Both George Williams and Matthew Baker interpret Florovsky‘s rejection of 
doctrinal development as a function of his rejection of certain organic models of history.  
Florovsky opposed biologistic historical models that interpret the course of temporal 
events as identical to that of the life of an organism, which develops (or ―evolves,‖ as he 
terms it elsewhere) according to a structure that pre-exists in the organism itself.
591
  Such 
a conception of doctrinal history would mean that revelation develops, or unfolds, its 
contents in history as a realization of its own innate power.  Florovsky reacts against this 
type of historical model—which he saw as endemic to the historiographies of both 
Idealism and Slavophilism, in addition to that of Soloviev—because, again, he believed 
that it failed to provide a role for the free divine and human creativity that belongs to 
personhood.  A biologistic reading of history means, for Florovsky, that history is the 
realization of a process from a beginning to an end that is achieved without, or in spite of, 
the irruptions of divine and human acts.  As Williams implies and Baker argues, 
Florovsky considered the word ―development‖ as synonymous with such a reading of 
history, a fact that colors his attitude toward the idea of doctrinal development.               
In his Masters‘ thesis, Baker has already provided a softening of Florovsky‘s 
rejection of doctrinal development as it relates to the organic metaphor.
592
  Baker, as did 
George Williams before, explains that Florovsky preferred the term ―epigenesis‖ to 
―evolution‖ or ―entwicklung‖ (―development‖) as a historical model.593  ―Epigenesis‖ 
refers, in general, to the genetic changes in organisms that take place as a result of factors 
                                               
591 Florovsky, ―Evolution und Epigenesis: Zur Problematic der Geschichte,‖ Der Russische Gedanke 1:3 
(1930): 240- 252. 
592 Baker, ―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 75-89. 
593 George Williams, ―Georges Vasilievich Florovsky,‖ 88, 99-100.   
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not present within the genes themselves, e.g., through environmental factors.   Florovsky 
believed this term better accounted for the unpredictable character of history, where 
unforeseen and freely-willed divine and human actions help contribute to the 
achievement of creation‘s telos.  He associated entwicklung, on the other hand, with non-
volitional biological processes.  Baker also points out that Florovsky did not associate all 
theories of doctrinal development with a biologistic conception of history, as evidenced 
by his support for Soloviev‘s understanding of doctrinal development in Ways.  Indeed, 
Florovsky seemingly qualifies his objection to doctrinal development in Ways when he 
explains that he does not oppose what doctrinal development claims about the human 
reception of revelation; rather, he objects to the imprecision of the term.
594
  
Baker notes that while Florovsky opposed organic conceptions of history, he at 
the same time utilized organic metaphors in expressing his theology of history.  
―Epigenesis‖ is itself an organic metaphor.  Indeed, one could characterize Florovsky as 
holding that an authentically Christian theology of history is necessarily an organic 
theology of history.  As already pointed out, Florovsky‘s preferred image for the Church 
was the ―Body of Christ‖—an image whose reestablished preeminence in theology he 
attributed to Möhler and Khomiakov, in addition to Philaret.
595
  As Florovsky recognizes, 
the Church is an organic reality inasmuch as it is a body: ―The Church is a body indeed, 
an organism, much more than a society or a corporation.  And perhaps an ‗organism‘ is 
the best modern rendering of the term to soma, as used by St. Paul.‖596  Baker points out 
that Florovsky recognizes limitations to the organic metaphor as applied to the Church: 
                                               
594 V6, 49, 149.  Both Lossky, on the Orthodox side, and Tillard, on the Roman Catholic side, also criticize 
the term ―development‖ for inaccurately describing the process of Tradition. (Lossky, ―Tradition and 
Traditions,‖ 160; Tillard, 176)    
595 V2, 200-202.  
596 V1, 63. 
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that the unity implied in the corporate imagery needs to be held in tension with ―the idea 
of [the Church as] a symphony of personalities.‖597  The Church as the ―Body of Christ‖ 
is, as Baker rightly qualifies, a ―spiritual analogy.‖598   
At the same time, however, Florovsky reminds us of the realism that the Fathers 
attached to the image of the Church as the Body of Christ.  ―It is,‖ he writes, ―a real and 
ontological unity, the realization of a single organic life in Christ… The ancient fathers 
did not hesitate to speak of ‗natural‘ and ‗physical‘ union…‖599  Admittedly, the organic 
imagery as applied to the Church suffers from the same limitations as all analogies that 
attempt to express divine realities.  However, some of the characteristics that Florovsky 
attributes to the Church are also those of physical, organic bodies.  And he very much 
saw the Church, in accordance with the Chalcedonian doctrine, as a theanthropic reality.   
Florovsky recognized that the organic character of the Church as the Body of 
Christ has consequences for its theology.  Thus, he attributes a living character to the 
theology of the Church.  Shaw summarizes this recognition, quoting Florovsky: ―As the 
Church is an organism, so its articulation of its pilgrimage, its theology and sense of 
unity, are ‗inner, intimate, organic.‘‖600  In Ways, Florovsky attributes the truth of 
Soloviev‘s theory of doctrinal development precisely to his ―living sense of the sacred 
reality of history in the Church.‖601  The living character of theology is cognizable in its 
bearing of ―fruit‖: ―The Word of God is preserved in the human spirit as a seed which 
sprouts and brings forth fruit.‖602  Pace those Orthodox theologians who primarily 
                                               
597 V1, 67. 
598 Baker, ―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 81, 165. 
599 V13, 48.   
600 Shaw, ―Introduction,‖ 104; V1, 39, 63.    
601 V6, 156. 
602 V3, 26.   
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characterized dogmas as boundary markers and inadequate formulations of Christian 
experience, Florovsky regarded them as necessary fruits born by human reflection on 
revelation.
603
   
Even more remarkable for a modern Orthodox theologian, Florovsky viewed a 
―system‖ as one of the fruits born by a living theology: ―Revelation must unfold within 
human thought, must develop into an entire system of believing confession, into a system 
of religious perspective—one may say, into a system of religious philosophy and a 
philosophy of Revelation.‖604  I say this is remarkable, for the dominant school of 
Orthodox theology in the twentieth century, in which Florovsky is usually included, 
generally considers the idea of theological systems as anathema.  They are associated 
with the rationalizing character of the West, as especially embodied in the scholasticism 
of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, and are considered to be the signs of a 
decadent theology.
605
  
A word closely associated with ―system‖ in Florovsky‘s thought is ―synthesis.‖606  
There have been some attempts to identify what Florovsky himself means when he uses 
the terms ―system‖ and ―synthesis.‖  Lewis Shaw describes it as the search for ―the 
‗code‘ underlying the ‗ecclesial mind‘ expressed in the Church's literary classics, 
                                               
603 Valliere uses the category ―Neo-Patristic‖ to refer to theologians such as Florovsky, Lossky, and 
Meyendorff, among others, whom he views as promoting a traditional form of Orthodoxy that seeks to 
merely repeat the insights of the Fathers.  Baker locates the distinction between the ―Russian‖ and ―Neo-
Patristic‖ schools of Orthodox thought as originating with Schmemann.  See Schmemann, ―Russian 
Theology,‖ 190-191; Baker, ―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 8n11.     
604 V3, 27. 
605 See, for instance, Lossky, ―The Theology of Light in the Thought of St. Gregory Palamas,‖ in Image, 
52, 68; Orthodox Theology, 15; John Behr, ―Faithfulness and Creativity,‖ in Abba: The Tradition of 
Orthodoxy in the West: Festschrift for Bishop Kallistos (Ware) of Diokleia, ed. Behr, Andrew Louth, and 
Dimitri Conomos (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 2003), 176; Christos Yannaras, Elements of Faith: An 
Introduction to Orthodox Theology (London: Continuum, 1991), 157;  Alan Brown, ―On the Criticism of 
Being as Communion in Anglophone Orthodox Theology,‖ in The Theology of John Zizioulas, ed. Douglas 
H. Knight (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 35-78.   
606 On the close association, or equivocation, between ―synthesis‖ and ―system‖ in Florovsky‘s thought, see 
Baker, ―‗Theology Reasons.‘‖ 
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iconography and liturgy.‖607  Baker, whose thesis is concerned with exegeting 
Florovsky‘s understanding of ―synthesis,‖ sees the term used by Florovsky in a twofold 
sense: as the entirety of the Church‘s theological tradition, and as the summaries of the 
faith provided by individual Fathers addressing their particular contexts.
608
  I wish to add 
to this second sense.  Florovsky seemed to understand a system, or synthesis, as an 
attempt by human reason, informed by faith, to order the truths of the experience of 
revelation into a unified whole.  This ordering function is usually accomplished by 
assigning centrality to certain truths of the faith (such as Florovsky‘s Christocentrism), or 
by describing these truths in a particular idiom (such as the Aristotelianism permeating 
Aquinas‘ Summa Theologiae).609  
 Baker‘s thesis argues that Florovsky‘s famed call for a ―Neo-Patristic synthesis‖ 
must be considered precisely as a call to construct a new theological system appropriate 
for the modern context.  Baker also points out that Florovsky did not believe this call was 
unique; rather, he believed that it was simply a general method for how theology should 
be done.  ―Orthodox theology…,‖ writes Florovsky, ―must not only retain the experience 
of the Fathers, but moreover develop it while discovering it, and use it in order to create a 
living work.‖610  This method was the same one he saw supported by Soloviev‘s 
understanding of doctrinal development, though he was critical of Soloviev for 
                                               
607 Shaw, ―George Florovsky‘s Model of Orthodox Ecclesiology,‖ Window Quarterly: Journal of the 
American Church 2:3 (1991).  See also V4, 177.   
608 Baker, ―‗Neo-Patristic Synthesis,‘‖ 37.  Later in his thesis, Baker points out that Florovsky also applied 
the term ―synthesis‖ to the contemporary hermeneutical appropriation of the patristic syntheses, in addition 
to his desired ecumenical reintegration of Tradition.  
609 It is a commonplace to clarify that Florovsky never attempted to create a system (Shaw, Introduction, 
88).  In this omission, he perhaps saw himself as emulating his master, Philaret, about whose lack of a 
system Florovsky remarks in Ways, 208, 217.  Florovsky realized that his writings tended to have an ad hoc 
character to them, as being responses to a particular need or issue that arose.  George Williams is wrong, 
however, in holding that Florovsky had ―a logical distrust of all systems‖ (―Georges Vasilievich 
Florovsky,‖ 106).   
610 V4, 200.   
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attempting to construct a synthesis based on non-ecclesiastical experience.
611
  In sum, the 
creation of systems—a process that cannot reach perfection on this side of the eschaton—
is for Florovsky the sign of a living faith, a manifestation of the Church‘s nature as an 
organism.  It is a sign of a faith that is truly engaging with Christian experience in all its 
fullness, which ―is only gradually discerned, dissected, and described in necessary 
definitions.‖612  
The organic character of the Church as the Body of Christ has other consequences 
for its history.  Growth is a sign of a body‘s life, and thus, as Florovsky acknowledged, 
―the truth of the [New Testament] is revealed and vindicated by the growth of the 
Body.‖613  George Williams qualifies that Florovsky‘s opposition to organismic readings 
of history was in part an opposition—shared with the French philosopher Charles 
Renouvier (1815-1903)—to ―theories of inevitable progress in history‖ that failed to 
account for human acts in the historical process.
614
  That qualification aside, Florovsky 
believed that history was indeed characterized by progress.  In fact, he believed that the 
concept of history as a ―sacred process‖ was a revealed truth: ―Our modern concept of the 
linear time, with a sense of direction or vectorality, with the possibility of progression 
and achievement of new things, has been derived from the Bible and the Biblical 
conception of history.‖615  What is more, Florovsky considered the view that history did 
not exhibit progress as one of the principle marks of Hellenism: ―there was no room for 
                                               
611 V6, 85, 159. 
612 V6, 159.   
613 V1, 26.   
614 G. Williams, ―Georges Vasilievich Florovsky,‖ 24.  According to Williams, Charles Renouvier (1815-
1903) ―exercised considerable influence in [Florovsky‘s] conception of creation, time, freedom, and 
eschatology.‖  See also Florovsky‘s article, ―On the Philosophy of Charles Renouvier,‖ in V12, 128-132.    
615 V2, 25-26, 130.   
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any progress, but only for ‗re-volutions,‘ re-circulation, cyclophoria and anacyclosis.‖616  
Because Florovsky viewed most Christian heresies as returns to a pre-Christian 
Hellenism, he was particularly attuned to this unprogressive view of history in many of 
the past and present threats to Christian orthodoxy.
617
  
 But of which realms of the Church‘s history can one predicate this progress?  For 
one, Florovsky believed it characterized the Church‘s theological work.  My contention 
that Florovsky considered the Church‘s unfolding of revelation to be progressive 
throughout time will seem erroneous to those who have associated his call for a Neo-
patristic synthesis with a derisive attitude toward all post-Patristic theologies.  Florovsky 
exalts the Fathers for the model they provided us for our own performance of theology, 
namely, an ―existential theology.‖  But he certainly did not countenance a ―theology of 
repetition‖ that merely preserved the Patristic theology in a pristine state, nor did he 
believe that the content of Patristic theology reached an apex that theology could not 
possibly improve upon.
618
  Instead, he held that Tradition is not so much a safeguarding 
and conservative principle, as a progressive and adducible one—the beginning of life, 
renewal, and growth.
619
   
Again, Florovsky did not believe Christians today can know more than the 
Church Fathers in terms of having a greater experience of the truth.  However, he did 
believe that the Church‘s theology in each age ―testifies of greater things.‖  ―In its 
definitions,‖ he writes, ―it always unchangeably describes the same thing, but in the 
                                               
616 V2, 56.  See also V4, 69. 
617 For example, Florovsky criticized Protestantism of viewing ―the history of Christian [as] a history of 
decline, of fall‖ (V12, 39).  He also perceived a cyclical view of history in Idealism: ―Hegel rejects the 
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618 V1, 110, 111. 
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unchanged image ever new features become visible.‖620  The Church‘s faith today is the 
same as yesterday, ―but now, as it were, properly and fully articulated.‖621  Thus, 
Florovsky did not believe theology today had progressed beyond the theology of the 
Fathers in terms of quality or method, but he did believe it had progressed inasmuch as 
more aspects of Christian experience had been articulated through reason.  As I showed 
above, Lossky and Louth deny theology even this kind of progress. 
To repeat, Florovsky held that theology was intimately connected with one‘s 
participation in God, or, with one‘s growth in holiness.  To once again play upon the 
phrase of Augustine, one may ascribe this belief to Florovsky‘s doctrine of the totus 
homo, which takes into account the interconnectivity of faith, or experience, and reason.  
Lossky did not wish to make the leap from what is true for the individual to what is true 
for the Body: he did not wish to claim that what takes place in a person‘s life of faith—
where growth in holiness is attended by growth in knowledge—also takes place at the 
corporate level.  In opposing the idea of doctrinal development, he allowed that ―this 
knowledge of the Truth in the Tradition thus will be able to increase in a person, in 
company with his increase in sanctification (Col 1:10): a Christian will be more perfect in 
knowledge at the age of his spiritual maturity.‖  But then he asks, ―Would one dare to 
speak, against all the evidence, of a collective progress in the knowledge of the Christian 
mystery, a progress which would be due to a ‗dogmatic development‘ of the Church?‖622 
                                               
620 V1, 49. 
621 V1, 107.  See also Florovsky, ―Types of Historical Interpretation,‖ 95: ―A knowledge of the past is 
always richer than the ‗past itself,‘ because it is a renewed experience of the past, as a living tradition and 
its appropriating and clarifying interpretation.‖  This article originally appeared in Russian in 1925.   
622 Lossky, ―Tradition and Traditions,‖ 162.  Behind Lossky‘s use of the phrase ―against all the evidence‖ is 
his belief that the history of the Church has been marked by a decline in the quality of theology since the 
Patristic era.  He writes, with not merely a twinge of sarcasm, ―Would this development have started in 
‗gospel infancy‘ to end today—after a ‗patristic youth‘ and a ‗scholastic maturity‘—in the sad senility of 
the manuals of theology?‖  It is interesting to note here that, in spite of Lossky‘s persistent emphasis on 
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Does Florovsky make this leap?  Does he claim that the Church, the Body of 
Christ, progressively grows in holiness throughout history in a parallel fashion to its 
theological growth?  The answer is yes, because he takes seriously the reality of the 
Church as the Body of Christ, as the totus Christus.  According to Florovsky, it is not 
only the deification of individuals that is taking place in history, but the deification of the 
Church, as well.  History now is the history of the completion of the Body of Christ.  In 
one of his most impassioned pieces of writing—the concluding chapter to Ways—
Florovsky describes the history of the Church ―as the ‗process of God-manhood,‘ as a 
departure from time into grace-filled eternity—the formation and creation of the body of 
Christ.‖623  Thus, because Florovsky affirms that the Body of Christ is continually 
growing, is progressively being deified according to the pattern of Christ‘s own life, and 
because he believes this deification is inseparable from the Church‘s dogmatic 
profession, it follows that he would hold that the Church‘s growth in theological 
understanding is inseparable from its growth in holiness.
624
  Indeed, he directly makes the 
connection in his essay ―The Work of the Holy Spirit in Revelation‖: ―The fullness of 
Revelation is assimilated by the Church in the measure of its spiritual growth.  And this 
gradualness in the profession of faith is connected with the dynamic growth of Church 
existence, with the process of vital salvation, sanctification, and transfiguration.‖625 
  It is important to ask whether or not Florovsky would also allow for a regression 
in the Church‘s growth, both in the understanding of doctrine and in its holiness.  Both 
                                                                                                                                            
apophaticism, both Florovsky and Newman are much more apophatic, and less confident, when it comes to 
the interpretation of history. 
623 V6, 296.  I refer to this conclusion as one of Florovsky‘s ―most impassioned pieces of writing‖ because 
he wrote all forty pages of it in one sitting, and it remains in its unedited form (See Blane, 53). 
624 Staniloae shares this belief with Florovsky, namely, that the development of doctrine is connected with 
the progress of the Church, and all humankind, in its participation in Christ.  See Staniloae, ―The Orthodox 
Conception of Tradition and the Development of Doctrine.‖  
625 ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 14. 
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Staniloae and Jean-Marie Tillard believe that the theory of the development of doctrine 
must leave room for such regress.  Staniloae recognizes that ―Humanity as a whole, and 
Christian humanity in particular, has its halts and setbacks in the course of history.  There 
are many temporary deviations on to wrong roads, dark sides in this journey towards the 
light.‖626  Interestingly, both Staniloae and Tillard connect their postulation of regresses 
in the Church‘s development of doctrine with their qualification of the organic metaphor.  
Thus, Staniloae writes, ―We are dealing here not with an organic, but with a spiritual 
level.‖627  Tillard qualifies the organic metaphor as follows: 
But this concrete existence shows that the condition of this truth is not that of a 
seed led by its inner force toward an always more perfect development.  It is the 
condition of a transcendent reality, delivered once for all (ephapax) with its whole 
richness (its katholou) in the kairos of Christ Jesus, always re-received in the 
communion of all the local churches of God, remaining the same in its inner 
perfection (its katholou) but expressed in the complex and constantly changing 
situation of humanity, sometimes advancing, sometimes regressing.
628
  
 
In allowing for the possibility of regressions in the Church‘s development of doctrine, 
both Staniloae and Tillard are concerned with leaving room for human freedom in the 
historical process.  Florovsky of course shares this concern, which is why he prefers the 
historical model of ―epigenesis.‖  This model seems to allow for possible regressions in 
the Church‘s development of doctrine and its progressive participation in the life of 
Christ.  Florovsky‘s Christological theandrism implies that there must be an overall 
growth and progression in the history of the Church, but between these ―leaps‖ there may 
very well be perceptible ebbs in the doctrinal and spiritual life of the Church.
629
  
                                               
626 Staniloae, ―The Orthodox Conception of Tradition and the Development of Doctrine,‖ 660. 
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629 See also Staniloae, ―The Orthodox Conception of Tradition and the Development of Doctrine,‖ 660: ―It 
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 Florovsky regards the ―pseudomorphosis‖ of Russian theological thought as one 
of these ebbs.  He contends that the pseudomorphosis brought about through Russia‘s 
rash appropriation of Western categories of thought was a schism in the Russian soul 
between theology and experience—between the tradition of liturgy, prayer, worship, or, 
the Russian people‘s life in Christ, and the rational expression of that life.630  According 
to Florovsky, Russia‘s pseudomorphosis was especially embodied in, and brought about 
by, the Romanizing tendencies of Peter Mogila (1596-1646) and the Protestant and 
secularizing reforms of Czar Peter I (1672-1725).
631
  Florovsky regarded ―a creative 
return to Patristic foundations and sources‖—a return already signaled by Philaret—as 
the only way to combat this pseudomorphosis.  In other words, Florovsky regarded a 
Neo-patristic synthesis resulting from both rational and ascetical activity as the 
antidote.
632
 
Consistent with the concerns of Staniloae and Tillard, Florovsky considered 
Russian theology‘s pseudomorphosis to be a regression in its tradition because it was not 
indicative of a free human response to revelation.  The post-Reformation Russian 
response to Western theology was not, according to Florovsky, one that proceeded from 
the depths of its experience as informed by the wealth of its patristic and Byzantine 
forebears.  Such would have constituted a free and dialogical engagement with Western 
ideas and categories.  Instead, the Russian response to Western theology bore the marks 
of a hasty adoption and a servile imitation.  As a result, writes Florovsky, ―no true 
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encounter with the West has yet taken place.  That could only happen in the freedom and 
equality of love.‖633   
Contrary to the claims of some modern Orthodox authors, Florovsky‘s diagnosis 
of pseudomorphosis was not a call for a reestablishment of Orthodox isolationism.
634
  
Quite the contrary, in fact, for Florovsky believed that ―a complete break with the West 
does not give a true and authentic liberation.‖635  It was instead a call for a free encounter 
with the West, from which a true synthesis may come about.  In fact, the call for a true 
synthesis was at the same time a call for true ―development‖ to come about.  ―Did not the 
rupture with the eastern part result in the grafting on of an alien and artificial tradition 
which would inevitably block the path of creative development?‖ asks Florovsky.636  
Through a Neo-patristic synthesis, Florovsky hopes that the Russian Church will once 
again return to a theological path in organic continuity with Byzantinism and the Patristic 
age.
637
  Such a path leads to freedom, to synthesis, and to development. 
Given Florovsky‘s emphasis on human beings‘ creative activity—which is able to 
effect changes in history toward the achievement of creation‘s telos—one might well 
conclude with Rowan Williams that there is ―a rather voluntaristic flavor to some of his 
writings.‖638  However, Williams is among a number of commentators on Florovsky, 
including Baker, who do not balance Florovsky‘s critique of organic readings of history 
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with a treatment of the role he assigns to Providence in history.  True enough, against 
interpretations of history that relegate men and women to a position of passivity, 
Florovsky wished to accentuate that the ascetic activity (podvig) of human beings does 
truly contribute to the achievement of history‘s end.  But he was also clear that God 
retains an active role in the historical process in guiding his creation ―toward the 
accomplishment of His ultimate purpose,‖ which is the predetermined end of the 
completion of the Body of Christ.
639
  Though Baker unfortunately left Florovsky‘s 
understanding of Providence unexplored, he makes clear elsewhere in his thesis that 
Florovsky ultimately understood the historical process as a synergy between God‘s grace 
and human freedom.
640
   
This same idea of synergy pervades Florovsky‘s understanding of theology.  In 
history, God guides the Church toward a greater knowledge of His revelation.  How this 
knowledge unfolds, however, is in part the result of the various persons, events, thoughts, 
and contexts that make up the historical matrix.  Interestingly, Florovsky recognizes that 
one‘s ascription to the doctrine of Providence is intimately connected with the idea of 
doctrinal development.  Among his critiques of the opponents of Soloviev‘s 
understanding of doctrinal development is the following: ―It is precisely divine assistance 
that is not a thread in the historical fabric.‖641  Florovsky characterizes Soloviev‘s 
opponents as regarding theology and ecumenical councils as purely human affairs that 
served a purely negative purpose, namely, the putting down of heresies that threatened 
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the true interpretation of Christian revelation.  Florovsky regarded such extreme 
voluntarism, like exaggerated apophaticism, as also fatal to theology.
642
    
 In conclusion, Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition represents a faithful 
synthesis of Orthodox thought on the subject.  Inspired by the Church Fathers, he 
attempts to elaborate a doctrine of Tradition that is Christocentric, and thus, Chalcedonic, 
leaving room for the operation of both the human and divine in the transmission of 
revelation.  In its Christocentrism, Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is also 
pneumatological, ecclesiological, and eschatological.  Like his other Orthodox 
contemporaries, Florovsky‘s understanding of Tradition is also indebted to the heritage of 
Slavophilism, which manifests itself, for better or worse, in his inclusion of all aspects of 
the Church‘s life in the concept of Tradition.   
Yet, Florovsky also parts ways with some of his Orthodox contemporaries on 
aspects of Tradition.  Most strikingly, he assigns a more positive role to reason and 
theology within the domain of Tradition.  He does not believe that men and women are 
called to merely preserve revelation in an apophatic experience, begrudgingly 
formulating this experience in propositions only when heresy forces the issue.  Rather, he 
believes propositional formulation is one of the expressions of the theological vocation of 
all men and women of the Church, who are called to apply their reason to the experience 
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possessing free will who also affect history for good or ill.  Granted, Florovsky‘s opposition to apocalyptic 
excess is valid.  And his caution about attempting to detect the ―hand of Providence‖ in actual history is 
applicable to the influence of angelic beings on history, as well (V2, 65).  But a thoroughly Christian 
history should be not only Christological and anthropological, but also angelogical.  
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of revelation in order to grow in their understanding of the latter.  What is more, he 
believes that this growth in understanding is intimately connected with the building up of 
the Body of Christ.  In the Dialogue section, I will attempt to answer whether or not this 
understanding of theology amounts to an acceptance of doctrinal development as 
Newman understands it. 
 
2.3: DIALOGUE 
I begin this dialogue section by returning to the question of Florovsky‘s 
apparently inconsistent position on the development of doctrine.  His rejections of 
doctrinal development provide a convenient framework for this section of Chapter Two.  
As I have already shown, his tendency was to reject the idea of doctrinal development.  
Yet, in Ways, Florovsky explicitly endorses doctrinal development and at the same time 
criticizes those who reject the idea.  In addition, positive references to ―development‖ are 
scattered throughout his writings, leaving one wondering whether he does indeed believe 
development is the pattern of the Church‘s doctrinal history.  How, then, is one to 
negotiate these seemingly contradictory positions?   
In searching for an answer to this question, one must begin by simply 
acknowledging that Florovsky‘s assessments of dogmatic development are confused, and 
often cryptic.  He never at any point directly defines what he understands dogmatic 
development to mean.  His opinions on the matter are situated in general essays on 
revelation and the Church, and lack sustained attention.  With the exception of Soloviev‘s 
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understanding of dogmatic development, he does not indicate in his writings an in-depth 
knowledge of particular treatments of the subject.
643
    
Florovsky‘s objections to dogmatic development appear in large part to involve 
terminological issues.  That is, Florovsky seemed to be operating with a very particular 
understanding of the phrase ―dogmatic development‖ that conditioned his reaction 
against it.  Indeed, I believe that terminological issues are one of the principal factors 
operative in the Orthodox reaction against doctrinal development in the twentieth, and the 
now the twenty-first, century.  It is often the case that the Orthodox understandings of the 
term ―doctrinal development‖ do not correspond to the principles of Newman‘s theory of 
doctrinal development, which has been received by Christian scholars as the 
representative theory.     
A number of modern Orthodox theologians have rejected doctrinal development 
under the guise that it would allow for new revelation, or a development of Tradition 
itself.  Such is the understanding of doctrinal development provided by Paul Valliere in 
Modern Russian Theology, and the one he portrays as true to an Orthodoxy unafraid of 
engagement with the modern world.  He describes the point of contention with Orthodox 
theology today as follows: ―The issue concerns that which is added to the foundation.  
Does it involve substantive additions and new discoveries, or does it simply entail new 
ways of expressing, articulating or defining that which the church has always known and 
preached?‖644  Those Orthodox who oppose doctrinal development on the supposition 
that it hypothesizes changes to the substance of revelation include John Behr, who writes 
                                               
643 As I indicated in the Introduction to this dissertation, Florovsky clearly had knowledge of Newman‘s 
works.  In fact, all his citations of Newman indicate that a favorable attitude toward him.  However, 
Florovsky never cites Newman‘s Essay on Development.  I have since discovered that former students of 
Florovsky heard him speak positively of Newman‘s theory of development.    
644 Valliere, Modern Russian Theology, 376. 
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that ―from an Orthodox perspective there is no such thing as dogmatic development,‖ for 
―a tradition with potential for growth ultimately undermines the Gospel itself; it would 
leave open the possibility for further revelation, and therefore the Gospel would no longer 
be sure and certain.‖645  Florovsky, however, does not appear to interpret doctrinal 
development as making the claim that Tradition itself develops.  In his mentions of 
doctrinal development he indeed clarifies that dogmatic definition does not amount to 
new revelation, but it does not constitute part of his rejection of the idea of doctrinal 
development.
646
  And of course, as I have already established, Newman does not claim 
that doctrinal development implies the development of revelation or Tradition. 
Matthew Baker argues that Florovsky‘s rejection of doctrinal development was 
principally a function of his rejection of organismic readings of history.  Baker‘s 
argument is clearly dependent upon George Williams‘ position that ―Florovsky formally 
rejects the idea of ‗the development of dogmas‘ in the course of Church history; but this 
must be understood in the specialized sense which the word ‗development‘ (entwicklung) 
has long since acquired in his systematic rejection of organismic views of  ecclesiastical 
history.‖647  Both Baker and Williams take Florovsky‘s essay ―Evolution und Epigenesis‖ 
(1930) as the lens through which they evaluate Florovsky‘s rejection of doctrinal 
development.  They argue (Baker in considerably more detail) that Florovsky‘s 
opposition to entwicklung (―development‖) as a historical model—which represented for 
Florovsky a model that failed to take into account free divine and human actions as 
                                               
645 Behr, ―Scripture, the Gospel, and Orthodoxy,‖ 247, 248.   
646 See also Florovsky‘s comment in Ways II on the debates on dogmatic development at the St. Petersburg 
Religious-Philosophical Meetings (1901-1903): ―It was noted in the debates that ‗development‘ does not 
mean ‗fundamental change,‘ although this was not clear to everyone‖ (V6, 255).   
647 G. Williams, ―Georges Vasilievich Florovsky,‖ 99-100.   
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affecting the historical process—colored his attitude toward the theory of doctrinal 
development.   
Florovsky‘s latest mention of doctrinal development in his oeuvre supports 
Baker‘s and Williams‘ contention.  In his 1961 essay ―The Quest for Christian Unity and 
the Orthodox Church,‖ Florovsky at one point attempts to navigate between both 
excessively static and excessively dynamic views of Tradition.  With the advent of 
historical consciousness in the modern era, Florovsky expressly approves that a more 
dynamic understanding of Church history has come to predominate, which included 
acceptance of the idea of development.  But, he laments,  
when the pattern of ―development‖ was finally adopted in the interpretation of 
 Church history, it came to be used without adequate discrimination and without 
 proper attention to the nature of the Church.  ―Development‖ was often equated 
 with ―evolution‖ or was interpreted in the terms of Hegelian philosophy, and in all 
 cases it was regarded as something exclusively ―human‖ and ―all too Human,‖ 
 and for that reason inextricably relative.
648
  
 
Once again, Florovsky does not name any specific perpetrators of this type of view of 
doctrinal development—one might hypothesize that he has in mind Möhler and the 
Tubingen school, whose theology was formed in dialogue with Idealism, and who viewed 
the history of dogma as a dialectical process.
649
  Nevertheless, this passage clearly shows 
Florovsky‘s concern lest the Church‘s doctrinal history be viewed in a biologistic sense.   
However, neither Baker nor Williams directly address what Florovsky ostensibly 
reacts against in his other mentions of doctrinal development, namely, the idea of ―logical 
development.‖  Logical theories of development were first explicated in the Counter-
Reformation and Baroque eras, and were employed in the works of Luis de Molina 
                                               
648 V13, 141-142.   
649 See Florovsky‘s review of Möhler: ―Kniga Molera o tserkvi [Möhler's Book on the Church],‖ Put' 7 
(April 1927): 128-130.  Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation, 282-293.   
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(1535-1600), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), and John de Lugo (1583-1660), among 
others.  Advocates of logical development in the twentieth century included the 
Dominicans Francisco Marin-Sola (1873-1932) and Marcolinus Maria Tuyaerts (1878-
1948), and the Jesuit Charles Boyer (1884-1980).
650
  Employing a number of distinctions 
such as the ―explicitly‖ versus the ―implicitly‖ revealed, or the ―formally‖ versus the 
―virtually‖ revealed, logical theories implied that Tradition can be said to ―develop‖ only 
inasmuch as the Church comes to name an aspect of revelation through a syllogistic 
process involving already acknowledged premises.  Thus, for instance, the Roman 
Catholic Church could be said to ―conclude‖ the dogma of Mary‘s Immaculate 
Conception from the already acknowledged (revealed) truths that Jesus was without 
Original Sin, and that Original Sin is transferred through generation.
651
   
Florovsky‘s rejection of logical forms of development is the catena linking his 
earlier rejections of dogmatic development in ―The House of the Father‖ (1927), 
―Revelation, Philosophy and Theology‖ (1931), and ―The Work of the Holy Spirit in 
Revelation‖ (1932), with his later rejection in ―Le Corps du Christ vivant‖ (1948).  One 
must recall that Florovsky understood theology as reasoning from the fullness of 
Christian experience, and that this reasoning must always stay rooted in this experience if 
it is to remain a true theology.  I have already pointed out Florovsky‘s approval of 
Soloviev‘s understanding of doctrinal development.  Interestingly, Florovsky also 
                                               
650 These authors‘ major works on doctrinal development are, respectively: M.M. Tuyaerts, O.P., 
L‘Évolution du dogme. Étude théologique (Louvain, 1919); Francisco Marin-Sola, O.P., L‘Evolution 
homogène du dogme chrétien (Fribourg, 1924); and Charles Boyer‘s articles, ―Qu‘est-ce que la théologie? 
Réflexions sur une controverse,‖ Gregorianum XXI (1946), ―Relazione tra il progresso filosofico, 
teologico, dogmatico,‖ Gregorianum 33 (1952): 168-182, and ―Lo sviluppo del dogma,‖ in Problemi e 
orientamenti di teologia dommatica (Milan 1957), 359-380.  The Boyer references are from Nichols, From 
Newman to Congar, 185n9, 12.    
651 For a summary of logical theories of development, see Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman, 21-48, and 
Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation, 135-178.  For a critique of the theory of development employed by these 
latter two authors, see de Lubac, ―The Problem of the Development of Dogma.‖  
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approves of an understanding of doctrinal development he perceives in Khomiakov 
precisely because it preserves the inseparability of theology and experience.  Florovsky 
portrays Khomiakov‘s view of development as forged in the latter‘s debate with his 
fellow Slavophile Iurii (Yuri) Samarin.  Khomiakov criticized Samarin for supporting a 
Hegelian view of ―ecclesiastical-dogmatic development‖ that ―made too sharp a 
distinction between… the Church as the life of the sacraments (and he admitted no 
development of this aspect), and the Church as a school… and for ―erect[ing] a firm 
border between reason and faith.‖652 
On the contrary, Florovsky writes that Khomiakov operates from an ―organic 
point of view‖ that ―predicate[s]… an original wholeness.‖653  More specifically, 
Khomiakov saw the Church as a living organism ―of truth and love‖654: one that affirmed 
the unity of reason and experience.  According to Florovsky, ―the entire uniqueness of 
Khomiakov‘s doctrine on the development of the Church is rooted in [the following] 
statement‖: ―The mystery of life and its inner sources are inaccessible to science and 
belong only to love.‖655  In spite of Khomiakov‘s proneness to exaggeration, this 
statement contains the important truth that the Church‘s theology can never be divorced 
from its experience, or, its life.  In an aphorism that acts as a fitting complement to 
Philaret‘s maxim that ―theology reasons,‖ Florovsky quotes Khomiakov‘s reminder that, 
in the Church, ―teaching lives and life teaches.‖656             
Florovsky considers that those who promote logical development assume that 
theology and experience can be separated.  Thus, he quotes Khomiakov as saying, ―The 
                                               
652 V6, 49-50. 
653 V6, 49. 
654 V6, 53. 
655 V6, 51. 
656 V6, 49.  
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decision of the Church flows out of an inner sense proceeding from God, and not from 
logical argumentation.‖657  He also notes that ―Khomiakov hesitated to acknowledge 
dogmatic terminology as self-sufficient and adequate outside of experience, that is, as a 
demonstrative exposition.‖658  Thus, Florovsky rejects a logical understanding of 
dogmatic development because he sees it as implying that dogmas, once defined, have 
become separable from Christian experience and are accessible to further development by 
reason irrespective of one‘s faith.  Such a view is in contradistinction to both Florovsky‘s 
and Khomiakov‘s view of theology as a necessarily existential and living endeavor.     
Furthermore, Florovsky rejects logical development because he believes it 
imposes a mathematical model of knowledge onto theology.  One might say that such an 
imposition results in the ―pseudomorphosis‖ of a truly Christian theology.  If one is in 
search of a lens through which to view Florovsky‘s rejection of dogmatic development, it 
is his 1924 essay ―On the Substantiation of Logical Relativism.‖659  ―When a geometer,‖ 
Florovsky writes, ―ascribes ‗truthfulness to any theorem… in essence he is asserting only 
that the given proposition flows with logical necessity from the series of preceding ones, 
from axioms and theorems.‖660  In other words, the geometer, or the logician, creates a 
conceptual construct or system based upon laws derived from nature considered in the 
abstract, and all subsequent occurrences of necessity conform to these laws.  ―Dogmas,‖ 
on the other hand, writes Florovsky in ―Le Corps,‖ ―are not theoretical axioms from 
which one can deduce new theorems.  A dogma is precisely a witness, a rational sketch of 
                                               
657 V6, 51. 
658 V6, 52. 
659 V12, 143-169.   
660 V12, 142.   
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a mystery of the faith.‖661  Its formulation is not a conclusion flowing from necessity, but 
is an interpretation ―based on a particular, immediate, living relation to what occurs on 
[the Church‘s] direct understanding of the experience.‖662 
 Florovsky‘s rejection of a logical understanding of doctrinal development is also 
related to his view of the adequacy of dogmatic language.  Again, he emphasized the 
ability of human words to adequately express truth: an ability he believes is rooted in the 
human possession of the imago Dei.  He characterized the dogmas of the Church as 
adequate expressions, or ―witnesses,‖ of certain aspects of the Christian experience of 
revelation.  They are, as it were, termini of the Christian process of reasoning that cannot 
be ―developed‖ into more improved expressions in the future.  Thus, Florovsky rejects 
the possibility that the dogmatic formulas surrounding the Trinity, the hypostatic union, 
or the essence-energies distinction are replaceable, or can yield to greater truths through a 
process of deduction: ―As strange as it may appear, one can indeed say: dogmas arise, 
dogmas are established, but they do not develop.  And once established, a dogma is 
perennial and already an immutable ‗rule of faith‘ ["regula fidei;" ho kanôn tis 
pisteôs].‖663  In other words, Florovsky rejects the idea that there is a process of 
development going on within the defined dogma, or truth of Christian experience, itself.  
 It is likely that Florovsky had in mind modern theories of logical development in 
his rejections of doctrinal development.  Though Newman‘s theory is today considered 
synonymous with doctrinal development, it was not so with the Neo-scholastic, Roman 
Catholic theology of the first half of the twentieth century.  Then it was logical theories 
of development—articulated, in part, against modernist theories of doctrine—that were 
                                               
661 Florovsky, ―Le Corps du Christ vivant,‖ 45-46.   
662 Florovsky, ―Types of Historical Interpretation,‖ 93.  
663 V3, 30.  
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considered as faithfully representing a Catholic understanding of how new doctrines are 
defined.
664
  It was in this climate that Florovsky wrote on doctrinal development, and 
there is some evidence that he knew the works of the above-mentioned advocates of 
logical development.
665
   
My pointing out of Florovsky‘s objections to logical development is intended to 
act as a complement to Baker‘s and Williams‘ argument that Florovsky‘s rejection of 
doctrinal development was a rejection of evolutionary and deterministic historical 
theories.  Indeed, Florovsky‘s reservations about predominantly logical epistemologies 
are intimately connected with his theology of history.  To repeat, the idea that growth in 
theological understanding comes about solely through a syllogistic process implies the 
separation of theology and experience.  For Florovsky, of course, the Church‘s 
experience originates in the historical events of revelation, and is further constituted by 
the Church‘s creative reception of revelation in thought and deed throughout history.  
Theology, according to Florovsky, is conducted ―from the living experience of the 
Church.‖666  In logic, however, ―time stands still,‖ as knowledge comes about through an 
exitus of abstraction from historical events and persons without a corresponding 
                                               
664 Thus, Owen Chadwick referred to Marin-Sola‘s L‘Évolution homogène du dogme chrétien (1924) as 
―the most able, and perhaps the most influential thesis upon the theory of development written during the 
twentieth century‖ (From Bossuet to Newman, 204n2).   
665 I need to thank Matthew Baker for doing some detective work on this issue.  Baker has pointed out to 
me that Florovsky was personally acquainted with Boyer, and that both were at the 1948 Amsterdam 
Assembly.  Also, Florovsky‘s 1948 essay ―Le Corps du Christ vivant‖ illustrates that he was reading Henri 
de Lubac around that time.  Earlier that year, de Lubac had published an essay entitled ―Le problème du 
développement du dogme‖ (Recherches de science religieuse 35 [1948]: 130-160) in which he had 
criticized modern theories of logical development (and specifically that of Boyer) on the basis of 
Newman‘s principles of development.  And, while at Harvard in the early 1960s, Florovsky directed a 
dissertation by John Gunther entitled Papal Views on Authority and Doctrinal Development, in which 
Gunther refers to Marin-Sola and Johann Franzelin.  (Florovsky had pointed Gunther toward Franzelin in 
his corrections of Gunther‘s dissertation abstract.)  Finally, Florovsky‘s 1968 talk, ―The Patterns of 
Historical Interpretation,‖ shows that he knew of Chadwick‘s From Bossuet to Newman, in which the latter 
discusses logical development. 
666 V6, 137. 
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reditus.
667
  A theory of knowledge as a purely logical system means ―the thought 
process… is exclusively ‗substantial,‘ and everything follows modo aeterno, purely 
logically, through immanent movement.  There is no place for acts or heroic ‗feats.‘‖668  
Men and women are subsumed within this system, and thus, their actions are in no way 
constitutive of their knowledge.  Ironically, Florovsky regards logical theories of 
doctrinal development, then, as implying that there is no development in history.
669
 
 But Newman‘s theory is certainly not a theory of logical development in which 
new dogmatic formulations come about through a syllogistic process.  In fact, it is quite 
the opposite, which causes Chadwick to comment: ―For centuries Catholic theologians 
had explained doctrinal development by the use of logical inference.  Yet the Christian 
public now associates the idea of development with a thinker whose suspicion of Dr. 
Hampden or the Reverend Charles Kingsley was as nothing compared with his distrust of 
the syllogism.‖670  Walgrave effectively distinguishes Newman‘s theory of development 
from logical theories, while at the same time explaining the place of logic within it: 
Development of doctrine, then is a continuous organic process of life by which 
the realizing faith of the Church expands itself into intellectual consciousness 
under the guidance of its illative sense, which is itself guided by the all-
penetrating presence of the Holy Spirit… Such a development is to be 
distinguished from an application of logical devices to a set of original 
propositions.  The process uses reason but largely goes beyond it.  There are 
spontaneous processes in it that later will be found to be in accordance with the 
rules of formal logic.  For ‗we think in logic as we talk in prose.‘  But the process 
as a whole cannot be described in terms of verbal logic, and some movements in it 
may seem incongruous for a time but will be corrected afterward.  ‗Nor do those 
enunciations become logical, because theologians afterwards can reduce them to 
                                               
667 V12, 33. 
668 V12, 90. 
669 V12, 33, 87. 
670 Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman, 48. 
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their relations to other doctrines or give them a position in the general system of 
theology.
671
   
 
Newman himself directly distinguishes his theory of the development of doctrine from 
mathematical and logical deduction in the Essay on Development.
672
  However, his 
Grammar of Assent, which many view as a continuation of his theory of doctrinal 
development, is a tour de force against the assumption that the human thought process 
operates in a purely logical manner.  Indeed, on the title page of the Grammar, Newman 
cited a phrase of St. Ambrose: ―Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum 
suum‖—―It is not by logic that it has pleased God to save His people.‖673  In the 
Grammar, Newman elaborates his view of knowledge as a personal and historical 
process in which an interplay between the real and the notional continually takes place.  
This view of knowledge as both personal and historical is a shared first principle between 
Newman and Florovsky.   
In ―Le Corps du Christ vivant,‖ Florovsky endorses the essence of Newman‘s 
theory of development in the same breath in which he condemns logical development:  
The truth is in effect given in its entirety at once.  But the apprehension of the 
truth is progressive.  That which develops in the ages of Christian existence is not 
the truth itself, but the witness of the Church… The witness of the Church 
becomes more explicit with time, or is transmitted in a new vocabulary, but it is 
always a witness of the same reality.
674
 
 
While endorsing such an understanding of development in relation to revelation, 
however, Florovsky rejects ―dogmatic development‖ because he believes ―the term is 
                                               
671 Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation, 307-308.  The quotes that Walgrave references from Newman come 
from GA, 228, and H.M. de Achával, ed., ―An Unpublished Paper by Cardinal Newman on the 
Development of Doctrine,‖ Gregorianum 39 (1958): 593.   
672 See Section II of Chapter 1, ―On the Kinds of Development in Ideas,‖ in Dev., 41-54. 
673 The phrase comes from Ambrose‘s De Fide ad Gratianum Augustum.  For Newman‘s understanding of 
this phrase, and his attitude toward logic, see also G.A., 158-159. 
674 Florovsky, ―Le Corps du Christ vivant,‖ 45.   
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contradictory.‖  The difference between Newman and Florovsky‘s understandings of 
development is thus principally terminological.
675
  
 Ironically, the only form of development Lossky appears to endorse is logical 
development.  Thus, Lossky writes that ―one can speak of dogmatic development only in 
a very limited sense: in formulating a new dogma the Church takes as her point of 
departure already existing dogmas, which constitute a rule of faith that she has in 
common with her adversaries.‖  He then goes on to describe this process: ―Thus, the 
dogma of Chalcedon makes use of that of Nicaea and speaks of the Son consubstantial 
with the Father in His divinity, to say afterwards that He is also consubstantial with us in 
His humanity…‖  Lossky also claims that the dogma of Christ‘s two wills at the Third 
Council of Constantinople (681) logically followed upon Chalcedon‘s determination that 
Christ possessed two natures, and that Palamas‘ essence-energies distinction follows 
upon III Constantinople.
676
  Florovsky would of course agree that past dogmas help frame 
the Church‘s approach to new questions or contexts, but he would maintain that the 
―departure‖ point is always the experience and life of the Church, which is ―mystically 
more primary‖ and ―broader and fuller than definitions.‖677   
 Florovsky‘s insistence on the irreplaceability of dogmatic definitions does not 
constitute sufficient grounds on which to reject Newman‘s theory of doctrinal 
                                               
675 Others who have taken issue with the term ―dogmatic development‖ include Lossky, who describes it as 
―ambiguous‖ (―Tradition and Traditions,‖ 160), and Tillard, who prefers the term ―unfolding‖ to 
―development‖ for reasons in harmony with Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s concerns: ―But ‗development is 
usually associated with the idea of progress, of stepping forward to increase the precision of former steps.  
‗Unfolding‘ means only the spreading out or unfurling of a rich reality that is already fully realized.  
Thanks to this operation it is evident that the knowledge people have of this reality is increased even when 
the reality itself does not necessarily change.  This is why we believe that the idea of unfolding is more in 
harmony with the nature of Christian truth than the idea of development as it is usually defined‖ 
(―Dogmatic Development and Koinonia,‖ 176).   
676 Lossky, ―Tradition and Traditions,‖ 164.   
677 V13, 71, 75. 
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development, but it is a worthy dialogical point.  Newman does not seem to entertain the 
notion that the development of the Christian idea could result in a dogmatic formulation 
eventually being replaced in favor of an improved formulation.  As Lash points out, a 
two-stage process of development emerges from Newman‘s writings: ―The first stage is 
the development from implicit awareness to explicit articulation in a body of doctrine.  
The second stage is the further elaboration and expansion of that body of doctrine.‖678  
Thus, once an aspect of the Christian idea is formulated in an explicit dogmatic 
statement, the only future development Newman sees it undergoing is a deepened 
understanding of it in the minds of men and women.  Indeed, Lash, who advocates for the 
possibility of either altering or sometimes eradicating certain dogmatic formulations, 
accuses Newman of ―betray[ing] an inadequate appreciation of [doctrines‘] historically 
conditioned nature‖ by ―regarding their crystallisation in dogmatic statements as the term 
of a process of ‗metaphysical development.‘‖679  
 One might also point to Newman‘s famed ―seven notes‖ of an authentic 
development in establishing that he did not believe such development could result in the 
replacement of a dogmatic definition.  ―I venture to set down,‖ writes Newman, ―seven 
Notes of varying cogency, independence and applicability, to discriminate healthy 
developments of an idea from its state of corruption and decay.‖680  These ―notes‖ 
constitute criteria by which one may judge historically, though not with certainty, 
whether or not a proposed development is, in fact, a development or a corruption.  The 
―notes‖ are: 1) preservation of type: that a true doctrinal development maintains a 
                                               
678 Lash, Newman on Development, 78.   
679 Ibid.  ―Metaphysical development‖ is the term Newman uses in the Essay on Development to refer to ―a 
mere analysis of the idea contemplated, [which] terminate[s] in its exact and complete delineation‖ (Dev., 
52).  Dogmatic developments thus constitute this type of development.     
680 Dev., 171.   
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recognizable unity with the Christian idea; 2) continuity of principles: that a development 
is consistent with those principles discernible in the Christian idea (such as the 
incarnational principle); 3) power of assimilation: a development demonstrates its truth 
by its ability to be exposed to other ideas without fear of corruption; 4) logical sequence: 
that one can retrospectively discern that a development conforms with the proper rules of 
reason, without holding that the development came about through strict logical 
procedures; 5) anticipation of its future: that one can retrospectively discern earlier 
historical evidence of what was later to be deemed a development; 6) conservative action 
upon its past: that a true development does not reverse, but protects, the course of 
doctrine that proceeded it; and 7) chronic vigour: that a true development will stand the 
test of time, whereas a corruption exhibits a process of decay.
681
  Taken together, these 
―notes‖ seem to point to the conclusion that Newman did not believe the Church could 
overthrow or reverse a previously defined doctrine either in its wording or its meaning. 
But Newman did not provide a positive theological defense of why the dogmatic 
formulation of an aspect of the Christian idea constituted a term in the process of 
development, and what would prevent its replacement in the future.  Plus, his persistent 
stress on the inadequacy of dogmatic language leaves his theory open to the suggestion 
that it allows for such replacements.  Rowan Williams has used Newman‘s stress on the 
                                               
681 On these notes and Newman‘s application of them to the Church‘s doctrinal history, see Dev., 169-445; 
Gerard McCarren, ―Are Newman‘s ‗Tests‘ or ‗Notes‘ of Genuine Doctrinal Development Useful Today?‖ 
Newman Studies Journal 2 (Fall 2004): 48-61.  I should point out that Newman‘s fourth note of ―Logical 
Sequence‖ does not conflict with his position against a logical understanding of doctrinal development.  He 
is here using ―logic‖ in a general sense to refer to ―the organization of thought,‖ or, reasonableness.  As 
applied to a newly formulated dogma or doctrine, Newman would apply the note of logical sequence to 
determine whether or not it conflicted with accepted principles of Christianity.  He does directly address the 
hypothetical question of whether this note implies a logical understanding of development as follows: ―The 
question indeed may be asked whether a development can be other in any case than a logical operation; but, 
if by this is meant a conscious reasoning from premisses to conclusion, of course the answer must be in the 
negative‖ (Dev., 189).    
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inadequacy of dogmatic formulations, and Newman‘s view that these formulations are 
merely the necessary and unfortunate residue of the Church‘s response to heresy, to argue 
for a ―doctrinal ecology‖ in which ―doctrinal definition is [considered]… itself a response 
to narrowing over-definition… and is itself open to potential critique in the name of a 
better sense of doctrinal ecology.‖682        
It is perhaps no coincidence that Williams, who advocates for a doctrinal ecology, 
is an astute commentator on Eastern Orthodox theology.  Indeed, he wrote his 
dissertation on Vladimir Lossky, whose understanding of apophaticism is still 
representative in Orthodox theology today.
683
  Williams and Lossky share a 
predominantly negative attitude toward dogmatic formulation.  Neither Lossky, nor the 
overwhelming majority of Orthodox theologians today, would advocate for the 
replacement of the dogmatic formulations of the past.  Nevertheless, the seeds of a 
doctrinal relativism are present in an exaggerated apophaticism, and even though other 
strengths of Orthodoxy (such as its emphases on Liturgy and asceticism, and its 
commitment to the patristic tradition) may keep these seeds from sprouting into outright 
relativism, they may nevertheless sprout in other ways.  Indeed, I maintain that they have 
sprouted and manifested themselves in a negative attitude toward theology among many 
Orthodox.  
Florovsky‘s emphasis on the ability of human thought to convey divine truth 
constitutes a positive response to such negative attitudes toward dogmatic formulation—
one that does not merely rely on recourse to authority.  He roots this ability in human 
beings‘ creation in the image of God and redemption accomplished in Christ.  
                                               
682 R. Williams, ―Newman‘s Arians,‖ 285.  Williams does admit that his conception of a doctrinal ecology 
involves ―go[ing] well beyond Newman.‖ 
683 R. Williams, ―The Theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky: An Exposition and Critique.‖ 
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Admittedly, Florovsky does not develop this connection between the imago Dei, 
redemption, and human language in his later writings.  However, it certainly underlies his 
persistent defense of the Hellenistic categories in which Christianity was first expressed, 
in addition to his qualification that theologians must be careful about exaggerating the 
economic character of revelation.  
Florovsky‘s estimation of dogmatic language was not purely cataphatic, as he 
acknowledged the apophatic character of theology.  Unlike others, however, Florovsky 
better held in tension the cataphatic and apophatic elements of theology, as he did not use 
the divine ineffability as an excuse for denigrating the cataphatic.  In holding these in 
tension, Florovsky illustrates an incarnational dogmatic theology.  The principle 
operative in the Incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity is that human flesh can be 
made to communicate the divine to men and women.  This same principle is operative in 
Florovsky‘s affirmation that dogma is able to convey the truths of Christian experience.  
Both the over-qualification of human dogmatic formulations in an exaggerated 
apophaticism, and the relativizing of dogmatic formulations under the assumption that 
they are replaceable, ends up denigrating that which is human.   
 In conclusion, Florovsky‘s concern that dogmas be acknowledged as ―eternal and 
inviolable ‗rule[s] of faith‘‖ does not necessitate a rejection of Newman‘s theory of 
doctrinal development.
684
  In fact, it represents a development of an aspect of Newman‘s 
theory that Newman himself did not take into account.  While Newman affirmed that 
dogmatic formulations represented the terms of the process of development, he did not 
consistently emphasize the adequacy of these formulations.  Such an emphasis is a sine 
qua non of the judgment that development has taken place, for such a judgment assumes 
                                               
684 Florovsky, ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 13.    
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a non-relativistic valuation of human language.  It also protects developments that have 
been defined from one day being deemed the opposite, namely, regressions in the 
Church‘s understanding of revelation. 
Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor in describing doctrinal development also 
would not constitute grounds for Florovsky‘s rejection of Newman‘s theory.  As I have 
explained, Florovsky‘s rejection of certain applications of the organic metaphor to history 
was not equivalent to a whole scale rejection of that metaphor.  What he rejected was a 
biologistic conception of creation that viewed history as the pre-determined and 
necessary evolution of creation irrespective of the free choices of persons.  But such is 
not the only application of the organic metaphor to history.  Florovsky‘s writings 
illustrate his consistent recourse to a biblically and patristically-inspired organic view of 
history, namely, history as the completion of the Body of Christ.  He regards this 
completion as a synergetic process that is composed of both divine and human actions.  
Significantly, he includes the work of theology among the human actions that contribute 
to the completion of the Body of Christ, thus assigning an organic character to theology, 
as well.   
 Again, Florovsky understood theology as the application of human reason to the 
Christian experience of revelation—as the gradual disclosure and profession of that 
which the Church possesses in its fullness.
685
  George Williams, seemingly aware of the 
various understandings of the idea of doctrinal development, qualifies Florovsky‘s 
rejection of doctrinal development as follows: ―Insofar as the Church is for him in fact a 
supernatural organism as a congeries of redeemed persons, he obviously acknowledges, 
indeed works continuously with, the idea of development in the sense of renewal, 
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201 
 
clarification, and exfoliation…‖686  As I have shown, Florovsky believed theology‘s 
unfolding of Christian experience manifested itself in organic results such as ―growth‖ in 
the Church‘s understanding of this experience, in addition to ―fruits‖ such as dogmas and 
systems.  These latter fruits spring from both the need for a free human response and 
witness to God‘s revelation, in addition to the human epistemological need for the 
rational elaboration of faith.
687
  Once again, Newman regards doctrinal development as 
the unfolding of the idea of Christianity in the minds and hearts of men and women.  This 
process of unfolding is manifested in, among others things, dogmatic definitions, which 
are then ordered into a system.   
I submit that what Florovsky regards as theology is essentially what Newman 
regards as doctrinal development: it is the unfolding of the Christian idea in the mind of 
the Church.  It is therefore unsurprising that Florovsky commends Soloviev‘s 
understanding of doctrinal development for ―establish[ing] a method for dogmatic 
theology.‖688  I wrote above that Florovsky‘s call for a Neo-patristic synthesis was simply 
a call to return to a proper method of theology—one that did not merely repeat the 
answers of the Fathers, but existentially and rationally appropriated them.  Because 
Florovsky equated theology with doctrinal development, and because he equated a Neo-
patristic synthesis with theology, it is also therefore unsurprising that he equated a Neo-
patristic synthesis with doctrinal development.  He writes,  
This call to ―go back‖ to the Fathers can be easily misunderstood.  It does not 
mean a return to the letter of old patristic documents.  To follow in the steps of 
the Fathers does not mean ―jurare in verba magistri.‖  What is really meant and 
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687 Florovsky, ―Reason and Faith in the Philosophy of Solov‘ëv,‖ 286; V1, 28; ―Work of the Holy Spirit,‖ 
12.    
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202 
 
required is not a blind or servile imitation and repetitions but rather a further 
development of this patristic teaching, but homogeneous and congenial.
689
     
 
Florovsky then goes on to quote Newman in support of this call for a theology that 
creatively appropriates and develops the work of the Fathers: ―As Cardinal Newman said 
on one occasion: ‗The Fathers are our teachers but not our confessors or casuists; they are 
the prophets of great things, not the spiritual directors of individuals.‘‖690  It would be a 
stretch to assign any constructive role to Newman‘s work in Florovsky‘s call for a Neo-
patristic synthesis.  However, Florovsky‘s association here of Neo-patristic synthesis, 
development, and Newman perhaps shows that he viewed Newman‘s theory of 
development as harmonious with that call for a Neo-patristic synthesis that has been so 
influential in modern Orthodoxy.  
Newman‘s principal purpose in using the organic metaphor in the Essay on 
Development was to argue that the growth exhibited by organisms analogously pointed 
toward the Church‘s growth in its understanding of the Christian idea.  Florovsky, as I 
have shown, does not disagree with this basic and essential idea that the Church grows in 
its understanding of the Christian idea, or, revelation.  That said, I believe that 
Florovsky‘s particular organic understanding of Church history has the potential to give a 
greater theological grounding to Newman‘s theory of development.  It would be wrong to 
claim that Newman‘s theory needs ―baptism,‖ since it is already written within the 
Christian tradition, and its object is the doctrinal history of that tradition.  In addition, 
Newman shows a concern with establishing that development is a process illustrated not 
only in nature, but also revelation.    
                                               
689 Florovsky, ―Patristics and Modern Theology,‖ 240.   
690 Ess., 2: 371.  Florovsky also quotes this passage in his 1937 ―Ways of Russian Theology‖ essay (V4, 
191), showing his even earlier connection of Newman and his work with a creative appropriation of the 
Fathers.   
203 
 
Pushing the sacramental analogy, however, one might claim that Newman‘s 
theory could use ―chrismation‖—that is, a further garbing in the theological language of 
the Church.  Newman was a controversialist and an apologist.  His immediate purpose in 
positing the theory of doctrinal development was to argue for the probability of such 
development: that it is reasonable to believe that ―new‖ doctrines would arise as a result 
of the Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation.  The impetus behind this 
purpose was the Protestant charge that certain Roman Catholic doctrines were 
corruptions since there was no definitive evidence of their having been held by the early 
Church.  Having argued for the probability of developments, Newman did not concern 
himself with the full theological implications of his theory.   
Later commentators on Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development have also not 
yet explored many of its theological implications.  Instead, the process of its reception 
has been mainly historical, confined to the attempt to determine whether or not the 
history of Christian doctrine justifies it.  The theological treatment of it has principally 
involved establishing whether or not it expresses an orthodox view of revelation, 
Tradition, and the Spirit‘s guidance of the Church.  This dialogue with Florovsky 
provides an opportunity for doctrinal development to further pass through the sieve of 
Christian Hellenism.   
Florovsky‘s emphasis on askesis offers an important critique of Newman‘s 
organic view of the epistemology of development.  Newman held that the notional 
development of an idea was an inevitable result of the nature of human reason, which 
judges, classifies, and abstracts when confronted with an object.  This development, 
writes Newman, ―is not an effect of wishing and resolving, or of forced enthusiasm, or of 
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any mechanism of reasoning, or of any mere subtlety of intellect; but comes of its own 
innate power of expansion within the mind in its season, though with the use of reflection 
and argument and original thought…‖691  Newman‘s qualification at the end of this 
statement is instructive, for though he assigned a place for human action in the process of 
development, his emphasis was on development as a function of nature rather than will.   
 Florovsky opposed any understanding of history that did not adequately accord a 
role for human action and freedom.  Thus, he would also oppose any understanding of 
theology, or, doctrinal development, that did not incorporate human freedom in the 
Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation.  He accordingly would not regard the 
doctrinal developments of the Church as mere inevitabilities of time and changed 
circumstance.  Nor would he regard them solely as necessities flowing from the nature of 
human reason.  Instead, he would regard them as results of human ascetical activity, as 
well.  
 Such an ascetical understanding of doctrinal development is in continuity with the 
principles of Newman‘s theology.  Though Newman did not have a developed theology 
of personhood (from which Florovsky‘s ascetical emphasis springs), he affirmed the 
ability of human beings to contribute to their salvation through their actions as attested to 
by his recommendation of the practices of prayer, fasting, and watchfulness in his 
Anglican sermons.  Perhaps Newman would have better clarified the role of human 
freedom in a later edition of the Essay on Development if not for his conformity to 
Roman Catholic custom upon his acceptance into its fold.  In Newman‘s understanding, 
the Roman Catholic Church considered ascetical speculations to be the purview of trained 
theologians, which Newman was not.  He therefore confined himself to both preaching 
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and practicing the ascetical disciplines officially recommended by the Church.  By his 
own admission in 1857 Newman said, ―I have not written on dogmatics or asceticism 
since I have been a Catholic, and I suppose never shall—because I gave up private 
judgment when I became one.‖692   
The ascetical corrective provided by Florovsky enables Newman‘s theory of 
doctrinal development to be not only descriptive, but prescriptive.  Doctrinal 
development describes not only the history of the Church thus far, but what that history 
should be.  The prescriptive character of doctrinal development follows from the views 
that such development is consonant with human beings‘ creation in the imago Dei and 
their redemption in Christ.  God‘s revelation is not merely to be passively received and 
preserved by men and women; rather, revelation is given in order they may creatively 
appropriate it through their reason and faith.  This appropriation results not only in 
defined dogmas, but in other creative expressions that make up the life of the Church.  
The theory of doctrinal development is thus a theology of history, and the history of the 
Church is theology.  The ascetic activity of the Church, as exercised in Christian 
rationality, testifies that ―the future is more truly and profoundly revealed when seen as 
an obligation rather than as an expectation and premonition.  The future is not merely 
something exacted or awaited—it is something created.‖693     
                                               
692 L.D., 17: 504.  On Newman‘s understanding of fasting and asceticism as both an Anglican and a 
Catholic, see my articles: ―Newman‘s Theology and Practice of Fasting as an Anglican,‖ Newman Studies 
Journal 5:2 (Fall 2008): 56-68, and ―Newman‘s Silence on Fasting as a Roman Catholic,‖ Newman Studies 
Journal 6:2 (Fall 2009): 38-48. 
693 V6, 308.  It would be interesting to put Florovsky‘s theology of history in dialogue with Ratzinger, who 
maintains that ―The human attitude which corresponds appropriately to the relation of the risen Lord to the 
time of the world is not the working out of a philosophy or theology of history but rather ‗watchfulness‘‖ 
(Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, Dogmatic Theology, vol. 9, 2nd ed. [Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 
1988], 195).  The truth probably lies in a synthesis of these two perspectives.  Frances Young‘s position 
elaborated in her well-known article, ―A Reconsideration of Alexandrian Christology‖ (Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History 22 (1971): 103-114), might perhaps provide a mediatory role.  In this article, she 
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 Florovsky‘s belief that theology is an integral part of the growth of the Church, 
the Body of Christ, also offers potential for the development of Newman‘s theory, as well 
as a critique of certain Orthodox understandings of theology today.  In Florovsky‘s 
assessment, ―Dogmatics and asceticism are organically and inseparably brought together 
in the system of St. Maximus.‖  For Maximus, men‘s and women‘s askesis is ordered 
toward deification.  Florovsky interprets Maximus as holding that knowledge is an 
integral part of men‘s and women‘s deification, and thus, the deification of the Church 
and all creation.  Florovsky writes, ―And knowledge is man‘s reply, man‘s response.  
Cognition of nature as God‘s creation has its own special religious significance.  In 
contemplation the soul is pacified—but contemplation itself is possible through apatheia.  
A new motive is creatively introduced into the harmony of the cosmos.‖694  According to 
both Maximus and Florovsky, then, the priestly and prophetic offices are interrelated: the 
work of theology is part of men‘s and women‘s sanctification of the world.  In Ways, 
Florovsky quoted Archpriest I. Slobodskoi as saying, ―The development of dogmas is 
nothing other than the development of our whole life, of man himself, in the image of 
Christ.‖695  Because Florovsky also regards men and women as microcosms of the 
Church, he holds that, inasmuch as dogmatic development involves the development of 
men and women into the image of Christ, it also describes the development of the life of 
the entire Church.  In other words, he holds that dogmatic development—the Church‘s 
                                                                                                                                            
addresses modern reproaches of the Alexandrian school of theology, which accuse it of not assigning any 
significant salvific role to Christ‘s human nature.  She answers these reproaches by pointing out that the 
Church Fathers regarded human receptivity to the divine as a form of activity.    
694 V9, 222. 
695 V6, 256.  
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growth in the understanding of revelation—is ordered toward, and inseparable from, the 
Church‘s growth as the Body of Christ.696 
 Florovsky saw the separation of dogmatics and asceticism, in addition to their 
conflation, as one of the main indicators of the decline of modern Russian theology.  ―In 
any event,‖ he writes, ―one cannot substitute asceticism for dogmatics, and neither can 
one dissolve dogmatics in asceticism.  Such a temptation is always an indication of a 
theological decline.‖697  Florovsky perceived this temptation in those who rejected the 
idea of doctrinal development.  He cautioned that its rejection was the precursor to, if not 
the indicator of, relativism and the reduction of religion to morality.  What is more, 
informed by the Maximian cosmology, he implies that the rejection of doctrinal 
development introduces a division into the totus Christus inasmuch as it does not give 
any meaningful role to rational activity in the building up of the Body of Christ and the 
deification of the world.
698
 
 In order to be fair to those Orthodox whose rejections of doctrinal development 
have received the most attention in this dissertation—Lossky and Louth—I do not think 
that either of them would directly claim that theology plays no role in one‘s deification.  
                                               
696 It is interesting to note that Florovsky‘s description of the origin of the ―Body of Christ‖ imagery also 
serves as a description of the process of doctrinal development: ―One Body, the excellent analogy so 
emphatically used by St. Paul when describing the mystery of the Christian existence, is the best witness to 
the intimate experience of the early Church.  There is no special theory here.  The analogy is born of a 
living experience.  It grew in the Christian mind from the sacramental experience of Baptism as an 
incorporation, and of the Eucharist as a mystery of community‖ (V13, 81).  Furthermore, this passage 
wonderfully illustrates that the Church‘s sacramental life acts as a ―mode‖ of doctrinal development.  See 
also Florovsky‘s description of Maximus‘ speculation about the motive of the Incarnation: ―The nature of 
the Incarnation, of this union of the Divine majesty with human frailty, is indeed an unfathomable mystery, 
but we can at least grasp the reason and the purpose of this supreme mystery, its logos and skopos.  And 
this original reason, or the ultimate purpose, was, in the opinion of St. Maximus, precisely the Incarnation 
itself and then our own incorporation into the Body of the Incarnate One‖ (V3, 168).   
697 V6, 214.   
698 V13, 72-73: ―Both understanding and acceptance of the tradition is closely connected with the faith and 
the physicality of the immutable beneficial presence of the Lord in the Church… Denial of the significance 
of tradition is in essence a denial of the Church as the Body of Christ, is insensitivity, denigration and 
nonacceptance of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit.‖ 
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Nor do I think they desire that human categories of thought be done away with in favor of 
experience.  Their rejection of doctrinal development appears to be largely a result of 
their lack of familiarity with the theory itself (at least in the case of Lossky), in addition 
to a reaction against Western rationalism.
699
  But ideas have consequences, and the 
negative attitudes toward theology in which their rejections of doctrinal development are 
couched are indicative of anti-intellectualistic tendencies present among some Orthodox 
today.  As Florovsky demonstrates, the proper response to rationalism is not the rejection 
of reason, but the cultivation of Christian rationality.  
I have already pointed out that the mutual interpenetration Newman attributed to 
the relationship between real and notional knowledge offers the potential to posit a closer 
link between doctrinal development and the spiritual growth of the Church (assuming the 
difference for now).  Though Newman maintained that doctrinal development was of the 
notional realm, he also maintained that the notional affects the real.  In the Grammar of 
Assent, he limited his discussion to the purifying effect that the notional has on the real.  
That is, he regarded the notional work of theology as preventing religion from falling into 
the errors of superstition and devotional excess.  However, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the notional could have more than a preventative role to serve in its relation with religion.  
Religion, as represented by the real, aims at the growth in its members‘ relationship with 
God.  This growth is expressed by Roman Catholics and Orthodox alike as a growth in 
                                               
699 Louth is clearly well-versed in Newman‘s theology, and thus, the theory of doctrinal development.  In 
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relationship between faith and reason, and thus, his understanding of theology.  Therefore, his more recent, 
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to John Behr‘s Formation of Christian Theology series: ―Orthodox theologians ought to have more 
problems with [the idea of the development of doctrine], a fruity of Romanticism, popularized by Cardinal 
Newman, than they often seem to‖ [Behr, The Formation of Christian Theology, vol. 1, The Way to Nicaea 
(Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 2001), xii.] are puzzling, to say the least.  
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the participation in God, or, deification.  If the notional continually helps maintain the 
integrity of religion, and if religion is ordered toward participation in God, it follows that 
the notional work of theology has a contributive role to play in deification.  
However, the idea that doctrinal development is connected with the spiritual 
growth of the Church is in more direct harmony with the principles of Newman‘s 
theology.  Newman‘s reading of the Eastern Fathers led him to characterize the goal of 
the Christian life as deification.  Though now an opponent of Newman‘s theory of 
development, Andrew Louth argues that deification was the central theme of Newman‘s 
1838 Lectures on Justification.
700
  As too was the case with the Fathers, Newman‘s path 
to his emphasis on deification was through Christology.  C. Stephen Dessain, in his essay 
on ―Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition,‖ expresses the connection between 
deification and the Christological dogmas well: ―One of the reasons why the Greek 
Fathers of the fourth century defended so firmly the divinity of Christ and the divinity of 
the Holy Spirit, was the connection of these truths with the divinization, the deification of 
the Christian.‖701    
 Benjamin King shows that Newman‘s Christology did not remain stagnant during 
his Anglican years, but underwent considerable development.  Certainly, as King argues, 
Newman‘s study of the early Church‘s Christological controversies and the struggle for 
appropriate theological language provided him with a model of the doctrinal development 
that is ever taking place in the Church.  Yet, it is also likely that Newman‘s Christological 
reflections contributed to his formulation of the theory of doctrinal development.  More 
                                               
700 King, 130. 
701 Dessain, ―Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition,‖ 95.  On the connection between the 
Christological dogmatic definitions and the deification of the Christian, see also Norman Russell, The 
Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  On 
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specifically, Christ‘s deification of human nature, and subsequently all creation, acts as a 
pattern for the development of doctrine.  Newman held that the entire life of Christ 
constituted the progressive deification of human nature.
702
  As especially instanced in Lk 
2:52—―and Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and favor before God and men‖—
Newman held that this process included the deification of the human intellect.  What is 
more, Newman affirmed that Christ would accomplish within each of us the progressive 
deification he accomplished through his Incarnation, life, death, and resurrection: ―Christ 
Himself vouchsafes to repeat in each of us in figure and mystery all that He did and 
suffered in the flesh.‖703  Our progressive deification, modeled after Christ‘s deification 
of human nature, also includes the deification of our intellect.  King notes that ―Newman 
followed Origen in making the resurrected Christ his intellectual pattern of life.‖704   
There is an interesting, and perhaps unmistakable, parallel when one considers 
Newman‘s understanding of revelation and deification in the light of development.  
Newman asserts that revelation has been given in its fullness, but one can grow in his or 
her understanding of it over the course of time.  So also, Newman holds that deification 
(or justification) has been achieved in its fullness through the salvific actions of Christ, 
but the individual Christian can grow in his or her participation in God:  
The fact that we are the temple of God does not admit of more or less; such words 
have no meaning when applied to it… But when we compare the various orders of 
just and acceptable beings with one another, we see that though they all are in 
God's favour, some may be more ‗pleasant,‘ ‗acceptable,‘ ‗righteous,‘ than others, 
and may have more of the light of God's countenance shed on them; as a glorified 
Saint is more acceptable than one still in the flesh.
705
  
 
                                               
702 P.S., 2: 32.  
703 P.S., 5: 139.   
704 King, 148.   
705 Jfc., 151-152.   
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 The Orthodox theologian George Dragas also sees this connection between 
Newman‘s principle of development and the deification of the Christian: 
Newman developed catholically and believed in catholic development.  He was 
concerned with human development in God‘s grace, rather than the development 
of abstract forms… [M]ankind is given in the pentecostal gift the ability to 
participate in [the resurrection] and taste its powers so that it may transform the 
old history and proceed through death to the pleroma of the resurrection.  
Christians are catholics in via, in development and growth.  They seek to integrate 
themselves with the whole world, because they know that all belongs to Him who 
makes, redeems from sin and gives the gift of eternal and blessed life.  Christians 
know that He is constantly coming to make them whole in His wholeness and 
integrate the world with catholicity.  This is what Newman has bequeathed to the 
modern Roman Church and through her to all the Christian churches 
everywhere—the catholic truth of the Risen Lord with all its implications for 
Christian life and growth in history.
706
 
 
Dragas here interprets Newman‘s work as affirming the truth that men and women are 
microcosms—that the development that happens within Christian men and women helps 
bring about the transformation of the world.  The deification of the Christian, which 
includes the deification of the intellect, also serves as a microcosm of the progressive 
deification of the Church.  As Newman writes, ―[T]he heart of every Christian ought to 
represent in miniature the Catholic Church, since one Spirit makes both the whole Church 
and every member of it to be His Temple.‖707  A number of commentators on Newman 
have observed that he believed doctrinal development to represent not only a 
development of the minds of individual Christians, but also a development of the ―mind 
of the Church.‖  Because Newman regarded the development of the mind as part of the 
process of deification, and because he held that doctrinal development represented a 
development in the mind of the entire Church, it follows that a correlation between 
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Fathers Today,‖ Greek Orthodox Theological Review 25 (1980): 281-282.   
707 S.D., 132. 
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doctrinal development and the deification of the Church is consistent with the principles 
of Newman‘s theology.  
 Framing Newman‘s theory of doctrinal development in terms of the Church‘s 
growth as the Body of Christ perhaps provides a solution to the query about whether or 
not doctrinal development corresponds to the growth of the Church in holiness.  Newman 
scholars have struggled with this question, and have more often than not rejected the link, 
because they seem to be operating with a predominantly voluntaristic notion of holiness.  
One would search in vain for historical proof that the Church has cumulatively developed 
in such holiness.  But holiness belongs to the Church primarily as a result of its status as 
the Body of Christ which is permeated by the Holy Spirit.  It is primarily an ontological, 
rather than a moral, characteristic.  Florovsky rightly maintains that ―[h]oliness comes 
from the Holy One, i.e. only from God. To be holy for a man means to share the Divine 
Life.  Holiness is available to individuals only in the community, or rather in the 
‗fellowship of the Holy Spirit.‘‖708  As one of Newman‘s sermon titles puts it, 
―Righteousness [is] not of us, but in us.‖709  Certainly the actions of the members of the 
Church contribute to the building up of the Body of Christ, but the Divine Actor is also at 
work in ways that cannot be measured.  Because knowledge is intrinsic to deification, one 
can safely affirm that doctrinal development contributes to the Church‘s growth in 
holiness, even if such growth is often imperceptible.  Such an affirmation is theological, 
if not always empirical.       
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It is interesting to note that Dessain, who has written on the Eastern character of 
Newman‘s theology, sees a parallel between Newman and Florovsky precisely in regard 
to their Christocentric conceptions of the Church: 
Newman held to what he had learned from the Fathers, in spite of the 
predominant opinion of the theologians and those in high places at the time.  It is 
only when Newman‘s view of the Church as a communion and not merely an 
institution is recognized, as it has been in Lumen Gentium, the Decree on the 
Church at the Second Vatican Council, that the way is properly prepared for the 
complete reunion of East and West.  Newman‘s teaching and that of one of the 
most authoritative of the modern exponents of Orthodox ecclesiology, Father 
George Florovsky, seem to be in entire agreement in this matter.  Khomiakoff and 
the doctrine of Sobornost treat the Church only as a communion and base 
ecclesiology too exclusively on the Holy Spirit, just as at times the Latins have 
based it too exclusively on Christ and the authority he conferred.  Surely the 
genuine and traditional ecclesiology is that in which Newman and Florovsky 
agree, which tries to be faithful to the actual plan of salvation, in which the work 
of the Holy Spirit in forming the Church derives from the work of Christ.  He 
gives the Spirit, and our life in him results from the gift of the Spirit.
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Dessain‘s statement about the identity between Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s ecclesiology 
certainly needs qualification, and his estimations about the ecumenical potential of 
communion ecclesiology are perhaps a bit grandiose.  However, contained within his 
statement is also a truth, namely, that Newman and Florovsky both viewed the Church as 
one because it is the Body of Christ indwelt by the Holy Spirit.  The Church is also one in 
its eschatological goal, namely, its participation in the divine nature.  All the activity of 
the Church—including its theological activity—if it is meaningful, is ordered toward the 
accomplishment of this goal.   
I mentioned earlier in this chapter that Florovsky could only accept the idea of 
doctrinal development if it displayed the characteristics of a truly Orthodox 
understanding of Tradition: if it was Christological, ecclesiological, and eschatological.  
As I have shown, these characteristics are indeed implicit in Newman‘s understanding of 
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doctrinal development.  He simply did not have the wherewithal, or opportunity, to make 
them explicit during his lifetime.  In Unfolding Revelation, Walgrave provides a 
taxonomy of theories of doctrinal development in the Church‘s history, categorizing them 
as either ―logical,‖ ―transformistic,‖ or ―theological.‖  He designates Newman‘s theory as 
a ―theological theory of development.‖711  It is my hope that further dialogue with 
Florovsky and Eastern Orthodox theology will help Newman‘s theory to realize this 
designation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: NEWMAN AND FLOROVSKY ON THE ROLE OF 
AUTHORITY IN DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Inevitably, it seems that all roads of ecumenical investigation lead in some way to 
that ―greatest obstacle‖ to ecumenical reunion: the papacy.  It is no different with an 
Orthodox-Catholic dialogue on the concept of doctrinal development.  I have thus far 
argued that Newman and Florovsky share many similar emphases in their respective 
understandings of revelation and Tradition, and thus, that the understanding of revelation 
and Tradition operative in Newman‘s theory of development is harmonious with the 
Orthodox understanding of the same.  Furthermore, I have shown that Florovsky accepted 
the idea of doctrinal development, and that his objections to it were not directed toward 
the principles of Newman‘s theory. 
 However, there remains the question of whether or not Newman‘s theory of 
development is inextricably bound to a particular, Roman Catholic conception of 
authority embodied in the papacy.  In the Essay on Development, Newman maintains that 
admission of the principle of doctrinal development leads to the further admission that 
―an infallible developing authority [is] to be expected.‖  As one might expect, Newman‘s 
description of the characteristics belonging to this infallible authority resemble those the 
Roman Catholic Church locates in the pope and the Magisterium.  Shortly after the 
publication of the Essay, Anglican critics such as James Mozley and Frederick Maurice 
saw Newman‘s understanding of authority as central to his idea of doctrinal development.  
Mozley went so far as to write, ―The doctrine of the Papal Infallibility comes out as the 
216 
 
keystone of Mr. Newman‘s whole argument, and according as he proves, or fails to 
prove, that doctrine, that argument stands or falls.‖712   
 The Orthodox theologian Andrew Louth also makes this charge in his 
aforementioned essay, ―Is Development of Doctrine a Valid Category for Orthodox 
Theology?‖  He holds that Newman‘s theory of development ―involves at least three 
specific senses, or connotations or entailments‖ that dovetail with each other.  These 
three ―senses‖ are as follows: one, Newman‘s use of the organic metaphor to claim that 
the Church actually grows, or develops, in its understanding of revelation; two, that the 
occurrence of these developments is unpredictable; and three, that the unpredictability of 
these developments requires a clearly-recognized infallible authority who has the power 
to judge what constitutes a development and what does not.
713
    
 Louth‘s charge on this third point—that Newman‘s theory requires an infallible 
authority—is worth quoting in full, for it provides a fitting summary of the issue at the 
heart of this chapter: 
Newman‘s idea of development entails an infallible teaching office to adjudicate.  
Here Newman abandons his reliance on the organic model.  For him, there needs 
to be some definite way of distinguishing authentic development from corruption.  
Newman is no longer prepared to stick to his organic metaphor, and makes it clear 
that recognition of authentic development ultimately needs an unquestioned and 
unquestionable authority, such as developed in the teaching office of the see of St 
Peter (though there is a certain circularity in the argument here, as the 
development of the teaching office of the pope is an example of development). 
 
These three specific points are linked.  The organic idea opens up the notion of 
development, taking it beyond mere logical development; this is emphasized in 
the second point, which makes a great deal (particularly in the examples Newman 
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gives from church history) of the way in which these developments could hardly 
have been predicted; which opens the way for Newman‘s final point, that an 
infallible teaching authority is necessary to distinguish authentic development 
from corruption.  It is important to realize that this final point is essential for 
Newman.  Discussions of development, often forgetting that this was where his 
argument was leading, simply recount the various tests he gave for distinguishing 
authentic development from corruption—Preservation of Type or Idea, Continuity 
of Principles, Power of Assimilation, Early Anticipation, Logical Sequence, 
Preservative Additions, and Chronic Continuance (to use the terminology of the 
first edition of the Essay).  But these tests need to be applied, and Newman was 
not prepared to leave their application to scholars and theologians.
714
   
 
 Louth‘s charge is significant for a couple of reasons.  For one, Louth is an astute 
scholar of Newman.  In an earlier work he wrote while still an Anglican—Discerning the 
Mystery—he even celebrated Newman for his ―stress on performance, doing, act, [as] 
central to the understanding of the notion of faith.‖715  This stress, as I pointed out in 
Chapter Two, is central to Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understanding of doctrinal 
development.  Thus, one cannot so easily chalk up Louth‘s perception of a necessary link 
between doctrinal development and the particular Roman Catholic understanding of 
authority to a failure to thoroughly engage with the works of Newman, as is perhaps the 
case with other Orthodox authors.  Louth has rightly recognized that ―To understand 
Newman we must read lots, not just the great books, but sermons, essays, letters, and so 
on.‖716   
 Two, Louth‘s charge goes beyond a mere hermeneutics of suspicion that 
condemns doctrinal development because of guilt by association with the nineteenth-
century ultramontane climate of the Roman Catholic Church from which it emerged.  
Undoubtedly that association is in the back of Louth‘s mind, as is perhaps his knowledge 
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that Soloviev‘s essay on dogmatic development was part of his larger volume—The 
History and Future of Theocracy—which attempted to justify a Christian theocracy with 
the pope as its head and center.  Nevertheless, Louth confines himself to arguing that the 
Roman Catholic understanding of the papacy is intrinsic to Newman‘s understanding of 
doctrinal development; that a centralized, infallible authority who can label some 
formulations of the Christian idea developments, and others perversions, is necessary if 
the theory of doctrinal development is to exist as anything more than a theory. 
 Florovsky clearly did not see such a necessary link between doctrinal 
development and the Roman Catholic understanding of authority.  He notes the 
connection in Ways, but it does not dissuade him from perceiving doctrinal development 
as ―a method for dogmatic theology‖ that affirmed human persons‘ ascetical vocation to 
witness to revelation in thought and life.
717
  But, as I will show, Florovsky recognizes that 
the issue of authority is indeed intrinsic to the idea of doctrinal development.  At the 
same time, he does not accept the Roman Catholic understanding of authority.  Therefore, 
an examination of Florovsky on the relation between doctrinal development and authority 
provides an interesting counter to both Newman and Louth. 
 Much has been written on Newman and his views of authority and the papacy, 
necessitating that I establish some parameters for my discussion in this chapter.  I will 
mostly deal with Newman‘s views on infallibility.  More specifically, I will explain why 
Newman believed an infallible authority was necessary to pronounce upon developments 
of doctrine.  In the first two chapters I attempted to clarify the theological principles 
present in Newman‘s understanding of revelation and Tradition that relate to doctrinal 
development.  I will do the same in this chapter on Newman‘s understanding of authority.  
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Accordingly, I will show that the role Newman assigns to authority in the process of 
development conforms to his view of Christianity as an incarnational, historical, and 
living reality that retains a place for both divine and human activity.  In so doing, I hope 
to offer a perspective on Newman‘s understanding of authority that differs from previous 
historical surveys of his view of infallibility.
718
  
 As I will demonstrate, Florovsky also shows a concern that his understanding of 
authority conform to the Christocentric, or Chalcedonian, hermeneutic.  He affirms that 
the hierarchy has a visible, concrete role in the process of doctrinal development.  Yet he 
parts ways with Newman in holding that doctrinal developments require no further 
―enfleshment‖ through formal guarantees of their truth provided by authorities invested 
with infallibility.  Instead, Florovsky holds that the very life intrinsic to the process of 
doctrinal development constitutes the only such guarantee of the truth of developments 
for each Christian person.  In the Dialogue portion of this chapter, I will evaluate 
Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s views of authority and doctrinal development by the same 
Christological litmus test to which they subject themselves. 
 
3.1: NEWMAN ON DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AND AUTHORITY 
A. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEED FOR AN INFALLIBLE AUTHORITY 
 Newman maintained that all the members of the Church participate in the process 
of doctrinal development. But he also maintained that there must be an authority that 
assists them in distinguishing true developments from false ones.  Thus, Chapter 2, 
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Section 2 of his Essay on Development is entitled ―An Infallible Developing Authority to 
be Expected.‖  Newman‘s language in this section is primarily apologetic, concerned 
with arguing that a divinely-bestowed authority is a consequence of a divinely-given 
revelation.  Like the idea of doctrinal development, Newman‘s argument for the need of 
such an authority temporarily served in the Essay as a ―hypothesis… required by the facts 
of the case, and reconciling them with each other.‖719  However, Newman‘s theological 
convictions undergird his apologetics.  In the paragraphs below, I will try to further 
clarify the theological themes that lead Newman to expect such an authority. 
 I established in Chapter One of this dissertation that Newman‘s theory of 
doctrinal development followed from his particular understanding of the mode and 
character of revelation.  So also, Newman believes the need for an authority in the 
process of development follows from the mode and character of revelation.  He writes, 
―…[S]ome authority there must be if there is a revelation given, and other authority there 
is none but she.  A revelation is not given, if there be no authority to decide what it is that 
is given.‖720 
 According to Newman, if developments of doctrine are to be expected, so is an 
authority that can guarantee that they are, in fact, developments.  The admittance of 
doctrinal developments, he writes, leads to ―the next question… What are they?‖  In order 
to answer this question, Newman holds that ―some rule is necessary for arranging and 
authenticating these various expressions and results of Christian doctrine.‖  This rule, 
which he identifies with authority, is to have a dual function: one, it will serve to 
discriminate true from false developments; two, it will serve to discriminate the greater 
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from the less, since ―no one will maintain that all points of belief are of equal 
importance.‖  In summary, Newman writes, ―If the developments… are to take place to 
any great extent, and without them it is difficult to see how Christianity can exist at all… 
surely an authority is necessary to impart decision to what is vague, and confidence to 
what is empirical, to ratify the successive steps of so elaborate a process, and to secure 
the validity of inferences which are to be made the premisses of more remote 
investigations.‖721 
 Newman not only holds that there must there be an authority to ―ratify‖ 
developments of doctrine, but also that this authority must be infallible.  He defines 
infallibility as ―the power of deciding whether this, that, and a third, and any number of 
theological or ethical statements are true.‖722  By an infallible authority, Newman writes, 
―we mean no more than that what he says is always true, always to be believed, always to 
be done.‖723  According to Newman, the infallible character of the authority is a corollary 
of the infallible character of revelation.  Just as revelation comes with ―a profession of 
infallibility‖—inasmuch as it comes from the divinely-infallible authority of God—so 
also it is probable that God would provide His Church with an infallible authority to 
guarantee the truth of those doctrines that Newman deemed ―commensurate with 
revelation.‖724 
 As is still the case today, the idea of infallibility was misunderstood and much-
maligned during Newman‘s time.  In response, he further explicated the notion of 
infallibility by clarifying what it was not, thereby illustrating some of the limits of 
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infallibility.  For instance, he distinguished the gift of infallibility from the inspiration 
enjoyed by the biblical authors.  Newman characterized inspiration as ―positive,‖ for it 
refers to the fact ―that the Divine Inspirer… acted, not immediately on the books 
themselves, but through the men who wrote them.‖725  He characterized infallibility, on 
the other hand, as ―negative,‖ for it merely guarantees that the ―out come‖ (the definition) 
of the process of doctrinal development was a true representation of revelation.  ―[A] 
definition,‖ he writes, ―may be absolute truth, though the grounds suggested for it in the 
definition, the texts, the patristic authorities, the historical passages, are all mistakes.‖726  
Moreover, Avery Dulles points out that Newman did not consider infallibility to be ―a 
distinct charism or infused gift…‖727  Whereas inspiration was such a charism or gift, 
enabling the inspired authors to faithfully communicate divine revelation in cooperation 
with God‘s guiding hand, infallibility does not dwell within any of the Church‘s 
members; it is an occasional, external assistance. 
 Newman also distinguished infallibility from certitude, since these two concepts 
were often confused in religious controversy.  ―A certitude,‖ according to Newman, ―is 
directed to this or that particular proposition; it is not a faculty or gift, but a disposition of 
mind relatively to a definite case which is before me.‖  It is an act of the mind that has 
arrived at a state of ―peacefulness,‖ or, ―of security and of repose‖ in its assent toward the 
truth of a proposition.  Newman explains that this state of certitude follows a process of 
reasoning, in which a person has investigated the truth of a proposition through real and 
notional means.  He famously referred to each person‘s process of reasoning as the 
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―Illative Sense,‖ and held that it is the responsibility of each man and woman to cultivate 
this process so that it reaches true certitudes.
728
 
 Newman sees an analogy between certitude and conscience in men and women, 
the former being the act of the ―intellectual sanction‖ and the latter being the act of the 
―moral sanction.‖  Whereas one‘s mind arrives at certitude after engaging in 
―examination and proof‖ about the truth of a particular proposition, one‘s conscience 
arrives at a judgment of right conduct after examining what ―hic et nunc is to be done as 
being good, or to be avoided as evil.‖729  According to Newman, ―[Conscience] is the 
loud announcement of the principle of right in the details of conduct, as the sense of 
certitude is the clear witness of what is true.‖730  He admits that the judgments of both 
certitude and conscience may be based on faulty reasoning.  Nevertheless, Newman holds 
that one is bound to follow them as the supreme authorities in the realm of the particular. 
 ―Infallibility, on the contrary, is just that which certitude is not; it is a faculty or 
gift, and relates, not to some one truth in particular, but to all possible propositions in a 
given subject-matter,‖ writes Newman.731  Whereas certitude is particular and directed to 
definite propositions, infallibility is general and encompasses numerous propositions—
past, present, and future.  Newman reasons that if persons are infallible, it means that 
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whatever they pronounce on propositions within a given sphere—assuming certain 
formal procedures are followed—will fall under the rubric of infallibility: ―An infallible 
authority is certain in every particular case that may arise; but a man who is certain in 
some one definite case, is not on that account infallible.‖732  According to Newman‘s 
logic, if God has graced His Church with such an infallible authority, individual members 
of the Church may have certitude about the truth of all propositions within the sphere of 
dogma that the Church has proclaimed and will proclaim. 
 I have above generally sketched out why Newman believed that divine revelation 
and doctrinal development required an infallible authority.  He saw that the particular 
mode and character of revelation required doctrinal development, but that not all of the 
members of the Church can be certain about which developments are true representations 
of revelation, nor can they be certain about the hierarchy of authentic developments.  
Therefore, an authority is needed who can infallibly guarantee the truth of doctrinal 
developments and their place within the larger system of Christian truth.  But Newman‘s 
argument raises questions: whence the need for such a guarantee?  Why is it important 
that the members of the Church have certitude about doctrinal developments?  And why 
is it necessary that an infallible authority supply this certitude through ratifying doctrinal 
developments?  
 Some commentators on Newman‘s thought characterize the longing for certitude 
as a phenomenon peculiar to post-Reformation history.  In ―St. Augustine and the 
Modern World,‖ Erich Przywara describes the pathos of Western thought since the 
Reformation as a ―terrified longing for assurance‖: from Descartes‘ belief that men and 
women can achieve subjective certitude in ―clear and distinct ideas,‖ to Hegel‘s 
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pantheistic identification of human thought with divine thought, to Kierkegaard‘s 
abandonment of the search for certitude in favor of a fearful resignation to God in His 
absolute transcendence.
733
  More recently, in Papal Infallibility: A Protestant Evaluation 
of an Ecumenical Issue, Mark Powell has proposed that the Roman Catholic definition of 
papal infallibility at Vatican I ―represents the culmination of the desire for religious 
epistemic certainty that has characterized the West at least since the Reformation.‖734     
 Newman, however, understands men‘s and women‘s desire for certitude as a 
function of human nature.  He writes, ―It is the law of my mind to seal up the conclusions 
to which ratiocination has brought me, by that formal assent which I have called 
certitude.‖735  He locates the activities of reason and conscience in the order of nature 
(not grace), and claims that reason is ordered toward a guarantee of the truth of its 
assents, just as conscience is ordered toward the rightness of its judgments.
736
  Faith, 
which for Newman is a function of reason, especially requires this certitude, since it is an 
assent to the truth of the Object whose existence grounds the existence of all other 
objects.  ―The human mind wishes to be rid of doubt in religion,‖ writes Newman.  
Indeed, a doubting faith is really an oxymoron for Newman.
737
  He understood the 
epistemological seal provided by certitude to be a condition of action, both in knowledge 
and in life.  What he writes of notional knowledge may be appropriately applied to 
certitude: without it ―we should for ever pace round one small circle of knowledge…‖ in 
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a state of skeptism.
738
  Skepticism does not admit the possibility of certitude, and is thus, 
for Newman, the enemy of action.
739
  
 Newman believes that men and women are capable of reaching authentic certitude 
through their reason.  However, he also believes that this ability has been considerably 
compromised by sin, which makes fitting the assistance of an infallible authority.  ―The 
initial doctrine of the infallible teacher must be an emphatic protest against the existing 
state of mankind,‖ writes Newman.  He furthermore describes an infallible authority as 
that ―suitable antagonist‖ that God has provided to combat ―the intensity of the evil 
which has possession of mankind.‖740 
 Newman characterizes the particular evil of the human intellect as ―rationalism,‖ 
and holds that it is this ―giant evil‖ that an infallible authority in the Church was 
appointed to ―master.‖741  His working definition of rationalism is at the same time both 
broad and nuanced.  He understands rationalism as the subjugation of truth to the 
standards of human reason, so as to even circumscribe the Source of Truth by human 
axioms and categories of thought.  The one who subjugates all truth to human standards 
has an inability to admit mystery, which Newman regarded as a necessary attitude when 
the object of one‘s thought is God and His revelation.742  In Newman‘s understanding, the 
Christian who makes reason his ultimate standard fails to reason from his ―real 
apprehension‖ of Christ and revelation, i.e., from the experience of the Church.  Newman 
thus regards rationalism as a hermeneutical sin.   
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 Because Newman lived in the Age of Reason, one could argue that he felt the 
effects of rationalism on the Church more so than past ages, which led him to offer an 
apology for an infallible authority to combat it.  Such is Mark Powell‘s aforementioned 
contention.  Newman himself admits that ―the absolute need of a spiritual supremacy is at 
present the strongest of arguments in favour of the fact of its supply.‖743   
 But Newman viewed the entirety of Christian history as a battle against 
rationalism, and the heretic as embodying a rationalist temper.  His broad definition of 
rationalism acts as an effective counter against those who might dismiss this view of 
history as merely Newman‘s creative projection of post-Enlightenment rationalism onto 
the past.  Stephen Thomas points out that, ―In The Arians of the Fourth Century, for the 
first time, there appears clearly enunciated, the analogy between heresy and the forces of 
Newman‘s own time which he regarded as enemies of Church and Christianity.‖  With 
the Fathers, Newman ―identifies rationalism as the intellectual origin of Arianism,‖ and 
takes up their charge that Aristotle was the ―bishop‖ of the Arians.744  The rationalism of 
the Arians was most famously evidenced in their contention that, according to logical 
principles, a Son could in no way be co-eternal with a Father: that ―there was a time when 
[the Son] was not.‖  Newman also writes of the Arians that ―they did not admit into their 
theology the notion of mystery.‖745  
 The rationalism of the Arians serves for Newman as a type of other heresies that 
the Church has been forced to combat.  Benjamin King gleans from Newman‘s 
unpublished paper on the Apollinarian heresy that Apollinarius opposed Arianism ―with 
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sophistry of his own, ignoring the Rule of Faith as much as any nineteenth-century 
rationalist.‖746  In the Essay on Development, Newman writes of the Nestorian heresy that 
―Its spirit was rationalizing, and had the qualities which go with rationalism.‖747  
Similarly, the Monophysites displayed ―an allowance of abstract reasoning, in other 
words, that is, maintenance of intellectually conceived first principles in a matter which 
was purely of faith.‖748 Of the Eusebians Newman writes, ―In this at least, throughout 
their changes, [they] are consistent—in their hatred of the Sacred Mystery.‖749   
 Newman portrays Protestants, too, as rationalists.  I have already described his 
charge, elaborated in Tract 73—―On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into 
Revealed Religion‖—that Protestants such as Richard Whately and Thomas Erskine 
arbitrarily made ethics the standard by which to judge the truth of doctrines (Chapter 
One, 27-28).  Newman also saw the Protestant principle of sola scriptura as an example 
of rationalism, for it attempted to logically deduce doctrine from Scripture, thus using 
Scripture for a purpose for which it was not intended.
750
  
 In a footnote of his essay ―Newman and the Modern World,‖ Christopher Dawson 
wrote that the last chapter of the Apologia ―is essential to the understanding of Newman‘s 
doctrine of development and of his philosophy of history.‖751  The philosophy of history 
that emerges from this chapter of the Apologia is one in which Christ has provided his 
Church with an infallible authority that has repeatedly had to stem the tide of rationalism 
in the Church‘s pursuit of knowledge and holiness.  ―What have been [this authority‘s] 
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great works?‖ Newman asks.  ―All of them in the distinct province of theology:—to put 
down Arianism, Eutychianism, Pelagianism, Manichaeism, Lutheranism, Jansenism.  
Such is the broad result of its action in the past…‖752  An infallible authority within the 
Church, according to Newman, is ―a supply for a need.‖ Newman primarily emphasizes 
that this need is the result of original sin and the darkening of the human intellect.   
 However, Newman also seemed to regard an infallible authority as ―a supply for a 
need‖ rooted in human finitude.753  His attitude toward historical investigations of 
developments of doctrine serves as evidence of this position.  He was an advocate for 
such investigations; after all, they constitute the bulk of his Essay on Development. But at 
the same time, Newman cautioned readers that they should not ―expect from History 
more than History can furnish.‖754  He did not believe that historical investigation was the 
normative path to doctrinal certitude for most men and women.  Such investigation into 
the historical veracity of doctrines may guide them in their search for certitude, but are 
more often than not the ―instruments rather than warrants of right decisions,‖ and better 
serve ―as answers to objections brought against the actual decisions of authority, than are 
proofs of the correctness of those decisions.‖755   
 Furthermore, Newman believed that the historicity of human persons told against 
their reaching unanimity in their historical investigations:  
 Considering that Christians, from the nature of the case, live under the bias of the 
 doctrines, and  in the very midst of the facts, and during the process of the 
 controversies, which are to be the subject of criticism, since they are exposed to 
 the prejudices of birth, education, place, personal attachment, engagements, and  
 party, it can hardly be maintained that in matter of fact a true development carries 
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 with it always its own certainty even to the learned, or that history, past or 
 present, is secure from the possibility of a variety of interpretations.
756
 
 
Thus, according to Newman, recognition of the role played by hermeneutics in 
knowledge should lead one to acknowledge the need for an authority.  Rationality, even 
Christian rationality, is subject to the first principles of its human purveyors.  Not all of 
these first principles have their source in revelation; some are the products of each 
individual Christian‘s circumstance.  Even those first principles that claim revelation as 
their source are differently interpreted by those men and women in whom they dwell, as 
the history of Christianity illustrates. 
 The hermeneutical issue is further exacerbated by the Catholic Church‘s universal 
call.  ―[I]ts very badge,‖ writes Newman, ―[is] to be ever making converts all over the 
earth, whereas other religions are more or less variable in their teaching, tolerant of each 
other, and local, and professedly local, in their habitat and character.‖757  But the Church 
encounters a difficulty when it attempts to fulfill this call, as its efforts to ―baptize the 
nations‖ and unite them with the Body of Christ include negotiating the barriers of 
language and culture.  According to Newman, only an infallible authority can act as an 
arbiter between the various interpretations that result from the different hermeneutical 
influences on the members of the Church. 
 The lack of such an authority to mediate these hermeneutical differences indicates 
a void within an ecclesial community.  Newman writes, ―If Christianity is both social and 
dogmatic, and intended for all ages, it must humanly speaking have an expounder.  Else 
you will secure unity of form at the loss of unity of doctrine, or unity of doctrine at the 
loss of unity of form; you will have to choose between a comprehension of opinions and 
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a resolution into parties, between latitudinarian and sectarian error.‖758  Unfortunately, 
this statement is typically used only as a punctuation mark to treatments of Newman‘s 
understanding of authority and infallibility, rather than being subjected to interpretation.  
The stark either-or Newman here offers appears to be based upon his belief that only a 
personal, infallible authority can act as a ―center of unity‖ who secures both form and 
doctrine, and maintains a unified tension between them.  Von Balthasar has rightly said 
that ―Authority per se is never in question…. An established authority is only attacked 
with troops that are in the service of some other authority.‖759  Without a personal center 
of unity, a religion must exalt something else into a place of authority: either form or 
doctrine.  And whatever is exalted ultimately suffers from the weight of its new crown.  
Thus, Newman writes that ―By the Church of England a hollow uniformity is preferred to 
an infallible chair; and by the sects of England an interminable division.‖  According to 
Newman, the Anglican Church chose form over doctrine: it retained certain external 
characteristics such as its liturgy, its Prayer Book, and Apostolic succession, but these 
externals did not prevent Anglicanism from lapsing into the divisions that have plagued 
Protestantism since its inception.  Protestantism, on the other hand, chose to secure unity 
of doctrine over form.  However, Protestantism accomplished this unity in doctrine 
through reducing both the number and sources of doctrine.  As a result, in Newman‘s 
estimate, ―Germany and Geneva began with persecution, and have ended in 
scepticism.‖760    
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 Christianity‘s character as a system, combined with the limits of the human 
intellect, also impressed upon Newman the need for an infallible authority.  ―A religion,‖ 
writes Newman, ―is not a proposition, but a system,‖ and a system represents a number of 
propositions that imply ―various kinds of assents.‖  Assuming that the human intellect 
desires certitude about truths, especially religious truths, and that certitude is usually 
gained by investigation, how can a Christian possibly achieve certitude about the infinite 
number of propositions implicit within the Christian system?   
 Newman‘s answer is that certitude about these individual propositions is included 
in a Christian‘s certitude that ―the Church is the infallible oracle of truth,‖ which is why 
Newman refers to the Church‘s infallibility as ―the fundamental dogma of the Catholic 
religion.‖761  Newman claims that the statement ―‗I believe what the Church proposes to 
be believed‘ is an act of real assent, including all particular assents, notional and 
real…‖762  On the other hand, he reasons, one doubts a defined dogma of the Church 
never gave his or her certitude to the infallibility of the Church, and thus, never had faith 
in the Catholic Church, for ―to deny one [dogma] is to deny all.‖763  (Granted, Newman is 
here speaking about the infallibility of the Church rather than an infallible authority 
within the Church. But, as I will show in the next section, Newman held that an infallible 
authority manifests the infallibility of the entire Church.)   
 Even if the propositions in the Christian system were few in number, the very act 
of abstraction involved in formulating propositions presents difficulties in achieving 
certitude.  Newman acknowledges that the mind‘s attempts to make notionally explicit 
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what it really and implicitly knows is a strained and tenuous process.
764
  He concedes that 
some of the erroneous opinions found in the Fathers were merely the results of 
deficiencies in language.
765
  If the formulator has difficulties being certain about whether 
or not his or her notions correspond to his or her own faith, one can imagine that the 
difficulties are even more pronounced for those who attempt to reach this certitude 
secondhand by recreating the reasonings of another.  These ―dangers of abstraction,‖ as 
Walgrave refers to them, must therefore be supplemented by an infallible authority who 
can ratify them.
766
  
 As an astute interpreter of Newman, Walgrave recognizes that the perennial issue 
of nature versus grace is central to Newman‘s position that an authority who can ratify 
doctrinal developments in the Church is necessary.  He interprets Newman as follows: 
 The Spirit which guides the Church is active, in varying degrees, both in the 
 community of the faithful and in all orthodox theology, but not in such a way that 
 the collaboration of these two can be a sufficient guarantee of lasting unity of 
 faith in the entire Church alongside the fertile and varied expansion of tradition.  
 Here, as in other spheres, the grace of God acts in a secret and unobtrusive 
 manner.  It may foster in a few souls a supernatural force and purity, together with 
 an almost infallible clearsightedness into the faith, but the rest of men remain far 
 below that level.  In spite of the persistent working of grace, human nature is ever 
 hostile to supernatural light.  Just as healing grace cannot at once remedy the evil 
 tendencies of the heart, so the illuminating grace of faith does not suddenly 
 remove the intellectual prejudices and bias of the ordinary man or the 
 theologian.  Consequently, the natural course of historical development, however 
 purified and led by grace, is not the means God chose for keeping tradition 
 unchanged as it developed.
767
    
 
Walgrave interprets Newman as holding that the human intellect desires certitude in all 
its reasonings, but such certitude is not intrinsic to human nature.  Walgrave here 
emphasizes that ―human nature is ever hostile to supernatural light‖; in other words, that 
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sin prevents even the redeemed men and women who comprise the Church from 
achieving certitude without divine provision. 
 However, it seems that Newman may have believed that this divine provision was 
necessary irrespective of original sin.  One does not find in Newman much speculation 
about the character of prelapsarian human rationality.
768
  If infallibility was only a 
―supply for a need‖ of fallen men and women, one might think that Newman would 
clarify that they could achieve certitude about truth through internal means before the 
Fall.  He indeed admits that ―certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test, 
sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude,‖ and lamented that his inability to 
provide such a test was the chief weakness of his Grammar.
769
  But he stopped short of 
claiming that this lack of an interior test was solely a consequence of sin. 
 Newman seemed to subscribe to the view that the Incarnation would have taken 
place even if there had been no original sin (see pg. 22).  Behind this view is the 
understanding that men and women were not born in a state of perfection, but needed to 
grow into the likeness of God.  The Incarnation was ultimately necessary for men and 
women to achieve this likeness through their participation in the divine life.  The original 
sin and its effects perhaps impressed upon men and women the need for redemption, but 
it was not necessarily the efficient cause of the Incarnation.   
 Similarly, sin impresses upon men and women the need for an authority who can 
confirm truth, but sin was not necessarily the cause of God providing such an authority.  
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Men and women are finite beings who were not created with perfect intellects.  Their 
intellects cannot perceive things as wholes, but must break them into parts and aspects in 
order to grow in knowledge of them.  Also, their intellects are subject to the vicissitudes 
of time and circumstance, which condition their knowledge and make difficult the task of 
arriving at unanimity, in spite of the unity of their nature and, for those in the Church, 
their unity in Christ.  These features of finitude persist even among the redeemed 
members of the Church.  Though human nature has been redeemed, and the healing of its 
imago has been accomplished, men and women must struggle to grow further in the 
likeness of God.  Their intellects share in this process of transformation, and certitude is 
an essential element of this process. 
 Thus, God, in His Divine Providence, has provided His Church with the gift of an 
infallible authority so that its members may be one in both mind and heart.  Indeed, the 
character of Divine Providence is the starting point for Newman‘s argument for the 
likelihood of an infallible authority in the Essay on Development.  Inasmuch as 
developments of divine revelation ―were of course contemplated and taken into account 
by its Author,‖ so also, reasons Newman, must ―the Divine Scheme‖ secure these 
developments ―from perversion and corruption.‖770  In this providential act of securing 
the Church‘s doctrinal developments, God aids the members of the Church in stretching 
toward that certitude that they desire by nature, but which they achieve by grace.  The 
grace of authority thus builds upon and elevates the nature of the human intellect.   
 I wish to once again return to Przywara‘s essay ―St. Augustine and the Modern 
World.‖  At the end of the essay, Przywara attempts to portray Newman as ―Augustinus 
redivivus‖ inasmuch as Newman, like Augustine, also accounted for the place of both 
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interiority and exteriority in knowledge.  According to Przywara, Newman‘s theory of 
real and notional apprehension overcame both the subjectivity of Descartes and Hegel, 
and the ―tragic agnosticism‖ of Kierkegaard and Pascal.  But Przywara does not take into 
account the fact that Newman was sympathetic to the ―terrified longing for assurance‖ of 
Western thought since the Reformation; indeed, Newman viewed this longing as a natural 
desire.  Moreover, Newman overcomes Descartes and Hegel, Kierkegaard and Pascal, not 
through his theory of the interdependence between real and notional apprehension, but 
through his recognition that reason is right in longing for assurance, or certitude, while at 
the same time knowing that it is not ultimately capable of sating that longing.  For that, 
one needs a divinely-appointed infallible authority.  The longing for assurance only 
becomes ―terrified‖ when one throws off this authority, as did the Reformers.771 
 I also wish to again refer to Mark Powell‘s Papal Infallibility. Powell proposes 
that Newman‘s emphasis on certitude and the need for an infallible authority, though 
moderate, is indicative of ―a strong epistemic conception of the Christian faith and 
ecclesial canons.‖ He relies on William Abraham‘s thesis that dogmas (or doctrinal 
developments) ―properly belong in the field of soteriology, not epistemology,‖ as they are 
―primarily means of grace that lead one to salvation.‖  Abraham maintains that dogmas 
are not intended to serve as epistemological norms from which we derive or defend truth 
claims; rather, they are intended to ―bring about the salvation and transformation of 
individuals and communities.‖772   
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 However, Powell‘s and Abraham‘s distinction between soteriology and 
epistemology represents a dichotomy incongruous with Newman‘s thought.  As I argued 
in Chapter Two, Newman had a holistic view of the human person, and viewed 
knowledge of the faith as intimately connected with salvation.  For Newman, certitude 
and an infallible authority are not merely stopgaps in response to rationalism and 
theological liberalism but, to use Powell‘s words, are also ―means of grace that lead one 
to salvation.‖     
 
B. THE INCARNATIONAL CHARACTER OF AUTHORITY 
 Having established Newman‘s belief that the Church requires an authority who 
can provide certitude about doctrinal developments, I now turn to Newman‘s 
understanding of the locus of this authority.  In Chapters One and Two, I argued that the 
incarnational character of Newman‘s theology manifested itself in his portrayals of both 
revelation and doctrinal development as personal, free, living, and historical realit ies.  
These same characteristics mark his descriptions of an infallible authority and its role in 
the Church.
773
  Newman portrayed this infallible authority as a personal, concrete 
guarantor of freedom and activity in the Church, and an emblem of a living and historical 
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religion.  He implies that this infallible authority gives further concreteness to doctrinal 
developments through authoritative ratification of them.   
 Newman‘s tendency as both an Anglican and a Catholic was to emphasize the 
infallibility of the entire Church.  He affirmed that the Church‘s infallibility derives from 
its identity as the Body of Christ indwelt by the Spirit, and that Christ and the Spirit are 
the true sources of the Church‘s infallible authority.774  The ―mind of the Church,‖ or the 
consensus fidelium, is made up of all those members who actively participate in the life 
of these true authorities through their life in the Church.  Through their participation in 
the divine life, the members of the Church come to a fuller understanding of the truths of 
revelation, and the objects of faith increasingly become as ―objects of sight.‖775  As I 
discussed in Chapter Two, all these members have an active role in the process of 
doctrinal development. 
 But Newman also came to recognize that the infallibility of the entire Church 
needed representation in the form of a visible, personal, and living authority.  The Church 
as a whole is infallible, but its infallibility needs concrete manifestation in accordance 
with the incarnational character of Christianity.  For the reasons outlined in the previous 
section, Newman maintained that each individual person cannot serve as his or her own 
authority.  Christ and the Spirit are indeed the ultimate authorities in the Church, but they 
are invisible.
776
  In his Anglican sermon ―Submission to Church Authority,‖ Newman 
defends the idea that the invisible authority of Christ and the Spirit is visibly represented 
in particular persons within the Church.  ―God distributes numberless benefits to all 
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men,‖ writes Newman, ―but He does so through a few select instruments.‖777  Newman‘s 
defense proceeds from the principle of mediation that God abides by in His dealings with 
the world.  It also proceeds from his Christocentric ecclesiology, which regards ―the 
Church now‖ as ―what His material Body was when [Christ] was visible on earth.‖778  
This Body is made up of various parts, some of which have the particular responsibility 
of ―channel[ing] out to the many‖ the authority of Christ and the Spirit.779  
 Newman regards the Magisterium, comprised of the pope and bishops, as the 
―few select instruments‖ on whom Christ bestows, or by whom he communicates, his 
authority both in and to the Church.  Their particular and definite role in the process of 
doctrinal development is the act of occasionally proclaiming an official definition of a 
development, or less officially, discerning between true and false developments.  
Newman uses a variety of terms in different writings to convey this function that is 
particular to the Magisterium in the process of doctrinal development.  In using these 
terms, he also qualifies the roles played by the other members of the Body of Christ in 
this process.  What is more, he understands that the members of the Magisterium 
participate in these roles, as well, while not denying their specific power of defining.      
 In ―Consulting the Faithful,‖ Newman employs the traditional distinction between 
the ecclesia docens and the ecclesia discens in order to clarify the role of defining 
specific to the bishops.  Writes Newman, ―… the gift of discerning, discriminating, 
defining, promulgating, and enforcing any portion of that tradition [of the Apostles, 
committed to the whole Church] resides solely in the Ecclesia docens,‖ which is made up 
of the bishops.  In an important letter of 1875 to Isy Froude (daughter of William 
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Froude), Newman refers to this same ―gift‖ as the ―active infallibility‖ of the Church, as 
opposed to the ―passive infallibility‖ of the faithful.780  Lastly, in his Preface to the third 
edition of the Via Media, Newman describes the Church according to the pattern of 
Christ‘s threefold office as priest, prophet, and king.  He implicitly locates the power of 
defining and approving doctrinal developments in the ―Regal function (or office) of the 
Church‖ when he notes that its ―special centre of action‖ is ―the Papacy and its Curia.‖781 
 As Dulles points out, Newman‘s use of the adjective ―passive‖ to describe the 
infallibility of the faithful is misleading, for they are anything but passive in the process 
of doctrinal development.
782
  In the Apologia, Newman writes that a definition of a 
development is but a pronouncement on ―a decision, which has already been arrived at by 
reason.‖783  The activity of the faithful continues in the aftermath of a definition through 
the process that has come to be popularly known as ―reception.‖  Many largely credit 
Yves Congar with giving the idea of reception greater prominence in modern theology.  
But, as Dulles writes, ―In many respects Newman‘s doctrine concerning reception as a 
criterion for the valid exercise of the infallible teaching office, and as a principle for the 
interpretation of hierarchical teaching, anticipates the insights of contemporary 
theologians such as Yves Congar.‖784   
 In the Preface to the Via Media, Newman designates the process of reception that 
takes place before and after a definition as a function of the Prophetic, or Teaching, 
Office of the Church, whose ―special centre of action‖ is the ―schola Theologorum.‖  
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Indeed, one of the most remarkable and laudatory aspects of the Preface is that Newman 
does not conflate the ruling and teaching offices of the Church, which was characteristic 
of the ultramontanes of his own time.
785
  This resistance to conflating the two was also 
evidenced in ―Consulting the Faithful,‖ where Newman describes the process by which a 
definition comes about as a ―pastorum ac fidelium conspiratio‖—a ―symphony of the 
pastors and the faithful.‖  Samuel Femiano describes Newman as holding that ―The 
bishops, by their particular title, were the judges of the faith, but by no means the 
guardians in an absolute sense.‖786  Newman‘s principal purpose in distinguishing 
between the active infallibility of the bishops and the passive infallibility of all the 
faithful was not to diminish the theological role of the latter, but to specify the defining 
role of the former.  In the act of defining doctrinal developments, the bishops incarnate 
the infallibility of the entire Church. 
 According to Newman, the Magisterium‘s exercise of their ―active infallibility‖ 
plays an important role in that it provides an aid to the faithful in attaining certitude about 
the truth of doctrinal developments.  Newman holds that the infallible guarantee attached 
to the bishops‘ act of defining serves as a ―form‖ or a ―rule‖ in relation to the ―matter‖ or 
revelation, giving further concreteness to revelation by ―arranging and authenticating 
these various expressions and results of Christian doctrine.‖787  Its enactment of Christ‘s 
promise to preserve his Church from error ―secures the object, while it gives definiteness 
and force to the matter, of the Revelation.‖788  While Newman remains open to the 
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environs in which this active infallibility is exercised, he consistently held that its 
―normal seat‖ was ―the Pope in Ecumenical Council.‖789  
 In guaranteeing the truth of doctrinal developments through their exercise of 
active infallibility, Newman also emphasizes that the Magisterium preserves and 
promotes the life of doctrine in the Church.  In Chapter Two, I pointed out that Newman 
saw the Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation as a function of its organic 
identity as the Body of Christ.  But he understood that some pruning is necessary if one is 
to preserve and promote the growth of a living thing.  In his Letter to Pusey Newman 
writes,  
 Life in this world is motion, and involves a continual process of change.  Living 
 things grow into their perfection, into their decline, into their death. No rule of art 
 will suffice to stop the operation of this natural law, whether in the material world 
 or in the human mind.  We can indeed encounter disorders, when they occur, by 
 external antagonism and remedies; but we cannot eradicate the process itself, out 
 of which they arise.  Life has the same right to decay, as it has to wax strong.  
 This is specially the case with great ideas.‖790   
 
Contrary to those who perceived an emphasis upon forms as indicative of a static faith, 
Newman wrote that they ―are the very food of faith.‖791  He deems formal authority in 
particular as ―the animating principle of a large scheme of doctrine.‖792  In Walgrave‘s 
estimate of Newman, it is ―the fundamental principle controlling the growth of the life of 
the faith,‖ which ―has to intervene to restrain rationalistic trends which are a constant 
danger to the faith, the tares which are always mixed with the wheat in the fields of 
God.‖793 
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 Newman also holds that this authority who protects the life of doctrine within the 
Church must be living: ―A living, present authority, himself or another, is [a man‘s] 
immediate guide in matters of a personal, social, or political character.‖794  Once again, 
Newman sees the demand for a ―living, present authority‖ as dictated by needs 
proceeding from both human sinfulness and finitude.  He maintains that only a living 
authority has the power to ―make a stand against the wild living intellect of man,‖ and not 
―the dead letter of a treatise or a code.‖795  ―Heart speaks to heart,‖ and thus, Newman 
considers a living authority to be ―the immediate motive in the mind of a Catholic for his 
reception of doctrines.‖796  Newman wrote that he did not wish to be converted by a 
―smart syllogism.‖  One could also safely claim that Newman did not wish his living faith 
to be sustained by a non-living principle.  He had witnessed in Protestantism and 
Anglicanism ―the ineffectiveness of those norms of authority substituted by other 
religions for the infallible living authority.‖797  For Newman, only the living Magisterium 
of the Roman Catholic Church serves as a sufficient fulfillment of men‘s and women‘s 
need for a living authority.     
 Some may claim that the pruning performed by an authority is stifling, and 
threatens not only the life, but the freedom of the members of the Church.  ―It will at first 
sight be said,‖ supposes Newman, ―that the restless intellect of our common humanity is 
utterly weighed down, to the repression of all independent effort and action 
whatever…‖798  In response, Newman points out that ―infallibility does not interfere with 
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moral probation; the two notions are absolutely distinct.‖799  Newman here means to 
point out that there is a difference between the infallibility that attends divine revelation 
and its commensurate doctrines, and the human reception of these realities.  A doctrine 
may be infallibly defined, but men and women are still free to interpret it, to inquire into 
it, to doubt it.  Therefore, the infallibility of the Magisterium as exercised in the 
ratification of a doctrinal development presents no initial, ostensible threat to freedom.   
 On the contrary, Newman considers it a first principle that the Magisterium‘s 
infallible authority is the very champion and guarantor of freedom.  He insists that the 
human intellect, the instrument of theology, must be given room to breathe.  But given 
that it ―tends to rationalism,‖ it is only free if it does not remain unbridled in its 
reasonings.
800
  Just as it is no sign of a free conscience to ―dispense with conscience,‖ so 
it is no sign of a free intellect to abandon itself to its ―suicidal excesses‖ by dispensing 
with authority.  According to Newman, ―[An infallible authority‘s] object is, and its 
effect also, not to enfeeble the freedom or vigour of human thought in religious 
speculation, but to resist and control its extravagance.‖  Given both human finitude and 
original sin, Newman considers submission to authority necessary for the askesis of the 
human reason: ―The energy of the human intellect ‗does from opposition grow;‘ it thrives 
and is joyous, with a tough elastic strength, under the terrible blow of the divinely-
fashioned weapon, and is never so much itself as when it has lately been overthrown.‖801  
In Newman‘s view, Magisterial authority is therefore ordered toward perfecting the 
reason of the Church‘s members, and thus, both preserves and promotes their free 
activity.  
                                               
799 Dev., 83.   
800 V.M., 1: xli. 
801 Apo., 220, 225, 226. 
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 Newman further specifies the nature of the Magisterium‘s infallibility by 
qualifying what it is not.  Dulles accurately characterizes Newman‘s understanding of the 
Ecclesia docens‘ power of defining when he writes, ―[Newman] viewed it not as a 
distinct charism or infused gift, but as a set of providential dispositions by which God 
brings about a determinate effect: the preservation of the truth of revelation in the 
Church‘s definitive teaching.‖802  According to Newman, the bishops comprising the 
Magisterium do not possess a special ability to tap into the mind of the Church by virtue 
of their ordination.  They have not been granted ―the gift of impeccability,‖ nor have they 
been given ―an inward gift of infallibility [i.e., inspiration]…such as the Apostles had.‖803  
Rather, they freely operate from their own knowledge informed by their faith in 
discerning true and false developments, and their discernment (like the discernment of 
the sensus fidelium) is bound by the Rule of Faith as held in the mind of the Church.   
 Indeed, Newman even hypothesizes in ―Consulting the Faithful‖ that ―there was a 
temporary suspense of the functions of the ‗Ecclesia docens‘‖ at certain times in history, 
such as during the Arian crisis following the Council of Nicaea, when ―the body of 
Bishops failed in the confession of faith… [and] spoke variously, one against another…‖  
Newman qualifies, ―I am not denying that the great body of the Bishops were in their 
internal belief orthodox.‖804  What he does deny, however, is that the Ecclesia docens 
actively exercised their proper function of concretely proclaiming true doctrine during the 
Arian crisis.  
                                               
802 Dulles, ―Newman on Infallibility,‖ 441.   
803 V.M., 1: xliii; Diff., 2: 328.   
804 Cons., 213, 214.  Newman responded to objections about this point in an appendix to the 1876 edition of 
Arians, in which he wrote, ―On that occasion I was writing simply historically, not doctrinally, and while it 
is historically true, it is in no sense doctrinally false, that a Pope, as a private doctor, and much more 
Bishops, when not teaching formally, may err, as we find they did err in the fourth century‖ (Ari., 464).  
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 Newman thus refers to the Magisterium‘s power to guarantee the truth of 
doctrinal developments as an ―external guardianship,‖ and of their authority as an 
―external authority.‖805  Lash rightly points out that, by ―external,‖ Newman ―clearly 
means ‗external‘ to the mind of the individual believer,‖ and not external to the Church.  
Lash interprets Newman‘s use of the term ―external authority‖ in the Essay on 
Development to refer to ―Episcopal Tradition‖—Newman‘s term in the Via Media for 
those creedal teachings considered necessary to the individual believer‘s faith.  Lash 
maintains that this interpretation is borne out by Newman‘s Letter to Perrone, and 
Newman‘s occasional identification of the term ―external‖ with ―objective.‖806  Contrary 
to Lash, however, Perrone appears to support the idea that the ―external authority‖ is the 
Spirit, ―in whom,‖ Newman writes, ―[the Church] is infallible.‖807  According to 
Newman, the authority of the Magisterium is thus an instrumental authority.  The bishops 
are the ―organs‖ of the Spirit, who ―carry into effect the promise made by Christ to the 
Church‖ in their pronouncements on doctrinal developments.808  Through their 
pronouncements, they incarnate the infallibility of the entire Church, and also make 
developments of doctrine concrete by guaranteeing their truth. 
 
C. THE INCARNATIONAL CHARACTER OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY 
 To repeat, Newman principally emphasized the infallibility of the entire Church 
and the role of the entire Magisterium in ratifying doctrinal developments through 
definition.  But, as is well known, Newman also assented to the dogma of papal 
                                               
805 Diff., 2: 328; Dev., 86.   
806 Lash, Newman on Development, 128-132.  
807 ―Newman-Perrone,‖ 420. 
808 Diff., 1: 218; Walgrave, Newman the Theologian, 194-195.   
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infallibility defined at Vatican I, which stated that the pope, when he speaks ex cathedra, 
can infallibly define dogmas that are irreformable ―ex sese, non ex autem consensu 
ecclesiae.‖809  Much literature has been devoted to qualifying that Newman‘s assent to 
the definition of papal infallibility was not without its difficulties.  He was critical of the 
ultramontane spirit that had called for the definition, he did not think the definition 
necessary, and he was concerned about the possible scandal it would create among the 
faithful.  
 But, in Newman‘s own words, ―Ten thousand difficulties do not make one 
doubt,‖ and he believed that his faith in the infallibility of the Church demanded 
acceptance of the definition of papal infallibility if such a definition did emerge from the 
council.
810
  Moreover, Newman wrote, ―For myself, ever since I was a Catholic, I have 
held the Pope's infallibility as a matter of theological opinion.‖811  Plus, in spite of his 
previous reservations, once papal infallibility was officially defined, Newman expressed 
relief at its moderation, aware that Pope Pius IX had wanted a much wider power than 
that allowed by the definition.
812
  
 Newman accepted papal infallibility as an authentic development of doctrine 
because he believed that it was a true fulfillment of Scripture testified to by the Tradition 
of the Church.  But what is more, I believe that papal infallibility accords with Newman‘s 
incarnational principle.  As J. Derek Holmes argues, ―[Newman‘s] assent to papal 
infallibility as a Catholic was simply a logical development of his former Anglican 
                                               
809 Pastor Aeternus 4.   
810 Apo., 214; G.A., 131.    
811 Diff., 2: 304.  J. Derek Holmes writes that ―On another occasion, [Newman] pointed out that he had even 
been accused of tacitly accepting papal infallibility in his article on [Jean-Marie de] Lammenais written in 
1837‖ (―Cardinal Newman and the First Vatican Council,‖ Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum 1 [1969]: 
383).  Newman‘s article on Lammenais is entitled ―The Fall of de la Mennais‖ and is found in Ess., 1: 138-
178.   
812 L.D., 25: 330, 447. 
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position when he accepted the infallibility of the undivided Church.‖813  Assuredly, 
Newman devoted more attention to providing a vigorous, positive defense of papal 
primacy (or ―supremacy,‖ as he called it) than papal infallibility, for his context largely 
dictated that his time was best spent nuancing the latter.  However, he located both papal 
primacy and the power to define within the ruling office of the Church, and I argue that 
his defense of the pope‘s primacy in relation to the other bishops also serves as a defense 
for the pope‘s primacy within the active infallibility of the Magisterium.  Indeed, 
Newman says as much in a footnote in the 1878 edition of the Essay on Development, 
within the section entitled ―An Infallible Developing Authority to be Expected‖: ―Seven 
years ago, it is scarcely necessary to say, the Vatican Council determined that the Pope, 
ex cathedra, has the same infallibility as the Church.  This does not affect the argument in 
the text.‖814 
 In arguing the above, I am admittedly going beyond what Newman directly 
maintained around the time of the council.  At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted 
Louth as pointing to ―a certain circularity‖ in Newman‘s argument that acceptance of 
doctrinal development entailed acceptance of ―an unquestioned and unquestionable 
authority, such as developed in the teaching office of the see of St. Peter.‖  The 
circularity, according to Louth, is that ―the development of the teaching office of the pope 
is an example of development.‖815  To call Newman‘s argument circular is unfair, since 
Newman did not see acceptance of doctrinal development as hinging upon acceptance of 
the pope‘s infallible authority.  But it is ironic that Newman‘s theory was now being 
―used against [him]‖ at the council to defend a definition to which he was resistant.  One 
                                               
813 Holmes, ―Cardinal Newman and the First Vatican Council,‖ 376.   
814 Dev., 87n3.  
815 Louth, ―Is Development of Doctrine a Valid Category?‖ 51.  
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of the attendees of Vatican I, Bishop Moriarty, wrote to Newman, ―Strange to say, if ever 
this definition comes you will have contributed much towards it.  Your treatise on 
development has given the key.‖  In his response to Moriarty, Newman writes, ―… nor do 
I think with your friend that infallibility follows on Supremacy.‖816  I will attempt to 
argue, however, that papal infallibility does indeed follow from the first principles that 
are at the root of Newman‘s assent to papal supremacy (primacy).   
 Newman held that papal primacy is consistent with what he refers to as the 
―antecedent probability of a monarchical principle in the Divine Scheme.‖817  According 
to Newman, the nature of the Church and its mission requires there to be a monarchical 
ruler who can preserve its unity.  As an Anglican he interpreted the New Testament, and 
Old Testament prophecies, to mean that Christ intended to found his Church as a 
kingdom, and a visible kingdom at that, and for the rest of his life he maintained what 
Paul Misner has referred to as a ―kingdom-ecclesiology.‖818  In Newman‘s 
understanding, a visible kingdom involves ―a political influence‖ and ―a complex 
organization….819  He writes, ―A kingdom is an organized body… It is as unmeaning to 
speak of an invisible kingdom on earth, as of invisible chariots and horsemen, invisible 
swords and spears, invisible palaces: to be a kingdom at all it must be visible, if the word 
has any true meaning.‖820   Moreover, Newman interpreted Christ‘s mandate to ―baptize 
all nations‖ as implying that the Church was to be not only a kingdom, but an ―imperial 
power‖ having universal jurisdiction.  ―By an imperial state, or an empire,‖ writes 
                                               
816 LD 25:57-58; quoted in Page, 95-96.  
817 Dev., 154.   
818 Paul Misner, Papacy and Development, 54.  Writes Misner, ―Though the imperial image of the church 
yields pride of place to other aspects in Newman‘s later Catholic writings, it remains a factor in his 
ecclesiology, the more disconcerting because it is presupposed rather than defended‖ (57).     
819 P.S., 2: 245; S.D., 234.   
820 S.D., 220.    
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Newman, ―is meant a power which has wide extent over the earth, and that beyond its 
limits,‖ and which has ―extended dominion, and that not only over its immediate subjects, 
but over the kings of other kingdoms…‖821  
 Newman reasons that if the Church is truly a kingdom and an empire, then it must 
be ruled over by a monarch: ―If the whole of Christendom is to form one Kingdom, one 
head is essential.‖822  In his sermon ―The Christian Church an Imperial Power,‖ he asserts 
that the ultimate kingship over the Church belongs to Christ: ―[Christ] truly is the only 
One, properly speaking, who sits on the throne of the kingdom; He is the sole Ruler in 
His empire…‖  But Newman qualifies that Christ is the invisible king of his Church, and 
affirming that Christ intended his Church to be a visible kingdom and society requires 
one to affirm the existence of a visible king, namely, the pope.  As with all authorities on 
earth, the pope‘s rule is ―given from above‖ (Jn 19:11).  He is a representative of Christ; 
a ―regent‖ or ―viceroy‖ whose rule ultimately derives from, and is sustained by, Christ.823   
 According to Newman, it is only the visible kingship of the pope that can preserve 
the unity of the visible kingdom of the Church: ―We know of no other way of preserving 
the Sacramentum Unitatis, but a centre of unity… It must be so; no Church can do 
without its Pope.‖824  Misner believes that Newman‘s reference to the sacramentum 
unitatis is a reference not to the Eucharist, but to ―one very particular theology of church 
unity, that of St. Cyprian and of his Anglican upholders.‖  According to Misner, ―it was 
                                               
821 S.D., 228, 234.  
822 Dev., 154.   
823 S.D., 220-221, 226; Diff., 2: 223.   
824 Dev., 154-155.  Newman then goes on to show that separated Christians who rejected the pope‘s 
authority very soon thereafter set up a substitute authority: ―The Nestorians have had their ‗Catholicus;‘ the 
Lutherans of Prussia have their general superintendent; even the Independents, I believe, have had an 
overseer in their Missions.  The Anglican Church affords an observable illustration of this doctrine.  As her 
prospects have opened and her communion extended, the See of Canterbury has become the natural centre 
of her operations‖ (155).     
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Cyprian who came closest to the episcopal theory of church unity, he who pleaded 
passionately for unity while at the same time rejecting the pretensions of the pope to be 
its special protector, and it was he who used the phrase sacramentum unitatis.‖825   
 There is not much textual evidence to support Misner‘s position that Newman‘s 
theology of the papacy involved an ongoing battle against a perceived abuse of Cyprian‘s 
ecclesiology, though Newman does note that ―St Cyprian is claimed by Protestants as 
denying the Pope‘s Supremacy…‖826  However, Misner is surely right that Newman 
believes episcopal collegiality alone an insufficient means of preserving the unity of the 
Church in the midst of a sinful world that tended toward disbelief.  A brief reflection on 
human nature as actually manifested in history suffices for Newman to reject the idea that 
the Church needs no papacy: ―there would be a legion of ecclesiastics, each bishop with 
his following, each independent of the others, each with his own views, each with 
extraordinary powers, each with the risk of misusing them, all over Christendom.  It 
would be the Anglican theory, made real.  It would be an ecclesiastical communism…‖827  
But Newman believes that history also yields a positive justification for the development 
of the Church‘s understanding of papal primacy.  The growth of the Church naturally 
resulted in the need for a greater system of Church government centralized in the See of 
St. Peter: ―As the Church grew into form, so did the power of the Pope develope [sic].‖828  
Thus, Newman implies that the Sacramentum Unitatis can only be preserved by what one 
might call a ―sacramentum auctoritatis.‖     
                                               
825 Misner, Papacy and Development, 77.   
826 L.D., 15: 496.  Contra Misner, Newman‘s mentions of Cyprian were chiefly in regard to the Eucharist.  
He also states that Cyprian‘s opposition to Rome on a point of discipline (not doctrine) did not constitute a 
rejection of the pope‘s supremacy.     
827 Diff., 2: 210-211.   
828 Dev., 154.  See also the Preface to the third edition of the Via Media, xli, where Newman describes how 
the ruling office of the Church, headed by the papacy, was the last of the offices to be developed in the 
Church. 
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 In the Preface to the third edition of the Via Media, Newman locates papal 
primacy within the context of his corporate, Christocentric ecclesiology.  The Church is 
―the Body of Christ,‖ he writes, ―and the sovereign pontiff… the visible head of that 
Body…‖829  The implication here and elsewhere in Newman‘s writings is that Christ 
remains active as the invisible head of the Church, but it follows from the sacramental 
and incarnational principles that Christ‘s invisible headship requires visible 
manifestation.
830
  Newman also qualifies that the pope is the head of the Body of the 
Church only inasmuch as he ―belong[s] to it,‖ meaning that in no way can the term 
―external authority‖ discussed above be applied to the pope; his headship is within the 
Body.   
 Returning once again to the application of Christ‘s threefold office to the 
Church—the distinguishing mark of this Preface—Newman principally locates the 
activity of the pope within the ruling, or kingly, office.  The pope, Newman holds, is the 
representative of the ruling office.  Even more strongly, Newman asserts that ―the Pope, 
as the Vicar of Christ, inherits these [three] offices and acts for the Church in them.‖  In 
Newman‘s mind, then, the pope acts as a sort of microcosm for the entire Church as ―the 
chief part of the body.‖  Yet, Newman had earlier stated that the entire Church is ―His 
representative… ‗His very self below,‘‖ and that the pope‘s ―special centre of action‖ is 
the ruling office of Church.  It is within this office that the pope most particularly acts as 
representative for the whole (office).    
 One may claim, as does Misner, that this reasoning makes Newman ―an 
ultramontane sui generis.‖  But Newman‘s claim that the pope is the special 
                                               
829 V.M., 1: xl. 
830 Var., 197, 283; Diff., 2: 208. 
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representative of the ruling office also simply follows from his incarnational principle 
and its corollary principles.  It follows from his consistent affirmation that the invisible 
visibly manifests itself, and that abstract truths such as ―rule‖ and ―power‖ need concrete 
representation.  It is a fulfillment of Newman‘s ―method of personation,‖ which affirms 
that the representation of truths in persons is part of the divine pedagogy.  For Newman, 
expediency demands, and history testifies to, the need for a universal Church to have a 
universal ruler in the pope.              
 This need also extends to the issue of papal infallibility, which Newman locates 
within the purview of the ruling office.  The Magisterium, whose special charge it is to 
exercise their active infallibility in defining a doctrinal development, must also have their 
concrete representative who can speak for them, who has a real power of ―universal 
jurisdiction.‖831  The pope acts as a personal manifestation of Christ‘s continuing 
authority over his Church, and when necessary, voices the decisions of the Magisterium 
through the infallibility with which Christ has endowed his office.  A function of the 
ruling office is to make judgments on doctrinal matters, and the mark of the rightness of 
such judgments is not always to be found in the majority, of which the Arian crisis 
affords an instance.  According to Newman, the hierarchical constitution of the Church 
requires that the Magisterium, too, needs its pope.  The pope provides what Newman 
refers to as a ―negative assistance,‖ an ultimum aimed merely at ensuring that ―the gates 
of hell shall not prevail against [the Church]‖ (Mt 16:18).832  Positively, Newman holds 
that the pope‘s occasional, official judgments provide a personal, living incarnation of not 
only the Magisterium‘s judgments, but of the infallibility of the entire Church and the 
                                               
831 ―Letter to Pusey,‖ quoted in Ward, 2: 223.   
832 L.D., 25: 309.   
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Holy Spirit‘s continuing presence in the Church.  They serve as a concrete manifestation 
of the Church‘s grasp of revelation, a faithful mirror that the members of the Church can 
consult in order to assist their certitude about the truth of revelation and the developments 
in the understanding of that revelation. 
 
3.2: FLOROVSKY ON DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AND AUTHORITY 
 In the previous section, I explained why Newman believed that the theory of 
doctrinal development necessitated an infallible authority who could confirm the truth of 
these developments.  I first showed that Newman believed that the human intellect was 
ordered toward certitude about the truth of developments that it cannot provide for itself.  
I then showed that his ascription of the power to pronounce on developments to the 
Magisterium and the pope was consistent with his incarnational theology. 
 My treatment of Florovsky on the question of authority in relation to dogmatic 
development will follow an inverse pattern.  I will first outline his concern that an 
orthodox understanding of ecclesiastical authority should conform to the standard of the 
Incarnation as especially represented by Chalcedon.  Florovsky‘s Chalcedonian 
understanding of authority includes a belief that it is the proper role of the bishops to act 
as the ―mouthpiece‖ of the Church‘s understanding of revelation as formulated in 
dogmas.  However, he did not believe that this episcopal role served as an aid to the 
members of the Church in achieving certitude about the truth of revelation, or, the truth 
of dogmatic developments.  Instead, as I will explain, Florovsky believed that the 
Church‘s members can only achieve such certitude through their free, ascetical living out 
of the truths of the Christian faith.  He thus implied that the Church‘s dogmatic 
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developments do not need further ―enfleshment‖ through formal guarantees of their truth 
supposedly provided by infallible authorities.    
 
A. FLOROVSKY’S CHALCEDONIAN UNDERSTANDING OF CHURCH AUTHORITY 
 Florovsky clearly evidences a concern to present a properly Chalcedonian 
ecclesiology in his writings.  The Chalcedonian hermeneutic is operative in his 
acknowledgement that the Church is both a ―visible‖ and ―invisible‖ reality.  He writes, 
―The teachings about the Church as visible and invisible at one and the same time, about 
the greatness and historically given, and sacred, i.e. divine, is a direct continuation and 
revelation of the Christological dogma in the spirit and meaning of the Chalcedonian 
dogma.‖833  Elsewhere Florovsky refers to the ―double condition‖ of the Church, which is 
at the same time the ―Church militant‖ and the ultimate ―Church triumphant,‖ and writes 
that ―this crucial mystery can be adequately conceived only in the categories of the 
Chalcedonian dogma.‖  Though Florovsky admitted an ―asymmetry‖ in the Chalcedonian 
definition (inasmuch as there was no human hypostasis in Christ) he does not apply this 
asymmetry to his Chalcedonian hermeneutic, and trumpets Orthodox ecclesiology for its 
―Chalcedonian balance.‖834  He furthermore opposes the Chalcedonian balance of 
Orthodox ecclesiology to the ―hyper-historicism‖ of a Roman Catholic ecclesiology that 
places too much emphasis upon visibility, and the ―hyper-eschatologism‖ of a Protestant 
ecclesiology that has ―dismissed‖ the historic and the visible.835 
 Florovsky seems to evidence a desire that his treatments of Church authority 
conform to the hermeneutic of Chalcedonian balance between the antinomies of visibility 
                                               
833 V13, 61-62. 
834 V9, 54-55; V14, 30-31. 
835 V14, 31, 52, 57.   
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and invisibility, the concrete and abstract, and the historical and eschatological.  
According to Florovsky, it has been the consistent emphasis of Orthodox theology that 
Christ remains the invisible head of his Body, the Church.  In his 1933 essay ―The 
Problematic of Christian Reunion,‖ Florovsky locates this emphasis in Orthodoxy‘s 
particular interpretation of Christ‘s Ascension, which maintains that ―through his 
Ascension into heaven Christ truly and directly (albeit invisibly) abides and governs in 
the ‗historical‘ and earthly Church…‖836  It is interesting that Florovsky here uses the 
prepositional phrase ―through his Ascension‖ rather than writing ―in spite of his 
Ascension.‖  His purposeful use of the word ―through‖ is further clarified by a statement 
he made in a letter to Archimandrite Sophrony in 1958, in which he wrote, ―Christ in his 
ascension is no less man than ‗in his days with us,‘ and perhaps more.‖837  In Florovsky‘s 
understanding, Christ‘s Ascension did not constitute an exodus from history; rather, it 
was the means by which Christ became even more fully present in history, in parallel 
with his becoming more fully human through the anthropological transformation and 
fulfillment effected through his Resurrection and Ascension.  Through his Ascension, 
Christ continues to function as the ultimate authority of both his earthly and heavenly 
Church.        
                                               
836 V14, 57.  See also V14, 14.  The editor of the Collected Works, Richard Haugh, elected to split this 
essay into two parts and retitle them for some unknown reason.  The first part is found in V13, 14-18, under 
the original title, ―The Problematic of Christian Reunion.‖   The second part, from which this quotation is 
taken, is entitled ―Rome, the Reformation, and Orthodoxy,‖ and is found in V14, 52-58.  I am grateful to 
Matthew Baker for alerting me to this discrepancy between Florovsky‘s original essay and the contents of 
the essay in the Collected Works.  The citation of the original Russian essay is ―Проблематика 
христианскаго возсоединения,‖ Пушъ 37 (February 1933): 1-15 (Supplement).      
837 Sofronii Sakharov, Perepiska s protoiereem Georgiem Florovskim (Essex: Svyato-Ioanno-
Predetechenskii Monast‘ir‘/Moscow: Svyato-Troitskaya Sergieva Lavra, 2008), 78; quoted in Baker, 
―Georges Florovsky (1893-1979) —Agon of Divine and Human Freedom,‖ in Creation and Salvation: A 
Companion on Recent Theological Movements, ed. Ernst M. Conradie (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2012), 32.  
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 In ―The Problematic of Christian Reunion,‖ Florovsky contends that this 
particular understanding of the Ascension ―has not been completely fortified and 
expressed‖ in Roman Catholic consciousness.  He writes, ―It is as if, in the [Roman 
Catholic interpretation of the] Ascension, [Christ] left and exited from history until the 
Second Coming… as if history had been abandoned… Hence the need for and possibility 
of Christ‘s well-known replacement in history—the idea of a ‗deputy,‘‖ i.e., the pope.  
However, Florovsky qualifies that ―it is impossible to reduce all the diversity and fullness 
of mystical and theological life in Roman Christianity to one particular ‗idea‘‖ such as 
their interpretation of the Ascension.
838
  He did not wish to be lumped in with Lev 
Karsavin (1882-1952) and Vladimir Lossky, who exhibited ―the dangers of excessive 
constructivism‖ in their attempts ―to derive the entire system of Roman Catholicism, 
directly and one-sidedly, from one particular doctrine, the doctrine of Filioque.‖839  This 
constructivism is an example of the logical form of dogmatic development Florovsky 
rejected.  But because Florovsky regards revelation and Tradition as originating and 
rooted in divine events, it is fair to say that he believes the Roman Catholic tendency to 
perceive the pope as a substitute for Christ‘s authority indicates a deficient understanding 
of that event (the Ascension) that particularly testifies to Christ‘s continuing authority in 
his Church.   
 Florovsky‘s emphasis on Christ‘s continuing, invisible headship over his Church 
is also related to his organic ecclesiology.  ―Christ the Lord is the only Head and the only 
Master of the Church,‖ writes Florovsky, and does not have a visible analogue in the 
                                               
838 V14, 57.   
839 V14, 211.  Lev Karsavin was a Russian religious philosopher and medieval historian who was also 
associated with the Eurasianist movement.  After teaching at various universities in Russian, he was 
eventually exiled and taught in Lithuania until its annexation by Russia.   In 1949, he was eventually 
arrested by Stalin‘s regime and died in a workers‘ camp.   
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earthly Church.
840
  As pointed out above, Florovsky regarded ecclesiology as ―an integral 
part of Christology,‖ and frequently invoked Augustine‘s ―doctrine of the Whole Christ—
totus Christus, caput et corpus‖ as emblematic of his organic ecclesiology.  What is 
more, he saw this doctrine of the totus Christus confirmed by the Chalcedonian dogma.
841
  
Chalcedon affirmed an intimate relation, without confusion, between the divine and 
human natures in Christ‘s person.  So also, Florovsky affirmed an intimate relation 
between Christ as Head and Christ‘s Body (the Church) while at the same time affirming 
their distinction.  It seems plausible that he thought the idea of an earthly head of the 
Church constituted a confusion between the proper identities of the Head and the Body.   
 But Florovsky balances this emphasis upon Christ‘s invisible headship by 
maintaining that the bishops serve as visible representatives of Christ‘s authority in the 
Church, even if they do not visibly represent Christ‘s headship.  He shirks conventional 
Orthodox avoidance of perceptibly Western categories by unflinchingly asserting that 
bishops act ―in persona Christi,‖ though it is noteworthy that he nowhere asserted that 
the bishops act ―in persona Christi capitis.‖  He variously describes the members of the 
episcopate as ―‗representatives‘ of Christ Himself,‖ as ―stewards of His mysteries,‖ and 
as ―standing for Him, before the community.‖842     
 According to Florovsky, the bishops‘ authority is primarily a ―sacramental 
authority,‖ and they principally represent Christ‘s authority through their place in the 
Church‘s sacramental matrix.843  Florovsky‘s focus on the sacramental nature of the 
bishops‘ visible representation of Christ follows from his position that ―the ultimate 
                                               
840 V1, 67-68.   
841 V4, 25. 
842 V1, 65-66; V14, 32.   
843 V14, 32. 
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identity of the Church is grounded in her sacramental structure…‖844  The bishops are 
initiated into their proper place in the Church‘s sacramental structure through 
ordination.
845
  In their celebration of the Eucharist—which Florovsky refers to as ―the 
mystery of the whole Christ‖—the bishops image ―the Heavenly Bishop,‖ and help bring 
about the completion of the Body of Christ.
846
  Inasmuch as the performance of the 
sacraments constitutes the primary identity of the bishops, and inasmuch as the 
sacraments are the primary means by which Christ abides in the Church, Florovsky 
invokes his oft-repeated principle that ―ministry (or ‗hierarchy‘) itself is primarily a 
charismatic principle… and not only a canonical commission…‖847 
 In spite of the central place Florovsky accords the Eucharist in the life of the 
hierarchy, he avoids a eucharistic ecclesiology (such as that promoted by Nikolai 
Afanasiev) that fails to integrate the eucharist into the dogmatic and canonical functions 
of hierarchy.
848
  This avoidance is signaled by Florovsky‘s affirmation that ―there is 
another and higher office: to secure the universal and catholic unity of the whole Church 
in space and time.  This is the episcopal office and function.‖849  Through his sacramental 
power to ordain—the power that precisely distinguishes bishops from priests, according 
to Florovsky—―the bishop has his own particular duty in the building up of Church 
unity,‖ and serves to make Pentecost ―universal and continuous.‖  Florovsky qualifies 
                                               
844 V14, 26. 
845 V1, 53.   
846 V13, 66, 91. 
847 V1, 65. 
848 Florovsky‘s criticisms of Afanasiev, who taught at St. Serge with him, were mainly confined to the 
latter‘s position on ecumenism, which is elaborated in, among other places, his essay ―Una Sancta‖ (in 
Tradition Alive: On the Church and the Christian Life in Our Time: Readings from the Eastern Church, ed. 
Michael Plekon, 3-30 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).  Pace Afanasiev, Florovsky 
consistently maintained that ―Real unity of love is hardly possible without unity in and of faith‖ (V13, 16, 
144). 
849 V1, 66.   
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that the Apostolic Succession is more than merely the ―canonical skeleton of the 
Church.‖850   But nevertheless, he affirms that this ―skeleton‖ does serve as a visible 
manifestation of the mystical unity of the Body of Christ with the Head. 
 Florovsky regards the Roman Catholic teachings on the papacy, on the other 
hand, as ―a false dogma of Church unity.‖851  He implies that the Apostolic Succession is 
a sufficient visible sign of the invisible unity and identity of the Church as the Body of 
Christ.  And, of course, he firmly reiterates that the unity of the Church must be based in 
dogmatic unity.  The falsity of papal primacy and infallibility as defined in the nineteenth 
century, according to Florovsky, stems from Rome‘s pathological striving for unity 
―above all else‖ throughout history.  Rome‘s perceived need for the pope to secure the 
Church‘s unity demonstrates a lack of trust in God and a ―weak[ness] in love.‖852  It 
shows their failure to recognize that, in addition to the Apostolic Succession, ―this unity 
must be maintained and strengthened by ‗the bond of peace,‘ by an ever-increasing effort 
of faith and charity‖ on the part of all the members of the Church.853  In other words, 
Florovsky believes that Rome creates an imbalance on the Chalcedonian scale of Church 
authority by striving after further, visible, concrete guarantees of Church unity.  
 Florovsky maintains that ―True ‗sacramentalism‘ in the Church ultimately 
depends upon a ‗doctrinal‘ orientation of devotional life… In fact, sacraments are a part 
and an article of dogma.‖854  As such, Florovsky also holds that bishops have a concrete, 
visible role in regard to dogmatic definitions.  Florovsky emphasized that theology, and 
doctrinal development, constitutes the vocation of all the members of the Church, and 
                                               
850 V3, 190; V14, 32.   
851 V14, 55.   
852 V14, 54, 55. 
853 V14, 32-33. 
854 V13, 90.   
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that all have a role in the coming to be of a dogmatic definition.  In addition, all the 
members actively receive this definition, testing it by the same Christian experience out 
of which it supposedly sprang.  But it is the province of the bishops alone, Florovsky 
maintains, to act as ―the mouthpiece of the Church,‖ ―to speak in a Catholic way… to 
witness on behalf of the Church… to teach.‖  Through their teaching, the bishops speak 
―in personae ecclesiae,‖ and make visible the experience of the Church and the authority 
of Christ.
855
    
 Louis Bouyer, drawing upon Yves-Noël Lelouvier‘s book on Florovsky‘s 
ecclesiology, saw in Florovsky‘s ascription of a concrete teaching function to the 
hierarchy a ―double criticism of Khomyakov and his emulators.‖  Bouyer writes,  
 [Florovsky] says they confuse—in the letter of the patriarchs on which they rely, 
 as in all the other significant documents of Orthodoxy—the function that is proper 
 to bishops, judging what the authentic truth is or is not, with the function that is 
 indeed common to the whole  people of God, in all its members: witnessing to the 
 truth.  Behind this primary error, and fully agreeing with Moehler, Florovsky 
 brings out the primary error of an ecclesiology that wishes to be exclusively 
 pneumatic and not christological, which would end fatally by misconstruing the 
 essential attachment of the work of the Spirit in us with the historical work of 
 Christ.
856
        
 
Thus, according to Bouyer, Florovsky implied that the Slavophile failure to recognize the 
bishops‘ role of making visible, or incarnating, the Church‘s interpretation of Christian 
experience through their authoritative judgments followed from an insufficiently 
Christocentric, or Chalcedonian, ecclesiology. 
 But Bouyer makes an unfounded and erroneous leap in the above quotation.  
Nowhere does Florovsky claim that the bishops‘ role of authoritatively voicing the 
                                               
855 V1, 53; V3, 198-200; Florovsky, ―Le Corps,‖ 38.  
856 Louis Bouyer, The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2011), 139.  Bouyer references Yves-Noël Lelouvier, Perspectives russes sur l'Eglise. Un theologien 
russe: Georges Florovsky (Paris: Éditions du Centurion, 1968), 58ff., 93ff., 120ff. 
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Church‘s teaching is the equivalent of them ―judging‖ the truth of this teaching.  In fact, 
as I will show in the paragraphs below, the absence of this claim in Florovsky actually 
demonstrates his affinities with the Slavophile position on authority and dogma.  What is 
more, I will show that these affinities are rooted in the tenets of Florovsky‘s anthropology 
and epistemology.  In the Dialogue section of this chapter, I will discuss whether or not 
Florovsky‘s position on authority in relation to dogma threatens the balance of his 
otherwise Chalcedonian ecclesiology.         
 
B. SLAVOPHILE INFLUENCES ON FLOROVSKY’S VIEW OF AUTHORITY 
 One finds Florovsky‘s lengthiest direct consideration of Slavophile ecclesiology 
in Ways.  There, he classifies Slavophilism as a Romantic reaction against both the 
Reformation and Idealism; against the isolationist anthropology of Protestantism and the 
Idealist exaltation of reason.  As a fruit of the Romantic milieu, Florovsky recognizes 
some of the excesses of Romanticism in Slavophilism—excesses that he perennially 
rejected as being at odds with a properly Christocentric, and Chalcedonian, Christianity.  
Thus, Florovsky noted that among the Slavophile thinkers one finds ―the spirit of dreamy 
withdrawal from and rejection of the ‗formal‘ or ‗external‘ in Christianity….‖857  In a 
related vein, Florovsky criticizes the Slavophile tendency to ―escape or even retreat from 
history,‖ and for a philosophy of history that relies too much upon ―a one-sided or 
exclusively ‗organic‘ point of view.‖858  In regard to this latter characteristic of 
Slavophilism, Florovsky cautions, ―Society and the Church are not commensurate.‖859  
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 Florovsky maintained that ―the failure of the Slavophiles to articulate [the 
incommensurability of Church and society] did not hurt their theology or their actual 
teaching on the Church as much as did their philosophy of history, or, more precisely, 
their philosophy of society.‖860  However, he did offer some criticisms of their 
ecclesiology.  Bouyer (via Lelouvier) rightly pointed out that Florovsky critiqued 
Khomiakov and Slavophile ecclesiology for their ―tendency to over-emphasize the 
Pneumatological aspect of the doctrine of the Church.‖  (Bouyer fails to recognize that 
Florovsky leveled this same critique at Möhler‘s Die Einheit in der Kirche, too, though 
Florovsky admitted that ―the balance [between Christology and Pnematology] was 
restored in Möhler‘s later writings, and already in his Symbolik.‖861)  Florovsky also 
admits that in Khomiakov—the ―Knight of Orthodoxy,‖ as he terms him—―the self-
sufficiency of the Church is presented with such resigned obviousness that its historical 
reality remains as if in a shadow.‖862       
 However, Florovsky did not translate any of these criticisms of Slavophile 
historiography and ecclesiology to the Slavophile understanding of authority‘s role in 
relation to dogma.  In spite of his reservations expressed in Ways and elsewhere, 
Florovsky qualified that ―Slavophilism is not exhausted by ‗romanticism,‘‖ and held that 
the Slavophile ecclesiology was ―completely true to fundamental and ancient patristic 
tradition.‖863  His estimate seems to apply to Slavophile ecclesiology on the issue of 
                                               
860 V6, 18.   
861 Florovsky, ―Christ and His Church: Suggestions and Comments,‖ in 1054-1954 L‘Église et les Églises: 
Études et travaux sur l‘Unité chrétienne offerts à Dom Lambert Beauduin, vol. 2, 159-170 (Chevetogne, 
Belgium: Éditions de Chevetogne, 1955), at 164.  
862 V6, 38, 41.  Florovsky‘s title for Khomiakov is derived from Herzen‘s description of Khomiakov 
sleeping ―fully armed, like a medieval knight.‖  Florovsky interprets it to mean that Khomiakov had a 
systematic mind in spite of the fact that he ―wrote only occasionally, fragmentarily, though always in bold 
strokes.‖  It is also an apt self-description of Florovsky.  
863 V6, 19, 46. 
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dogmatic authority, which, interestingly, Florovsky implies is closely related to the idea 
of dogmatic development.  As I pointed out in Chapter Two, Florovsky especially lauded 
Khomiakov in Ways for ―his understanding and estimation of the historical disclosure and 
self-realization of apostolic tradition (usually denoted in the West by the imprecise term 
‗dogmatic development‘)…‖864  Yet, both Khomiakov and Florovsky rejected the idea 
that the truth of these developments could be guaranteed, or certified, by an ―external 
authority.‖   
 In order to understand Khomiakov‘s opposition to the idea of an ―external 
authority‖ that judges the truth of dogmatic developments, one must start with a brief 
explanation of that most distinctive and enduring emphasis of Slavophile ecclesiology: 
sobornost.  Khomiakov used the Slavic term sobornost (which Florovsky, contra today‘s 
theological consensus, maintains is accurately translated by the English term 
―catholicity‖) to characterize the essence of the life of the Church.  According to 
Khomiakov, the Church was above all a unity of life in divine grace to which men and 
women submit in ―free communion and in love.‖865  It was also a life of dogmatic 
development: ―the legacy of an inner life [inherited from the blessed apostles], a legacy 
of thought, inexpressible yet constantly yearning to express itself.‖866  He held that the 
unity of the Church, including the unity of its doctrine, is maintained and developed 
                                               
864 V6, 49.   
865 V6, 44.  Writes Florovsky, ―Accordingly, this Russian term [sobornost] does not mean more than 
catholicity.  There was no need to borrow it and use it in English as if there was a peculiar ‗Russian‘ 
conception of the Church which could be denoted by a foreign neologism… Instead of borrowing a foreign 
term, it would be more helpful to recover the ancient conception of internal catholicity, which can be 
adequately denoted by traditional words‖ (V14, 34).   
866 V6, 51.  Florovsky is here quoting Khomiakov‘s response to the dissertation of Yuri Samarin (1819-
1876), a disciple of Khomiakov, but also of Hegel.  Samarin‘s dissertation was entitled Stefan Iavorskii I 
Feofan Prokopovich, and the footnote in Ways cites its location as volume 5 in Samarin‘s Sochineniia 
(Moscow, 1880).   
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―through the mutual love of Christians, and has no other guardian except this love.‖867  In 
particular, as Florovsky notes, Khomiakov describes the freedom that marks the life of 
the Church and its members as opposed to an ―external authority,‖ or, ―the formal 
compulsion of external proofs.‖868 
 For Khomiakov, the phrase ―external authority‖ is a tautology, as he explains that 
―an authority is something external.‖869  Though he applies it to the Roman Catholic 
understanding of the hierarchy, Khomiakov more generally understands ―external 
authority‖ as any extra-ecclesial principle or rationality that would stand in judgment 
over the Church and its dogmas.  Florovsky recognizes this rejection of ―external 
authority‖ in another Slavophile thinker, Ivan Kireevskii, as well: ―For Kireevskii the 
entire meaning of western falseness is revealed in the triumph of formal reason or 
rationality over faith and tradition, by the elevation of the [sic] deduction over 
tradition.‖870   
 This Slavophile polemic against external authority, especially in Khomiakov, 
proceeds from an understanding of the Church as a self-sufficient, incommensurable, and 
organic whole whose truth can only be discerned within.  It is also a Romantic reaction 
against rationalism and its manifestation in Idealism.  Florovsky describes Khomiakov as 
holding that ―As an organism of love the Church is not and cannot be subjected to the 
                                               
867 V6, 51.  Florovsky notes that ―Khomiakov is referring to the famous circular letter of the eastern 
patriarchs of 1848,‖ which was in response to Pius IX‘s ―Epistle to the Easterns‖ of the same year.  
However, this passage does not actually appear in the eastern patriarchs‘ letter, but is Khomiakov‘s 
interpretation of the ―spirit‖ of the letter.  For the passage in Khomiakov‘s Quelques mots, see On Spiritual 
Unity: A Slavophile Reader, ed. Boris Jakim and Robert Bird (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Books, 1998), 112.  
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869 On Spiritual Unity, 58.   
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judgment of reason.‖871  Thus, dogmatic truth cannot be determined according to external 
authorities such as logic and ―demonstrative exposition,‖ but only by the inner experience 
of the Church.
872
  Its determination comes from ―not knowledge alone, but knowledge 
and life at the same time.‖  It ―is based on the holiness of the mutual love of Christians in 
Jesus Christ.‖873  The supposition that knowledge of dogmatic truth is not dependent on 
life is, for Khomiakov, the essence of rationalism.     
 Florovsky strove in his writings to protect the freedom that he saw affirmed in the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and the distinctive Christian understanding of personality.  In 
fact, freedom is really the underlying theme of all the sporadic treatments of the relation 
between authority and dogma in his writings.  Florovsky saw in Khomiakov‘s reflections 
on authority and dogma a companion in the vigorous defense of Christian freedom.  
Florovsky wrote at the end of Ways that ―Freedom lies neither in rootlessness nor in 
having roots, but in truth, in the truthfulness of life, in the illumination that comes from 
the Holy Spirit.‖874  If one were to reverse the terms of this formula to read ―truth lies in 
freedom, in the freedom of life,‖ one would have a fitting summary of how Florovsky 
believed Christians were able to come to certitude about dogma.        
 Florovsky endorsed this Romantic polemic against the ―external authority‖ of 
extra-ecclesial rationality in his writings of the 1920s and 30s, and it conditions his later 
views of how the Church determines the truth of dogmatic developments.  His 1921 essay 
―The Cunning of Reason‖ presents the ―crisis of European culture‖ as one of 
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but not his organic understanding of the Church.   
872 V6, 51-53.  
873 On Spiritual Unity, 61, 72.   
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rationalism.
875
  There he characterizes rationalism as ―the idea of the general accessibility 
of cognition‖ that holds that ―Truth must be nothing other than a system of reason… 
accessible to all and not… dependent on the spiritual anointment of the individual.‖876  In 
opposition to rationalist claims, Florovsky emphasized that the Church‘s dogmas can 
only be understood within the Church and its experience of faith.  Similarly, Florovsky 
holds that one within the Church cannot be convicted of the truth of these dogmas 
through an ―outward authority‖ such as logical verification, or ―historical inquiry,‖ or 
even a ―consensus patrum.‖877    
 Both Khomiakov and Florovsky emphasize that the truth of dogma, including 
dogmatic developments, can only be perceived through the free activity of the Church‘s 
members: through their askesis, or, their lived rationality.  ―For a person living in the 
Church,‖ Florovsky writes, ―tradition is completely realized and self-verified…‖; ―Right 
life [is] the only efficient test of right beliefs,‖ not ―formal subjection to outward 
authority.‖878  At the heart of Florovsky‘s call for a ―Neo-patristic synthesis‖ was his call 
for the retrieval of the ―existential theology‖ of the Church Fathers, who perceived, and 
witnessed to, the mutual coinherence and interdependence of dogmatics and asceticism.  
One might also say that Florovsky advocated an existential understanding of Church 
authority in relation to dogma that placed the onus (like Khomiakov) on each Christian‘s 
―responsibility‖ to come to a more perfect conviction of the ―tradition of truth‖ through 
an ascetical life, while not denying the teaching role specific to the hierarchy.
879
  
According to Florovsky, ―The Church treasury of total truth is revealed to each in the 
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measure of his spiritual growth.‖880  In affirming that guarantees about dogmatic truth 
come only through askesis, Florovsky holds, ―the painful duality and tension between 
freedom and authority is solved.‖881 
 With their emphasis upon a lived rationality, both Khomiakov and Florovsky 
seem to be operating with what one might call a participatory understanding of 
rationality, or, an ontology of rationality.  In his ―Human Wisdom and the Great Wisdom 
of God,‖ Florovsky quotes approvingly Vladimir Ern‘s statement that ―Truth can be 
achieved by man only because in man is the place of Truth, i.e. he is the image of God, 
and to him is accessible endless and continual growth in the realization of the eternal idea 
of his being.‖882  Florovsky himself grounded men‘s and women‘s ability to perceive 
truth in their creation in the imago Dei.
883
  He grounds their ability to grow in the 
comprehension of truth in their free askesis: ―To know the truth means to become true, 
i.e., to realize one‘s ideal, to realize the Divine purpose…‖884  Now, Florovsky holds, 
―knowledge of God has become possible through that renewal of human nature which 
Christ accomplished in his death and resurrection,‖ as men‘s and women‘s askesis in 
reason becomes ―a rebirth or transformation, indeed a theosis [θέωσις].‖  More 
specifically, ―the knowledge of God has become possible in the Church, in the Body of 
Christ as the unity of the life of grace.‖885  Thus, according to Florovsky, men‘s and 
women‘s convictions about the truth of dogmatic developments are proportional to their 
participation in the divine life through and in the Church. 
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 Florovsky applies the concept of ―external authority‖ to Roman Catholic 
conceptions of the role of the hierarchy in a twofold sense.  In the first sense, he rejects 
the idea that bishops, or the pope, can somehow stand external to, or outside the mind of 
the Church, in their authoritative pronouncements.  ―The hierarchy teaches as an organ of 
the Church.  Therefore it is limited by the ‗consent of the Church‘ [e consensu 
ecclesiae],‖ writes Florovsky, in obvious opposition to the formula of Pastor Aeternus.886  
It is in this sense that Florovsky critiques Roman Catholicism for ―an exaggeration of the 
notion of hieratical charism… a kind of canonical ‗Montanism‘‖ indicated by the attitude 
that the pope possesses a special power of discernment by virtue of his office.
887
 
 The second sense relates to the concept of lived rationality as it applies to both the 
bishops and the faithful.  In regard to the bishops, Florovsky affirms that they are indeed 
the ones who rightfully ―anoint the truth‖ through acting as the Church‘s mouthpiece.888  
But Florovsky clarifies that in order to perform this function, ―the bishop must embrace 
his Church within himself; he must make manifest its experience and its faith.‖889  In 
other words, a bishop only functions as a mouthpiece of the Church‘s teaching inasmuch 
as he himself lives an ascetical life.  In regard to the faithful, Florovsky holds that the 
authoritative pronouncements of the hierarchy ―cannot be a source of spiritual life‖ for 
them.  ―Loyalty to tradition does not mean loyalty to bygone times and to outward 
authority; it is a living connexion with the fulness of Church experience.‖890  Just as the 
hierarchy‘s pronouncements on dogmatic developments are ―unclear, unconvincing‖ to 
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bishop] must speak not from himself, but in the name of the Church, e consensu ecclesiae.  This is just the 
contrary of the Vatican formula: ex sese, non autem ex consensu ecclesiae‖ (72).   
887 V14, 57.   
888 V3, 196.   
889 Florovsky, ―Sobornost,‖ 72.   
890 V3, 199; Florovsky, ―Sobornost,‖ 63.   
270 
 
those outside the Church, so also, Florovsky holds, will they fail to convince those 
faithful who do not have the ―inner evidence of spiritual life.‖891  For the faithful, on the 
other hand, ―they give secure direction in the intellectual investigation of the faith.‖892   
 Florovsky‘s belief that dogmatic definitions become authoritative for Christian 
persons only through their free, existential appropriation of these definitions is intimately 
connected with the centrality of creatio ex nihilo in his thought.  As such, his critique of 
the Roman Catholic understanding of authority in relation to dogma touches upon the 
particular emphases he sees affirmed in the Christian understanding of creation.  
According to Florovsky, the ―radical contingency‖ of the created world and its otherness 
entails that human formulations of the truth have a similar contingency.
893
  Though 
Florovsky claims that dogmas have a ―perennial significance,‖ he at the same time 
qualifies that they are not identifiable with the divine substance.  They are symbols for 
experience, ―the result of a creative imagination applied to facts—once again, the ‗free 
creations of the human soul.‘‖  Thus, dogmatic definitions are not ―necessary,‖ and 
cannot have a certitude attached to them that is external to the experience that gives rise 
to them.
894
        
 According to Florovsky, the Roman Catholic belief that the pope and the 
hierarchy are infallible dogmatic authorities who make guaranteed pronouncements 
represents an attempt to improperly attach necessity to dogmatic definitions.  It is a form 
of epistemological ―utopianism‖ that Florovsky sees as ―a continual and inescapable 
temptation of human thought, its negative pole, charged with great, although poisonous, 
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energy.‖895  ―Utopians,‖ writes Florovsky, ―seek logical justification for these ideals not 
in concrete, living experience, but in uniform norms of ‗reason‘ or ‗nature,‘ in ‗natural 
law.‘‖  In the case of papal infallibility, the Roman Catholic Church seeks justification 
for dogmatic truths in the satisfaction of certain canonical norms, such as when the pope 
speaks ex cathedra on issues of faith and morals.
896
  But, as Florovsky holds, certainty 
about dogmatic developments cannot simply be imposed from above, nor can it be a 
passive acquiescence to a belief in necessary and final words.  Certainty, as a function of 
cognition, can only be achieved by Christian persons through ―heroic acts.‖897  And 
certainty about dogmatic developments—like the theosis to which they are inseparably 
tied—is an epektasis: an infinite ―stretching forth‖ that does not come to a term before 
the eschaton. 
 Florovsky‘s rejection of guarantees of dogmatic truth detached from free askesis 
also manifests itself in an allergy to form as related to authority and dogma.  As I 
discussed in Chapter One, one of the characteristics of Hellenist and Idealist philosophies 
of history that Florovsky opposed was an overemphasis upon form, which ―remains [in 
these systems] always the final and highest value.‖898  These philosophies conceived of 
history as unfolding according to a certain preexistent outline or scheme irrespective of 
the free actions of human persons.  Applying these concerns to the issue of authority and 
dogma, Florovsky believed that formal guarantees of dogmatic truth imply that such truth 
can be perceived and agreed upon if the obligations of certain forms, or structures, are 
fulfilled.  He thought such a formal circumscription of dogmatic truth represented a threat 
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to the freedom of the members of the Church belonging to them by virtue of their status 
as persons.   
 In particular, Florovsky was apprehensive about attaching canonical status to 
ecumenical councils as forums for official dogmatic definitions.  He frequently reiterated 
that the authority to determine the truth of dogmatic statements was a ―charismatic‖ and 
not a ―canonical‖ authority.  This distinction reappears throughout his oeuvre, and it is 
best illuminated in his 1967 essay ―The Authority of Ancient Councils.‖  By this 
distinction, Florovsky means that the truth espoused within councils is a matter to be 
determined retrospectively; that the Church attempts to discern whether or not the council 
has ―under the guidance of the Holy Spirit… witnessed to the Truth, in conformity with 
the Scripture as handed down in Apostolic Tradition.‖  It was thus a matter of reception.  
In disavowing any formal status to councils, he labeled them as ―occasional charismatic 
events‖ as opposed to ―a canonical institution,‖ and used the language of ―spontaneous‖ 
and ―occasional‖ to describe these events in order to accentuate their origins in free 
activity rather than structural conformity.
899
     
 Interestingly, Florovsky seems to endorse a view promoted by both Vasily 
Bolotov and Hans Küng, namely, that we should conceive of the entire life of the Church 
as a great Council, and ecumenical councils as ―representations‖ (perhaps 
―microcosms‖?) of this great Council that is the Church.  Such a view appears consistent 
with Florovsky‘s position that ―the Council is not above the Church,‖ but is an event 
within the life of the Church—the growth of the Body of Christ in history.  The attempt 
to accord formal character to ecumenical councils would be a-temporal and thus a-
historical, inasmuch as it implies that councils are somehow able to stand outside the 
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normal flux of the life of the Church that is Tradition.  Such an attempt—which implies 
for Florovsky that God provides a special, external assistance when certain formal criteria 
are met—also seems to ignore the fact that ―the Church… is indeed a ‗Divine 
institution,‘‖ and therefore has ―the ability to discern the truth in faith.‖900  Its 
discernment of the truth is ongoing in history, and is perhaps ongoing even in the 
eschatological state, making it an infinite askesis.    
 On the contrary, an insistence on ―formal guarantees in doctrinal matters‖ makes 
the Church revert back to the ―cyclophoria‖ of Hellenism.  It implies that the Church‘s 
existence in history is marked by a continuous circle of falling away from the faith until 
God‘s external assistance descends upon the Church in the form of an ecumenical 
council.  The insistence on formal guarantees is, for Florovsky, a denial of the Church‘s 
true status as the Body of Christ.  It is a denial of the fact that Christ truly dwells within 
each one of us, through his Spirit, and through this indwelling effects the transformation 
of our entire selves, including our reason.  It is a denial of not only our ability to discern 
truth, but of the fact that we become truth through our life in Christ.       
 In the search for formal certitudes disconnected from askesis, Florovsky sees not 
only ―a continual and inescapable temptation of human thought,‖ but indeed, its original 
sin.  Florovsky adopts the view of original sin formulated by the Russian theologian 
Viktor Nesmelov (1863-1920), whom Florovsky lauds for ―his brilliant interpretation of 
the Biblical story of the Fall.‖  Florovsky summarizes Nesmelov as deeming that ―the 
‗fall‘ consisted in the fact that people desired to attain [the cognition of good and evil] not 
through a creative act, through free searching, vital God-serving, but rather by a magical 
route, mechanically…‖  Both Nesmelov and Florovsky link themselves with ―the early 
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Slavophiles, along with the West-European Romantics‖ in calling this original sin by the 
name of ―rationalism.‖901   
 Florovsky implies that the Roman Catholic understanding of authority is a form of 
rationalism, as it attempts to guarantee the certainty of dogmatic definitions apart from 
the creative activities of thought and life.  Such was also the position of Khomiakov, who 
held that ―rationalism is more apparent in papism than in Protestantism.‖902  To 
paraphrase the words of Maximus the Confessor (whose understanding of the Fall has 
affinities with Nesmelov‘s), the Roman Catholic Church seeks to provide the faithful 
with certitude about dogmatic developments ―without God, before God, and not in 
accordance with God.‖903  Infallible statements thus attempt to provide ―external 
illumination‖ irrespective of ―transfiguration.‖904  But, as Florovsky recognizes, ―sin and 
evil come not from an external impurity, but from an internal failure, from the perversion 
of the will,‖ and can be ―overcome only by inner conversion and change…‖905  So also, 
the conviction that dogmatic developments accord with the truth of inner experience can 
only be arrived at through askesis. 
 Relatedly, Florovsky also maintains that the Roman Catholic Church‘s 
understanding of authority reveals that ―the Resurrection, the victory over decay and 
death, is insufficiently felt‖ by them.906  The purpose of the Resurrection was not merely 
an external satisfaction of sins, but ―to unite man with God for ever... a lifting up of 
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human nature into an everlasting communion with the Divine Life…‖  Such a lifting-
up—―the ‗deification‘ of human nature, the ‗theosis‘‖—included a transformation of 
human reason so that knowledge of God is once again possible.
907
  In asserting that men‘s 
and women‘s certitude about dogmatic truth is only attainable through this truth‘s 
conformity to predetermined forms, Florovsky holds that Roman Catholic theology 
denies the character of the new, free life in the Spirit, and remains enslaved to the law.  
Indeed, this law-spirit dichotomy, characteristic of the Slavophile movement, underlies 
all of Florovsky‘s treatments of the issue of authority and dogma.     
 
C. FLOROVSKY’S TEMPERING OF HIS SLAVOPHILE DEPENDENCE 
 Although Florovsky made clear that it was the prerogative of the bishops alone to 
give authoritative voice to the Church‘s teaching, he did not believe that this action came 
with an infallible guarantee of the truth of the teaching.  To put it within the 
Chalcedonian framework, Florovsky affirmed that the bishops‘ role was to incarnate the 
Church‘s dogmatic developments in their witness on behalf of the Church, but that these 
developments did not need to be further incarnated through canonical assurances.  Rather, 
like Khomiakov, Florovsky held that the faithful can only obtain such assurances through 
their free askesis within the Church, or, through their fuller incorporation into the Body 
of Christ.  
 But it is a testament to the Chalcedonian balance of Florovsky‘s thought that this 
position was not without qualification.  Though Florovsky was clearly indebted to 
Slavophile ecclesiology, its Christological shortcomings meant that it could never 
exhaust Florovsky‘s own thought on ecclesiology, including his thoughts on 
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ecclesiastical authority and its role in dogmatic definition.  One could rightly describe 
him as having an existential, or ascetical, understanding of Church authority, but he 
significantly nuanced his thought so as to perhaps separate himself from the purely 
voluntarist understanding of reason and authority others perceived in Khomiakov.
908
  
 Florovsky‘s turn to the Fathers appeared to balance the Slavophile influence of his 
understanding of authority.  If one were to look for a patristic figure who best represents 
Florovsky‘s own thinking on authority, it would be St. John Chrysostom, ―the prophet of 
charity.‖  In his analyses of Chrysostom, one finds, in germ, the principles underlying 
Florovsky‘s own understanding of authority.  Florovsky finds in Chrysostom‘s writings 
the successful integration of the poles of freedom and authority, of dogma and life.  
According to Florovsky, ―Chrysostom understood pastoral work primarily as a service of 
teaching and persuading.  A pastor is an authority, but his jurisdiction is realized through 
words which attempt to convince, and this is the basic difference between spiritual power 
and secular power.‖909  The recognition of this ―basic difference between spiritual power 
and secular power‖ is, of course, one of the principal tenets of Slavophilism, as well.  So 
also was Chrysostom‘s characterization of the Church as primarily a life of freedom and 
charity. 
 Florovsky never rejects Chrysostom‘s, or Slavophilism‘s, characterization of the 
Church and its particular understanding of authority.  But the historical work he performs 
in his patrologies demonstrates his growing appreciation for the need to hold this 
characterization in tension with the fact that the Church still dwells in the world.  He 
recognizes that ―the situation [of the Church] changed with the conversion of the 
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[Roman] Empire,‖ which ―made the universality of the Church more visible than ever 
before.‖910  This increased universality meant that the earlier means of maintaining 
communion between the churches needed to be supplemented by increased organization, 
which included the occasional calling of ecumenical councils.  In the title of a 1957 
essay, Florovsky expressed the tension of the Church‘s existence in the world, but not of 
the world, as a tension between ―Empire and Desert.‖  In this essay, he portrays the 
Church‘s attempt to navigate this tension in history as an ascetic struggle and a lock for 
which ―there is no earthly or historical key… but [only] an eschatological key, the true 
‗Key of David.‘‖911  As such, Florovsky does not attempt to offer any solutions to this 
tension, but his very act of wrestling with the tension perhaps helped move him away 
from the Romantic notions of authority that marked Slavophilism.    
 Florovsky‘s increased recognition of the need for organizations and institutions 
within the Church manifested itself in qualifications of earlier, polarizing statements that 
touched upon issues pertinent to authority.  For instance, though Florovsky displayed an 
allergy toward circumscribing the discernment of truth by any formal criteria, he at the 
same time affirmed the place of form in the life of the Church.  He acknowledges that 
form is an integral part of a historical Church, and that ―there are… permanent structures, 
both in doctrine, ritual and institution, which belong to the very esse of the Church, and 
constitute her perennial ‗form.‘‖912  I have already discussed his stance that the verbal 
forms of defined dogmas have an ―eternal, irreplaceable‖ character that serve as a guide 
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for the faithful.
913
  ―[Christian worship],‖ he wrote, ―is and must be determined in form 
and content by certain ‗credal‘ assumptions.‖914  One should also note that his famous 
diagnosis of the ―pseudomorphosis‖ of Russian theological thought via Western 
categories implies a recognition of ―the truth that form shapes substance…‖915 
 Relatedly, Florovsky also saw in the canonical forms a confirmation of the 
historical reality of the Church, and one of the visible manifestations of her theology.  He 
reiterated in numerous essays that the current canonical division between different groups 
of Christians is indicative of a real schism.
916
  Against Bulgakov and others who 
advocated limited intercommunion on the supposition that a true, mystical unity existed 
among certain Christians visibly separated by schism, Florovsky said, ―A ‗catholic‘ 
cannot divorce order from faith; a very definite Church order is for a ‗catholic‘ an article 
of his integral Christian faith or dogma.‖917  And in spite of his trope that ecumenical 
councils are not so much canonical institutions as charismatic events, at the end of his 
essay ―The Authority of the Ancient Councils‖ he adds in passing that ―canonical 
strictures or sanctions may be appended to conciliar decisions on matters of faith.‖918  In 
other words, Florovsky allows that canonical status may be attached to councils as a 
result of the active reception of the faithful.  Finally, though Florovsky repeatedly 
maintained that there was no ―rigid theory‖ about ecumenical councils in the early 
Church, he also grants that ―the highest authority in the Church was a Council.‖919  
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Ultimately, one sees in these qualifications of the canonical realm that Florovsky wished 
to protect the concept of freedom so dear to Khomiakov, while at the same time avoiding 
Khomiakov‘s seeming denial of the role of form and order in the life of the Church. 
 In later years Florovsky also tempered his criticisms of Roman Catholicism, 
including its understanding of authority, though it would be hasty to view this tempering 
as a repudiation of the positions he espoused in his philosophical and theological essays 
from the 1920s and 30s.  This change appears to be in part the result of Florovsky‘s 
increased engagement with Roman Catholic theologians, especially those belonging to 
the Nouvelle Théologie school.  It was also perhaps the result of his involvement with 
Protestant groups in the ecumenical movement, whose ―problem of manifold 
denominationalism‖ he perceived to be a result of ―the rupture of Church authority‖ that 
came about with the Reformation.
920
 
 Florovsky‘s patrologies illustrate a much more balanced estimate of the Roman 
Catholic claims about the papal office.  Throughout his examinations of the patristic age, 
which attempt to combine Geschicthe and Dogmengeschicthe, Florovsky consistently has 
no trouble in recognizing that ―It is merely a fact that from the very beginning—see Pope 
Clement‘s early letter to the Church at Corinth—there was a certain recognized primacy 
of the Roman Church,‖ and that ―other churches and individuals were constantly 
appealing to Rome.‖  At the same time, he cautions that ―this does not establish in any 
sense the later doctrine of papal infallibility nor does it imply that Rome was always 
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correct.‖921  In regard to papal primacy, Florovsky provides a rather neutral account of 
how Pope Gelasius I (492-496) attached greater canonical significance to the office of the 
pope.  His only negative commentary was a lament that Gelasius‘ actions ―managed to 
deepen the rift between Constantinople and Rome, though Florovsky attributes the 
deepening of this rift to ―Gelasius‘ contemptuous attitude to the patriarchal throne of 
Constantinople,‖ and not to Gelasius‘ primatial claims per se.922  
 Florovsky‘s more balanced view of Roman Catholic authority is also evident in 
his 1959 essay ―On the Upcoming Council of the Roman Catholic Church,‖ written on 
the eve of the Second Vatican Council.  In this essay, Florovsky demonstrates a 
remarkably patient attitude toward the First Vatican Council and its definitions of papal 
primacy and infallibility.  He acknowledges the contextual difficulties surrounding the 
adoption of the ―Vatican Dogma‖: that the Council had ―disbanded without completing 
its program‖; that the definition ―had been rather awkwardly removed from its general 
context,‖ namely, a dogmatic constitution on the Church; and that the ―‗theological 
climate‘ has changed significantly—in the Roman Catholic Church and in the entire 
Christian world—since the times of Pius the Ninth.‖  
 At the same time, Florovsky does not believe these contextual issues constitute 
grounds for hoping that the ―Vatican Dogma‖ will eventually be regarded as mere 
historical and theological folly.  He admits that ―Papal primacy and infallibility is now 
not only historical and canonical fact, but an ‗article of faith‘ in the Roman Church.‖  
Nevertheless, his tone is hopeful.  Rather than alleging that Vatican I‘s definition 
represented the dogmatization of Rome‘s Christological deficiencies, Florovsky points 
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the way forward by suggesting that the Vatican Dogma needs to be more clearly and 
distinctly formulated within the ―dogma of the Church.‖  He thought such a balancing 
would help ―render an authentic interpretation of the ‗Vatican Dogma,‘‖ and restore 
―theological equilibrium.‖  While not glossing over the differences in the doctrine of the 
Church that Orthodox and Catholics must still overcome, Florovsky allows that there is 
room for ―discovery and development.‖923  He even seems to imply that the definitions of 
papal primacy and infallibility may one day be able to be synthesized within an orthodox, 
Chalcedonian hermeneutic.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 An initial glance at Florovsky‘s direct mentions of dogmatic development might 
lead one to think that he does not connect it with the concept of authority.  As I 
established in Chapter Two, Florovsky sees in the idea of dogmatic development an 
affirmation of the place of both reason and life in the growth of the Body of Christ.  But 
for Florovsky, the idea of authority is implied in this affirmation, as dogmatic 
developments become more authoritative for Christian persons through their life, or, 
through their incorporation into Christ.  This incorporation constitutes, for Florovsky, the 
concretization, or incarnation, of dogmatic developments, rather than any hierarchical fiat 
or other supposed formal guarantee of their truth.  Such was also the Slavophile position 
of Khomiakov, though Florovsky parts ways with Khomiakov in affirming the bishops‘ 
concrete role of giving voice to the Church‘s teaching, or, her dogmatic developments.  
But in solidarity with Khomiakov, Florovsky never held that magisterial pronouncements 
constituted a beacon for the faithful‘s certitude about the truth of these developments.    
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3.3: DIALOGUE 
 I have argued that the language Newman used to justify the Roman Catholic 
understanding of authority in general, and the papacy and Magisterium in particular, 
flowed from the incarnational principle that characterized his thinking about Christianity.  
Florovsky, too, works out his version of an orthodox Christian understanding of authority 
through the lens of the dogma of the Incarnation as mediated through Chalcedon.  
Newman and Florovsky thus coincide in using the Incarnation as a referent point for their 
respective understandings of authority in relation to doctrinal development, though they 
differ on the application of this principle.  In this Dialogue section of Chapter Three, I 
will further examine Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s application of the incarnational 
principle, though such an examination involves the unenviable task of engaging in what 
Heidegger referred to as a ―hermeneutics of hermeneutics.‖  
 As I argued, the theme of certitude is at the heart of the strong connection 
Newman makes between doctrinal development and authority.  His argument that ―An 
Infallible Development Authority [is] to be Expected‖ hinges upon his position that the 
Church‘s members have a natural desire for certitude about revelation and its human 
exposition in word and deed, and that they are not capable of achieving such certitude, in 
all cases, through their own efforts.  An underlying assumption of his position is that 
certitude about revelation as a whole is intrinsic to Christian faith.
924
   
 Moreover, Newman held that certitude about the whole of revelation, as 
traditioned by the Church, is also a prerequisite of Christian growth, lest one forever spin 
around the circle of skepticism.  The idea that it was the responsibility of each Christian 
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to achieve certitude about every doctrine and development of doctrine on his or her own 
was ludicrous to Newman.  According to Newman, the usual (and proper) pattern of 
Christian life was to accept such developments based upon one‘s prior certitude in 
Magisterial authority, and to grow in one‘s understanding of these developments over the 
course of time and in a manner proper to each person‘s particular vocation.  (Newman 
believed that Catholics‘ certitude in Magisterial authority also obliges them to 
respectfully regard the less official statements of the Magisterium with an attitude that he 
referred to as the ―pietas fidei.‖)925  The Magisterium‘s acts of defining doctrinal 
developments aid the certitude, and thus the growth, of the faithful, inasmuch as the gift 
of infallibility protects and guarantees the truth of their definitions.  This guarantee serves 
to make developments more concrete for the faithful, and makes concrete the promise of 
Christ to his Church that ―the gates of the netherworld shall not prevail against it‖ (Mt 
16:18).  
 Newman regarded the Roman Catholic understanding of authority as a fulfillment 
of Scripture, and thus, an authentic development of doctrine.  But for the most part, 
Newman‘s account of authority is, as he freely admits, more apologetic than theological.  
Yet in this sense it is incarnational, as it professes to take human beings and history as 
they are, and argues that the Magisterium and the papacy are effective supplies for 
humanity‘s natural and historical needs.  Newman‘s conversion to Roman Catholicism 
was based on his arrival at the conclusion that its system, which includes its 
understanding of authority, was more congruent with his first principles than those other 
systems that claimed to be Christian.  These first principles were formed based on his 
real, concrete experience of revelation, history, and a multitude of other things.  Thus, 
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Newman‘s account of authority proceeds from concrete experience, and attempts to show 
that the Roman Catholic understanding of authority accords with this experience.      
 Like Newman, Florovsky indeed acknowledges that the Magisterium has been 
granted the power to define dogmatic developments, or, to make concrete and visible the 
verbal witness of the Church.  But he nowhere claims that the bishops‘ act of defining is 
protected by the infallibility that belongs to the entire Church.  Thus, Florovsky denies 
that Magisterial definitions in and of themselves provide any sort of guarantee of their 
truth.  This denial is especially signaled by his rejection of any formal, canonical bounds 
by which the members of the Church may identify what is, and is not, a true dogmatic 
witness to the experience of faith.  As Florovsky reminds us, history shows that the 
actions of a pope may very well be condemned, ―a large ‗general‘ council may prove 
itself to be a ‗council of robbers,‘‖ and a ―numerus episcoporum does not solve the 
question.‖926 
 In solidarity with Khomiakov and Slavophilism, Florovsky holds that guarantees 
about the truth of doctrinal developments can only come about for each of the Church‘s 
members through their personal askesis.  According to Florovsky, the truth of dogma 
further impresses itself upon the ―symphony of personalities‖ in the Church in proportion 
to their increased participation in the Truth, namely, Jesus Christ.  As they become fuller 
members of the Body of Christ, they come to more and more think with the ―mind of the 
Church.‖  It is only in the process of this synergetic relationship between the believer and 
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Christ that doctrinal developments become more authoritative and more certain for the 
former.  Such certitude does not originate from supposed infallible guarantees provided 
by the Magisterium.  To repeat Florovsky‘s words, ―Authority (understood here as 
referring to officially designated authorities within the Church) cannot be a source of 
spiritual life.‖927 
 One could very well argue that Florovsky‘s more ascetical understanding of 
authority is incarnational in that it testifies to the essential unity of faith and life.  
According to Florovsky‘s reasoning, doctrinal developments become more certain for a 
believer the more he or she ―puts on Christ.‖  However, Florovsky‘s dependence on a 
Slavophile understanding of authority perhaps also make for chinks in the otherwise 
formidable armor of his Chalcedonian theology.  His primary critique of Slavophilism in 
Ways was directed toward its ―philosophy of history,‖ which seemed to represent an 
―escape or even retreat from history.‖928  Florovsky‘s patrologies contain some analysis 
of the problem of authority in the first millennium when, Newman maintains, the 
Church‘s understanding of authority was still very much nascent.  However, Florovsky 
hardly wrestles with the issues of authority that punctuated the historical path of the 
Church since the Great Schism of 1054.  An exception is his 1960 essay ―St. Gregory 
Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers,‖ where he critiques the restrictive periodization 
of the ―age of the Fathers‖ to the Seven Ecumenical Councils by remarking, ―Then, St. 
Symeon the New Theologian and St. Gregory Palamas are simply left out, and the great 
Hesychast Councils of the fourteenth century are ignored and forgotten.  What is their 
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position and authority in the Church?‖929  But Florovsky‘s answer to this question does 
not include a role for the official authorities within the Church, the bishops.  Nor does 
Florovsky anywhere provide contemporary examples of the bishops‘ exercise of 
dogmatic authority within the Church.  By implication, Florovsky seems to regard the 
history of the Church‘s understanding of authority as a history of decline. 
 More importantly, Florovsky seems to ignore the possibility that authority might 
provide any kind of assistance to Christians in their personal askesis.  Like Khomiakov, 
he rejects the idea that the Magisterium‘s giving of form to Christian witness through 
authoritative pronouncement serves as an aid to the faith of the members of the Body of 
Christ.  Florovsky claims that his ascetical understanding of authority solves ―the painful 
duality between freedom and authority.‖930  But really, he does not go beyond 
Khomiakov‘s opposition between freedom and authority.931  Ironically, Khomiakov‘s and 
Florovsky‘s rejection of ―external authority‖ turns back upon them, as they end up 
characterizing the dogmatic role of Magisterial authority as completely external to 
Christian askesis.    
 Lewis Shaw hints that this failure to attribute any discernible role to the bishops‘ 
power of defining within the Christian life threatens the incarnational character of 
Florovsky‘s understanding of authority.  According to Shaw, ―[Florovsky‘s] ecclesiology 
was one of sustained metaphor and image, rather than one which concentrated on 
delineating the locus or the matrix of the Church‘s authority.‖932  More apropos to the 
issue of doctrinal development, Shaw writes,  
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 Florovsky found it difficult to bring any critical standard to bear on his idealized 
 Church.  He did speak of a ‗charismatic,‘ as opposed to ‗canonical,‘ Church, but 
 he never elucidated the distinction.  He believed that kerygma and dogma were 
 mutually elaborative, correlative, and definitive statements of the eternal meaning 
 of the Christian faith, and that kerygma could serve as a critical principle for 
 interpreting any later developments within Christianity.‖933   
 
Thus, as Shaw implies, Florovsky never provided any canonical criteria by which the 
members of the Church could distinguish true from false developments of doctrine.  
Because of this lacuna, Shaw appears to characterize Florovsky‘s view of ecclesiastical 
authority as Romantic—a quality he also attributes to Slavophile ecclesiology which, he 
writes, portrays ―love-held-in-common, ‗the depository and the guardian of faith,‘ [as] 
the Church‘s guarantor of truth—not the Bible, not a single bishop acting in the name of 
the whole Church, nor a council.‖934  Aidan Nichols, who is admittedly indebted to 
Shaw‘s reading of Florovsky, also remarks that ―Florovsky‘s marked preference for the 
inner, over against the outer, in matters of catholicity is not, however, in keeping with the 
character of Christianity as an incarnational religion.‖935 
 As I mentioned above, Florovsky admits that the Church may eventually grant 
canonical status to councils and their doctrinal statements as a matter of reception, which 
is but another descriptor for the askesis of the members of the Church.  Zizioulas has also 
adopted this position, and in a statement bearing striking similarity to Florovsky‘s own 
position writes, ―[A] true council becomes such only a posteriori; it is not an institution 
but an event in which the entire community participates and which shows whether or not 
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its bishop has acted according to his charisma veritatis.‖936  However, while granting that 
councils must be received (a position Newman holds, as well), it seems that a council 
must have some a priori authority if the Church is to have something to receive.  In his 
dissertation on Florovsky, Shaw made the interesting point that ―Florovsky never 
addresses the philosophical question of givenness; that is, do givens become so because 
they are grounded in revelation, or do we treat events as revelation because they function 
as givens in our thought?‖937  In the parallel case of Magisterial statements produced by 
councils, one may well ask: are these statements received because they already have an 
authoritative status in the ―mind of the Church,‖ or do they solely become authoritative 
through the act of the Church‘s reception of them?  Florovsky does not provide an 
answer. 
 Shaw‘s evaluations of Florovsky‘s understanding of authority indirectly raise the 
question: is the role of defining doctrinal developments that Florovsky locates in the 
Magisterium merely an abstract role, having no real, concrete function in the growth of 
the Body of Christ?  While giving credence to the Slavophile understanding of authority 
endorsed by Florovsky, John Meyendorff unwittingly goes beyond it in estimating that 
―If Orthodox theology has any contribution to make to the present ecumenical dialogue, it 
will consist in stressing and showing the auxiliary character of authority.‖938  According 
an auxiliary character to authority in the dogmatic realm seems to imply attributing some 
real, canonical power to it.  Newman, as I pointed out, located the Magisterium‘s power 
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of infallibly defining doctrinal developments within their role in the ruling office of the 
Church.  He held that the Magisterium has a special responsibility, by virtue of 
ordination, to not only occasionally define doctrinal developments, but to judge and 
proclaim the Christian truth for the faithful when the need arises.  This responsibility of 
the Church‘s ruling office served, in Newman‘s understanding, to protect the unity of the 
Church and promote its growth. 
 Florovsky‘s writings, on the other hand, contain almost no reflection on the 
kingly, or ruling, office of the Church and how it functions within Christian life.  The 
linguistic omission is probably due to the limited Orthodox recourse to the model of 
Christ‘s threefold office, which was made popular by Calvin‘s Institutes.  The conceptual 
omission, however, appears related to Florovsky‘s opposition between freedom and 
authority.  Florovsky primarily characterizes the authority of Christ, like the authority of 
those deemed Fathers of the Church, as a teaching authority.  In the Synoptic Gospels, 
writes Florovsky, ―Jesus is portrayed as having an authority—ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων—
hitherto not known, an authority of teaching which astounds the people…‖939  When 
Florovsky does refer to Christ‘s ―kingly rule‖ in his essay on the ―Redemption,‖ he 
speaks of it in terms of regeneration, and clarifies that ―No one, so far as nature is 
concerned, can escape Christ‘s kingly rule, can alienate himself from the invincible 
power of the resurrection. But the will of man cannot be cured in the same invincible 
manner; for the whole meaning of the healing of the will is in its free conversion.‖940  
Florovsky then goes on to emphasize the Christian‘s union with Christ in Baptism as 
involving the path of free renunciation.  Indeed, the typical modern Orthodox 
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interpretation of Christ‘s kingly rule is that it is appropriated by each Christian inasmuch 
as he or she exercises ―rule‖ over his or her passions.  While not denying the truth of this 
interpretation, which has support in Tradition, it seems that the question of whether or not 
Christ‘s kingly office applies to the episcopate in any specific sense is worth further intra-
Orthodox reflection.
941
  
 Unlike Newman, Florovsky does not see the bishop‘s role of defining as serving 
to protect the unity of the Church in a visible manner.  Rather, he holds that the visible 
unity of the Church is manifested in the Apostolic Succession, which he regards as 
primarily a function of the sacramental, or priestly, office of the Church.  Florovsky 
seems to implicitly adopt Constantine‘s sharp distinction between the imperial authority 
of the secular rule and the sacerdotal authority that resides in the episcopacy.
942
  He 
affirms an intimate connection between unity in the sacraments and unity in faith.  
However, he does not claim that the bishops have a specific role, by virtue of their 
ordination, in preserving unity through their power of defining.  He never maintained that 
the bishops‘ definitions necessarily served as authoritative judgments of the mind of the 
Church, nor that their definitions indicated the ongoing triumph of truth.  And he ascribes 
no canonical or institutional power to the bishop‘s dogmatic role.    
 Florovsky‘s failure to attribute a concrete ruling power to bishops in regard to 
dogma once again raises the issue of the philosophy of history.  I established in Chapter 
Two that Newman and Florovsky both affirm, with qualifications, an organic 
                                               
941 As Radu Bordeianu points out, Dumitru Staniloae (a thinker close to Florovsky) also predominantly 
regards the Christian‘s fulfillment of the kingly office to consist in his or her rule over passions.  
Interestingly, Bordeianu argues that Staniloae‘s failure to apply it beyond the ascetical sphere is perhaps 
due to the Communist persecution of the Romanian Church of his time, which removed Church authority 
from the public square (―Priesthood Natural, Universal, and Ordained: Dumitru Staniloae‘s Communion 
Ecclesiology,‖ Pro Ecclesia 19:4 [2010]: 427.     
942 V8, 141.  
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interpretation of history.  They both view history as the growth of the Body of Christ, and 
both consider that the Church‘s growth in the knowledge of dogma is an indispensable 
part of its overall growth.  But they differ as to how this growth in the knowledge of 
dogma is preserved and promoted.  Newman believes that it is the prerogative of the 
ruling office of the Church to tend to this growth, pruning when necessary, through their 
power of defining and authoritatively pronouncing on dogmatic matters.  Florovsky, on 
the other hand, does not claim that the bishops‘ power of defining ensures that the 
Church‘s witness to the experience of faith remains faithful.  Shaw alludes to a problem 
that arises with Florovsky‘s position: ―Strangely, his obsession with free will never 
obtrudes upon, nor arises within, the context of Church-cum-υρόνημα; e.g., could the 
Church have chosen Arianism, or does the Spirit dictate her choices?‖943  Florovsky does 
not seem to regard the Church‘s perseverance in faith as a completely open-ended 
contingency, and thus, one would assume he believes this perseverance involves a 
synergy between human action and Divine Providence exercised through the Spirit of 
Christ‘s presence in the Church.  But he certainly differs from Newman inasmuch as he 
does not acknowledge that God providentially guides His Church‘s adherence to the truth 
through any of its visible structures.  
 As a function of his understanding of the ruling office of the Church, Newman 
furthermore affirms the dogma defined by Vatican I that regards the papacy as endowed 
with the ability to infallibly define dogmas without the explicit consent of the rest of the 
Magisterium and Church.  As I argued, Newman‘s acceptance of papal infallibility was 
congruent with his belief that there was a need for a ―center of unity‖ in the Church.  For 
him, the dogma of papal infallibility was but an extension of the claims of papal primacy 
                                               
943 Shaw, ―Introduction,‖ 215. 
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into a clearer role in the dogmatic realm.  Von Balthasar, who studied under Newman 
scholar Erich Przywara, takes up a similar line of thinking as Newman in his work Der 
Antirömische Affekt.  He describes the pope as the ―‗head‘ within the collegium and the 
communio as the element instituted by Christ to represent and (what is more) to 
determine unity… [who] must be able to exercise his legal authority throughout the 
whole of the united body without being limited by the rights of his fellow bishops.‖  He 
furthermore writes that papal infallibility ―is not an obstacle to [the pilgrim Church] but 
the indispensable prerequisite if she is to be communio in the Spirit of Christ here on 
earth.‖944  
 Von Balthasar then goes on to expand on the idea that only a Church with a pope 
can guarantee the freedom of its members, and has recourse to the thought of Newman 
and Soloviev.  Quoting Soloviev‘s Russia and the Universal Church, von Balthasar 
points out that Soloviev opposed the ―idle daydreams‖ of the Slavophiles, who proposed 
that there existed a unity in faith among the members of the Orthodox Church in spite of 
visible divisions among them.  Because this supposed ―unity in faith… is not expressed 
by any living acts,‖ Soloviev referred to it as ―an abstract formula that produces nothing 
and has no binding power.‖  According to Soloviev, it is only the pope, protected by 
infallibility, who can concretely secure the unity of the Church in truth and freedom.
945
  
 Florovsky was aware of Soloviev‘s line of argument in Russia and the Universal 
Church.  In Ways, Florovsky had dismissed Soloviev as ―[knowing] little more about the 
West than unionistic ultramontanism and German idealism,‖ and regarded his theocratic 
                                               
944 Von Balthasar, Office of Peter, 215-216, 221. 
945 Von Balthasar, Office of Peter, 276-283.  Von Balthasar quotes from the German translation of 
Soloviev‘s La Russie et l‘Église Universelle (Russland und die uniersale Kirche in Deutsche 
Gesamtausgabe der Werke 3).    
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hopes as ―utopian.‖946  Florovsky seems to adopt a more nuanced criticism of Soloviev in 
later years, and notes in ―Reason and Faith in the Philosophy of Solov‘ëv‖ (1955) that 
―The theocratic conception of [Soloviev‘s] ‗Romanizing‘ years has not been properly 
studied up to now.‖  Florovsky also acknowledges that ―in [Soloviev‘s] interpretation, it 
was precisely ‗authority‘ of the divine truth, mediated through the hierarchical 
stewardship of the Church, that could secure true freedom,‖ but Florovsky does not 
comment further on this contention.
947
  Undoubtedly, Florovsky never wavered in his 
position that Soloviev‘s theocratic proposals exhibited a failure to effectively maintain 
the tension between ―empire and desert.‖  But he also never wavered in his adulation for 
Soloviev‘s recognition of the unity of faith and reason, which was exemplified in 
Soloviev‘s acceptance of the idea of dogmatic development.  Soloviev came to perceive 
the need for a concrete authority to ensure unity in the Church and the freedom of its 
members to develop their understanding of dogma.  It is unfortunate that Florovsky never 
examined this corollary of Soloviev‘s promotion of dogmatic development, or whether 
the tension between ―empire and desert‖ is applicable in the dogmatic realm.  
 Florovsky‘s evaluation of Soloviev in ―Reason and Faith‖ contains the indirect 
critique that Soloviev‘s understanding of authority lacked an emphasis on askesis.948  It is 
important to keep in mind that Florovsky‘s anthropology is behind the ascetical character 
                                               
946 V6, 302; V11, 108.   
947 Florovsky, ―Reason and Faith,‖ 291, 292.   
948 Florovsky, ―Reason and Faith,‖ 296: ―As far as he could see, ‗reason‘ spoke in history rather for ‗faith‘ 
than against it.  One had to ‗believe‘ because it was only through ‗faith‘ that one could ‗understand.‘  Credo 
ut intelligam.  On the other hand, one gets the impression that it was precisely the ‗intelligence‘ that 
supplied him with the ultimate assurance or security.‖  On the lack of an ascetical component in Russian 
religious philosophy in general, Sergey Horuzhy writes, ―… it was noticed that, however successful the 
metaphysics of All-Unity, it left out vital aspects of Russian spirituality—above all, anthropology, 
Orthodoxy‘s views on man in relation to God.  Here lay the classical themes of Orthodox mystics and 
ascetics: the flexibility of human nature, the struggle against passions, the purification of the soul, and the 
deification of many by God‘s grace.  All this fell outside the metaphysics of All-Unity and could not be 
described by its concepts‖ (―Neo-Patristic Synthesis and Russian Philosophy,‖ SVTQ 44 [2000]: 314).   
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that marks his understanding of authority.  To summarize some themes touched upon 
earlier in Chapter Two, Florovsky believes that Christ‘s redemption accomplished the 
renewal of human reason, and that the Christian person is thus capable of knowing the 
truth through his or her growth in union with Christ through his body, the Church.  
Florovsky balances his acknowledgement of the ultimately apophatic character of 
theology with the affirmation that men and women can really know the truth.  As I 
pointed out, Florovsky‘s 1933 essay ―The Problematic of Christian Reunion‖ contains the 
charge that the Roman Catholic understanding of authority reveals a failure to feel ―the 
Resurrection, the victory over decay and death.‖949  This charge is part of a larger 
Orthodox polemic against a Western theology of the cross that fails to adequately 
integrate the crucifixion within the entirety of the Paschal Mystery.  Though Florovsky 
was less negative in tone toward Roman Catholic theology in later years, his charge is 
still worth examination.  As Florovsky pointed out at the end of Ways, ―Return is possible 
only through ‗crisis,‘ for the path to Christian recovery is critical, not irenical,‖ though he 
qualified that this ―crisis‖ must involve not tired polemics, but ―a historiosophical 
exegesis of the western religious tragedy.‖950 
 Newman indeed emphasized that the Church still needs a clear authority with the 
power to act infallibly due to the sin that ever threatens the Church until the eschaton.  I 
pointed out that there is evidence that Newman thought such authority would have been 
needed regardless of sin, as a result of human finitude, but it is certainly not an emphasis 
of his.  Though Newman‘s retrieval of the salvific model of deification is commendable, 
he does not give a positive account of how the divine indwelling contributes to the 
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character of Christian knowledge.  Such is also a general trend with the Roman Catholic 
theology of authority in general.  Florovsky‘s charge should give Roman Catholics pause, 
for it points to a need to account for the redeemed character of human knowledge within 
their understanding of authority and its function in the Church. 
 Nevertheless, Newman‘s account of authority is not devoid of an ascetical 
component.  Newman located the act of defining in the Ecclesia docens, as does 
Florovsky, but this episcopal act is not intended as a substitute for the active assent of the 
faithful.  Certitude about doctrinal developments cannot be forced upon the men and 
women of the Church, even if they do have the supposed infallible guarantee provided by 
the Magisterium.  Indeed, in the aftermath of the definition of papal infallibility, Newman 
famously wrote, ―We cannot force things. The Council cannot force things—the voice of 
the Schola Theologorum, of the whole Church diffusive, will in time make itself heard, 
and Catholics instincts and ideas will assimilate and harmonize into the credenda of 
Christendom, and the living tradition of the faithful…‖951  According to Newman, the 
formal guarantees provided by infallible authorities constitute ―external evidence‖ of the 
truth of the Church, but they still require the ―internal [evidence]… supplied by the moral 
sense‖ of the faithful.952  Newman portrays the faithful‘s reception of defined doctrines as 
still very much an ascetical act.  Through their active reception, the faithful help further 
draw out the meaning of what has been defined, which sometimes requires a ―legitimate 
minimizing‖ that serves to ―trim the boat‖ of a definition.953  Finally, in Consulting, 
Newman approvingly quotes a passage from a letter of Bishop Ullathorne (Newman‘s 
ordinary), published after the proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, 
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which makes the claim that those faithful who live truly ascetical lives are the best 
mirrors of the Church‘s faith: ―And it is the devout who have the surest instinct in 
discerning the mysteries of which the Holy Spirit breathes the grace through the Church, 
and who, with as sure a tact, reject what is alien from her teaching.‖954  
 But there is a difference in Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s models of ascetical 
reception.  Newman portrays the process of Tradition as a dialogue between the ruling 
and prophetical offices of the Church, between authority and theology, mediated by the 
Holy Spirit, who serves as the unifying principle.  Edward Miller aptly describes 
Newman‘s understanding of this process:   
 The dialectical movement between the magisterium and the baptized faithful 
 [including the  schola theologorum] occurs, of course, at the level of grace, and 
 the process can be described in terms of the original unity that is the Holy Spirit.  
 All dialectical movement attempts to recapture the original unity from which it 
 arose.  The faith is externalized into words (i.e., Newman‘s  principle of dogma), 
 and the words are assimilated, under the action of the Holy Spirit, so that there is 
 proper understanding (internalization) of what had been externalized.  The faith of 
 the church returns to itself in more articulated form but not as a stranger.
955
 
 
Newman assuredly believes that the priestly office also has a role in this dialectical 
process, but he did not elaborate on this role in any of his works.  He also acknowledges 
that each member of the Church possesses all of these offices in some mode.   
 Florovsky, on the other hand, like Khomiakov, does not portray the Christian 
person‘s askesis in truth as a dialogue between different groups within the Church.  He 
views the person‘s activity within Tradition as a dialogue, but it is a dialogue with other 
past and present persons within the Body of Christ, who is the ―personal centre‖ of the 
                                               
954 Consulting, 211.  The work Newman quotes from is Bishop William Ullathorne, The Immaculate 
Conception of the Mother of God: An Exposition (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1988).   
955 Edward Jeremy Miller, John Henry Newman On the Idea of Church (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 
1987), xix, 120; quoted in Merrigan, Clear Heads, 239.   
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Church.
956
  The personal emphasis of Florovsky‘s model of the Christian‘s askesis in 
truth is, of course, not opposed to Newman‘s, since Newman regards the various offices 
of the Church as made up of persons, and claims that each of these offices belong in some 
way to each baptized Christian.  But Florovsky‘s emphasis indicates a phenomenon that 
marks his understanding of authority.  Florovsky‘s ecclesiology was an ecclesiology of 
persons, but he did not always emphasize the functional identity of certain persons within 
the Church except in the sacramental realm.  Accordingly, his model of the Christian‘s 
development in the understanding of doctrine was not the hierarchical schema of the 
Church, but monasticism, which in the East ―cut across the basic distinction between 
clergy and laity in the Church.‖  Florovsky acknowledges that ―Monasticism could never 
become a common way of life.‖957  But he never quite incorporated this insight into his 
understanding of authority, which is characterized by the otherness of the monastic way 
of life. 
 In a 1933 essay, Florovsky accused Roman Catholic understandings of authority 
as evidencing an insufficient feeling of the Resurrection.  However, one might very well 
accuse his understanding of authority at this time as not sufficiently feeling the effects of 
sin that remain in the Church after the Redemption.  Florovsky‘s reticence in regard to 
the continued existence of sin in the Church is perhaps a sign of the ―voluntaristic flavor‖ 
that Rowan Williams perceives in some of Florovsky‘s writings.958  Shaw, who also sees 
this voluntarism in Florovsky, notes that the consequence of Florovsky‘s emphasis on 
                                               
956 V1, 67.   
957 V2, 86-87, 98. 
958 R. Williams, ―Eastern Orthodox Theology,‖ in The Modern Theologians, 166.  
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―creative freedom… lays him open to the serious charge of undervaluing the role of grace 
in his salvation history.‖959   
 Though Shaw is rightly cautious about making this charge, it does seem that 
Florovsky failed to consider whether authority could be a form of grace for Christians in 
their growth in the understanding of Christian experience.  According to Newman and the 
Roman Catholic tradition, the effects of sin continue to thwart the askesis of the members 
of the Church in their knowledge of, and participation in, God, and authority serves as a 
divinely-provided aid to keep these members on the right path.  Some of Florovsky‘s 
later works admit the continued obstacle of sin in the Church‘s growth in knowledge, 
thus blunting the voluntarism that characterizes some of his earlier essays.  For instance, 
in ―Religion and Theological Tensions‖ (1955), Florovsky writes, ―Of course, we have to 
distinguish the inevitable and healthy ‗tensions‘ of search, physiological tensions, as it 
were, and the pathological ones, which are implied in our sin, which is remitted and yet 
not exterminated to the full extent.  In our actual practice, the healthy dialectics of search 
is still dangerously contaminated by the dialectics of error.  We still belong to a fallen 
world; it is already redeemed, but not yet transfigured.‖960  But he does not here take the 
further step of asserting that the fallen nature of the world necessitates the guidance of 
infallible authority within the Church. 
 Aside from the above reference to ―physiological tensions,‖ Florovsky for the 
most part fails to account for finitude and contingency in the Christian‘s askesis in truth.  
Though Florovsky consistently emphasized the limitations and contingencies of human 
knowledge, he did not seem to acknowledge that these limitations and contingencies 
                                               
959 Shaw, ―Introduction,‖ 189.   
960 V13, 11-12.  The editor of Florovsky‘s Collected Works, Richard Haugh retitled this essay ―Theological 
Tensions among Christians.‖  The original essay appeared in The Bostonian (April 1955): 3-6.   
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could represent obstacles to Christian men and women in their growth in knowledge.  He 
is right in affirming that Christians, in their redeemed state, can indeed know the truth, 
and know it with certainty.  But their knowledge and their certitude still remain subject to 
the contingencies of created existence, and thus, it can falter, as has been historically 
indicated by the many heresies that have beset the Church.  The Incarnation and 
Redemption indeed brought about the ―newness‖ of created existence, and the members 
of the Church are members of the new creation who participate in the divine life.  But in 
this participation, which is a true participation, God still remains other.  Authority may 
not be external to the Church, but finite human knowledge still needs an authority that is 
externally manifested within the Church in order to aid its members in their askesis. 
 I began this chapter by quoting Andrew Louth‘s contention that Newman‘s theory 
of doctrinal development is inextricably bound up with the particular Roman Catholic 
understanding of authority.  Florovsky‘s carefully nuanced acceptance of doctrinal 
development demonstrates that Louth‘s contention is a bit of overstatement.  Mutatis 
mutandis, however, Louth is right in perceiving that the idea of doctrinal development, or 
Tradition, is inextricably bound up with the question of authority.  Both Newman and 
Florovsky share Louth‘s perception, though each has a different answer to where the 
proper locus of doctrinal authority in the Church lies.     
 I had written in the beginning of this section that judging the Chalcedonian 
fidelity of Newman‘s or Florovsky‘s respective understanding of authority involves 
engaging in a ―hermeneutics of hermeneutics.‖  Both Newman and Florovsky show a 
concern with affirming certain categories they see as represented by the poles of the 
human and divine in the hypostatic union—the visible and invisible, the concrete and 
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abstract, the historical and eschatological—but these categories are differently applied by 
them to the issue of the role of Church authority in doctrinal development.  Newman sees 
the infallibility of the entire Church as needing visible and concrete manifestation in the 
authoritative doctrinal pronouncements of the hierarchy, which guarantee the truth of 
doctrinal developments and thus aid the certitude of the faithful.  Florovsky grants that 
the hierarchy has the power to visibly represent the teaching of the Church by defining 
doctrines, but denies that this power serves to aid the faithful in their conviction of the 
truth of doctrinal developments.  Instead, he holds that the truth becomes more concrete 
for the members of the Church solely through their askesis, and neglects to assign the 
bishops a clearly defined role in this askesis.   
 Furthermore, Newman believes that history testifies to the need for an infallible 
authority in the process of doctrinal development, and that history has revealed the chaos 
that ensues without such an authority.  Florovsky, on the other hand, interprets history as 
demonstrating that the Church does not need canonical strictures in order to ensure the 
continuity of its faithful witness to revelation.  How is one to determine which of these 
accounts of the dogmatic role of Church authority is more faithful to Chalcedon?  The 
answer is tied up with the question.  
 Though a definitive answer to this question is impossible right now, this 
examination of authority‘s role in the process of doctrinal development nevertheless has 
the potential to bear fruit.  Both Newman and Florovsky recognized the place of first 
principles in knowledge at the individual and ecclesial levels.  Roman Catholics and 
Orthodox agree that the papacy is the greatest obstacle to reunion, but there are principles 
underlying the affirmation or rejection of the papacy.  Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s 
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understandings of the dogmatic role of the papacy in particular, and Church authority in 
general, reveal some of these principles.  As I have attempted to show, their respective 
answers to the question of the role of authority in doctrinal development are conditioned 
by their positions on the fundamental issues of nature and grace, freedom and 
personhood, faith and reason, the cross and the redemption.  And, the incarnational 
character of their theologies means their position on these issues is bound up with their 
respective answers to Christ‘s question to Peter: ―Who do you say that I am?‖ 
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CONCLUSION 
 
  
 The catalyst for my dissertation was some modern Orthodox authors‘ perception 
that doctrinal development was not, as Andrew Louth puts it, ―a valid category for 
Orthodox theology.‖  I stated in the introduction that one purpose of this dissertation was 
to respond to this Orthodox rejection of doctrinal development, whose most recognized 
exponent is John Henry Newman.  Newman‘s theory of development has come to be 
representative of Roman Catholic thinking on the topic.  The Orthodox rejection of 
doctrinal development is in part attributable to the lack of attention they have directed at 
this theological category.  Orthodox authors have engaged in neither a thorough reception 
of doctrinal development in general, nor of Newman in particular.  My response 
consisted of putting Newman in dialogue with one of modern Orthodoxy‘s most 
representative thinkers—Georges Florovsky—on the question of doctrinal development.  
In so doing, I hoped to highlight areas of agreement between Newman and Florovsky on 
the issues of revelation and Tradition that are fundamental to the idea of doctrinal 
development.  I also hoped to frame some of the Orthodox objections to doctrinal 
development, and at the same time, reveal some of their shortcomings.  
 The assumed premise of my first chapter was that the way one views the mode 
and character of divine revelation affects one‘s attitude toward doctrinal development, 
i.e., the Church‘s reception of revelation.  I showed that both Newman and Florovsky 
portray divine revelation as a series of personal, and thus free, acts of the living God in 
history for the sake of men and women‘s deification.  Significant for doctrinal 
development, Newman and Florovsky both imply that God‘s act of revealing serves as a 
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pattern for human persons‘ act of receiving this revelation.  The initial reception of God‘s 
revelation—which Newman terms ―impression,‖ and Florovsky terms ―experience‖—
involves cognitive and creative activity on the part of the human person.  What is more, 
Newman and Florovsky claim that this active reception of revelation takes place not only 
on the individual level, but on the ecclesial level of the Church‘s ―mind,‖ as well.  This 
active reception of revelation marks the life of the Church in history, and constitutes its 
mandate. 
 In Chapter Two I took up the subject of Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s 
understandings of Tradition, which represents the Church‘s active reception of revelation 
in history, and which I identified with the development of doctrine.  Newman and 
Florovsky regard Scripture and dogma as two principal manifestations of the reception of 
revelation, though they also regard the entire life of the Church as manifesting this 
reception.  According to both authors, the dogmatic definitions that are the fruits of 
development serve a positive function in the Church: for Newman, they are the explicit 
concretizations of the ―idea‖ of revelation as it exists in the Church‘s mind; for 
Florovsky, they are the Church‘s witness to the ―experience‖ of revelation.  Furthermore, 
both claim that the Church‘s development of doctrine is ordered toward systematization, 
and that it is appropriate to employ the organic metaphor in describing this development. 
 In the Dialogue section of Chapter Two, I attempted to clarify the apparently 
contradictory statements Florovsky made about the idea of doctrinal development.  
Florovsky rejected organismic accounts of doctrinal development that portrayed the 
Church‘s growth in the understanding of revelation as the unfolding of an idea 
irrespective of human action.  Relatedly, most of his rejections of doctrinal development 
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manifest a rejection of logical theories of development.  These theories claimed that 
growth in understanding of revelation comes about through a syllogistic process 
independent of experience.  In other words, they implied for Florovsky a disjunction 
between faith and reason.  On the other hand, Florovsky saw the unity of faith and reason 
affirmed in Soloviev‘s understanding of doctrinal development, which he commended for 
―establish[ing] a method for dogmatic theology.‖  And Newman‘s theory of development 
was neither organismic nor logical, which explains why Florovsky never specifically 
rejected it, and perhaps even endorsed it in his 1960 encyclopedia article on ―Tradition.‖  
 In Chapter Three I examined Newman‘s and Florovsky‘s understandings of the 
role of authority in the process of doctrinal development.  I demonstrated that Newman 
and Florovsky both believe that the issue of authority is intrinsic to doctrinal 
development.  However, my focus in this chapter (versus Chapters One and Two) shifted 
from trying to establish harmony between Newman and Florovsky on this point, to more 
clearly explicating a theme in the theory of doctrinal development that too often remains 
unexamined.  Newman believed that acceptance of the theory of development 
necessitated acceptance of an infallible authority who could give certitude to the faithful 
about the truth of developments through definitions.  He held that the entire Church is 
infallible because it is indwelt by the Holy Spirit.  But he also held that this infallibility is 
actively exercised in the official decisions of the Magisterium of the Church, whose head 
is the pope.  Florovsky, too, believed the power to define the teaching of the Church 
belonged to the bishops alone, but he did not believe this power was protected with 
infallibility.  According to Florovsky, the members of the Church could only become 
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convicted of the truth of doctrinal definitions through their personal, ecclesial askesis, 
rather than the act of defining itself.         
 My dissertation‘s second goal was to demonstrate that an evaluation of Newman‘s 
theory of development according to Eastern categories of thought, via Florovsky, would 
lead to that theory‘s own development.  In Chapter One, I defended Newman against the 
charge that his theory promotes new revelation.  At the same time, dialogue with 
Florovsky showed that Newman‘s recourse to the formula that revelation ended with the 
―death of the last Apostle‖ is reconcilable with a dynamic understanding of revelation 
that affirms that the human response is itself included in that revelation.  The fact that 
both Newman and Florovsky hold that revelation is received by the ―mind of the Church‖ 
provided an opportunity for examining this term‘s place in Newman‘s theory.  I showed 
that both authors believe the experience of revelation dwells in the members of the 
Church, but is not reducible to a collective consciousness of the members alone.  I then 
argued that both authors regard it as a participatory concept, and that the members‘ 
development of doctrine depends upon their union with Christ and his Spirit who dwells 
in the Church.  
 Chapter Two included several points on which Florovsky‘s theology could 
potentially contribute to the development of Newman‘s theory.  Florovsky better 
emphasized the positive character of dogmatic formulation than Newman, an affirmation 
that he rooted in men‘s and women‘s creation in the imago Dei and the redemption of 
their reason through Christ‘s assumption of a human intellect.  In addition, Florovsky 
offers a potential corrective to Newman‘s assertion that the idea of revelation, like other 
ideas, organically develops of its own innate power in conjunction with the innate power 
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of reason.  Florovsky allows for the propriety of organic metaphors for Christian 
theology, but he clarifies that doctrine develops as a result of the synergistic divine and 
human activity of the Body of Christ.  This clarification is consonant with the 
significance of human activity and corporate ecclesiology in Newman‘s thought.  Lastly, 
Florovsky stressed the inseparability and mutual coinherence of growth in knowledge and 
growth in holiness, and maintained that this growth constituted the vocation of not only 
each Christian person, but the Body of Christ as a whole.  One finds in the system of 
Florovsky, as he wrote of Maximus‘ system, ―dogmatics and asceticism…organically and 
inseparably brought together.‖  He provides a patristically-grounded rationale for 
claiming that the Church‘s development of doctrine corresponds with its growth in 
holiness, which is a claim Newman scholars have typically balked at making. 
 Because Orthodoxy has not reflected on the question of authority as extensively 
as Roman Catholicism, Chapter Three yielded more potential areas in which Newman 
could contribute to some of the ideas present in Florovsky rather than vice versa.  
Florovsky never quite freed himself from the abstractions and oppositions typical of the 
Slavophile understanding of authority.  Unlike Newman, Florovsky fails to consider that 
authority‘s act of defining may play some role in the faithful‘s askesis in truth, though he 
absolutely believes that dogmatic definitions themselves have an authority that directs 
this askesis.  And though one must conclude that Florovsky did not ultimately oppose the 
canonical and the charismatic realms, his descriptions of authority remained more in the 
latter than the former.   
 In spite of its shortcomings, Florovsky‘s reflections on authority offer possible 
contributions to Newman‘s theory.  Florovsky‘s more ascetical understanding of 
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authority points toward a need to further account for the theological role of the faithful in 
the process of development.  In addition, Florovsky‘s insistence that Christ‘s redemption 
included the redemption of human knowledge deserves consideration given Newman‘s 
emphasis upon the necessity of a clear and distinct infallible authority to compensate for 
human fallenness and finitude.  The more negative statements about Roman Catholic 
understandings of authority found in several of Florovsky‘s earlier essays are also worthy 
of consideration, for opposition is a stimulant of development.   
 I believe that the third goal of this dissertation represents the most important 
development of Newman‘s theory: the illustration of its Christocentric character.  
Newman and Florovsky‘s theologies share an incarnational, or Christocentric, 
orientation, which is most likely attributable to their common reliance on the patristic 
witness.  Newman held that the Incarnation was ―the central truth of the gospel, and the 
source whence we are to draw out its principles.‖  Florovsky more explicitly and 
unabashedly sought refuge in a vigorously Christocentric theology, and affirmed that 
―one can evolve the whole body of Orthodox belief out of the Dogma of Chalcedon.‖  
His Christocentrism is marked by a focus on the hypostatic union as defined by 
Chalcedon, and the emphases he sees affirmed by this union: personhood, freedom, and 
the significance of both divine and human action, the concrete and the abstract, reason 
and faith, the historical and the eschatological.   
 While Newman‘s Christocentrism is not as explicit as Florovsky‘s, one finds 
these realities similarly affirmed in Newman‘s works, and particularly in his theory of 
doctrinal development.  As such, I have attempted to show that doctrinal development is 
something more than ―an hypothesis to account for a difficulty.‖  Rather, it testifies to a 
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God whose free and active revelation of His person in history beckons men and women 
to actively respond with their whole beings—in thought, word, and deed.  This response 
characterizes their history in these ―last days,‖ and contributes to the completion of the 
Body of Christ.  ―Development of doctrine‖ is thus a descriptor of a Christian theology of 
history.   
 Christocentrism also provides the lens with which one should view objections to 
doctrinal development leveled by certain Orthodox authors.  Florovsky held that Christ‘s 
assumption of human nature represented a mandate to affirm both divine and human 
activity in the life of the Church.  He also emphasized that Christ redeemed the totus 
homo, and that both reason and faith, or, theology and life, contribute to the progressive 
deification of the Body of Christ and its members.  He perceived this same emphasis 
affirmed in both Khomiakov‘s and Soloviev‘s understandings of doctrinal development.  
I have argued that Newman‘s theory also affirms this emphasis, which he makes more 
explicit in the unity he posits between real and notional knowledge in his Grammar of 
Assent.      
 I have instanced Lossky‘s and Louth‘s objections to doctrinal development as 
threats to the maintenance of this unity between faith and reason.  They both ascribe a 
role to theology in relation to the believer‘s experience of faith.  But seemingly in 
deference to the priority they grant to apophaticism, they deny that theology contributes 
to a growth in one‘s understanding of this experience and, by implication, fail to accord a 
place to reason in one‘s mystical ascent.  Concomitantly, Lossky ends up promoting a 
species of logical development, which Florovsky vehemently opposed for its implied 
separation of theology and life.  Also, Lossky and Louth echo the commonly-held view 
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that doctrinal definitions are necessary only when heresy threatens the faith.  Florovsky 
believed that such a position indicates not only a negative view of reason, but a negative 
view of history.  
 My primary reason in distinguishing between Florovsky and those Orthodox who 
reject the idea of development is not to erect new walls within modern Orthodox 
theology, but to call forth further reflection on the category of doctrinal development.  As 
I have argued, this category acts as a nexus for a number of themes of fundamental 
theology: revelation, Tradition, the role of dogmatic language, the place of reason and 
faith in the growth of the Body of Christ, and the role of authority in this growth.  Greater 
Orthodox reflection on doctrinal development must entail what Florovsky advocated as a 
combination and correlation of Geschichte and Dogmengeschichte of the entirety of the 
Church‘s Tradition.  But it should also entail further reception of the thought of Newman, 
whose entire thought, and not just his Essay on Development, represents the locus 
classicus for the question of doctrinal development. 
 Newman has had a tremendous impact on Roman Catholic thought in the 
twentieth century, and thus, greater Orthodox reflection on doctrinal development has 
ecumenical implications.  Thus far, the Orthodox-Catholic dialogue (at the official levels) 
has focused on differences surrounding particular dogmas and doctrines, such as the 
Filioque clause and the Vatican I definitions of papal primacy and infallibility.  But, as 
Florovsky has argued, these differences were preceded by the progressive ―disintegration 
of the Christian mind.‖  There are thus hermeneutical differences that are operative in, 
though not entirely determinative of, these differences at the dogmatic level.  Florovsky 
wrote that ecumenism ―will require the development of Church doctrines, in all their 
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entirety and complexity.‖  This development will involve not only a retrieval of the 
―common mind‖ of the first millennium, but also a creative appropriation of that mind 
through engaging with the questions and concerns of today.  Ultimately, reunion can only 
come about through askesis, but it must be an askesis of the totus homo and the totus 
Christus that ascribes a role to both reason and life.  Such a holistic askesis is the path of 
―Neo-patristic synthesis,‖ and the path of the development of doctrine.    
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